BIBLIOGRAPHIA CARTESIANA
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A CRITICAL GUIDE TO
THE DESCARTES LITERATURE
1800–1960

THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NIJHOFF
1964
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NOTES TO THE USER

1. To survey the literature in a major area of research, begin with the pertinent section in Part I, then consult the Systematic Index as a guide to the Analytical Index.

2. To locate a given author's work on Descartes, consult Part II under his name; check the Analytical Index under his name for discussions of his contribution.

3. To find the literature on a special topic, consult the Analytical Index, then follow up cross references, and scan the Systematic Index for other pertinent headings.

4. Where the place of publication of a book is not listed, the place is Paris.

5. German ä, ö, ü is treated as ae, oe, ue in the alphabet. Thus: Rodríguez, Rød, Rogers, not: Röd, Rodriguez, Rogers.

6. For Descartes literature published since 1960, consult the Répertoire bibliographique de la philosophie for titles and reviews, the Bulletin signalétique for notices.
This book offers a new type of working tool for Cartesian studies. It presents the literature of the last 160 years in alphabetical order (Part Two), combined with a systematic analytical survey (Part One) and a detailed topical index to the whole (Part Three). This organization makes it possible to turn bibliography from a repository of references into a workshop of research. The systematic survey of Part One and the topical index of Part Three, together, offer a mise au point of Descartes studies over their full historical and topical range. The results have often been surprising and illuminating to the author, and if his experience is any guide, the reader, too, will begin to wonder about certain seemingly well-settled points, or marvel at the Protean shapes which our elusive philosopher assumes when mighty commentators force him to reveal his true nature.

A work which has been in the making for fifteen years must show the traces of expansion in scope, and changes in evaluation. Bibliographia cartesiana amends my Descartes chapter in A Critical Bibliography of French Literature, v. 3, 1961 (see no. 19a), and supersedes an earlier version of Parts One and Two, published in 1959 under the main title Descartes and his Philosophy, v. 1 (see no. 18a).

Part I (Introduction to Descartes Studies) divides the field into eleven broad areas. It offers critical notices and references to the bulk of significant contributions, covering as much as one-fifth of the whole literature. Other useful items which could not be incorporated in Part I for technical or other reasons will be found annotated in Part II; they are of course fully indexed. Each main title in Part I is annotated; in addition I have listed all reviews I could locate, discussions in books and articles as well as book reviews proper; condensed but detailed tables of content indicate the scope of works that cover a great variety of topics. If I could rewrite Part I in the light of the understanding I gained by making the detailed topical index, selection and emphasis as well as my evaluations of some contributions would be different. But the changes would not be decisive. Part I would still include every undoubtedly indis-
pensable work, and most of the works I did select as being exceptionally useful. I would still add important older works of no great current value because they give the necessary historical perspective to the picture of Descartes scholarship. And I would still emphasize contributions neglected because they appeared where the Descartes scholar would hardly look for them, because they were written in a minor language, or because they just had bad luck. Nor would I tone down the language of my notices: I do not think that grey is the only color suitable for painting the Cartesian rainbow. As to my critical evaluations, they are no better than my judgment: caveat emptor. The user will form his own better judgment anyway, and to him the literature will look different, if only because there will be even more of it: "majoremque habemus rerum experientiam," as Descartes said when he was a very young man.

Part II (Alphabetical Bibliography) is a comprehensive listing of all the literature on Descartes from 1800 to 1960 which I could locate, including the material contained in Part I. The total is close to 3000. I doubt that anything of major significance has been overlooked, but complete coverage cannot be claimed; besides, the limits of this type of compilation cannot be precisely drawn.

Part III contains the indices that serve as key to the material presented in Part I and II. The Systematic Index gives a synopsis of the Analytical Index and draws attention to useful entries that might be overlooked. The Analytical Index is quite detailed. Every topic that appears in a title, notice, or table of contents (but not under reviews) has been indexed, with extremely few exceptions (minima non curat praetor). In addition, many books and articles of importance have been indexed from the original, including major works by Alquié, Bouillier, Gilson, Gouhier, Gueroult, Norman Kemp Smith, Thijssen-Schoute and others. The user should not be dismayed if a reference given in the Analytical Index leads him to an entry in Part I or II which does not mention the subject at all; if he will consult the book or article itself, he will find what is promised — unless a typographical error has occurred, in which case I humbly beg his pardon. Needless to say, completeness is impossible in indexing; the user will have to make his own way from the point to which the Analytical Index takes him. He will certainly wish to consult the fundamental works of the literature, whether the Index refers to them or not. This means the ABC of Descartes biography (Adam, Baillet, Cohen), and the Three Cartesian G’s (Gilson, Gouhier, Gueroult).

Convenience, not formal consistency, has been the principle adopted in this bibliography. I regret certain minor discrepancies in style and serial numbering;
some material was originally prepared for publications using a different bibliographical style, and new items were added to the very last. The typography has been kept as simple as possible, on the assumption that the user will recognize titles as titles, and foreign words as foreign words, even though they are not typographically distinguished from the rest. And since English is likely to be a foreign language for many – probably for most – users of the work, I have taken the liberty of using philosophical terms freely in their Cartesian form, in French or Latin. Quotations, too, have as a rule been left in their original language.

Moreover, I have used French terms to distinguish their Cartesian from other meanings, and to avoid ambiguity in indexing. Thus, the term morale always means the moral philosophy of Descartes, as distinct from other philosophers’ ethics. Méthode means the méthode of Descartes which, properly speaking, is more than method and methodology. Sagesse and générosité have been left in Descartes’ own language, and “conscience” (always given between quotation marks) means French “conscience” (awareness, self-awareness, Selbstbewusstsein, autocoscienza), not English “conscience” (a bothersome awareness of right and wrong). Âme and volonté and libre-arbitre stand for soul, will, free will; pensée means pensée, whether thought, thinking, mind, understanding, or that linguistic horror “thinking-self” is implied. Connaissance d’autrui has not been converted into The Other Self Problem; nor did it seem useful to translate esse & nosse or lumen naturale.

One last word of caution. Condensing means falsifying. Brief notices cast sharp light, and sharp light casts deep shadows that often engulf important areas. In indexing, condensation becomes almost brutal: one word must sum up what a scholar developed, explained, and importantly qualified on perhaps a hundred pages. I hope that no user will treat this bibliography as a source of authoritative information on a work, instead of a guide to that work. The only claim made for it is that it attempts to be a conscientious if fallible guide; and that it reveals the enormous span, diversity, and depth of Descartes studies in the past 160 years.

Emory University, May 1962

G.S.
Johann Nestroy, speaking of the sumptuous private balls of his time, said that he had no trouble understanding people who went to a ball; what he found utterly unexplainable was the existence of people who gave balls. Bibliographies like the present one are in the same category, except that in this case even the existence of people who go to the ball cannot altogether be taken for granted. The very bulk of this bibliography suggests that many writers about Descartes are not readers of what other writers wrote about him. The fact that the Cartesian cogito is (is not) an immediate experience seems to need to be freshly established year after year; there is no end to the flow of irrefutable proofs that Descartes did (did not) commit the Cartesian circle; even the rationalism (antirationalism) of Descartes comes as a surprise to a host of authors who stumble upon it in the course of their original research.

There is a reason for this. When a thinker thinks about Descartes, it is to find out whether Descartes is right or wrong. To this end he must read him and examine his arguments; this is necessary, and sufficient. The greater a philosopher, the less he reads about Descartes before writing about him. The greatest and most original among them have as much use for a Descartes bibliography as Descartes himself had for the collected writing of St. Thomas Aquinas. Cartesian method is the enemy of Cartesian bibliography.

However, there are people less interested in finding out whether Descartes was right than in establishing “wie es eigentlich gewesen”: the historians of philosophy and of ideas, the biographers, the editors, the exegetes. This bibliography is addressed to them.

The chief limitation of this bibliography is that it does not cover the literature before 1800. After considerable efforts I became convinced that only international cooperation among scholars with access to the great European collections can successfully deal with the Cartesian era.

Descartes editions are listed if they are indispensable or exceptionally useful. Even within these limits, only a sample of annotated and commented editions
could be included. We still need a good critical list of commentaries and translations of Descartes’ works, and a modern bibliography of original editions.

Chapters in *general works* on the history of philosophy, mathematics, science, etc., have been listed only if there was some special reason for it. But *ephemeral literature* has been generously treated regardless of its intrinsic value; someone may look for it some day, trying to trace the changes in Descartes’ fortunes, or studying the ever-changing Descartes image and the ways in which Descartes scholarship filters down to popular levels.

The *reliability* of references varies. A large number of items were verified from the originals, and Professor Jules Brody independently verified many hundred of titles and reviews now included in Part I. Where the item was not available, I have followed the best sources I could find. In a few cases, question marks after the title indicate that the title could not be checked. Where a notice had to be written without seeing the contribution, I give my source.

My debt to others is recorded elsewhere. But this is the place to acknowledge my gratitude to the Descartes scholars upon whose work this bibliography rests: Francisque Bouillier, Francesco Olgiati, Jean Boorsch, Henri Gouhier, Ernst Cassirer, Paul Schrecker, Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Louise C. Thijsse-Schoute, Paul Dibon, and those anonymous workers at Louvain and elsewhere who, over the decades, have raised philosophical bibliography to an enviable degree of perfection.

August 22, 1959

G.S.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For permission to use their Descartes checklists I am indebted to Professor Norman N. Douglas, and to the late A. G. A. Balz who generously placed his collection of some 900 titles at my disposal. To Professor Nathan Edelman I am deeply grateful for his invitation to contribute to the third volume of A Critical Bibliography of French Literature and for his superb editorial guidance in this venture; Part I of the present work shows the benefits of our happy collaboration. Professor Jules Brody meticulously verified every reference in the more than 330 items I originally prepared for Professor Edelman’s volume; this independent check was most appreciated. To the Syracuse University Press I am grateful for permission to incorporate material that appeared first in the Critical Bibliography. Professor Edgar Lehrman directed me to a hitherto overlooked source for Soviet items. My friend and colleague, Professor Thomas R. Hart, and my wife, Helen Sebba, helped me in checking the accuracy of certain foreign language titles and quotations. Needless to say, the responsibility for errors of all kinds remains entirely my own, but this compilation is much the better for their help.

A generous grant-in-aid from the Research Committee at Emory University made the completion of Bibliographia Cartesiana possible. I am thankful for this well-timed assistance. From 1947 to 1959 the University of Georgia unfailingly supported my Descartes research; special thanks are due to its excellent staff of librarians. During the same period, grants-in-aid for travel, received from the University Center of Georgia, the Carnegie Foundation, and the Modern Language Association of America, enabled me to use the resources of some twenty great libraries in the Eastern United States and in Europe. I gratefully acknowledge these grants and the library courtesies received on these occasions. To Professors Paul Dibon and Richard H. Popkin I wish to express my appreciation of the honor of being invited to contribute this Descartes bibliography to the Archives internationals d’histoire des idées. It is a pleasure to thank the publishers for their cooperation, Mr. G. H. Priem for his service as editor, and the printers for their exceptional care and skill.
PART ONE

INTRODUCTION TO DESCARTES STUDIES
I. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE


Valuable catalogue of over 800 items of great bibliographical and biographical interest; wide coverage, helpful annotations. Iconography includes a list of portraits of Descartes (68-77), “Le cartésien inconnu” by van Bronckhorst, and Dumesnil's Christina of Sweden surrounded by learned men including Descartes and Mersenne. Reviewed by Paul Mouy in Runiv 46: 1937, 326–331. Johan Nordström (“Till Cartesius' iconografi,” Lychnos 1957–58, 194–250) ingeniously utilizes the testimony of Erasmus Bartholinus to establish the van Schooten engraving (first distribution dated back to spring 1650) and two portraits at Tours and Amsterdam as the truest likenesses of Descartes, while the famous Hals portrait at the Louvre is “practically a creation of the artist's imagination”: Descartes probably never sat for Hals. The richly documented study has some new biographical material, especially on the Abbé Picot and on de Villebresieu. English summary. No comprehensive iconographic study and no complete collection of contemporary portraits of D. exists.


Life and work of D. chronologically examined and judiciously summarized. Represents the state of D. studies on the eve of the 1937 tercentenary. An outstandingly precise introduction, particularly to the problems of D.'s biography and the genesis of his works. Well chosen bibliography with helpful hints.


Rich list of Descartes editions in many languages and of secondary literature. The Descartes section in the BN catalogue is now badly dated, though important for early editions.

3

Exceptionally rich, comprehensive, selective, critical guide to 17th-c. literary scholarship, not to original source material. Background material on biography, bibliography, socio-political life, art, science, philosophy, religion, Baroque, Classicism, symbols etc. complements bibliographies of major and minor writers, many of them important to D. studies. Almost uniformly high level of judgment and accuracy. Excellent 80-page index. Indispensable working tool. See also 19a, 397a, 464a.


"Le interpretazioni di Cartesio" (p. 1–59, reprinted from Gmet 1: 1946, 114–28, 188–203) analyzes views of D.'s contemporaries, and criticist and idealist interpretations from Kant to Husserl. Appendix (p. 175–92) on Laporte, Carabellese, Carbonara. Develops the original but debatable thesis of a four-stage movement in D.'s thought from Regulae through DM to a supposed transcendental spiritualism in MM and to a Timaeus-type cosmogony in PP.


Authoritative survey and critique of main contributions to the 1937–38 Descartes and Malebranche anniversary literature. Cassirer's own viewpoint is applied to problems of Descartes interpretation and to Cartesianism and 18th century French and English philosophy. Handy bibliography of 138 items. No index. See also the complementary article by Colombo (no. 1577).


Outstanding survey and critical discussion of the secondary literature; Bouillier, Bohatec, and of the special studies of Voetius, Regius, Reneri and others. Rich in historical information on Dutch Cartesian.


Alphabetical list of D.'s main philosophical terms, each followed by texts from his works and parallel texts from Scholastic literature, in the original Latin or French, showing D.'s indebtedness to the philosophy he repudiated. An indispensable philosophical Descartes dictionary.
8 GIRAUD, JEANNE: Manuel de bibliographie littéraire pour les XVIe, 
la faculté des lettres de l'Université de Lille, v. 2.)


Though chiefly devoted to French literature, no. 8 and 9 contain useful bibliogra­ 
phies of D., Malebranche and their contemporaries in philosophy, in chronological 
order, with occasional references to important reviews.

10 HAGMANN, MORITZ: Descartes in der Auffassung durch die Histori­
er der Philosophie. Zur Geschichte der neuzeitlichen Philosophiege­

D. judged by Germanic historians of philosophy from Jakob Brucker to Harold 
Höffding, by Kant and the German Idealists, Schopenhauer, by moderns from 
Franz Brentano and Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Sartre. Changing D. interpre­
tations linked to changing German views of history of philosophy. Good guide to 
much material not brought together before. No index.

11 LAVELLE, LOUIS: La philosophie française entre les deux guerres. 
Aubier (Editions Montaigne), 1942. 279 p. (Les chroniques philosophiques 
v. 2). Italian translation: no. 2467.

A collection of the noted philosopher's review articles, many from Le Temps, with 
excellent discussions of main French contributions to D. criticism in the 1930’s 
(p. 15–53, 239–50).

12 LEWIS, GENEVIÈVE: “Bilan de cinquante ans d'études cartésiennes.” 

Rapidly moving, highly compressed survey of philosophical D. criticism in the 
first half of century, including ground covered by Boorsch and Olgiati (no. 2, 14). 
Written with complete technical mastery and fine judgment. Rich bibliographical 
footnotes, especially for 1937–50. Non-specialists may find the article difficult, 
despite its almost conversational tone.

13 MORGAN, DOUGLAS N.: Cartesiana: an informal, inconsistent, 
incomplete and inaccurate list of works by and about René Descartes. 
September 1955. Northwestern University. 29 pp. (Hectographed.)
Rich bibliographical checklist for students in the author’s Descartes course, with 
 witty, shrewd comments.

(UCSC, v. 20).

I. Descartes e la religione [Baillet, recent interpretations, accusation of irreligiosity].
II. Descartes e la scienza [Ch. Adam, Card. Mercier, Gilson; D. and French liter-
Admirable comprehensive survey and analysis of modern D. criticism with references to some 200 authors. Main interpretations under three headings: religious, scientific, idealistic. A better, more up-to-date classification in C. Ferro’s excellent article in RFNS 42: 1950, see no. 25. The two concluding sections develop Olgiati’s own interpretation (see no. 185). Exposition and critique are lucid, reliable, precise. Unusually full treatment of German and Italian studies. Though inconvenient for quick reference (no bibliographical checklist, organization by topics rather than authors, occasional misspelling of names), the work is an indispensable guide to 19th and early 20th century D. criticism.


(1) FRANCE by Gérard Milhaud: Classified, not error-free; critical introduction.
(2) ITALY by G. Bontadini: Outstanding critical bibliography; supplemented in Cartesio (no. 35, 85–104); both reprinted in no. 239, 37–69. See also E. Chiroditi in CD 1: 127–33.
For the history of Cartesianism in Italy: Berthé de Beauné (no. 433) and C. Ottaviano (no. 466).
(3) GERMANY by Ernst Bergmann: Worthless.
(5) ENGLISH by S. V. Keeling: Insignificant.
(6) HOLLAND by H. J. Pos and C. A. Steenbergen: Includes local items of biographical interest. See also Dibon (no. 6), Monchamp (no. 458), Thissen-Schoute (no. 467).

