

CLAUBERG AS CARTESIAN COMMENTATOR
(Daniel Garber, Princeton University)

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Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius Ontosophia... (Amsterdam, 1664)

Opera omnia philosophica (Amsterdam, 1691)

Quoniam enim omne tempus vitæ in partes innumeras dividi potest, quarum singulæ a reliquis nullo modo dependent, ex eo quod paulo ante fuerim, non sequitur me nunc debere esse, nisi aliqua causa me quasi rursus creet ad hoc momentum, hoc est me conservet. Perspicuum enim est attendenti ad temporis naturam, eadem plane vi et actione opus esse ad rem quamlibet singulis momentis quibus durat conservandam, qua opus esset ad eandem de novo creandam, si nondum existeret; adeo ut conservationem sola ratione a creatione differre, sit etiam unum ex iis quæ lumine naturali manifesta sunt. [Descartes, Meditatio III, AT VII 48-49]

[Lust:] I see that intellectual substance has nothing in common with extended substance and that the one limits the other and if, in addition to these two substances, you want to posit still a third, which is perfect in everything, then you will involve yourself in manifest contradictions. [Spinoza, *Korte Verhandeling*, dialogue I, Geb. I 28]

[Reason:] O Lust! I tell you that what you say you see--that there are distinct substances--is false. For I see clearly that there is only one, which exists through itself, and is a support of all the other attributes. And if you want to call the corporeal and the intellectual substances in respect to the modes which depend on them, you must equally call them modes too, in relation to the substance on which they depend. For you do not conceive them as existing through themselves. In the same way that you call willing, sensing, understanding, loving, etc., different modes of what you call a thinking substance (all of which you lead back to one, making one of them all), so I also infer, by your own proof, that infinite extension and thought, together with other infinite attributes (or as you would say, substances) are nothing but modes of that unique, eternal, infinite Being, existing through itself; and of all of these we make (as we have said) One Unique being or Unity, outside which one cannot imagine anything. [Spinoza, *KV*, Geb. I 29-30]

[Reason:] You say, then, that since the cause is a producer of its effects, it must be outside them. You say this because you know only of the transitive and not of the immanent cause, which does not in any way produce something outside itself. For example, the intellect is the cause of its concepts; that is why I called the intellect a cause (insofar as, or in the respect that its concepts depend on it); and on the other hand, I call it a whole, because it consists of its concepts. Similarly, God is, in relation to his effects or creatures, no other than an immanent cause, and also a whole, because of the second consideration. [Spinoza, *KV*, Geb. I 30]

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DE COGNITIONE
DEI ET NOSTRI,

Quatenus naturali rationis lumine,

Secundum

VERAM PHILOSOPHIAM,

potest comparari,

EXERCITATIONES

Centum.



DVISBURGI ad RHENVUM,

Ex Officinâ ADRIANI WYNGAERDEN

Academ. Typographi.

CLIO I O C LV I.

C A P I T A E X E R C I T A T I O N U M

De Cognitione Dei & nostri.