ROSENFIELD, LEONORA DAVIDSON COHEN: From beast-machine to man-machine. New York, 1941. [See no. 226.]


Attempts “to unearth the work of a score of Peripatetics” opposed to Cartesianism (p. 15). Bibliography of 20 Peripatetics, including G. Daniel, J.-B. DuHamel, H. Fabri, P.-D. Huet, La Chaise, Le Valois, and Rapin, with biographical information and summaries of the works listed.
Excellent, reliable list of special literature on D.’s contribution to mathematics and science, classified by major fields, from the mid-19th century to the early 1930’s. Widest coverage. No annotations.

(No more published.) Full title: no. 3251a.
Reproduced as manuscript: see Preface to the present book.


Critical notices of essential Malebranche literature; compact introduction to Descartes, absorbed into the present volume.

Checklist of sources and secondary literature, dated but still useful for references to sources of Cartesian doctrine and to older literature.

“Chrono-bibliography” of Descartes and Cartesianism (353 ff.) with source references in order of first publication. Excellent starting point for a study of ramification of Cartesianism; selected secondary literature, some annotated, with chapter titles of important works. Well worth consulting, despite its confusing organization and misspellings of foreign titles. Valuable references also in Carlo Cordiè, Avvimento allo studio della lingua e della letteratura francese (Milano, Marzorati, 1955). For the history of Cartesianism see also Bouillier (no. 438), Thyssen-Schoute (no. 467) and Vartanian (no. 468, 323–32).

An analysis of the work of Roger Lefèvre (no. 179a–c) and its relations to Gouhier (no. 96), G. Rodis-Lewis (no. 215c), J. Russier (no. 228), the controversy over the ontological argument (Gouhier-Gueroult, no. 270 and 270a), and Alquie (no. 127). Author sees the prevailing mood of French Descartes interpretation as viewing his philosophy not as a rigid system of clear and distinct ideas but as "dynamic, and maintaining an orientation towards discovery" (437).


Spirited review of important 1937 contributions, notably by Maritain, Olgiati, Jaspers, Roth; general comment on Descartes criticism.

24 BREMOND, ANDRÉ (S.J.): "Quelques essais de ‘religion’ rationaliste.”

Aph 8, no. 4: 1931, 60–117.

On the "querelle de l’athéisme" (BSFP 28: 1928, 49–95) and on Brunschvicg’s "religion cartésienne de l’Esprit et les reactions qu’elle a provoquées" (60). Also on Alain and Gilson.


Important review article asks why D. interpretations are in plain conflict with each other. Suggested reason: Cartesianism may be a fusion of disparate elements. Classification of more recent interpretations, which are critically discussed. For a less charitable view see Henri Bouchet, "Le pseudocartésianisme" (ZPF 4: 1949, 483–97), castigating D. scholarship for arbitrarily inflating some element in D.’s philosophy, usually drawn from DM, to represent the essence of “l’esprit cartésien”: mathematics, rationalism, "clarté," mechanism, cogito, etc.

26 FETSCHER, IRING: "Das französische Descartesbild der Gegenwart.”

PhRu 3: 1955, 166–98.

Precise, documented critical survey of recent French studies which reveal in D.’s religious metaphysics "eine Tiefen und einen Reichtum . . . . , von dem sich das herkömmliche Descartesbild nichts träumen lässt." Discusses Gouhier, Laporte, G. Lewis, Gueroult, and Alqué whose interpretation the author prefers as the most dynamic one, though he finds Gouhier’s and Gueroult’s more faithful.

27 GIORGIANTONIO, MICHELE: "Descartes ed i suoi recenti interpreti, 1937–1950.”


Interpretations (especially of the cogito) by Laporte, Lavelle, Blondel, Chevalier, G. Lewis, Ottaviano.
Stresses the importance of taking D.’s metaphysics into consideration, noting
Maritain, Marcel, Heidegger, Brunschvicg, R. Hubert, E. Le Roy, Le Senne. Discusses
D.’s “Naissance de la paix,” the Huygens-D. correspondence, Gilson, Garin, Espinas,
Laberthonnière, Mesnard, Leroy.

Outstanding survey, a critical contribution to D. studies in its own right. Supple­
ments Boorsch (no. 2). See no. 36.

30 SEBBA, GREGOR: “Some open questions in Descartes research.”
Notes recent literature on questions of D. biography, history of Cartesianism,
literary merits of D.’s writing; stresses the need for a new complete Descartes
edition.

31 SORIANO, MARC: “Ouvrages récents sur Descartes.” Pensée 40: Jan­
Remarkably perceptive Marxist critique of Serrurier, G. Lewis, Alquié, and of Soviet
contributions.

32 STEWART, W. F. M.: “A survey of work on 17th century rationalism,

Interesting sketch rapidly surveys D. interpretations from Hegel and Tennemann
to Gilson and Espinas. Sees no way of reconciling the conflicting images of D. as
physicist-methodologist and as continuator of Scholastic thought except by going
back to his unconscious, repressed motivations which broke through in his
“Dream.”

II. COLLECTANEA

(Full list: no. 501–562 below)

35 [CARTESIO]: Cartesio nel terzo centenario del “Discorso del metodo.”
Massive international Catholic tribute by 60 D. scholars, medievalists, and historians
of philosophy. Contributions, on a high technical level, range from doctrinal
exegesis and comparative studies to peripheral topics. The historical approach
prevails. The treatment of D. is generally friendly, always respectful, in contrast to the sharply critical Thomist contributions in E 57: 1937, 369–558.


Important reference tool. Vols. 1–3 contain abstracts of 66 papers of extraordinary variety on D.'s philosophy, scientific work, life, also on sources, influences, history of Cartesianism. Valuable papers in vols. 4–9 deal with his mathematics, logic, psychology, seen from the viewpoint of contemporary philosophy. M. Gueroult's "Descartes au Congrès Descartes" (RMM 45: 1938, 105–26), a searching analysis of the philosophical papers, is eminently helpful in working through CD.


Lucie Prenant ingeniously and subtly investigates the meaning of D.'s rationalism; Labérenne sums up the essence of the three Essais of DM; President Benèsh of Czechoslovakia discusses D.'s stay in Bohemia, his relation with Komenský (Comenius), his place in Czechoslovak philosophy. Gutermann and Lefèbvre develop the standard Marxist view of D. and the struggle between bourgeoisie and feudalism.


38 DESCARTES ET LE CARTÉSIANISME HOLLANDAIS. ÉTUDES ET DOCUMENTS. PUF – Éditions françaises d'Amsterdam, 1950. 309 p. (Publications de l'Institut Français d'Amsterdam – Maison Descartes.)


Twenty-four papers: valid contributions to philosophical and historical D. research, interspersed with some vague effusions. Complements no. 40: same spirit, less vigor.


The “Descartes years” 1937 and 1950 revealed hitherto unsuspected strength and vigor in Latin-American D. scholarship, reflected in numerous special journal issues and commemorative publications. Among the latter, the Buenos Aires “Homenaje” stand out in freshness, comprehensiveness, orientation toward the present rather than the past. Among its 46 articles are valuable surveys of Descartes' scientific work, noteworthy studies of Cartesian influence upon literary criticism, brief sketches on Cartesian philosophy in Spanish colonial America. Apart from a few weak contributions, the work is well worth consulting.


Contributions by J. Benes, E. de Ivanka, R. Bizzarri, V. de Ruvo, A. Lantrua, J. Sirven, and a study of the Cartesian philosopher and poet Campailla. For reviews see Brie, v. 1: 21464–76.


Proceedings of the international colloquium on Descartes' philosophy at Royaumont Abbey in 1955, the most important among recent Descartes collectanea. Galaxy of contributors includes F. Alquié, L. J. Beck, H. Gouhier, M. Gueroult whose “Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons,” no. 170, dominates the colloquium, H. Lefèvre, P. Mesnard, G. Rodis-Lewis, Jean Wahl. Main themes: Cartesian metaphysics, moral philosophy, esthetics; two papers on Descartes' Géométrie; one on Descartes, Galilei and Vico. Outstanding discussions, reproduced verbatim; they are unusually frank, searching, scholarly, and disclose sharply differing viewpoints. The “discussion generale” (443–90) concerning the principles of historical philosophical interpretation brings out the clash between the approaches of Alquié, Gueroult and the Marxists who make an impressive showing throughout the volume, being perceptive, scholarly and remarkably non-doctrinaire. See the discussion by V. Goldschmidt in RMM 62: 1957, 67–71 on the Alquié-Gueroult controversy; A. Robinet, “Variations sur le nom de Descartes” in Crit 14: 1958, no. 135–36, 774–91; R. Boehm in Eph II: 1956, 92–93 (an interim report); B. Rochot in Rsyn 79: 1958, 128–29.
III. EDITIONS

BASIC EDITIONS


1–5: Correspondence 1622–50, with index. [Supplements in v. 7, 8, 10, 13.]
6: DM, Dioptrique, Météores, Géométrie [French, Latin].
9: MM, PP [both French].
10: Early and undated writings.
12: Ch. Adam, Vie et œuvres de D. (no. 121).
13: Supplement: Correspondence, biographical material. Indices.

The Adam–Tannery edition, commonly cited AT, is accepted as the definitive text of D.’s writings and supersedes even the original editions. Indispensable introductions; textual and explanatory notes; Tannery’s important mathematical annotations. D.’s orthography (discussed in AT I, lvix-cv) is preserved or conjecturally restored. The translations of main works are those authorized by D. himself. The text of the Correspondence is authoritative, but dating and identification of correspondents have been considerably revised (Ch. Adam in RPFE IIj: 1933, 373–401; see also no. 79).
Edition lacks: most of the correspondence with Huygens (no. 81); Naissance de la paix (no. 78); seven letters (no. 124, v. 2, 169–73; Eur 1937, 406–14; no. 38, p. 71–81, 109–11); “Stammbuchblatt” (K 40: 1935, 264–69). However, the marginal notes, supposedly by D., in a London copy of Galilei’s “Systema mundi” are definitely not in his hand (L. Roth, “Falsa Cartesiana,” RPFE 105: 1928, 149–51) – [A new edition of AT, to include all material now lacking, is being prepared by B. Rochot.]


Leibniz’s extracts, now lost, from Descartes’ long-lost earliest manuscripts. Modernized Latin spelling faced by Foucher’s French translation. The most important discovery are the Cogitationes privatae (Foucher’s title) from D.’s earliest philosophical notebook, key to the understanding of his formative period. Charles Adam sharply criticized Foucher’s editing of this Leibniz copy, particularly his ignorance of cossic notation. Adam’s corrected, annotated text in AT X, 206–256 disregards Foucher’s presumably authentic division into “pensées” (which affects the interpretation of certain philosophical items), and “restores” the presumed original spelling, giving a veneer of source authority to his version. Foucher’s edition should therefore still be consulted; his 117-page introduction, wholly and unjustly neglected, makes some good psychological points, especially on the Dream of Descartes.

Handiest one-volume desk edition, but vastly inferior to the superb Rousseau edition of the Pléiade. Contains: Regulae; DM; Dioptrics I–VI; Météores VIII;
Géométrie II; MM; Objections and Responses I–VI; PP I, II, end of IV, complete table of contents; TP; Traité de l’homme, not easily available elsewhere; RV; 144 letters by D.; Entretien avec Burman; Baillet on the death of D. Texts in French, modern spelling. Brief introductions. Lacks: Cogitationes privatae, Opuscula 1619–20, Le Monde.


Most comprehensive English version, superseding the earlier standard translations by Veitch (Open Court). All of Regulae, DM, MM, RV, TP, Notae in programma; generous excerpts from PP; v. 2 gives the first complete English translation of the “Objections and Responses” to MM, plus the Letter to Dinet. The translation is philosophically precise rather than fluent or elegant, but the problem of terms like “âme,” “mens,” “entendement,” etc. is not quite solved. The Great Books reprint, widely available, has Regulae, DM, MM with all Objections and Responses, Letter to Dinet, followed by the Smith-Latham version of the Géométrie (no. 88).


Text of D.’s long-lost only venture in poetry: “La naissance de la paix. Ballet dansé au Chateau Royal de Stockholm le jour de la naissance de sa Majesté” (1649), 344 lines. Introduction by Thibaudet (p. 163–72). The timelessness of D.’s rather crude verse, some of it in the spirit of Callot, is attested by Arason’s post-1945 free prose version and its translation by Hans Paeschke: Die Geburt des Friedens, 1949 (see no. 1072).


Indispensable edition (concordance with AT in the last volume) presents all known letters in chronological order, except for new finds in vol. 7. Modernized spelling, Latin and Dutch letters in the original and in French translation, the latter either Clerselier’s 1668 translation revised, or new. Dates and identification of recipients are presumably definitive and differ sometimes from AT; in the earlier volumes, changes from AT were not always explicitly indicated; v. 7 brings some new revisions. Essential AT notes are retained, some in expanded form. Vol. 2 has the complete text of D.’s “Introduction à la géométrie” which supersedes the “Calcul de Monsieur Descartes” in AT X, 659–80; also the hitherto unpublished French original of Florimond Le Beaune’s “Notes brèves” to D.’s Géométrie, which D. himself recommended. An index of names at the end of each volume gives concise biographical sketches of all persons referred to in the letters, thus forming one of the handiest reference tools.

80 BEECKMAN, ISAAC: Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634, publié avec une introduction et des notes par Cornelis de Waard. 4 vols. La Haye, Nijhoff, 1939-1953.

Beeckman, whom D. called his "awakener," kept a monumental scientific diary of greatest importance to D. studies and early 17th c. history of science. He inserted several D. letters and records of their 1618-19 scientific relationship, first published in AT X. The complete Journal, superably edited by its discoverer, still awaits definitive study to do justice to the remarkable figure of Beeckman and to explore his impact upon young D. Factual biographical introduction, excellent index, terse notes; but the lack of any organization in the sequence of Beeckman's Latin and Dutch entries makes the mastery of this work exceedingly difficult.


A capital find of 141 letters enabled L. Roth to publish this masterly definitive edition of the D.-Huygens correspondence, essential to the study of D.'s life and views, and of the genesis of DM. Edition has 35 unpublished letters to Huygens, 4 to other correspondents; correction of texts and dates of letters previously published in AT. Lacks two letters to Huygens, including a note from Stockholm, December 4, 1649 (no. 38, 71-85) rectifying the notion that D. was disappointed by Queen Christina. Important editorial introduction of 78 pages, supplemented by a 1937 paper (CD 2: 101-08) on the value of this edition "for the criticism of the sources of our conceptions of Descartes" (106), showing how Clerselier, the first editor of D.'s correspondence, doctored texts in the interest of orthodoxy and created an image of the "historical" Descartes which influenced interpretation from Baillet to Martain.


Magnificent edition in very slow progress (v. 1-7 cover the years 1617-1698) adds rich new documentary material and erudite notes by de Waard to Descartes' correspondence with his principal partner. Placing Descartes within P. Mersenne's circle along with Beeckman, Gassendi, Galilei, Peiresc and others, this edition gives a truer picture of D.'s position in his time than emerges from editions of his own correspondence only. Gérard Milhaud and R. Lebegue correct errors in earlier volumes (Thales 3: 182-96, RHL 44: 1937, 555); see lists of errata in the post-1945 volumes. Robert Lenoble's great Mersenne biography (no. 215) is an indispensable companion to this edition.

83 [DM]. GILSON, ÉTIENNE. René Descartes: Discours de la méthode; texte et commentaire. 2e éd., corr. Vrin, 1930. 493 p. [See no. 2027.]

Text of the “édition classique” (AT) in original pagination but modern spelling, followed by a monumental 400-page commentary which elucidates the work almost phrase by phrase and discusses every important aspect of D.’s life and work. Excellent analytical index. A. Brémond said without exaggerating that Gilson’s commentary, if nothing else were left of D.’s work, would suffice to reconstruct “toute la doctrine vivante avec ses principes profondes, ses incertitudes, ses dépendances, son originalité” (Aph 4, no. 4: 310, 1928). Necessary companion to any study of D.’s life and thought. See Léon Brunschvicg’s review article (“Mathématique et métaphysique chez Descartes”), no. 1396, reprinted in no. 159.

OTHER USEFUL EDITIONS


Correspondence with an anonymous opponent (“Hyperaspistes”), with Antoine Arnauld and Henry More, culled from AT, extends the arguments of the “Objections and Responses” to MM. Deals with the nature of the soul, innate ideas in the child, the beast-machine hypothesis, other problems of dualism. Latin text, faced by Clerselier’s French translation. Strictly a text edition. English translation of the correspondence with More regarding beast-machine, by Leonora D. Cohen [Rosenfield], in AnSci 1: 1936, 48-61.


Precious record, discovered in 1895, of an interview which D. gave in April 1648 to Francis Burman, twenty-year-old Dutch student who asked searching questions about difficult passages in MM and received very frank, good-humored answers. Latin text from AT V, 144-79, faced by Adam’s French translation. Authoritative introduction and notes.


Text of D.’s Dioptrique with the AT notes, in a none too fluent or precise German translation. Interesting introduction (7–66); elucidates the work in considerable
detail, contrasting D.'s “analytical” thought model with Kepler's “more geometrico” approach. D.'s work on lenses is discussed in the light of modern optical theory. Though noting D.'s insistence on the instantaneous transmission of light, author misrepresents him as postulating “very rapid motion.”

**Reviews:**


Facsimile of the first edition, faced by a helpfully annotated translation “made to give the meaning of the original in simple English rather than to add to the difficulty of the reader by making it a verbatim reproduction” (Preface). Includes the “Privilege du roi.” Helps make this difficult work accessible to non-mathematicians. See also Scott, no. 396.


These letters from D.'s last period form an integral whole, his last statement on ethics. See Chevalier, no. 132, 327–40.


Text of TP in modern spelling. The notes utilize the correspondence with Princess Elisabeth. Short glossary of now obsolete terms. Bibliography. Important preface whose “parfaite conduite .... fait de cette nouvelle édition un instrument de travail indispensable” (Leger's review, 37). Another good edition is that of Pierre Mesnard (Boivin, 1937; xxix, 167 p.; reprinted 1955, Bph) with an interesting introduction and good annotations (some errors in page references). See the controversy over these editions between Mme Rodis-Lewis and P. Mesnard in Royaumont (no. 42), 209ff.

Latin text only; valuable introduction and list of special studies. For a bilingual edition see: Regulae ad directionem ingenii, texte présenté, revu et traduit par G. Le Ray (Boivin, 1953; xxi, 277 p. Bph); the Latin text of this edition is based on Leibniz’s copy and the first edition of 1701, with facing French translation. A good French version, fluent and accurate, without the Latin text is: Règles pour la direction de l’esprit, tr. et notes de J. Sirven (Vrin, 1959, viii, 192 p. BTP), with explanatory notes and marginal AT pagination. Good companion to the Gouhier edition.

Contains D.’s letters to Regius, 1640–45, his Notae in programma with a French translation from the early editions, D.’s letter to Voetius of May 1643, and selected texts from the Philosophia naturalis of Regius (1654) in which he develops his D. critique. English translation of the Notae in Haldane-Ross, no. 77; Spanish translation of Notae: Notas contra el programa filosófico de Regius, tr., intr., notes by Elisabeth Goguel de Labrousse, in: Notas y estudios de filosofia (Tucumán) 1: 1949, 276–92.

Cantecor is the typical debunker of the 1920’s: “... l’office d’un historien n’est pas de préparer le procès de canonisation de son auteur. C’est là d’ailleurs une tâche dont MM Gilson et Gouhier s’acquittent avec toute la piété souhaitable” (7). Denies, against Gilson, the historicity of DM. Calls young Descartes not a systematic searcher for certainty but a capricious amateur who gradually finds his geometry, then generalizes it to a supposedly universal method. “Oisivéte” is fundamental to his nature. This paper and the author’s earlier “La vocation de Descartes” (RPFE 96: 1923, 372–400), both craftsmanlike, well-documented, malicious, gave impetus to the revaluation of DM. But the decisive step towards a truer Descartes image was taken by Gilson, Blondel, Jaspers, Krüger on philosophical not biographical ground.

Utilizing records of the 1618 sale of La Chilliolière, patrimonial property of D.’s family, Couderc reconstructs the family assets in D.’s time. The value of D.’s share is found to be extremely modest though sufficient for his equally modest needs. See also no. 99.


A well-read psychiatrist with broad interests critically scans studies of D.’s childhood and formative period, noting fundamental insecurity and latent homosexuality. Stimulating references to current work on psychology of superior personalities.


Modestly offered as material towards a needed “Jeunesse de Descartes,” this meticulous study reviews, judges and revises all important earlier studies of D.’s “années d’apprentissage” (1618–20) from Millet (no. 2764) to Sirven (no. 100) and boldly advances beyond them. It finds “le jeune Descartes réagissant violemment contre l’esprit de ‘la Renaissance’ au moment où il échappe au ‘Moyen âge’ ” (9), a scientific revolt. This unexpected conclusion is reached by a penetrating, sober scrutiny of sources and imaginative yet never of careless analysis of their content. The book establishes a firm basis for the study of the Opuscula of 1619–20, especially of Olympica, and explodes the legend of D.’s “Rosicrucianism.” Hypotheses and conclusions about intricate questions of source criticism are stated with model precision. Not the last but so far the most important word on D.’s formative years and the Cogitationes privatae. Bannan in the review cited below finds Gouhier failing in his attempt “to manage the union of the personal and the historical” (417), but the problem is deeper than the reviewer suggests. On the 17th c. as the Cartesian and the renascent century see Gouhier, “Les deux XVIIe siècles” (1948, no. 2090). Note also his studies of the Cartesian problem of a philosophy without rhetorics (no. 2098) and of D.’s rejection of symbolism in his mature philosophy, in contrast to Olympica (no. 2101a), on which see also Rossi, no. 328.


The two first chapters of a book interrupted by death: I. “Descartes au Collège de La Flèche” (1-62); II. “Chronologie de la vie de Descartes depuis sa sortie du collège jusqu'à son établissement définitif en Hollande, 1614-29” (63-125). Believes that Descartes left La Flèche in 1614. Study of his Jesuit teachers and his friend Chauveau of Melun.


Minute historical study of the ratio studiorum, daily life of students and teachers, methods of instruction, techniques of silent ubiquitous supervision, holidays and festivities etc. gives an incomparably full and vivid picture of the environment which furnished the setting for D.'s “Dream” of 1619, and the schooling he described and rejected in his DM.


Milestone in the study of D.'s La Flèche years and earliest writings. This painstaking, most ingenious and subtle reconstruction of the 1619-20 Opuscula must still be reckoned with, despite Gouhier's equally ingenious recent interpretation (no. 96). Asserts that the four rules of method in DM (1637) go back to 1619-20, which would make the Regulae of 1628 a later development. Written without regard for the reader's convenience, the book cries out for subtitles, summaries, subject index. Useful 34-page bibliography lists sources of Cartesian doctrine and some older criticism.


Independently of Monchamp, P. Six corrects Baillet by letting D. leave La Flèche in 1614 instead of 1612. Study, based on Jesuit archives, corrects Monchamp and Sirven on minor points and gives valuable details about the Jesuits whom D. knew at La Flèche.
DESCARTES' "DREAM" AND "ROSCRICUAINISM"


Careful historical study leads the author to deny the existence of a Rosicrucian Brotherhood in D.'s time, hence to absolve him of membership; but Rosicrucian literature existed, and D. was familiar with it. Shows striking similarities between the Dream of D. and the "Noces chymiques de Christian Rosenkrantz" of Johann-Valentin Andreae (1616) and particularly with the "Raptus philosophicus" of "Rhodophilus Staurophorus" published in 1619; D.'s "Dream" of 1619, "absolument dans le goût des rêves-paraboles qui foisonnent alors en Allemagne," thus appears to be "une imagerie forgée par Descartes sur le modèle ... de paraboles connues" (299). Gouhier, though impressed, still asserts there was a dream and tries to ward off the hypothesis of plagiarism or imitation (no. 96, 138-41). See B. Rochat in Rsyn 77: 1956, 353-61.


This Jungian interpretation is too unspecific to convince, despite its vast mythological apparatus (14 pages on the "melon" episode alone), but adds rich new association material and a careful reading of the Ausonius poems cited in the "Dream."


Written in 1914, this study by a gifted young historian killed in the first world war justifies its belated publication by its careful assembly and evaluation of the evidence, though its conclusions are dated. See also the treatment of the question by Ch. Adam (no. 121) and G. Cohen (no. 123, 402-07).


The Dream of D. might well be the very source of the modern scientific world view which excludes dream from the cognitive process. Rejecting the usual psychoanalytical interpretations, author sees in Dreams I and II merely a struggle to banish actual pain (felt while asleep) into the dream sequence, to guard the sleep. By contrast, in Dream III the dreamer is exactly what the observer is in the Cartesian system - "res cogitans, the pure and irrelevant spectator, the external observer" (18). The "real consequences" of this dreaming were thus what D. claimed - a revelation of the mathematical structure of the world for which separation of mind from matter is the first postulate. Lewin's study utilizes Paul Federn's distinction between mental and bodily "Ich-Gefühl" corresponding to Cartesian dualism (see
Federn, no. 1872a: the cogito is mental ego feeling). Lewin adds that my existence in
the dream as dreamer has the same validity as my waking existence as a cogitator:
*somnio ergo sum.*


A revelation: The "Dream of Descartes" is the thinly disguised scenario of Rosicrucian initiation, a sort of Cartesian "Zauberflöte." Revelation not accepted by non-Rosicrucians. See Gouhier's discussion of this and other Persigout writings in no. 96, 155-56. Also no. 2938.

**106 POULET, GEORGES:** "Descartes." In his: Études sur le temps humain. Edinburgh UP. 1949, v. 1, ch. 2, p. 60-88. [Other editions and transl.: no. 2991.]

A brilliant chapter in a brilliant book offers a profound analysis of the Dream, without textual source criticism and without proof other than that of great inner consistency.


The "Dream" is in reality D.'s record in symbolic code of his supposedly heretical discoveries, especially the vortex theory, to escape persecution while safeguarding scientific priority. Impossible hypothesis. *Max Wundt* ("Der Traum des D.", K 46: 1954-55, 367) takes author to task for ignoring French work since Gilson and treating Descartes as a mere theoretical abstraction.

**108 SCHÖNBERGER, STEPHAN:** "A dream of Descartes; reflections on the unconscious determinants of the sciences." Intern. Jl. of Psychoanalysis 20: 1939, 43-57.

Disregarding Freud's warning not to read more into the Dream of D. than D. read out of it, author produces an uninhibited coprophilous analysis, misunderstanding even "the unconscious determinants of science." On Sigmund Freud's letter see no. 124.

**THE DESCARTES LEGEND**

**109 ANON.:** Der klagende Geest van Descartes. s.l. 1685. 4p.

Quarto sheet of doggerel verse (copy in the Cambridge University Library) attacks Dutch anticartesians as violating D.'s "sacred grave" and bones: "Wie wroet aen Cartes heyligh Graf / En knaagt sijn door gebeent, / Wat hert is so versteent / Dat naa den doot nog wraak en straf .... " Specimen of hitherto unrecorded, unutilized material reflecting the posthumous rise of popular D. images, especially in Holland. Pamphlet names Spannheim, de Vries, Johannes Nelenus [Neel], "Cocceanen," "Voetianen," etc.

Descartes' sudden death at only 54, coming after his announcements that a fabulous increase of the human lifespan was now within imminent reach, and the mystery surrounding his Stockholm burial stirred rumors that he had not really died. This underlies Pierre-Daniel Huet's notorious "Nouvelles mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du cartésianisme" (1692), Gervaise de Montpellier's "Histoire de la conjuration faite à Stockholm contre M. Descartes" (1695), the "Voyage du Monde de Descartes" of the Jesuit Gabriel Daniel, and other polemics and satires of the time.


On October 2, 1793, the Convention Nationale ordered the transfer of D.'s remains to the Panthéon. Mercier's vehement attack three years later caused the revocation of the unimplemented decree. Stripped of rhetoric, Mercier's argument echoes encyclopedist criticism: "C'est le cartésianisme qui tua la physique expérimentale, qui fit des pédans d'école au lieu de naturalistes observateurs" (p. 3); regarding "le mécanisme social," "pas une phrase que l'on puisse citer à cet égard: il étoit né pour son monde imaginaire . . . . Il écrivit sur la morale, sur laquelle il est presque impossible de mal parler" (p. 10). See H. Gouhier (RMM 29: 1922, 243-51) on the decrees of 1793 and 1796. On one root of Mercier's antipathy to Descartes see no. 126.

ANON.: Le Club des Dames, ou Le retour de Descartes. Comédie en une acte, en prose. A Paris, au Bureau de la Bibliothèque des romans, 1784. viii, 40 p. "J'avois beau crier: Newton est enterre à côté des Rois, and Descartes, son Maître and the vôtre, git à côté des gueux" (preface). But the Club women root for D. who obligingly descends from heaven for a dénouement. Insipid piece, illustrating the nationalist feeling about Newton and D., and the popular reduction to zero of Cartesianism as in the final Vaudeville: "L'univers est une machine, Où chacun rit à l'unison, Sans m'en vanter, je l'examine, Et crois que chacun a raison," etc. On a 1686 Paris opera performance where the universe is made easy for the ladies, thanks to Descartes, see Spink, no. 466a, p. 202.

BOUILLY, JEAN NICOLAS: René Descartes. Trait historique en 2 actes et en prose, par le citoyen Bouilly. Barba, an V. 40 p. [BN]. "Cet ouvrage, d'une morale pure et d'un doux intérêt, obtint un succès assez grand" when performed at Théâtre de la République in 1796, after the denial of Panthéon honors to the philosopher. It had been performed at the first D. celebration known (La Haye-Descartes, 9-10 Vendémiaire, An II; cf. no. 124, v. 2, p. 187.) For an account of this weird biographic phantasy see Larousse's Grand Dictionnaire Universel du XIXe s., v. 6, p. 533. Apparently this is Descartes' last personal appearance on stage, though in 1844 he descends to earth once more to berate V. Cousin (Les ombres de Descartes, Kant et Jouffroy à M. Cousin, par un professeur de philosophie [P. H. Mabire?]. Lyon, Pelagaud, 1844, 249 p.)

Collection of wartime articles in Le Matin on how to fight the coal shortage, how to like turnips, solve all war problems etc., in the spirit of “un Descartes créé par le peuple français, imaginé par lui, sorti de sa moelle” (15), “du M. de la Falisse de la chanson, du Descartes du pauvre” (16). What Friedrich (no. 543) calls “Vulgär-kartesianismus,” and by no means confined to France.

PERSONAL RELATIONS


Documented account of the personal relationship between D. and G., “abstraction faite de toute considération doctrinale.” Gassendi remains dignified and pleasant while Descartes is almost brutal, even by the standards of the time.


Wealth of documents assembled by the noted Leibniz historian covers the life of the Princess. Some additional material in Max Heinze’s Pfalzgräfin Elisabeth und Descartes (ibid., 6. Folge, 5: 257–304, 1886).


The interesting correspondence between Sir Charles Cavendish and Dr. John Pell (1611–85), both of whom had met D., throws light on the personal relationship between Hobbes and D., especially on the famous dinner meeting between D., Gassendi and Hobbes, probably in 1648. See also Jean Jacquot, “Un amateur de science, ami de Hobbes et de Descartes, Sir Charles Cavendish, 1591–1654” (Thalès 6: 1949–50, 81–88).


“Charmant et solide essai” finds between D. and Princess “nulle trace d’amour, platonique ou autre, mais beaucoup de preuves ….. d’une amitié profonde, confiante et fidèle – mieux encore: de cette tendre déliection qui s’observe entre père et fille, et qui est quelquefois assez douce pour consoler de l’amour ou pour en tenir lieu” (Laporte, p. 9–10). Cantecor reached a similar conclusion on rudely different grounds: D.’s blind admiration of the great which made him find genius, nay, beauty “en ce laideron que fut la princesse Élisabeth” would have made him regard the very idea of considering her a woman as a sacrilege. “Il est vrai qu’il a eu une fille; mais cela ne prouve nullement qu’il ait jamais été amoureux” (no. 93, p. 17).
PELSENEER, JEAN: "Gilbert, Bacon, Galilée, Kepler, Harvey et Descartes; leur relations." Isis 17: 1932, 171-208.
Assembles and sifts biographical facts about D.'s relations with each of the others named in the title. Tedious but useful.

BASIC BIOGRAPHIES

ADAM, CHARLES: Vie et œuvres de Descartes. Étude historique. Cerf, 1910. xix, 646 p. [= AT XII.] First modern critical biography, written with incomparable knowledge of texts and sources then available. Corrects errors and misinterpretations of the first biographers, definitively settles numerous details. The analysis of D.'s works and philosophy, leaning on Liard, is dated. Newly found texts and documents, research on the genesis of D.'s works, on D. in Holland, his formative years, etc., invalidate parts of biography without diminishing its stature. Supplementary material in AT XIII and in Adam's Descartes, sa vie, son œuvre (revised factual summary of AT XII; Boivin, 1937); Descartes; ses amitiés féminines (Boivin, 1937); "Descartes et ses correspondants anglais" (RLC 17: 1937, 437-60); "Quelques questions à propos de Descartes" (RCC 38: 1937, 577-89; 39: 1-8). See no. 1011-12, 1019-20. All these are important guides to fact, texts, documents.