- I.** **D**E utilitate Philosophandi, tibi imprimis docetur quid quantumque prodest in Deo cognoscendo lumen ingenii naturale exercere.
- II.** Naturalis Dei cognitio Philosophiæ principium, medium, finis.
- III.** *Quæ ex propria mentis contemplatione desumuntur argumenta, optime nos ducunt ad Deum cognoscendum.*
- IV.** Mentis nostra natura est, quod sit res cogitans.
- V.** Mens nostra inter alias cogitationes habet etiam imprimis cogitationem de Deo.
- VI.** Cogitationem de Deo mens nostra habere non posset, nisi Deus revera existeret.
- VII.** Idem argumentum pro Dei existentia ex idea Dei, quæ est in nobis, desumptum paulo adhuc plenius exponitur.
- VIII.** Cogitationis & picturæ comparatio, ad melius intelligendum pro Dei existentia allatum argumentum utilis.
- IX.** An mens nostra ideo cogitationem de substantia infinita possit habere, quia se ipsam finitam cogitat?
- X.** Cogitationes nostras de Infinito non esse potius negativas, quam positivas existimandas.
- XI.** Simplex de Deo cogitatio sive idea Dei, quæ est in nobis, maximè clara est & distincta.
- XII.** Cogitatio potest esse in mente nostra clara & distincta, licet non sit rei adequata & perfecta.
- XIII.** In simplice cogitatione, sive conceptu non est error seu falsitas.
- XIV.** Simplex de Deo cogitatio, sive idea Dei est maximè vera.
- XV.** Cogitationumstrarum simplicium sive idearum esse vicarium seu objectivum non est nihil; sed aliquid reale & perfectum in ipsis.
- XVI.** Clariss. Comradii Bergii, Theologi, de ideis doctrina Cartesianæ explicandæ inseruit.
- XVII.** De causis idearum observationes miscellaneæ.
- XVIII.** Cur in ideis nostris non datur progressus in infinitum, sed ad primam earum causam exemplarem necessario veniatur?
- XIX.** An possimus habere ideam alicujus rei, quæ nec est, nec esse potest?
- XX.** An possimus habere ideam plurium Deorum?
- XXI.** Plura de unitate veri Dei & filiorum multitudinis.
- XXII.** Dei existentiam non modo ex cogitatione nostra de Deo, verum etiam ex continuatione existentie nostræ cognoscimus.
- XXIII.** Mentem nostram non posse parò existere, nisi ab aliqua causa conservetur.
- XXIV.** Mentem nostram non habere ullam semetipsam conservandi facultatem.
- XXV.** Mentem nostram non conservari ab ullare, nobis nota, quæ sit minus perfecta Deo.
- XXVI.** Mentem nostram à solo Deo continuo conservari.
- XXVII.** An & qualem operationis divinæ, quæ mens nostra conservatur, perceptionem habeamus?
- XXVIII.** Opera Divina & humana mentis perlegati ratione inter se conservantur.
- XXIX.** Creatio & conservatio revera sunt idem.
- XXX.** Tanta ad rem conservandam, quanta ad creamdam virtus requiritur.
- XXXI.** Dei existentia necessaria ex sola ejus natura consideratione cognoscitur.
- XXXII.** Quomodo solius Dei existentia sit de ejusdem essentia?
- XXXIII.** Id quod simpliciter est, æternum est & immutabile.
- XXXIV.** De veracitate Dei.
- XXXV.** Simplicis & compositi variæ significationes & oppositiones.
- XXXVI.** Simplicitas Dei est omnium ejus perfectionum individua unitas.
- XXXVII.** Quomodo talis Dei simplicitas demonstratur?
- XXXVIII.** Simplicitas Deum altissimè supra res omnes corporeas exebet.
- XXXIX.** Res corporeæ licet non sint ex materia & forma substantiali compositæ, nil tamen simile habent simplicitati divinæ.
- XL.** Per simplicitatem suam Deus supra res alias omnes intelligentiâ præditas atrellitur longissimè.
- XLI.** Quanta perfectio sit Dei simplicitas, & quinam ex ejus contemplatione usus habeantur?
- XLII.** Quomodo substantia & accidens distinctè sint concipienda?
- XLIII.** An accidentia sint res sive aliquid reale.
- XLIV.** Consensus Philosophorum realitatem strictè dictam accidentibus denegantium.
- XLV.** Quas ob causas realitas strictè dicta accidentibus abrogetur?
- XLVI.** Distinctio inter latè & strictè dictam latè patet, ac multis controversiis finem imponit.
- XLVII.** Qui negat aliquid ab alio realiter distinctum esse, non ideo illud nihil esse statuit.
- XLVIII.** De essentia seu natura rei corporeæ in communi.
- XLIX.** Solvantur objectiones nonnullæ contra definitionem Corporis allatam productæ.

CAPITA EXERCITATIONUM, &c.