BAILLET, ADRIEN: La vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes. Horthemels, 1691. 2 vols. [6], lxii, 417; 394 p. Condescendingly treated by certain modern critics, the work remains the fountainhead of D. biography. Preserves much contemporary information and sources since lost. Baillet's fierce asceticism, as well as the then current Jesuit attacks upon Cartesian doctrine, explain the apologetic undertones, but the charge of hagiography sits ill on this "dénicheur des saints" and "hypercriticus." Cartesians and anticartesians alike censured his disclosure of incidents which, in P. Boschet's nice phrase, make the hero blush and the reader blench: today this detailed, intimate picture of the man is priceless. Baillet's once internationally popular Abrégé of 1692, reprinted in 1946 and 1959 (see no. 111), omits the tedious, useless blobs of irrelevant material that swell the original, preserves its spirit and flavor, and occasionally deviates somewhat in pertinent information.

COHEN, GUSTAVE: "La philosophie indépendante: Descartes en Hollande." In his: Écrivains français en Hollande dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle. Champion (La Haye, Nijhoff), 1921, p. 355-689. Thèse Paris, 1920. Books I and II lovingly describe the life of the French soldiers, poets, scholars and students who went to Holland before D., indirectly clearing up the "puzzle" why the philosopher went there and what made him stay, as Gilson remarks in his important review. Book III follows the life of D. from birth to death, giving broadest space to his years in Holland. Writing with charm, warmth, gift of narrative, but also with the historian's scrupulous attention to detail, Cohen succeeds where Baillet and Adam had failed: in uncovering Dutch documentary material and reaching an intimate understanding of Descartes' Holland. Apart from special
points affected by the new Beeckman, Huygens, Mersenne editions, the core of this most readable of D. biographies remains valid. Excellent illustrations and 26-page index of names. Revised, augmented, corrected edition (Rodelin, 1950) was announced but not published.


Title from D.’s famous “larvatus prodeo” (AT X, 213). Behind the mask, a sardonic, restless intelligence, wise agnostic. The philosopher’s boon companions and chance acquaintances are gently transformed into atheists, Rosicrucians etc., as the argument may require. “Très curieux ouvrage et fort utile en ses exaggerations, comme réaction aux fadeurs d’une certaine hagiographie” (Cantecor, no. 93, p. 26, n.)

Interesting new biographical material in the appendices, including two pièces de résistance: a letter on D.’s Dream, solicited from Sigmund Freud himself (also in his: Gesammelte Werke, London, Imago, v. 14, 1948, 358–60); an unpublished letter from La Flèche “le 12 mai” (no year) from one “R. Descartes” to “Mademoiselle ma mere,” thanking her for “lescu que non sans nécessité vous mavez envoie.” Now tentatively accepted as D.’s only extant childhood letter, to his grandmother (AM, v. 1, 47f.)


The author’s own translation, revised, of her 1930 Dutch-language work (no. 3266) and the only true biography among similar modern shorter works, “.... une aquarelle, pleine de nuances charmantes et d’une réelle sensibilité” (M. Soriano, review below), rich in detail (especially on D. in Holland) without being tedious. Good explanation of points at issue between D. and his Dutch adversaries; useful documentation. Complements Cohen (no. 123).


“Du siècle d’Aristote à celui de Descartes j’aperçois un vide de deux mille ans” (Œuvres diverses, 294); no wonder that L. S. Mercier characterized this Éloge as “grand tapage de mots” by “le grand pugilateur en ce genre” (no. 112, p. 16). Yet
this set piece superseded Baillet as chief biographical source for nearly a century; Diderot preferred it, along with Marc Aurel and some pages from the "Histoire naturelle," to all of Rousseau (see his: Œuvres complètes, ed. Assézat, v. 3, p. 95; but then he had advised Thomas on this Eloge, see no. 438). V. Cousin placed it at the head of his D. edition of 1824. Competing eulogies were published in 1765 by F. H. Gaillard (who shared the prize), C. H. Couanier Deslandes, Fabre de Charrin, F. De Gourci, Mazarelli, and L. S. Mercier himself who "had not yet learned that the world's greatest charlatans are sometimes its most famous men" (no. 112, p. 3), but missed the prize nonetheless. Comparison of these 1765 products with the 1839 AMP prize essays by Bordas-Desmoulin, Bouillier, Renouvier reveals the impact of 19th century historicism upon D. interpretation.

V. INTRODUCTION TO DESCARTES


Profound introduction to D.'s metaphysics and epistemology, compressing a wealth of thought into smallest compass. Capsule treatment of his life. Scientific work ignored, except in its philosophical aspects.


128 ASTER, ERNST VON: Einführung in die Philosophie Descartes'. München, Rösl, 1921. 118 p. (Philosophische Reihe, v. 10.)

Sober, incisive introduction outlines D.'s philosophy in sharp profile. Very good on his philosophy of science. Shortest and best German work of this kind. See also von Aster's Geschichte der neueren Erkenntnistheorie von Descartes bis Hegel (Berlin, de Gruyter, 1921), ch. 1 et passim, and C. von Brockdorff, no. 441.


I. La vita. II. La dottrina: Il pensare come prima verità. L'io pensante e il problema del mondo esteriore. La scienza. La morale. Idealismo e realismo.

Undertakes to show "non il Cartesio 'tradizionale dell'autoscienza', ma l'asseritore della 'spiritualità della sostanza' " (Dedication to P. Carabellese). Lively biographical part, followed by five vigorous expository and critical chapters on D.'s metaphysics, science, ethics, ably arguing author's viewpoint against well-considered literature. Complemented by an unusual selection of short, well annotated excerpts from D.'s writings, in Italian translation. Bibliography (335-44).


"Brunschvicg oppose au cartésianisme de Descartes un cartésianisme vrai," as Alquié (no. 149, p. 360) formulates Brunschvicg's own more circumspect statement of purpose: to lay bare, beneath the deceptive unity of the system, the hidden unity of intuition which revolutionized the science of the time. "... un petit livre toujours vivant et d'une clarté vraiment cartésienne," as Guéroult says in his discussion of its thesis (RMM 45: 1937, 106-07.) Sections on D.'s life and an impressive set of plates.


Most popular of D. books, reprinted time and again, reproduces a lecture course which drew people "autant que le cinéma" (11). Passionately Gallic, firmly Catholic, Chevalier views D.'s metaphysics as "réalisme de l'idée." Fine critical analyses, blunted by a tendency to rescue D. from the resulting judgment. Very good analytical tables. Editions after 1937 have Chevalier's "Sur quelques points de la philosophie de Descartes qu'on peut estimer acquis" (from: Cartesio, 221-25). Review: R. Jolivet in RdePh 29: 1922, 95-98.

Louis Dimier's La vie raisonnable de Descartes (1926, no. 1777) is another good introduction; Neothomist viewpoint. See also André Cresson's popular biography (no. 1659) and the pleasant Confessions sans pénitence by Georges Duhamel (see note to no. 1808.)

134 DELBOS, VICTOR: "Descartes." In his: Figures et doctrines de philosophes. Plon, 1918, p. 95-141.

"La pensée de Descartes, c'est le type de la pensée classique, aux contours définis, aux lignes nettes, aux directions sûres, sans oscillation et sans fléchissement" (115). These qualities also characterize this masterly lecture which rapidly surveys D.'s life and main doctrines in non-technical language of great precision. See also Delbos' La philosophie française (Plon-Nourrit, 1919, 16-48) which reprints a basic paper on the relation of science to philosophy in D. and a short survey of D.'s philosophy. See no. 1708-13.


Most comprehensive German study, first published in 1852, repeatedly revised, still reprinted. Biographical part obsolete. Reflects Hegel's famous view of Descartes (no. 1714.) Vol. 2 (Spinoza's Leben, Werke und Lehre) gives a survey of Cartesianism especially in France and Holland, treating the development of doctrines from the viewpoint of a dialectic unfolding of philosophical history. See Hagmann (no 10), 120-27.
139 GOGUEL [DE LABROUSSE], ELIZABETH: Descartes y su tiempo. La Plata, Yerba buena, 1945. 179 p. (Imagen del tiempo).
Biographical sketch after Ch. Adam and M. Leroy. Some 50 interesting plates with facing explanatory text on the life, works, predecessors and followers of D.

Written before AT and Charles Adam's fundamental study, this biography has so far remained the sole English-language life of Descartes. Good journeyman's work, as Harold Laski said.

Admirable, finely drawn character sketch of young Descartes, anticipating many research themes of the next sixty years: elevation of DM to the rank of D.'s decisive master piece; the problem of his formative years; the historicity of his autobiographic account in DM; his curiosity, secretiveness, love of travel and spectacles; the apparent contrast between his life and his thought. Spirited defense of Baillet. Rejects French exaggerations and German underrating (H. Ritter's Geschichte der Philosophie, 1829ff.; see no. 3074-75) of Descartes' genius.

Substance of three engaging 1938 Cairo lectures (no. 2377): "Le monde incertain," "Le cosmos disparu," "L'univers retrouvé." Opposes Descartes, not to Aristotle and Scholasticism, but to Montaigne; claims that the Cartesian spirit still dominates modern science, although the body of D.'s philosophy and physics is very dead indeed. Good initiation to Descartes when read along with Alquié's no. 127 and Lewis' no. 145.

145 LEWIS, GENEVIÈVE [Mme G. Rodis-Lewis]: René Descartes, Français, philosophe. Tours-Paris, Maison Mame, 1953. 160 p. (Service de la France.)
Brilliant, compact synthesis of D.'s life and work, written with authority, precision, verve. Best introduction for the uninitiated, stimulating to the more advanced.

Eight huge, annotated 1937 tercentenary lectures. Popular, vivid, original (partly because of unfamiliarity with major D. literature). One of a "série luminosa de

146a DE SACY, SAMUEL: Descartes par lui-même. Éditions du seuil, 1936. 192 p. (Écrivains de toujours.)

Abundant illustrations and a remarkably good text, most of it by no means “par lui-même,” evoke Descartes' time and the intellectual excitement of his extraordinary life. Not a source but a vademecum.


146b WEIZSÄCKER, CARL FRIEDRICH FREIHERR VON: Descartes und die neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft. Selbstverlag der Universität Hamburg, 1958. 29 p. (Hamburger Universitätsreden 3.)

In smallest compass, Weizsäcker gives an orderly syllabus of the main points of D.'s thought and scientific contributions, with an original, critical evaluation. D.’s main purpose is firmly viewed as laying the foundations of modern science; D.’s own contributions are judged from the modern viewpoint, with illuminating results. An excellent introduction.


VI. FUNDAMENTAL INTERPRETATIONS


“J'ai dit souvent que ce qui nous manque pour comprendre Descartes, c'est l'intelligence” (110). Alain fills this gap with éclat, placing himself, like Descartes, “en dehors de toute discussion, de toute critique” (G. Milhaud’s review, 79–80). Contains his “Étude sur Descartes” (1927) and “Sur le Traité des passions” (1928). “Ce petit livre si dense, d’une densité un peu affectée, si original, si riche en suggestions profitables” (A. Brémond, review below, 60), achieves what Alain ascribed to TP: “…. à le lire seulement on prend quelque air et quelque mouvement de cette grande âme” (199). See also no. 1031–35.


Famous description of the Descartes portrait by Frans Hals: “C’est un homme terrible à prendre pour maître. Son œil semble dire: Encore un qui va se tromper” (253).
Alain's D. is very much alive, plainly recognizable in that "type de vieux commandant janséniste et polytechnicien, qui savait tout et qui ne croyait rien, hormis l'incroyable .... Ce n'est pas Descartes; rien n'est Descartes; mais enfin c'est le moins étafragiste des hommes que j'ai connus" (335-54). A handful of brilliant pages.


First great Descartes interpretation since Gilson and Gouhier, rooted in modern philosophical anthropology. A.'s rigorous chronological method, a refusal to interpret later texts in the light of earlier ones, unexpectedly yields "une saisissante vision d'un Descartes découvrant progressivement .... l'Être, et sa situation d'Homme par rapport a l'être" (Sarano's review, 338), passing from "l'esperir mécaniste" through a transcendent distinction between knowledge and being to the "metaphysical discovery of Man" beyond all temptation of ontology. Method and interpretation, irreconcilably at odds with Gueroult's systematic approach (no. 170), are highly original: "On ne peut manquer d'ètre à la fois seduit et déconcerté par ce genre d'argumentation" (Aime Patri, review below, 216). Useful chronology of origin and publication of D.'s works in the Appendix.


150 ASMUS, VALENTIN FERDINANDOVOICH: Dekart. Moskva, Gos. izd-vo politicheskoi lit-ry, 1956. 371 p. (In Russian.) See also no. 1091a-c.

Descartes scholarship is more active in the USSR than it was in Czarist Russia (see Index s.v. "Russia"). It has produced substantial critical editions in translation and studies chiefly of his scientific work, but no new translations of important Western D. criticism. Only Kuno Fischer, Fouillée, Krantz are available in Russian, all done before 1910. Asmus' full-length critical work (first printing: 30,000 copies) confirms D.'s reception into the Communist Pantheon as father of French materialism (despite his compromise with Scholasticism) and creator of modern concepts in mathematics and science (forerunner of Pavlov, though his mechanistic materialism, attuned to the rise of the French bourgeoisie, is now superseded by Marxist dialectic materialism.) Philosophical doctrine and Western D. criticism (books only) are treated with considerable acumen, but neither the man nor the spirit of his thinking come alive. Identical approach in the able encyclopedia article by V. V. Sokolov, 1952 (see no. 3315, German translation ibid.; also the note to no. 3314), in Cecile Angrand's much debated "Les origines françaises du matérialisme" of 1946 (no. 1066), in Marjorie Barjonet, "Ce qui mourait et ce qui naissait chez Descartes" (Pensée no. 32: 1930, 21-32). The scriptural text is Marx: "Kritische Schlacht gegen den französischen Materialismus" in Marx und Engels, Die heilige Familie, 1845, ch. 4, sec. c. (translations: no. 2663). F. Alquié ("Marxisme et cartésianisme," TMOD I: May 1946, 1378-1400) finds Marxist man dissatisfied and revolutionary because "le fond de sa conscience recèle cet infini, ce pouvoir absolu de dépassement qui, pour Descartes
aussi, fonde le cogito” (p. 1398). Alquié counters Angrand’s Marxization of Descartes by an equally intrepid Cartesianization of Marx: “La vérité du cogito cartésien est le fond même du Marxisme” (p. 1399). Heidegger might agree, for different reasons.


Claims that D. is “in spirit, in prophetic insight, and in generous ideality the father of the modern mind” (p. viii). A broad, loosely structured exploration of the metaphysics and epistemology of MM, developing the Cartesian image of world, nature, man. Tries to distinguish between “Cartesius,” symbolizing “Reason itself,” and “René Descartes” as “symbol for every conductor of inquiry” (67), contrasting the systematic aspect with the progressive development of D.’s philosophy. The sum of life-long meditation by an American thinker who found both “Cartesius” and “René Descartes” the more enigmatic the more profoundly he came to understand them.


“Le christianisme de Descartes, sincère, original, complexe et inconsistant” (567) is diagnosed as an “agnosticisme chrétien” which allows D. to lay down “les conditions d’un positivisme intégral, conséquent, et conscient de ses postulats” (560). Regarding reason and faith, “il n’oppose, il ne sépare, il ne combine pas, il distingue” (563). But a residual of “la foi de tout le monde . . . , cette foi banale et commune” (551) perverts D.’s genuine Christianity and reveals its insufficiency. “Le vice profond de son christianisme” is to have suppressed “toute préparation rationnelle de la foi, tout travail de la raison dans la foi, toute intelligence de la foi” (566). Fundamental, deeply penetrating study, unshaken by Gouhier’s criticism (no. 168, 187–93, 294–300). Jacob Epelbaum, “El agnostismo de Descartes y su sumisión a lo infinito” (Homenaje, no. 40, v. 2, 331–33) shows that D.’s agnosticism concerning “lo último irracional y no el saber mismo” (331) did not prevent the development of his rationalism and was resolved on the ethical level by “la sumisión a la incomprensibilidad y infalibilidad divinas”; but this participation “en las categorías supremas del Ser” (331) had no Christian character. See also G. Krüger, no. 176 and Blondel on Malebranche’s anticartesianism, no. 435b. Also no. 27, and Gouhier’s Blondel critique in no. 168, p. 187–93, 294–300.


German “Blut und Boden” contribution to D.’s jubilee; honors him by declaring him the chief philosophical enemy of National Socialist “Weltanschauung.” In contrast to dead Cartesian thinking, German thought is “erschlossenes Denken” characterized by depth, dynamism, intensity, “Systemfeindschaft,” “Weltweite,” mythical roots.
Reviews: E. Cassirer in no. 5, p. 22-26; G. Radetti in GCH 21: 1940, 117-122, (critical); A. van der Wey in TP 2: 1940, 86-97 (important); RdePh 1941, 80; L. Landgrebe in RomF 55: 1941, 153-54; A. Marc in Aph 14: 1938, suppl. bibl. 80-81.