- L. Jacobi Revii contra Corporis definitionem argutationes refelluntur.
- L I. Quenam sint cognoscenda ei qui Anima humane immortalitatem vult demonstrare?
- L II. Demonstratur anime immortalitas, id est, perpetua existentia, ex Dei constantia & immutabilitate.
- L III. Demonstratur anime immortalitas, id est, perpetua cogitatio, ex ipsa ejus natura.
- L IV. Demonstratur anime immortalitas, id est, indivisibilitas, (quod non possit resolvi in partes) ex ejus natura.
- L V. Ex corporis corruptione anime interitum non sequi.
- L VI. Quod aliqua substantia in nihilum abeat, nullo exemplo aut argumento posse doceri.
- L VII. Animam humanam non esse ad instar ignis aut ventis concipiendam.
- L VIII. Qualis distinctio & oppositio sit inter mortalitatem & immortalitatem.
- L IX. Artium & scientiarum concentus & harmonia, ubi vite intellectualis & civilis communita quedam axiomata populari modo explicantur, ut, quod natura malis dare, quam accipere; quod non modo dare, sed etiam abundare, quod regredi potius quam stare vel male progredi conetur, & quidem redeundo ad eum terminum, à quo primum exiit quasi per circulum; quod dubium in meliorem partem interpretari; quod potius ad construendum, quam ad destruendum tendere jubeat; quod unius corruptio alterius generatio & contra; quod majori conatu eundem sit ad communia, quam ad propria. In his omnibus variarum rerum consonantia pulchra & admirabilis monstratur.
- L X. Deum & Creaturam habere aliquam in re similitudinem & convenientiam.
- L XI. Quomodo distantia inter finitum & infinitum sit infinita?
- L XII. Deum & Creaturam habere communia quedam nomina.
- L XIII. Deum & Creaturam posse communi conceptu apprehendi, vel occasione ipsorum communium nominum.
- L XIV. Deum & Creaturam posse communi conceptu à nobis apprehendi, ideo quia similitudinem inter se habent.
- L XV. Demonstrata Dei & Creature similitudine & communi utriusque conceptu & nominibus, non tamen illico demonstratum esse, abstractam à Deo & Creatura scientiam uniuersalem esse tradendam.
- L XVI. An omne quod est, alicubi sit, adeo ut hoc axioma à Deo & Creatura sit abstractum?
- L XVII. De uno & multo axiomata decem Ontosophica.
- L XVIII. De relictis axiomata tria Ontosophica.
- L XIX. Dissertatio de oppositis juxta se positis ac ponendis, ut magis eluceant; in qua objectiones mouentur contra hanc oppositorum regulam.
- L XX. Que continet Responsiones ad precedentes objectiones, regulam de oppositis juxta se positis ac ponendis, ut magis eluceant, pluribus rationibus atque illustribus exemplis defendendo.
- LXXI. De Tempore, theses Philologico-Philosophicæ.
- LXXII. Cur vitia quedam non valde frequentia pro virtutibus soleant haberi?
- LXXIII. Prodigalitatibus & auaritiis, auaritiis & ambitionis, superstitionibus & atheismi comparatio.
- LXXIV. Quam accurate Cartesius Passiones anime siue affectus definiuerit.
- LXXV. De rebus admirabilibus in genere.
- LXXVI. De admirandis visibilibus, que supra nos.
- LXXVII. De admirandis visibilibus, que infra & prope nos.
- LXXVIII. De admirandis invisibilibus & hyperphysicis.
- LXXIX. De admirandis in homine.
- LXXX. De personis admirantibus.
- LXXXI. De usu admirationis, & quomodo tollatur.
- LXXXII. De admirationis & dubitationis similitudine.
- LXXXIII. An omnis cognitio nostra petatur à sensibus externis, & quis inter eos præcipuus.
- LXXXIV. De tribus gradibus sensus in communi.
- LXXXV. De primo gradu sensus in specie, hoc est, de organi corporei motu.
- LXXXVI. Solum organi corporei motus quandoque sensus appellatur.
- LXXXVII. De secundo gradu sensus, qui est perceptio anime.
- LXXXVIII. De tertio gradu sensus, qui est iudicium.
- LXXXIX. Aphorismas Hippocratis, Sect. 2. sextus: Quicunque dolentes parte aliqua omnino dolorem non sentiunt, iis mens ægrotat, ex præmissis explicatur, & Revii de dolore calumnie refelluntur.
- X C. Tres loquendi gradus cum tribus sentiendi gradibus conferuntur.
- XCI. De nexu, qui est inter mentem humanam & corpus & inter functiones utriusque.
- XCII. De sede anime humane præcipua.
- XCIII. Paralipomena quedam de sensuum gradibus.
- XCIV. De metodo, quæ opera Dei considerantur in Physica, generatim.
- XC V. Exemplis octo illustribus defenditur & explicatur Cartesianæ Physicæ methodus.
- XC VI. Eadem Physicæ methodus declaratur exemplo Poëtico perquam apposito.
- XC VII. Objectiones contra allatam ex Poësi comparationem refelluntur.
- XC VIII. Aliæ comparationes in simili materia insuntur.
- XC IX. Ex dictis de metodo considerandi opera Dei quam plurimas Cyriaci Lensuli in Cartesii Physicam calumnias refutari.
- C. Ex iisdem dictis non pauciores Jacobi Revii calumnias clare satis detegi.

EXER-

11. Cùm verò illud clarissimè menti nostræ innotescat, nullam vim esse in nobis, per quam nos ipsos conservemus, ac proinde nos à Deo debere conservari, falsò dictum est, nos nullam habere ejus rei notitiam seu perceptionem sive conscientiam, qua nihil clarius percipimus atque intelligimus.

EXERCITATIO XXVIII.

Opera divinæ & humanae Mentis pereleganti ratione inter se conferuntur.

1. DEIIS quæ hætenus demonstrata sunt non ampliùs dubitarem, si nullis præjudiciis excocati planas tantùm & faciles luminis naturalis vias sequeremur. Sed cùm simus assueti de operibus Dei quæ extra eum sunt, eodem modo philosophari ac de nostris quæ extra nos, facile in eum errorem incidimus, ut, quemadmodum videmus ea opera, quibus manum apposuimus, propria virtute subsistere, hoc est, nostro auxilio non indigere ut in existendo perseverent: ita putemus opera Dei, postquam existentiam suam ab ipso semel mutuata sunt, ejus ope non indigere ut conserventur, quasi existentiam non semper deberent mutuari ab eodem.

2. Verum sic opinando gravissimè erramus, cùm longè alia ratio sit eorundem operum si considerentur in ordine ad Deum quàm si spectentur in ordine ad nos. Opera enim illa quibus manum adnovemus jam erant neque nostro concursu unquam egerunt ut subsisterent, quid enim aliud facit architectus quàm ut lapides & ligna reliquamque materiam, jam antè existentem, conjungat ad ædificium extruendum? Unde minimè mirum videri debet, si hoc illo non concurrente postea queat subsistere. Idemque de reliquis quæ extra nos sunt est judicandum.

3. Itaque si veram & geminam comparationem instituire velimus, conferre debemus opera illa, quorum causæ procreantes majori ratione, quàm architectus ædificii, dici possumus, cum iis omnibus, quorum Deus verè creator est, tumque videbimus, quomodo etiam ea quæ à nobis esse suum mutantur nostro concursu indigeant ut conserventur.

4. E. G. Si ex mente mea conceptum alicujus rei depromam, hic conceptus, qui antea nihil erat, & cujus effectus ego sum, ne per momentum quidem temporis potest subsistere sine continuo mentis meæ influxu, præsentemque & continuam attentionem desiderat statimque evanescit, simul atque mens ad alia convertitur. Item, cùm voluntas fertur ad amorem alicujus objecti, tam diu durat iste amor quàm diu à voluntate fovetur, & si semel voluntas velle desierit, statim amor perit.