Posthumously put together from manuscripts and notes in progress, the book looks forbiddingly difficult; its mystifying title (author's own) refers to the unfinished conclusion which views moral life as process by which man "enters into and enjoys the 'sacrament' of the universe" (Editor, p. vi). However, closer examination shows it to be an extremely rewarding critique of the modern naturalist tendency to pass over the mind-body duality "as if the distinction were wanting in depth and reality" (59). The body of the book is a careful critical examination of philosophy of G. Santayana and A. N. Whitehead, showing that their attempted monism leads to new, irreconcilable dualities: substance and essence in Santayana "becomingness" and permanence in Whitehead, whose system is treated with great penetration and respect. Important complement to Lovejoy's great work on dualism (no. 182). A. E. Taylor's review article "Back to Descartes" (Phil 6: 1941, 126-37) is helpful.


Great illuminating study of D.'s philosophy as conceptual starting point for Spinoza, Plato towering behind both of them. Rich, subtle analyses of Cartesian epistemology, important as is all of Brunschvicg's work on Descartes.

Only with D. does Montaigne's ideal, "l'humanisme de la sagesse," again take possession of the West. The secret of D.'s revolution is entirely in his "Géométrie" which gave to idealism the tool vainly sought by Plato, the evidence of first verities, the guarantee of the correspondence of universal mathematics with reality (see also no. 358). D. tends towards spiritualist immanence, though with restrictions. Great rationalist interpretation of the history of philosophy; profound analyses of Malebranche, Pascal, Fontenelle, Beyle, etc.


Descartes opposes Montaigne on every point, though only "après avoir tout accepté de lui" (97). What Montaigne had relegated to nothingness rises again in a "rafraîchissement foudroyant": the intimate truth of science, "l'expansion infinie de la raison, la conscience profonde du moi impliquant la présence de Dieu" (96). The third act in this intellectual drama is Pascal - "le réalisme va tenter sa revanche sur le spiritualisme" (133). "Emouvant par son intime sérénité" (Cochet, review below, 173), Brunschvicg's last statement on D. may serve as introduction to his earlier work which is ably summarized by Gerard Milhaud in Rsyn 14: 76-78, 1918.


Five studies (1921-37), posthumously reprinted, deal with the position of mathematics and metaphysics in D.'s system, the role of intuition, the relation of D.'s thought to Plato's, D. and Pascal. Two popular commemorative papers in Appendix 303-17. Editor's "Notes bibliographiques" (106-07) usefully refer to parallel sections in B.'s books of which no. 358 offers the clearest statement of his highly original view of D.'s role in the history of ideas.


Ex unguem leonem: the great historian of philosophical ideas offers as first-fruit a masterly analysis of D.'s criticist epistemology of mathematics of science, his
substance concept (substantialization of space, substance and change), his concepts of experience, the infinite, time. Standpoint of the Marburg School.


Greatest of the author’s works on the history of philosophical ideas, the book has a broad D. chapter followed by a discussion of the development of Cartesianism, Pascal to Bayle, unparalleled in its interweaving of related strands of thought without ever blurring the finest doctrinal differences between thinkers. Necessary consequence: Descartes remains the mere locus of a bundle of ideas streaming through him on their turbulent way towards Kant, their appointed goal.


Strangely beautiful, stirring vision of D. whom “some mighty, insuperable force, which he could not have called by its name and whose name he did not try to discover,” Hegel’s “Zeitgeist,” drove “to banish mystery from our lives at all costs” (English tr., 248). Tremendous view of Spinoza: “he has slain God for history” (273), yet loves Him. Thought speaking the tongue of myth, in the terrifying Old Testament manner.


Influential posthumous work. Vol. 1 assembles Espinas’ vehemently discussed 1906–07 articles which represent D. as a Catholic apologist, eager to stop Libertinism and to rescue dogma from the fatal encounter with the new science by using the beast-machine concept as “clé de voûte.” The analysis of D.’s formative years sees Platonist and Augustinian influences, received through the Oratoire, as decisive. Vol. 2, overshadowed by the first, is a previously unpublished study attempting to distill a definitive “morale” from D.’s later thought, after the removal of the
overgrowth of influences. A. Brémond (review below) attacked the author's “érudition incertaine et confuse ou l’arbitraire seul jette des clartés” (288) and his “mauvaise théologie d’universitaire autodidacte, prénomptueux et trop pressé” (295). But Gilson, though critical, was impressed and influenced by these “articles si remarquables et d’une analyse si pénétrante” (no. 164, p. 434) which still repay for their wealth of comment on the relationship between D. and earlier thinkers. Besides, Espinas’ once discredited main theses have been unexpectedly revived by R. Lefèvre and others.


Though D.’s only weapon against Aristotle was truth, he tried to adapt traditional theology to needs of his science, not to defend the Church, but to protect himself against it by shunning conflict. Although, “historically speaking, this work is now out of date,” having been “ably corrected” by Gouhier (Gilson, no. 166, p. xiii and 80, n. 1) it remains a landmark in D. research. For Gilson’s defense of his striking theses on divine, human free will, D. and Molinism, early Jansenism, etc. against searching critique of M. de Wulf, L. Lévy-Bruhl, V. Delbos, Father Labérthonnière and others, see BSFP 14: 207-58, 1914 (séance du 19 mars 1914). See also no. 248.

Reviews: Anon. in RMM 21, suppl. 3, p. 7, 1913; A. Brémond in Aph 8, no. 4: 1920, 10-17; H. Gouhier in RPhH 5: 1937, 200-01; J. Hoffmans in RNS 21: 1913, 97-102; Gérard Milhaud in Rsyn 14: 1937, 74-76; F. Olgiati in no. 14, 73-75, 175-83. See also Koyré, no. 214.


I. Sources médiévales de quelques doctrines cartésiennes: 1. L’innéisme cartésien et la théologie. 2. D., Harvey et la scolastique. 3. Météores cartésiens et météores scolastiques.

II. Descartes et la métaphysique médiévale. 1. De la critique des formes substantielles au doute méthodique (psychologie de la physique aristotélicienne; physique et métaphysique dans le système cartésien; génèse de la Première Méditation). 2. Le cogito et la tradition augustinienne. 3. La preuve de Dieu par la causalité (cause des idées; D. et S. Thomas; psychologie du lecteur scolastique). 4. D. et S. Anselme. 5. Une
nouvelle idée de Dieu. 6. La véracité divine et l'existence du monde extérieur. 7.
Anthropologie thomiste et anthropologie cartésienne.


Gilson’s “Index scolastico-cartésien” (no. 7), his DM commentary (no. 83), and this collection of 15 interrelated studies form the greatest single contribution to the historical understanding of D.'s philosophy, destroying the legend of its invention ab ovo. No comparable work has stood up better, perhaps because Gilson confined himself to laying the foundations instead of erecting a complete structure. Written with precision and graceful ease, the book includes a definitive treatment of D. and Harvey, a comparison of Cartesian and medieval meteorology, and historical explorations of Cartesian key concepts, especially an outstanding study of D.’s critique of substantial forms. Concise “Index des questions traitées.” See Garin (no. 209a).


Merciless, sometimes sarcastic critique of Descartes “the great dreamer” (148) whose philosophy, “a recklessly conducted experiment to see what becomes of human knowledge when moulded into conformity with the pattern of mathematical evidence” (133), broke down on all fronts: mathematicism, spiritualism, idealism, physics. Astonishing judgment on D. by his greatest historical commentator who as a philosopher found his master in St. Thomas. The book has had no echo whatever in French D. scholarship.

Reviews: J. Dopp in RNS 41: 1938, 476-78; H. Gouhier in VInt June 30, 1938.


Four lectures on the “metaphysical problem of God,” continuing the critique of D. (74-108): “Like the innate ideas of Plato, Descartes’ innate idea of God was a reminiscence; not, however, the reminiscence of some idea contemplated by the soul in former life, but simply the reminiscence of what he had learned in church when he was a little boy” (82-83); his God “a stillborn God,” “an infelicitous hybrid of religious faith and of rational thought” (89). Autobiographical note in the “incomparable little preface” (Veatch, review below, p. 506) explains Gilson’s philosophical development and astounding change of attitude towards Descartes.


I. Les intentions apologetiques de Descartes. II. Les rapports de la raison et de la foi. – Appendix: Le songe de Descartes. La Recherche de la Vérité.
Masterly study of D.'s attitude towards religion in all its aspects, a work of first importance; brings to life the development of his "pensée personnelle," from first conceptions to maturity. Gouhier's Descartes, "incoerciblement fier, cornélien, héroïque" (Brémond, Aph 4, no. 4: 298, 1927) takes up God's cause, yet produces a non-religious philosophy. This paradox is ingeniously explored in remarkable analyses of D.'s treatment of Reason vs. Faith, concluding, somewhat surprisingly to more official representatives of the Catholic viewpoint, that "en apportant aux hommes la vraie philosophie, Descartes a donné un allié à la vraie religion" (233). Careful, critical, comprehensive; one of the basic works in the literature. Second edition, considerably augmented and revised, in preparation. See also Gouhier's methodological note in Cartesio (no. 35, 414-24) distinguishing three questions in the problem of D.'s religiosity: (a) his sincerity, (b) the Christian elements in his system, (c) Christian vs. Cartesian spirit.


This small, beautifully written collection of essays may well prove to be the most influential work of the rich 1930's. Its new, enticing D. image and its new view of the architecture of his thought anticipate current French D. scholarship by two decades. From a discussion of D.'s formative years the book rises to magnificent analyses of cogito, Dieu-trompeur, and malin génie in which D.'s movement of thought is intimately, almost lovingly, caught. The book then turns to D.'s "morale" and ends with an anticlimatic, needless defense of his conservative conformism in politics. Gouhier's Descartes is the very opposite of Leroy's: a philosopher without mask, without enigma, without conflict – contented, radiating, just as Frans Hals informally painted him; only the sardonic gleam in the eye (which Alain caught) is missing. Structurally, D.'s metaphysics claims central place. Mathematics and science enter only marginally, while strong emphasis falls on moral philosophy. In unveiling an unsuspected Cartesian political philosophy, Gouhier anticipates not only the findings but the peculiar tone of his latter-day followers; e.g., in D.'s striving to win over the high and mighty, "l'ambition la plus généreuse s'accorde avec le devoir le plus doux" (281). Yet, balance is firmly maintained: this D. remains the irrevocably committed thinker throughout, neither an agnostic nor an apologetic zealot, neither moralizer nor morally obtuse, neither a reckless experimenter nor an archaic fossil. As a living, breathing portrait of Descartes, the book still stands alone.


This most impressive of all systematic Descartes commentaries so far written treats D.’s philosophy rigorously as “profond monument, solide et géométrique, comme une forteresse de Vauban,” built by a “penseur de granit” (v. I, p. 1). The title states its thesis which challenges all previous exegesis: only from an unflinching logical analysis according to the order of arguments (“l’ordre des raisons”) does the immense unity and inner coherence of D.’s thought as systematic thought emerge; psychological, historical, chronological “approaches” will not do. See Gueroult’s passionate statement cited under no. 193. A contrapuntal “structural analysis” of the nexus rationum clears up apparent contradictions while bringing to light the deeper impasses. The work studies MM as the epitome of D.’s thought, but utilizes all relevant texts. Vol. 2, devoted to the Sixth Meditation, concludes with a 35-page analytical summary of the argument “aussi dense et aussi riche, aussi heureux et aussi beau” as any ever given (Canguilhem’s review, 286), and extremely helpful. The tables of content are a veritable outline of Cartesian metaphysics. (Belaval’s review below notes inaccuracies in references). The work, which should be consulted on any problem of D.’s metaphysics, has become the center of fundamental controversy over Descartes interpretation. See the Royaumont Colloquium (no. 42). Alquié’s review below notes inaccuracies in references). The work should be consulted on any problem of D.’s metaphysics, has become the center of fundamental controversy over Descartes interpretation. See the Royaumont Colloquium (no. 42). Alquié’s review below notes inaccuracies in references).


matérielles. 17-18, Âme – corps. 19, Physique (théorie du mouvement, de la matière.) 22-23, Psychologie (intelligence, passions, volonté.) 24, Esthétique, morale.

Posthumously published course (1903-04). Broke new ground by asserting against Liard the primacy of metaphysics and the systematic unity in D.'s thought. The beautifully reasoned book analyzes the system not from D.'s own but from Hame-lin's neo-idealistic standpoint. Important and influential.

Reviews: Anon. in RMM 19: 1921, 11, 1-2; É. Callot in no. 447a, 11-14 (on the “system” approach); A. Carlini in no. 4, 53-59 (on neo-idealistic interpretation); J. Guéville in APC ser 4, v. 13, no. 163: 516-23, 1911-12; Régis Jolivet, La notion de substance (Beauchesne, 1929), 114-18; Gérard Milhaud in RSyn 14: 71, 1937; M. Muller in no. 316, 313-52, 157-58; F. Olgiati in no. 185, 215-16.


Hegel authoritatively enunciates the fundamental view of Descartes as founding genius and initiator of all modern philosophy, leaving even Bacon outside the pale. “Hier, können wir sagen, sind wir zuhause ….. mit ihm hebt die Bildung, das Denken der neueren Zeit an”; Descartes tore thinking loose from Scholasticism and “philosophizing theology” and made the inseparable connection of thought and Being the center of philosophy. His two basic and equivalent doctrines, cogito and ontological proof, establish thinking as the pure culmination of inwardness (Innerlichkeit) and thus initiate the rule of “the Protestant principle” of autonomous interiority. All else in D.’s philosophizing is secondary by comparison, including dualism and Cartesian mechanism, which fails to account for the organic, and rather splendidly so: “Es ist aber das Grosse darin, dass das Denken in seinen Bestimmungen fortgeht, und dass es diese Gedankengenossen zu dem Wahrhaften der Natur macht” (362). Ludwig Feuerbach, in his Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 1833 (no. 1889), sees the cogito as “das Wesen des Geistes” and strives for a way out of its pure subjectivity and radical split between subject and object. But he rejects the Hegelian view of D. as the originator of modern philosophy in favor of Bacon. Johann Eduard Erdmann (Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der neueren Philosophie, 1834-51; no. 1844a) marks the transition from the Hegelian approach to the new professionalism in the history of philosophy, which will eventually lead to historicism. He fully spells out Hegel’s “Protestant principle”; his critical evaluation, chiefly technical, rejects charges of inconsistency against Descartes as failing to understand the fundamental turn which philosophy took with him. See Hagmann’s useful monograph (no. 10); on the cogito in German Idealism also F. Medicus (no. 2687).


Heidegger has always considered Descartes a decisive thinker. In Sein und Zeit he makes the first attempt to come to grips with the cogito. Descartes misses “den Seinsinn des sum” in the cogito (24) because he transfers medieval ontology upon the res cogitans as an ens creatum. Consequently the decisive relation between time and the cogito does not even become a problem; in this, even Kant dog-
matically follows Descartes. Chapter 3 (sec. 19–21) deals with D.'s failure to identify "das innerweltlich Seiende" as "Welt"; the concept of "world" as res extensa "jumps" both "Sein als Zuhandenheit" and "Sein als Substanz." The "phenomenological destruction of the cogito sum" (89), promised for the abandoned sequel to S & Z, is replaced by the lectures on Nihilism (1940, no. 172b), a cogito critique from the viewpoint of "Überwindung der Metaphysik." See Hagmann (no. 10, 157–64), A. de Waelhens in RNS 41: 1938, 574–76; E. Nicol in RMM 61: 1936, 303–27.


This lecture (1943) contains a condensation (91–103) of the extensive analysis offered in no. 172b. It defines D.'s central place in modern metaphysics: "Zur Wissenschaft als Forschung kommt es dann, und nur dann, wenn die Wahrheit zur Gewissheit des Vorstellens sich gewandelt hat . . . . Die gesamte neuzeitliche Metaphysik, Nietzsche mit eingeschlossen, hält sich in der von Descartes angebahnten Auslegung des Seienden und der Wahrheit" (80). Though German philosophy since Leibniz has essentially transformed D.'s position, it failed to overcome it and thus it indirectly strengthened it; "dagegen hat die blosse Descartes-Scholastik und ihr Rationalismus jede Kraft für die fernere Gestaltung der Neuzeit eingebüßt" (91).


The title of this 1940 course marks Heidegger's definitive evaluation of Descartes: in founding modern subjectivism, D. lays the foundations of European Nihilism, in Nietzsche's understanding of the term. Between D. and Nietzsche, modern metaphysics rises and sets; its "Wesensmöglichkeiten" are now exhausted; in Nietzsche, it has been turned upside down ("die Umkehrung," ) and a new understanding of Being must be sought. The heart of the argument is an elaborate cogito analysis which considers Protagoras, Descartes, and Nietzsche. Descartes' cogito was the metaphysical foundation for liberating man in this new freedom and self-guaranteed autonomy. With D., "das gesamte Menschentum und seine Geschichte" moves out of Christian speculative truth into the subjective representation (Vorstellung) of "das Seiende," establishing that subject-object relationship without which "die neuzeitliche Herrschaftsstellung des Menschen" would have been impossible (187–88). From Descartes on, "metaphysics is anthropomorphism" (127). Nietzsche could not but misread D.'s cogito as an "ego volo," a declaration of the Will to Power; he did not realize how utterly Cartesian he was in his attack upon Descartes. In Nietzsche, D.'s quest for certain truth as avoidance of error is carried to the ultimate: now truth itself is in essence error, since the Will to Power makes true what it must will to be true, within its own "aggressive" concept of "justice." Written in clear, uncomplicated German and with deliberate repetitions, this large study is easier to grasp than the difficult 1943 summary (no. 172a).