5. Cùm igitur res omnes quæ à se non sunt, alicujus mentis, scilicet potentissimæ, hoc est divinæ mentis sint operationes (neque enim quod non erat potuit esse, nisi à mente quæ voluerit ut existeret) sequitur, quòd res illæ eodem modo se habeant erga Mentem divinam, ac se habent operationes mentis nostræ erga mentem nostram; atque ut hæc sine fixo & continuo mentis nostræ in eas obtutu non possunt vel per momentum temporis subsistere: ita ut res quæ extra Deum existunt in existendo perseverent, necessariò continuus ejusdem Dei concursus requiritur.

6. Et quamvis res illæ extra voluntatem divinam aliquid sint, non minùs tamen singulis momentis ab ea dependent, quia hoc non à se habent, sed à natura mentis illius cui conjunctæ sunt & à qua dependent, quæ cùm sit potentissima & efficacissima, & in qua velle & operari non distinguuntur, ens omne reale habet pro termino voluntatis, id est, substantiam omnem, cùm nostra voluntas pro termino habeat solùm nonnulla accidentia, quæ entis realis (scilicet mentis nostræ) sunt attributa.

7. Quibus omnibus non difficulter assensum præbebimus, si ad veram *Substantiæ* naturam attendamus; nihil enim aliud per eam possumus intelligere, quàm rem quæ ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum; cumque unica tantùm res ejus naturæ, ut nulla planè re indigeat, possit intelligi, facile erit percipere, res omnes alias non nisi ope illius posse existere, atque ita non simpliciter, sed secundùm quid esse entia.

8. Neque ampliùs putabimus nos, cùm jam certum sit nos esse, necessariò etiam in posterum futuros, neque alterius conservatione indigere, cùm tota nostra natura in omnimoda ab alio ente (summè perfectò) dependentia & conservatione posita sit, nullamque prorsus *essentiam & existentiam*

tiam haberemus, si nihil aliunde reciperemus, & solum quod nostrum est haberemus (NB.) ut anima nostra seipsam alloquendo jure queat exclamare: Quid habes, quod non acceperis? si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris?

9. Neque etiam dicemus, existentiam nostram esse sufficiens argumentum ad probandum, nos etiam in existendo perseveraturos: quamvis enim hanc perseverantiam credere deceat, si habeatur ratio Creatoris, qui cum sit Deus optimus atque immutabilis, non verisimile est, nos è nihilo eduxisse, ut in idem nihilum reduci patiatur; attamen si nosmetipsos tantum respiciamus, ne momentaneam quidem vitæ durationem nobis, ex viribus nostris, possumus polliceri.

10. Denique facile intelligimus, quomodo id quod jam est, in nihilum possit reduci, modò non de substantia illa, quæ revera nulla prorsus alia re indiget ad existendum, hoc accipiamus, de qua nec dici nec concipi potest; sed de ea solum, quam non nisi virtutis & operationis divinæ ope existere posse percipimus, cujusmodi sunt res omnes extra Deum existentes.

11. Si enim res eas tanquam divinæ Mentis operationes consideremus, non majorem habebimus difficultatem ad intelligendum, quomodo res istæ, cum jam sint, in nihilum possint relabi, quam habemus ad concipiendum, quomodo ideæ sive conceptus in mente nostra existentes possint desinere esse: ad hoc enim nulla actio, sed actionis tantum cessatio requiritur.

12. Tantum igitur abest ut magnifice de nobis sentiendi occasionem ullam habeamus, ut potius maximam habeamus è contrario judicandi, nos erga Deum idem esse, quod cogitationes nostræ sunt erga mentem nostram, & adhuc aliquid minus, quoniam dantur nonnulla, quæ nobis etiam in vitis menti nostræ sese offerunt, quæ causa fuit Themistocli, ut artem potius oblivionis, quam memoriz sibi optaret. Sed Deus suarum creaturarum adeo Dominus est, ut voluntati suæ resistere minimè valeant, & ab eo tam strictè dependent, ut, si semel ab iis cogitationem suam averteret, statim in nihilum redigerentur.

13. Ex quibus omnibus tandem clariùs, opinor, intelligitur, quomodo Apostolus dixerit Act. XVII. 27. 28. *Dominus non longè abest ab unoquoque nostrum. In ipso enim vivimus, movemur & sumus, &c.*

E X E R C I T A T I O XXIX.

*Creatio & conservatio revera sunt idem.**

I. **C**um actio non sit in agente aut faciente, sed in fiente, ut sic dicam, sive in eo quod fit, secundum receptam Philosophorum sententiam & rei ipsius veritatem, de creatione quoque & conservatione dicendum erit, eas non esse in Deo, sed in re creata & conservata, ut in subjecto.

2. Opponis: Cum per actionem agens, & per talem actionem tale agens sit ac dicatur, quomodo Deus creator & conservator omnium esse ac dici queat, nisi in ipso sint creatio & conservatio? Resp. Res non modo denominantur ab iis quæ ipsis, tanquam subjectis, inhærent; verum etiam ab iis quæ sunt extra eas, ut uxoratus quis dicitur ab uxore; &c.

3. Maneat ergo verum illud, quòd actio sit potius^b ab agente quam in agente, creatio & conservatio potius à Deo quam in Deo, cum Deus non sit terminus ad quem tendunt (nihil enim creari aut conservari potest in Deo) sed terminus à quo procedunt, sine ulla ipsius creantis & conservantis in se mutatione.

4. Quare cum actio nihil aliud sit quàm ipsum fieri rei quæ fit, sive ipse terminus quatenus producit, consequens est, ut actio una eademque sit, quæ ad unum eundemque terminum tendit, diversa, quæ ad diversos terminos.

5. Si igitur creatio & conservatio in re creata & conservata non differunt, sequitur, quòd re non differant. Atqui non differunt in re creata & conservata. Ergo.

6. Probatur minor, quoniam una eademque res est, sive consideretur in primo momento sus-

M m m m 3 esse,

a Illa excludit esse prius habitum, hæc præsupponit.

b Utrumque dici posse Cl. Witichius contendit, & exemplum addert ex Cart. Princ. II. 27. de illà actione quæ intelligitur esse in movente. Confess. Verit. §. CCLXXVIII.

From Clauberg, *De cognitione Dei et nostri...exercitationes centum* (1656)

I. On the usefulness of philosophizing....

II. The natural knowledge of God is the beginning, middle, and end of philosophy.

III. How arguments are found from the contemplation of one's own mind which best lead us to knowing God.

[IV to XXI develop and comment on aspects of the Meditation III argument for the existence of God from the idea we have of God and the necessity of a cause. Clauberg then goes on to discuss elements of the second argument for the existence of God in Meditation III.]

XXII. The existence of God is known not only from our knowledge of [the idea of] God, but also from the continuation of our existence.

XXIII. Our mind cannot continue to exist unless it is conserved by some other cause.

XXIV. Our mind doesn't have any faculty for conserving itself.

XXV. Our mind isn't conserved by any thing known to us which is less perfect than God.

XXVI. Our mind is continually conserved by God alone.

XXVII. Whether we have a perception of the divine operation by which our mind is conserved, and of what sort it might be.

XXVIII. *The works of the divine and the human mind are related to one another by means of an exceedingly elegant analogy* [ratio].

1. We can no longer have any doubt about those things that we have demonstrated, if unblinded by prejudice, we follow only the plain and easy path of the light of nature. But since we are accustomed to philosophize about the way God operates outside of himself in the same way as we philosophize about the way we operate outside of ourselves, we easily fall into this error. Just as we see that those works on which we have laid a hand subsist through their own power, that is, they don't require our help to persevere in existence, so we think that the works of God, after once deriving their existence from him, no longer require his help in order to be conserved, as if they do not need always to derive their existence from him.