Husserl develops the core of his own philosophy in a Cartesian "mouvement de la pensée" and in intimate contact with D.'s metaphysics. This second of the three
main statements of his phenomenology, originally intended to develop into the “Hauptwerk meines Lebens” (Husserliana, v. i, p. xxvii) notes his debt to Descartes and defines his point of separation from him. The difficult French version is now superseded by Husserliana, v. i, which gives the German text of the Paris lectures of 1929, accompanied by Husserl’s helpful outline, the original German version of the Méditations cartésiennes in their hitherto unpublished final form, and Roman Ingarden’s important critique of the manuscript which influenced Husserl’s revision of it. This volume is now the key text for the relation between Husserl and Descartes, but see also no. 174 and no. 2251 (Husserl’s Formale und transzendentale Logik).

Reviews etc. : no. 174.


According to Böhm, the “Cartesian Meditations” are the “Erste Philosophie” of 1923-24 in the form which Husserl gave it for publication; but “Erste Philosophie” points forward to “Krisis” as well as to the “Cartesian Meditations”. It contains important texts on the “Cartesian way to transcendental reduction”, on cogito and époché, and it sharply works out the role of Locke and English empiricism in the Cartesian succession (chief texts noted in no. 2254a). Jean Wahl’s incisive paper “Jugements de Husserl sur Descartes et sur Locke” in the Husserl Colloquium at Royaumont (no. 3528a, with discussion) is based on “Erste Philosophie” and on “Die Krisis”, which is Husserl’s last work and third definitive statement. Here Descartes appears as “der urstiftende Genius der gesamten neuzeitlichen Philosophie” (p. 75).

Dualism stems from the acceptance of science as cognitional model (§ 10ff.); Descartes inherits it as an unchallenged presupposition, and it falsifies the cogito (§ 16-21). In the époché of the radical doubt, the “Galilean certainty of a universal and absolutely pure world of bodies,” as well as the distinction between mere sensual experience and pure thought, should have been bracketed out. “Le bon sens” prevented D. from doing so; and the fatal psychological substitution “des eigenen seelischen Ich für das ego” prevents him from seeing “dass das ego, sein durch die Époché entweltlichtes Ich . . . . unmöglich in der Welt als Thema auftreten kann, da alles Weltliche eben aus diesen Funktionen seinen Sinn schöpft, also auch das eigene seelische Sein, das Ich im gewöhnlichen Sinne” (p. 81-82). This text marks the exact point of separation between Husserl and Descartes. Valuable auxiliary texts (Beilagen V-X, XVI, p. 392-431, 455-58) greatly expand and elaborate the compressed main text. They include a striking analysis of Meditation I (Beilage VI, p. 402-11).


The German Existentialist undertakes a deeply searching revaluation of the enigmatic person and philosophy of D., a climactic figure who gave fiery impetus to thought, but in the wrong direction. Calls D.’s scientific attitude archaic: Galileo and Leibniz were the true representatives of modern “Wissenschaftsgesinnung.” Original, independent, controversial. See E. Cassirer’s important critical discussion in no. 5, 18–22, 38–39. Gertrud Kahl-Furthmann charges Jaspers with “breaking into Descartes’ world” with existentialist categories that fail to accommodate Descartes’ thought. The result, she claims, is not damage to Descartes but critical failure on Jaspers’ part. (ZPF 14: 1960, 127–38; see no. 2328a).


Outstanding modern German study, hitherto entirely overlooked even by German scholars. Profound assessment of D.’s historical position which underlies the singularity and hidden insecurity of modern metaphysics. D.’s universal doubt “kehrt sich … im letzten verschwiegenen Grunde gegen den christlichen Glauben” (242); he founded the freedom of philosophizing “aller göttlichen Allmacht zum Trotz: hier ist keine christliche Innerlichkeit, sondern hier beginnt … der Aufstand gegen das Christentum, der wir die Aufklärung nennen” (246). Outstanding treatment of D.’s ethics (“générosité,” translated as “edler Stolz”), the true meaning of which D. is thought to have concealed. D. does not deny God, he turns away from him: surely he is not a Christian believer, much less a Catholic apologist. His ideal is the strong mind who does not hope for help but helps himself: yet Chris-

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tainty leaves a residue of doubt in man’s own power. The Cartesian problem of autonomous, free philosophizing founded in “Selbstbewusstsein” is still unresolved today. A truer, deeper analysis than Jaspers’. I. Fetscher (PhRu 3: 1935, 170, n. 12) finds Krüger influenced by M. Leroy (no. 124) who sees D.’s metaphysics as a mere screen for his revolutionary and social thought. However, this possible influence does not affect Krüger’s argument, as Fetscher admits.


Vol. 2: IV. La morale. V. La religion. – App.: La physique d’Aristote et la physique de Descartes.

Posthumous work, written 1905–15, includes Laberthonnière’s 1909–11 APC articles. Violently debated interpretation of D. as a practical, utilitarian, reform-minded champion not of religion but of a science designed to conquer the world; Cartesian man is aware of God behind him but he no longer sees God before him. Vols. 1, 2 comprehensively survey D.’s philosophy; v. 3 adds late studies of D., Spinoza, Malebranche and Leibniz, and a youthful essay expressing author’s leanings towards a Cartesian independence of reflection and his “horreur du ghetto scolastique,” as editor terms it (v. 3, 313). Work condemned (Acta Sedis Apost. 29: 13, 1937) not for preferring D., but for attacking official teachings and ministry. Repetitious writing, eloquent and superficially clear, recalls J. Dedieu’s characterization of the celebrated Oratorian’s rambling talk; “... à travers l’emploi des formules hermétiques, un indéfinissable assemblage d’affirmations péremptoires et d’imprécises notions” (RHL 44: 1937, 277).


Livre I: Nature de la raison. La connaissance: méthode, facultés, objets, origine.
Livre III: Religion et raison. La religion considérée en elle-même, dans ses rapports avec la physique, avec la morale. Conclusion: Descartes est-il rationaliste?

Laporte defines rationalism as admission of the “réalité spécifique de la raison, sa valeur universelle et sa suffisance” (470). Finds that D. is not rationalist in this particular sense, his philosophy not a system but rather a pluralism, his attitude an authentic “empirisme radical et integral” (477). Meticulous analyses, supported by a stupendous array of texts, take up D.’s views regarding nature, the value of reason, its relation to religion, covering most basic themes of his metaphysics. Cf. the notes to no. 347a (continuity of time?), no 2490 (finality), 2451 (liaison nécessaire), 2454 (méthode), and no. 291 (étendue, liberté). “Volume ottimo per la serieta e scrupulosita dell’intento e delle ricerche. La tesi, invero, non è molto nuova .......” (A. Carlini in no. 4, p. 175). See also L. Lavelle in no. 11, 17-19, 23-31.

Reviews:

LEFEBVRE, HENRI: Descartes. Éditions Hier et Aujourd’hui, 1947. 312 p (Grandes figures.) Polish translation: no. 2484.

Attractive long essay, from the viewpoint of dialectic historical materialism Naturally, DM becomes a manifesto of the rising liberalistic bourgeoisie and its industrial civilization. Ch. 2 (“Les contradictions cartésiennes”) is a running polemic against prevalent D. criticism, insisting that Cogitations privatae and Dream mark the ideological difficulties from which methodical doubt freed Descartes in a process of increasing purification of his thought, though the doubt cannot overcome the consequences of the split between thought and world. This “solitary hero of knowledge” is also “le type ethnographique du sorcier .... maudit et redouté,” the outsider who anticipates the solitude of the modern intellectual, the man of transition, complex and troubled (131). The main emphasis, though, falls upon D.’s scientific work and its epistemological underpinnings. Thoughtful, rewarding study, without Borkenau’s impetuous, brash freshness (see no. 154).


LEFÈVRE, ROGER: La vocation de Descartes. PUF 1956. 228 p. (BPC). See notice to no. 179d.

179b LEFÈVRE, ROGER: L’humanisme de Descartes. PUF, 1957. viii, 284 p. (BPC). See notice to no. 179d.

I. La vie morale. 1. Les principes moraux. 2. L’expérience morale. 3. Le progrès moral. 4. L'idéal moral.
II. La vie sociale. 1. Les sources (sentiments; événements; documents). 2. La doctrine (peuple; prince; philosophe.) 3. La pratique (politique; technique; devenir).
III. La vie religieuse. 1. La situation (libertinage; apologie). 2. L'intention (actes; idées). 3. La prétention (méthaphysique; physique).


Critique de la pensée pure. I. Le fondement de la raison, (Le procès des certitudes; les lacunes de la pensée; les sources de l’évidence). II. Le mouvement de la raison: génése du doute; génése de la certitude; l’essor de la métaphysique). Conclusion: Le message de Descartes. Appendices.


“A 40 ans, Descartes imprime, et le doute méthodique paraît” (V 1). This fatuously terse sentence opens an enormous work of 160 pages in 4 volumes (we cite V, H, C, B), with more to come (Rêveries cartesiennes). With sensitivity, technical virtuosity, clarity, Lefèvre unveils in relentless symmetry and sententiousness his “true Descartes”: a religious moralist and Catholic apologist à la Espinas. Lefèvre’s discussion of D.’s metaphysics is admirable (see also his small La métaphysique de Descartes, PUF, 1959). Descartes moves through four levels of the doubt: empiric, methodic, metaphysic, didactic (i.e., moralist). C and D view him at the fourth and highest of these levels; the analyses of doubt and cogito follow the finest nuances of the masterfully handled texts; the treatment of the Objections and Responses is of exceptional clarity. Penetrating discussion of D.’s theory of sensation in C. For a careful appraisal of V, H, and C see Bannan (no. 22).

Lefèvre’s Descartes philosophizes not in a quest for certainty but out of “une sorte de besoin joyeux de plénitude spirituelle” (V 96). Cartesianism is not a philosophical position but “un effort d’amélioration de la nature par la culture [sic], un appel à l’épanouissement de la liberté en verité, une ascension du vouloir . . . vers l’univers et vers Dieu. D’un mot, un humanisme” (H viii). The historical setting is enticingly simple: chiefly the Church vs. Atheism, Science vs. the Church. Descartes vanquishes in one blow Atheism and Scholasticism, saving the Church from Science, and Science from the Church. One whole book (H) is given to this “historical” Descartes. In its center is a full-fledged political philosophy woven together from
the ad hoc comments of D., that profoundly unpolitical thinker; the sides of the triptych are a system of ethics and a philosophy of religion, both also by Descartes. The political philosophy is a marvelous web of sophisms designed to refute Machiavelli by deodorizing him. In V and H, the “penseur de granit” looks more like a “penseur de beurre,” full of wholesome goodness and yearning for the mould: “Contraint naguère de ‘supprimer’, pour ne pas heurter l’Église, une physique dont le mérite est de s’ajuster à l’Église; désireux maintenant de l’extraire de l’ombre ou elle s’envelopit sans cesser de s’enrichir, Descartes entend s’assurer qu’elle ne sera pas refusée par ceux qu’elle prétend servir [the Jesuits] et cherche a créer le climat qui la rendra désirable” (V 7). Every feature of this “new” Descartes has its paternity (mostly unacknowledged) in Gouhier, Espinas, Cantecor, Gilson, M. Leroy and others. The composite image derives its plausibility from the massive omission (apart from generalities and apologetic claims) of D.’s mathematics and physics; from shifting the whole weight of argument to his moral utterances; and from introducing conjectures as if they were facts. Father Robert Lenoble patiently examined Lefèvre’s claim to historicity, saw the rise of “une sorte de scolastique intra-cartésienne” in which masses of detail obscure the great structures, and warned of D. scholarship degenerating into an interminable, barren battle of the texts (his review article below). However, Lefèvre’s treatment of D.’s metaphysics is unimpaired (though not unaffected) by his disquieting historical operations.


Lévy-Bruhl’s challenging unpublished Descartes course at the Sorbonne left deep traces upon French D. scholarship. Gilson reconstructs the essence of this course from his 1904–06 notes and his recollections. Lévy-Bruhl was first in distinguishing between image, doctrine, and goal of D. The changing D. image since 1650 is traced with emphasis on Voltaire and Cousin (the early naive, the late eclecticist and spiritualist Cousin); Gilson adds valuable comment on the difference between an image and an interpretative argument. After discussing precursors and originality of D., Lévy-Bruhl turned to his most influential proposition, critically discussed by Gilson, that D.’s ultimate goal was not a new metaphysics but a new physics. See also the Descartes chapter in Lévy-Bruhl’s History of modern philosophy in France, 1899, p. 1–37 (reprints: no. 2321) and his brief note on “The Cartesian spirit and history” in the Cassirer-Festschrift (1935, p. 191–96; see no. 2524).


A pathbreaking study which turned the traditional viewpoint upside down by taking method and physics to be D.’s all-important concern, while “ce qui s'y
trouve inséré de métaphysique peut en être détaché sans blessure" (141). This interpretation profoundly influenced Charles Adam, Lévy-Bruhl, M. Blondel, Laberthonnière and their generation; it is still upheld, with modifications, by Descartes scholars of widely varying observance. The work was at once attacked as “une espèce de coup d’état universitaire. Il consomme l’abandon de la dogmatique cartésienne par la philosophie officielle ... Descartes serait ainsi un pré­curseur des positivistes” (Mgr. Bourquard in his review below, 187, which represented “une leçon de catéchisme à Descartes, ainsi qu’à l’auteur”; 377). Today it is Descartes who is made to administer this “leçon de catechisme” to those who see in him chiefly the pathbreaker of modern science.


Brilliant analysis of the 20th c. monistic “revolt” against Descartes, 17th c. philosophy, and their twin dualism, one epistemological (theory of representative perception, the book’s main theme), the other psycho-physical. Modern philosophical and physical theories receive penetrating discussion with two important chapters on Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead whose Process and Reality, however, is not considered. Whitehead answered Lovejoy in Adventures of Ideas (1933, ch. 11, sec. 23; see 356): “Throughout the universe there reigns the union of opposites which is the ground of dualism.” The author’s basic position is epitomized in a “myth” that explains why the Demiurgus created a new kind of animal gifted with knowledge, thus building epistemological dualism into the scheme of things. But A. E. Murphy (review below) found “Mr. Lovejoy’s Counterrevolution” upholding not two but 18 different dualisms, indicating that the Demiurgus may have done more than he intended.


1. Le songe de Descartes. 2. Révélation de la Science. 3. Déposition de la Sagesse. 4. Les preuves cartésiennes de Dieu. 5. L’héritage cartésien.

“Descartes a donné à l’anthropothésisme ses lettres de crédit philosophiques. C’est pourquoi nous lui faisons la guerre”; Cartesianism is “le grand péché français” in modern history (286-87), traced from its inception in D.’s “Dream” to its consequences for modern culture, by the Neo-thomist master of philosophical prose. Maritain asserts that D. was a true believer: “un traître eût été incapable de ravages aussi profonds” (312). Five connected essays, one unpublished; 43 pages of learned, fiery notes for the scholar.


Descartes’ sin is angelism. He made “de la Connaissance et de la Pensée une Perplexité sans remède, un abîme d'inquiétude, parce qu’il a conçu la Pensée humaine sur le type de la Pensée angélique”; “(il) a dévoilé le visage du monstre que l'idéalisme moderne adore sous l’e nom de Pensée” (77–78). Violent, impassioned diatribe, ruthlessly simplifying both Cartesianism and Thomism to destroy the rationalist monster Descartes. But the notes are scholarly as always; hatred dictates some penetrating pages; and the description of St. Thomas' intellectual angels in just five soaring, grammatically fabulous sentences (79–81) is a masterpiece of French prose and the bane of translators. See also Maritain’s important technical paper “Le conflit de l’essence et de l’existence dans la philosophie cartésienne” (in no. 40, v. I, 11–20, and see no. 2645), with M. Gueroult's searching critique of it in RMM 45: 1938 107–10 (illuminating confrontation of Maritain’s and Brunschvicg’s interpretation.)

Reviews:


Asked to decide for either Pascal or Descartes, Maritain chooses St. Thomas. He suggests that (pre-Communist) Russian philosophy rejected both theandrism and the anthropotheism of Descartes and the Marxists. To Berdiaeff’s amazement and against all Russian tradition, Vycheslavzeff rises to D.’s defense, with interesting comments on the cogito as phenomenological reduction. The critique of Maritain’s thesis in the discussion is worth noting; among the participants are L. Gabrilovich, Berdiaeff, Désiré Roustan, O. Lacombe. See also Maritain’s Réflexions sur l’intelligence et sa vie propre (1924; 3e éd. 1931: no. 2643, 27–142, 288ff.)


In his Cartesio (no. 14) Olgiati provided “una specie di ‘bilanco filosofico’ degli studi principali” of Descartes scholarship, demonstrating their insufficiency (v). Now he makes a comprehensive survey of the fundamental concepts which are
"the columns and the constitutive parts of Descartes' palace of ideas" (p. viii). He asserts the primacy of D.'s initial metaphysics which gives unity to his system by establishing a new concept of reality which Olgiati labels "fenomenismo razionalistico." Barié notes that Olgiati, this clear-sighted critic of the interpretations of others, "non è altrettanto chiaro quando si tratta di esporre la propria" (no. 129, p. 143 n.2). Nonetheless these 26 chapters are invaluable as a complete, comprehensive, reliable mapping of D.'s "palace of ideas" in all its parts, including unfinished ones like law and politics, ethics, history, pedagogy, philosophy of language Olgiati summarized his own interpretation in his "Le phénoménisme de Descartes." (CD I: 105-10, transl. from no. 35, 615-21). See also Bontadini (no. 239) on the "fenomenismo razionalistico" question.


186 PÉGUY, CHARLES: Note sur M. Bergson et la philosophie bergsonienne; note conjointe sur Descartes et la philosophie cartésienne. In his: OEuvres complètes, Gallimard, v. 9, 1924, 57-331. [Other ed. and Spanish translation: no. 2923.]

Péguy's ultima verba (August 1, 1914) before going to war and death. Brief "Note sur M. Bergson" deals chiefly with Descartes, while the long "Note conjointe sur Descartes" stays with Descartes only long enough to give Péguy's celebrated profile of the philosopher as the "cavalier français qui partit d'un si bon pas" (59). See: Pierre Mesnard, "Méditation sur Descartes en la compagnie de Péguy" (Et 230: Feb. 20, 1917, 459-68).


Famous series on intuitive knowledge, "written in the spirit of opposition to Cartesianism" (Collected Papers, v. 5, p. 126) sums up "The spirit of Cartesianism," (156-98) in four points: universal doubt, individual consciousness as ultimate test of certainty, single thread of inference, the will of God as creator making many created facts inexplicable while Scholasticism "had its mysteries of faith, but undertook to explain all created things" (156). In refutation, Peirce postulates "four incapacities" of mind: it has no power of introspection, of intuition, of thinking without signs, no concept of the absolutely incomprehensible. These postulates, tested for validity by tracing their consequences, become the foundation of Peirce's own idealist pragmaticism. Most important American contribution to D. debate. See James Feibleman, An introduction to Peirce's philosophy; interpreted as a system. New York, Harper, 1946, 60-75 et passim; C. Eisele-Halpern on Peirce and 17th century logic of science, no. 1833a.

Singular attempt to construe all history of philosophy from Plato to Kant as preparation for, appearance of, and deviation from Descartes. Written by France’s great neocriticist in his early twenties in an “especé de fougue philosophique” upon first discovering D. and philosophy (CrPh 6/2 [12]: Nov. 29, 1877, p. 276), the book contains the revised 1839 prize essay on D. which Damiron carefully analyzed, mistaking the tyro author for a foreigner: “Il a plus de variété que de profondeur, plus d’aperçus que d’analyse: il ne démontre et ne prouve pas assez” (no. 451, 1: 146).

But Renouvier was first in Cousin’s day to restore D.’s mathematics and physics to their rightful place, and the bold, suggestive freshness of his youthful attempt is unimpaired.

See also Renouvier’s series of papers on Descartes’ physics, relating it to Newton, Leibniz, Pascal, Comte, and on interpretations of Liard and T. E. Huxley (CrPh 1874, 1877, 1882; see no. 3044-46); and his remarkable series of papers called “Les labyrinthes de la metaphysique” (CrPh 1877-79; no. 3047) on determinism and on the concept of the infinite; particularly “Une évolution personnelle,” ibid., on his youthful discovery of Descartes. For his treatment of Malebranche see Sebba, no. 19, p. 74.


1. DM and the Cartesian revolution. 2. Literary history of DM. 3. Background of DM (D. and Pascal; the spiritual emergence of D.; the ‘vision’ of 1619, the ‘mission’ of 1628; the poetic strain in D. and its repression in Cartesianism). 4. Nature of the method (Bacon’s rules, Regulae, 4 rules of DM). 5. Its weakness. 6. Its eclipse (Daniel’s Voyage du monde de Descartes; Chr. Huygens; Huet’s Censura, etc.). 7. Survival of the method (Locke a Cartesian although rejecting both his metaphysics and physics). 8. Conclusion: The problems of the method (Pascal’s criticism of Descartes; the geometric ideal useless, especially in physics, and so recognized by D. himself).

“The Cartesian ‘revolution’ lay in the attempt to substitute a physics based on metaphysics for a metaphysics based on physics” (4). This revolution failed: control of nature could not be achieved by the “méthode” as the sole instrument of scientific discovery, as Descartes’ mathematicist mind demanded. A remarkable reassessment of the main works gives the “true” date of the Meditations as 1628–29, that of PP as 1639–33. Accordingly, the Discours is not a preliminary manifesto later abandoned, but “the retrospect of a Descartes who has been through the stages of Meditations and Principles and now looks back on them” (75), a conglomerate of pieces from different periods, its Pt. VI D.’s confessio fidei. Penetrating pages on Descartes and Bacon, Pascal, Locke. Small, vigorous, original, important study. See Roth’s summary: “The Discourse on method, 1637–1937” in Mind 46: 1937, 32–43, and his doctrinal critique of DM and méthode in no. 318. Roth’s thesis of the non-empirical character of the “méthode” is attacked by Alan Gewirtz [Gewirth] in “Experience and the non-mathematical in the Cartesian method” (JHI 1: 1941, 183–210).


The editor of Mind launches “the most brilliant attack on the mentalism of mind-body dualism in a long time” (Hofstadter, JP 48: 1951, 256). Ryle makes it his “destructive purpose to show that a family of radical category-mistakes is the source of D.’s double-life theory” (18). Calling intelligent conduct “mind,” D. treated it as if conduct were in the same logical category as body, not realizing that this “mind” in the body was but a “Ghost in the Machine” (22). “Descartes’ myth” (Ch. 1) is by no means the only target of Wittgensteinian expurgation; the “ghost” is chased from every corner of behavior – knowledge, will, emotion, capacities, self-knowledge, sensation, imagination, intellect. In the end, Cartesian receive a backhanded compliment: they were like soldiers who, finding their old stone fortress in collapse, “take up their stand in the most fort-like thing they can see, namely, the shadow of the decrepit fort,” thus giving at least “some evidence of teachability” (330). No wonder that the old battle flared up anew; e.g. in the anti-Ryle issue of JP (48: 1951, 277–301): D. S. Miller on “Descartes’ Myth and Professor Ryle’s fallacy” (270–80), H. R. King, M. Weitz, A. Hofstadter (Ryle’s “present malady”: a case of excessive nominalism). The ghost-in-the-machine argument still continues, interlocking with debates on whether machines can think, whether problem of “other minds” (connaissance d’autrui) is a problem or another ghost – 20th century resumptions of 17th century topics. See also M. Macdonald, no. 306, J. Z. Young, no. 350.


SANTAYANA, GEORGE: Scepticism and animal faith; introduction to a system of philosophy. New York, Scribner’s, 1923, xii, 314 p.

Ch. I–VIII develop Santayana’s “true” scepticism, opposed to D.’s “histrionic” one, as an ideal attitude, though one impossible to maintain in the face of our compulsory “animal faith” in substance (185–86), which leads to duality between essence and substance and to the failure of this attempt to overcome Cartesian soul-body dualism, as Bowman convincingly showed (no. 155). Harsh critique of the cogito (289–91): D.’s doubt discounted since “his mind was not plastic nor mystical enough to be profoundly sceptical, even histrionically” (289). Awareness of the “inner life of the body was the rock of vulgar belief which Descartes found . . . . after his not very serious shipwreck . . . . On this stepping stone to idealism the father of modern philosophy, like another Columbus, set his foot with elegance” (291).

SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL: “La liberté cartésienne.” In his: Descartes. Paris, Trois collines, 1946, 9–52 (Les classiques de la liberté). Also in his: Situa-
Sartre's controversial contribution to D. criticism sees in D.'s notion of method "une magnifique affirmation humaniste de la liberté créatrice" in fulfillment of man's task: "faire qu'une Vérité existe dans le monde, faire que le monde soit vrai" (24). In the doubt and cogito, Being is bracketed out and man "se surprend comme un pur néant" (36). But Descartes, at the threshold of the existentialist discovery, turned back under the inner pressure of his epoch and gave to God "ce qui nous revient en propre" (31), namely the absolutely free, creative act. D.'s God is therefore the freest of all the Gods which human thought has made, and the only creative God. Existentialism revokes this theologizing compromise: "l'homme est l'être dont l'apparition fait qu'un monde existe" (51). G. Rodis-Lewis finds Sartre reducing the fruitful part of D.'s theory of freedom to the negativity of doubt "et à l'autonomie de Dieu qu'il interprète comme une sublimation d'une liberté humaine authentique" (RPFE 141: 1951, 265). Abbé Robert Lenoble assails Sartre's thesis in a remarkable paper ("Liberté cartésienne ou liberté sartrienne!" in Royaumont, no. 42, 322-24, discussion 325-35). He contrasts Descartes' and Mersenne's God and their notion of freedom. See also the related analysis of Cartesian freedom by Sarano, no. 33.


Like Hegel, Schelling sees in Descartes the revolutionary originator of modern philosophy; but his view is critical and pessimistic. In his new start, Descartes threw philosophy back into a sort of second childhood and narrowed it down to its one central modern problem, the relation of thought and Being. It widened out again, but its character remained what D. had made it. In his critique of cogito and doubt Schelling dismisses D.'s Dieu-trompeur and malin génie arguments as a mere shying away from the complete Idealism towards which D. was headed; in this context occurs the much-quoted remark that D. was not concerned with understanding things but merely with knowing that they are - "the least one can say of them" (SW 10, p. 12). D.'s most influential doctrine was the ontological argument which, to Schelling, does not prove God's existence but introduces the fundamental concept of his necessary existence, which leads to antinomy. Ultimately more influential were Schelling's earlier comments (scattered texts of 1794-1804, conveniently brought together by Hagmann, no. 10, p. 96-101). Here appears the profoundly pessimistic view of Cartesian dualism as both symptom and cause of the radical transformation of Western man's attitude to God, World, Nature, This dualism is a secularized Christian feeling of discord between World and God; it marks the withdrawal of the Numinous from the world (Heidegger's "Fehl Gottes") and the interiorization of the Light. Its consequence is the irremediable split between subject and object upon which the modern view of Nature rests. Metaphysically, the observational empiricism of modern science represents the victory of dualism which
alone makes willful mastery over nature possible. In D.'s mechanistic physics, his innermost intention achieved systematic form, while his metaphysics still stopped short of its inevitable consequences. One recognizes the roots of essential elements in Heidegger's view of Descartes as founding father of European Nihilism.


Very useful chapters on Cartesian principles in Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, on Hume's D. critique, and on the transition to Kant who initially accepts a Cartesian mind concept refined in the light of Hume's critique of causality. The first chapters on D.'s method and metaphysics repay reading for their precision and for comparison with author's New Studies of 1932 (no. 193).


Great commentary. Not a revision of author's Studies in the Cartesian philosophy (no. 192b) – which were by no means “prentice work” as he now calls them – but a new, comprehensive study of D.'s philosophy excepting ethics. The Descartes of the “New Studies,” “un pionnier au goût anglais” as Gueroult rather contemptuously puts it, forces his way into philosophical terram incognitam through a dense forest of difficulties, continually working and reworking the themes of his younger years, handicapped by uncertain terminology, incomplete enumeration of “simple natures,” etc. Kemp Smith's radically historical approach, contrary to the conception of Cartesianism as a monolithic system, drew a sharp attack from Gueroult in his anonymous review (RMM 59: 1954, 231-32) for destroying “l'ordre des raisons”:

"au lieu de s'en prendre à Descartes, que ne s'en prend-il à lui-même qui a brisé en mille miettes ce merveilleux ensemble dont Descartes nous dit .... que 'la moindre chose qu'on en ôte ou qu'on y ajoute en entraîne la ruine totale'."


A fighting churchman-scholar adds the Protestant voice to the Catholic lament about “the most disastrous moment in the history of Europe” when René Descartes emerged from the poêle with a cogito whose assurance is purely subjective, a methodical doubt purely artificial, an ontological argument “circular in a vicious manner” (57). Roaming from Aristotle via Bosanquet to Whitehead, from Conservative Party via Machiavelli to “Art for Art’s Sake” and points beyond, the great prelate expresses his conviction that every trace of Cartesianism must be removed from modern thought before a sound view of God and Church can be reached. Valuable reference to Baron von Hügel’s critique (78–79). For an urbane reassessment of the Archbishop’s “famous indictment” see R. G. Norburn, “The Cartesian faux-pas and the malignant demon” (CQR 272: Jan.–Mar. 1946, 127–54), rejecting the charge of impiety against Descartes on interesting Protestant grounds (140–41), but finding him incapable of conquering the “malin genie” of irrationalism, with sad consequences for philosophy. Far briefer, weightier, deeper than Temple is Karl Barth (Die kirchliche Dogmatik, v. I, 1932, p. 401–15; see no. 1149) whose “powerfully realistic outlook in ontology and epistemology” leads him to an equally uncompromising Protestant rejection of Cartesianism in philosophy and theology (R. E. Cushman, “Barth’s attack upon Cartesianism, and the future in theology.” JRe 36: 1956, 207–23).


For nearly 20 years Valéry tried to seize the quality of Descartes’ “magnifique et mémorable moi” (Variété 5, p. 253.) An interim stage, his opening address before the Congrès Descartes (RMM 1937) was “much elegant phrase-making” (Anon. in Mind 43: 1939, 118.) The final result, “Une vue de Descartes,” is a short but astonishingly fruitful essay. On Valéry’s affinities with, and aversions to Descartes see René Fernandat (no. 1877–1877a) and G. Vigorelli in no. 35, 787–91, with further references.


Whitehead develops his “philosophy of organism” in a profound dialogue with the philosophical tradition, chiefly Descartes, Locke and Hume. Descartes is assessed in the light of subsequent development in metaphysics, mathematics, physics. As for all great systematic philosophers, so for Whitehead too Descartes is the philosopher
of the cogito who recognized that "those substances which are the subjects enjoying conscious experiences, provide the primary data for philosophy, namely themselves as in the enjoyment of such experience" — "undoubtedly the greatest philosophical discovery since the age of Plato and Aristotle"; but "like Columbus who never visited America, Descartes missed the full sweep of his own discovery" (Pt. II, ch. VII, Sec. I). It is not always easy to recognize Descartes in Whiteheadian garb, but P & R sheds unexpected light on Descartes' thought, e.g. regarding the ontological principle (Whitehead's term, not the ontological argument), D.'s failure to provide for the perception of a particular actual entity and thereby missing a chief point of Whitehead's philosophy of organism. The identity of Cartesian substance and Whiteheadian "actual occasions," the theory of representative ideas, the treatment of dualism are other pertinent issues. See also no. 182 (Lovejoy) and A. G. A. Balz on "Whitehead, Descartes, and the bifurcation of nature" (JP 31: 1934, 281–97) on the dualism problem. Chapter 9 of Whitehead's Science and the modern world (1925; see no. 3555a) is devoted to a confrontation of Descartes and James, paradigmatically, and may serve as a non-technical introduction to the difficult Descartes passages in P & R.

VII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES
GENERAL STUDIES AND MONOGRAPHS


Boldly speculative fantasy on Genesis, Descartes, and Man: "Descartes, c'est le démiurge prétendant compléter et arriver à pervertir l'œuvre initiale de Dieu" in a spirit "tout imprégné et tout imbibé de divin" (39). Three chapters on D.'s "night of ecstasy," his Method, its aftermath.

196 ARTIGAS RAMÍREZ, JOSÉ: Descartes y la formación del hombre moderno. Madrid, Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas. Instituto S. José de Calasanz de Pedagogía, 1951. 176 p. See also no. 1087.

Descartes' importance for modern education, the author's theme, cannot be judged from his explicit statements concerning "sagesse" (ch. 1). In the "morale provisoire" (ch. 2) his orientation towards praxis becomes evident; the theme of God is postponed ad Kalendas Graecas, and the "métabasis a lo infinito queda en mera posibilidad y definitivamente desatendida" (156). The core chapter, "Aristas del hombre moderno" (89–150), sees in D.'s metaphysics and "morale provisoire" the root of modern man's operational attitude towards nature and to his "abstención de lo divino." The Cartesian type of modern man is incapable of identifying himself with a community that has a historical social mission; he is "esencialmente profano y morbosamente apegado a lo terreno." The epilogue rapidly surveys the countervailing forces in Spanish education, Thomism and mysticism; these must be called upon for a modern educational ideal of the whole man.
Authoritative, detailed commentary on the Regulae, which are taken, without special proof, to be the main statement of Cartesian method, the Four Rules of DM being a partial reformulation. D.'s méthod is viewed in its own context, not in its connection with D.'s metaphysics. This epistemological orientation, common to modern English D. scholarship, criticized in the Wittgensteinian TLS review below, is not only defensible (see J. Berthet, no. 237), but needed to keep the analysis to the technical point. The secondary literature is carefully judged, controversies are firmly dealt with. Wright's review below finds conclusions insufficiently separated from arguments. However, the presentation is always precise and clear. Among the many illuminating pages are those on intellectual intuition (D.'s “intuitus”) and on D.'s attitude towards formal logic, with interesting remarks on its relation to later developments (Leibniz, modern symbolic logic.) Index; list of the Regulae texts quoted. See also Beck's “L’unité de la pensée et de la méthode” in no. 42, 393-411.