2. Indeed, we greatly err in holding this opinion, since the relation of the works in question to God is quite different than it is to us. For those things to which we apply our hand already existed, and never needed our concurrence in order to subsist. For what does a builder do in constructing a building but join together stone, wood, and other materials that already existed? From this it should seem hardly surprising if it doesn't need the builder's concurrence in order to subsist afterwards! We should judge similarly about other things that exist outside of ourselves.

3. And so, if we want to establish the true and genuine comparison [between us and God], we should compare those things about which we can say with greater reason than in the case of the builder and the building that we are the productive causes, with all of those

things of which God is the true cause; then we will see how even those things which derive their being from us require our concurrence in order to be conserved.

4. For example, if from my mind I produce a concept of some thing, then this concept, which was nothing before [I produced it], and whose producer I am, can't subsist through even a moment of time without the continual influx of my mind; it requires my present and continual attention, and immediately disappears as soon as my mind turns to another. In just the same way, when the will is led to the love of some object, this love endures only as long as the volition supports it, and if once the volition ceases to want it, immediately the love perishes.

5. Therefore, since all things which do not exist in themselves [*a se*] are operations of another mind, indeed the most powerful mind, that is the divine mind (for what did not exist could not exist unless through a mind which willed that it exist) it follows that these things bear the same relation to the divine mind as the operations of our mind bear toward our mind. And just as these things [i.e. the operations of our mind] could not subsist for even a moment of time without the fixed and continual attending to them of our mind, so the things outside of God which persevere in existence necessarily require the continual concurrence of that same God.

6. And although these things are something outside of the divine will, none the less they depend on it at every individual moment, since they do not have [their being] from themselves, but from the nature of the mind to which they are joined, and on which they depend. When [that mind] is most powerful and efficacious, in which willing and the accomplishment of that which is willed are the same thing, it has as the goal of its willing every real entity, that is, every substance; when it is our mind, it has as the goal of its willing only some accidents or another, which are the attributes of a real thing, i.e. our mind.

7. All of this will be easily assented to if we attend to the true nature of *substance*. For by substance we can understand nothing but a thing that exists in such a way that it requires no other thing for existing. And since there is only one single thing of such a nature that it plainly requires no other thing, it can be understood and will be easy to perceive that all other things can exist only with the help of that thing, and so aren't entities *simpliciter* but *secundum quid*.

.....

10. And finally, we can easily understand how that which already is can be reduced into nothing. But we agree to this not with regard to that substance which really needs no other thing for its existence, about which this cannot be said or conceived, but only concerning those things which we perceive can exist only through the help of divine power and operation, of which sort are all things existing outside of God.

11. For if we consider those things as operations of the divine mind, we will not have any greater difficulty in understanding how those things, though they already exist, can slip

back into nothingness than we have in conceiving how ideas or concepts existing in our mind can cease to exist. For no action is required for this, only the cessation of an action.

12. Therefore so far are we from having any opportunity for thinking of ourselves with pride! On the contrary, this [reflection] gives us the greatest opportunity to judge that we are related to God in exactly the way that our thoughts are related to our mind; indeed even less so, since there are some [thoughts] which present themselves to us, even when our minds are unwilling, which was the reason why Themistocles preferred the art of forgetting to the art of memory. But God is the Lord of his creatures to such an extent that they have so little power to resist his will, and depend on him so strictly, that if once he were to turn his thought away from them, they would immediately fall back into nothingness.

13. From all of this I think that we can understand what the Apostle meant when he said, "God is not far from each and every one of us. For in Him we live, move, and have our being, etc." Acts XVII 27, 28.

XXIX. Creation and conservation are really the same.

XXX. As much power [*virtus*] is needed for conservation as for creation.

4. Thus it must be understood that everything there is except God is by its nature a dependent being, a being *ab alio*; for if there were something that did not depend on God, that is, on the being of greatest perfection, then He wouldn't be of the greatest perfection.

[XXXI to XXXVIII treat aspects of the ontological argument for the existence of God in Meditation V.]

[XXXIX to the end treat a wide variety of topics, many of which are directly connected with Descartes, but many of which are not.]

Translated by Daniel Garber