Thorough study of D.’s method in the sciences and in philosophy, from the “discovery of method” to the last stage where ‘sagesse’ becomes the culmination and synthesis of all science. The author stresses the prime methodological and psychological importance of MM as satisfying D.’s need for shoring up his physics. French table of contents. Summary of Benes’ viewpoint: “L’importance des Méditations métaphysiques de Descartes au point de vue de sa méthode” (CD 1: 3-9, 1937.) See Gueroult (RMM 45: 1938, 109).

“Le mérite, rare et singulier, du livre,” as Brehicier says in his Preface (p. 1) “est d'avoir montré que la portée du cogito dans le système cartésien ne pouvait être entièrement comprise par l'étude de ses antécédents,” namely St. Augustine, himself a confluence of older Greek and neoplatonist conceptions, and Campanella. Gilson's important review accepts Blanchet's thesis of a Cartesian transformation of Augustine's “si enim fallor, sum,” but rejects his claim of Campanella's influence
on D. as manifestly false. Original, exhaustively documented work. See also Blan-
chet's posthumously published "La préparation du cogito cartésien dans la philos-
phie grecque de l'antiquité" (RMM 40: 1933, 187-230), and É. Bréhier's "Une forme
archaïque du cogito ergo sum" (RPFE 131: 1943, 143-44) on a passage in Aristotle
which by contrast reveals "tout ce qu'il y a d'audace dans la philosophie cartésienne
à prendre son appui dans une certitude évanouissante" (144); see the comment by
P. M. Schuhl in RPFE 138: 1948, 191-94.

Reviews: Anon. in RMM 28: 1921, suppl. 1, 6; H. Gouhier in no. 168, p. 29-35, 290-94;
F. Olgiati in no. 14, p. 75-79; É. Gilson in RPFE 91: 1921, 302-10, reprinted in no. 165,
259-68.

200a BOAS, GEORGE: "Homage to Descartes." PPR II: 1930-51, 149-63.

Since D. recognized three fundamental non-rational ways of understanding,
Cartesianism is not pure rationalism. Its core is the concept of perfectly ordered
systematic knowledge, still at the root of Western thought but now in need of
modification. Delightful commemorative lecture, modern in approach. Review: A.

The chapter "Descartes and the Cartesians" in Boas' Dominant themes of modern
philosophy (New York, 1957, 90-132; see no. 1264) is a sympathetic though critical
discussion of what became fruitful in Descartes and his successors up to Spinoza.
The next chapter (133-58) balances the account by following French anticartesianism
from Gassendi to Huet. Reviewed by R. H. Popkin in TP, January 15, 1959; J. P. Day
in Phil 35: 1960, 175-77.

201 BOUTROUX, ÉMILE: De veritatibus aeternis apud Cartesium. Baillière,
Alcan, 1927. 146 p. (BPC)

Challenging thesis which tries to establish "que les principes cartesiens constituent
tantôt une dualité, tantôt une unité" (137), pivoting about the idea of God as it
emerges from D.'s doctrine of eternal verities. This succinct, careful study of the
document in relation to other elements of Cartesian philosophy (doubt, cogito,
evidence, existence of God and things, dualism, free will, judgment) is still authori-
tative. For its impact on French scholarship see Brunschvicg's preface to the French
translation.

202 CAIRD, EDWARD: "Cartesianism." In his: Essays in literature and
267-383. Italian transl. by M. C. Bombelli: Il cartesianismo. Firenze,
Nuova Italia, 1933. 99 p.

Pellucid critical treatment, in transcendentalist language, of the metaphysics and
epistemology of Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza. Going straight to the core, the
essay sheds unexpected light on many a well-worn text, illuminating basic issues
and conflicts in D.'s thought. Granted that many pages would read differently if
written after Gilson, the essay repays close reading as it stands. See also Caird's art.

Interprets D.'s cogito and Bergson's "durée" as "exemplos incisivos do ato filosófico em sua pureza original e primitiva," rising "como impulsos incoercíveis de um inconsciente rico de imagens e de símbolos, sintetizando tód a uma existência a serviço do ideal especulativo" (32), both losing their authenticity in the laborious rational operation of system-building. Modern analysis, sober despite its colorful language; less than fundamental.


Vol. I: L'idea. L'essenza del cartesianesimo nelle Meditazioni. 1. La causazione e l'idea. 2. La causa sui. 3. L'idea dell'infinito. 4. L'argomento ontologico. 5. Il circolo vizio.

Vol. II: La dualità. 6. La dualità della sostanza. 7. La natura del conoscere: intendere o sentire?


I. Il cartesianesimo tradizionale: cogitare puro, negatività dell'essere, autocoscienza. II. Il cartesianesimo integrale: l'evidenza come principio della certezza e come regola dell'essere; raggiungimento dell'essere col cogito. III. La scoperta di Cartesio: la spiritualità della sostanza; le incoerenze fondamentali di Cartesio. IV. La riconqueta del cartesianesimo: liberazione dall'autocoscienza – la concezione realistica dell'essere; correzione del circolo vizio cartesiano.

Carabellese's great work on the Objections and Responses to MM (no. 204), "nato da due corsi di lezioni, 1938–40, già pubblicate in dispense ad uso degli scolari," rigorously analyzes Descartes' Meditations, argument by argument, and offers the fullest systematic study so far of the Objections of Gassendi, Hobbes, Arnauld, etc., and of D.'s Responses, covering all major themes of Descartes' metaphysics. "Lavoro .... di primissimo ordine, meditato seriamente e concretamente construito in ogni sua parte, e col quale dovremo fare i conti nella presentazione del ver Cartesio" (Ferro's review, 206). The author's own ontologist philosophy of "ontocizeniaлизmo" is applied to Descartes who appears tending towards purest rationalism. The much-discussed analysis of the Cartesian circle (v. i, 199–248) was first published in 1937 (no. 1454), and reprinted in the author's Da Cartesio a Rosmini, 1946, together with the noteworthy study "La riconqueta dal cartesianesimo" (no. 204a) which sums up Carabellese's own philosophical position as applied to the Descartes problem.

Author sees D. driven towards realism by supposedly inevitable exigencies of scientific thought, yet clinging to an idealistic interpretation in purely philosophical matters. Cartesianism is said to derive its power from the Eleatic-Platonic ontological tradition of early medieval philosophy. One of the best Italian studies, by an influential philosopher.

This well-documented study exalts D.’s “sagesse” as a triumph over his epistemology, mathematicism, and scientism, thus shifting the emphasis from what has become hard to defend, e.g. his physics, to what is hard to refute. Beginning with a critique of D.’s dialectics and of the cogito, Combes proceeds to analyse D.’s “morale,” both the provisional and the supposedly definitive one; his views on the knowledge of man’s nature; the supreme good; divine and human freedom; the love of God as “sommet de la Sagesse”; and Cartesian “générosité.” In this perspective, D.’s quest for a mathesis universalis shrivels to “une ascèse, une méthode de purification” (343) as “Sagesse” triumphs over analysis, rises to “l’absolu de l’affirmation” and becomes in an ultimate apotheosis a “pure epistemology” and a “philosophy of pure immanence” (34).

Influential study. Contains an analysis of D.’s “idealism of freedom” (348–59), a brief comparison of his system with that of Hobbes, Spinoza and Leibniz, and a notable treatment of his theory of passions (479–92) within the context of the changing concept of man.

Traces the subjectivism and idealism of modern philosophy back to Descartes. Interesting discussion of the D. criticism of Vico, Gioberti, and lesser Italian op-
ponents of Cartesian psychologism. Original treatment of D.'s controversies: his defenses were a triumph, though his arguments were partly invalid. "Par leur clarté, leur méthode, et par les très intéressantes critiques ... qui pénètrent au vif des apories cartésiennes, ces pages méritaient d’être arrachées à l’oubli" (G. Bonfardini in Rsyn 14: 1937). See also Olgiati (no. 14), p. 222-23.


A commanding study of Thought and Being in Descartes and St. Thomas. The Cartesian cogito is immediate perception, "affirmation du moi substantiel" (ch. 3, 76) while Thomist "reflection" finds Being before finding itself. Ch. 4 seeks the roots of D.'s doctrine of the thinking substance in Francisco Sánchez and the Conimbricenses whom D. studied at La Flèche. The last chapter gives an ontological critique of the cogito: it cannot guarantee absolute certitude; D.'s three attempts to evade the consequences failed. Rich work, going back to primary texts, clarifies D.'s doctrinal relationship to Scholasticism, though some of its theses were challenged. Elaborate table of contents, no index. The bibliography on the cogito lacks essential non-French contributions.


209 GALLI, GALLO: Studi cartesiani. Torino, Chiantore, 1943. xi, 443 p. (Testi e studi di filosofia e pedagogia, v. 1.) Also published without the last chapter as: Il pensiero filosofico di Cartesio (see no. 1959).

1. La dottrina del metodo. 2. Il dubbio e il cogito. 3. Le prove dell’esistenza di Dio. 4. La dimostrazione dell’esistenza del mondo esterno ed il valore pratico delle qualità sensibili. 5. Il problema dell’errore.

This collection of five large studies of the years 1937–39 (see no. 1960–66), a considerable technical contribution, treats Descartes’ metaphysics as a concrete, objective, immanentist idealism. The large, almost book-length study of the problem of error is of particular interest. See A. Pastore, “Presentazione degli Studi cartesiani di Gallo Galli” in AcTorino v. 79; t. 2, 1943–44.


A Thomist disciple of Jacques Chevalier meticulously analyzes the doctrine of eternal verities in D. and St. Thomas. Very comprehensive critique of the literature. From this narrow basis he jumps to broad conclusions, contesting Gilson (no. 165): D. knew only the eclectic Jesuit Scholasticism taught at La Flèche, not genuine Thomism, whence his distrust for metaphysics and his leanings towards positive science. But Garin fails, even in Thomist judgment, to give proof of "what
is otherwise quite admissible” (E 57: 555, 1937), which does not diminish the value of his analysis of the doctrine of eternal verities.


The only comprehensive British study of D.’s philosophy other than that of N. Kemp Smith, a difficult but rewarding work, attempts to see Descartes’ thought as a systematic whole; this, in the author’s view, requires separating the philosophical intention from D.’s superficial and misleading statements arising partly from his desire to ease the difficulties of his philosophy, partly from a failure to understand the real drift of his own thinking. This disengagement leads to the central theme: there are two Cartesian methods, one scientific-mathematical, the other metaphysical (see Serrus, no. 231.) “The” Cartesian method of the Regulae and DM is applicable only to the realm of abstraction (mathematics and natural sciences), not to Cartesian metaphysics which Gibson sees as an attempt to prove the inseparable union between the experiencing, experienced real self and a real God. Stout’s elaborate critique (below) notes among other essential points Boyce Gisnob’s alleged failure to understand D.’s representational theory of ideas and hence his notion of innate ideas. Gibson’s contention that the fundamental character of D.’s philosophy does not really require D. to have recourse to the Cartesian circle is challenged by P. A. Reynolds in PhR 48: 1939, 423–27. Boyce Gibson’s general view of Descartes is expressed in the Great Thinkers Lecture no. 6 (“Descartes,” Phil. 10: leses in AJPP II, no. 1, 1933, 72–77.


Outstanding work from the Marburg neocriticist school. Leonardo da Vinci, Kepler, Galilei, Bacon are stepping stones on the road from empirical science to method, but D. alone found the transition to the epistemological conception of method “als einer umfassenden Charakteristik des Erkennens überhaupt” (26). Part I is a rich, masterly study of D.’s method of clear and distinct knowledge; Part II treats Leibniz “Methode der formalen Begründung,” his epistemology and monadology, with illuminating discussion of his doctrinal relation to Cartesianism. Valuable index that guides quickly to specific Leibniz-Descartes problems and to key doctrines of both thinkers.


A doctrinal and historical monograph on “ontotheology,” tracing the history of the ontological argument from Descartes to the end of German idealism. Author distinguishes between Anselm’s and Descartes’ argument and finds Anselm’s proof by the maximum of essence (ens perfectissimum) wholly ineffective in modern philosophy, while Descartes’ proof by the concept of necessary being determined the course of modern metaphysics (cf. also Schelling, no. 192a): this “will always remain one of the most peculiar phenomena in the history of philosophy” (i). With Descartes, the notion of ens necessarium becomes the fundamental problem of metaphysics, leading to a metaphysical climax followed by a deep crisis. The book traces this almost organic growth and decay of “ontotheology” from the establishment of the argument in Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, the Cambridge Platonists and Leibniz through the period of criticism (Gassendi and Huet to Hume and Kant); the chapter on Kant’s critique of “ontotheology” (137–188) is perhaps the best analytical presentation of this critique and of the Kantian notion of rational theology. The last part treats the unexpected revival of “ontotheology” from Hegel to Chr. H. Weisse, with a melancholy concluding chapter on why the argument is now dead. The careful treatment of many minor yet important contributing thinkers is particularly valuable. Charles Hartshorne, in his new Anselm edition (New York, Open Court Philosophical Classics), surveys the formulation of the argument in numerous philosophers, claiming that Anselm remained ineffective because he was quoted but not read. The so-called Cartesian argument by the ens necessarium is the Anselmian argument of the Proslogion, ch. 3. Descartes may have independently invented it, but hardly contributed anything new. See Hartshorne’s fundamental: The Logic of Perfection (Lasalle, Illinois, Open Court), 1962, ch. 2.


With German directness and cool Thomist precision, the distinguished historian of philosophy and theology goes to what he considers the heart of D.’s philosophizing (his new concept of science). Excellent treatment of the contrast between D.’s method and Aristotelian logic. Required reading for those just talking of “l’esprit cartésien.” See also Jansen’s “Die Methodenlehre des Descartes, ihr Wesen und ihre Bedeutung” in Cartesio (no. 35), 487–512.


Joachim’s important Oxford course, given in the early 1930’s, reconstructed from the editor’s and J. Austin’s notes, offers a bold, concise analysis and criticism of the Regulae. Third (last) chapter introduces Joachim’s idealistic epistemology, his “theory of the concrete”. Woozley’s markedly unfriendly critique below tries to shake the reconstructed text by pointing to some “staggering” misrepresentations of what D. said (188), but the vigor and originality of these lectures comes through despite rough edges in transcription.

Reviews: Anon. in TLS 56: 1957, Oct. 11, 613; C. L. in Rmet 11: 1957, 347; A. W. Levi in


Epistemological critique of apodeictic evidence in Descartes who did not distinguish between apodeictic and assertory evidence, between the origin of knowledge in concepts and the genesis of these concepts as rooted in perception. His transposition of epistemological apriorism to the genesis of concepts led to the theory of innate ideas which he applied even to the relationship between stimulus and sensation. This forced him to distinguish between causae and occasiones and led to the difficulties inherent in his notion of “clear and distinct” thought. A meticulous, technically clean study, with valuable discussions of Arnauld, Régis, modern voluntaristic interpretations of D.’s epistemology (Kastil uses Broder Christiansen’s book as example; see no. 1959). Kastil’s own position is indecisive.


(Leaders of philosophy.)

Examines D.’s philosophy “through conceptions and in language more readily understood today” (p. ix), with some original interpretations. Part Three rapidly surveys the Cartesian school, with interesting comment on changing concepts of causality and substance (to Spinoza and Leibniz). The concluding critical chapter is admittedly sketchy. Reviewed by C. D. Broad in Mind 44: 1935, 70–75. See also Keeling’s Descartes: Annual Hertz Lecture on a Master Mind, in Proc. Brit. Acad. 34: 1948, 57–81, cf. note to no. 2347), reviewed by (G. Lewis) in RIP 4: 1950, 320–21.


Original, vigorous monograph on D.’s concept and proofs of God, and on the Scholastic roots of his thought. Discounting D.’s ingenuous and strenuous disavowal of his predecessors (“malheureusement, la grandeur intellectuelle et la grandeur personnelle ne vont pas de pair chez D.; en lui, le penseur est plus grand que l’homme [201],) Koyré sees in him not the destroyer of Scholastic philosophy but a successor to genuinely medieval speculation rooted in St. Augustine. Extensive
source quotations (341 items, p. 170–244 of the German ed.) include many citations of medieval philosophers, badly marred by printing errors. D.’s views of voluntas humana et divina, of eternal verities, error, lumen naturale etc. are discussed with reference to Bonaventura, St. Thomas, and particularly Duns Scotus. Koyré assumes that D. read Duns in 1626–29 and rates this influence greater than does Gilson. In his proofs of the existence of God, Descartes shows himself a “disciple of Augustine and Plotinus, moving away from the classical Thomistic proofs and going back to the thought of Augustine, Anselm, and Bonaventura” (p. 96 of the German ed.) The Cartesian circle is necessary and legitimate, and indeed inherent in any epistemology; its Cartesian version is held to rest on a doctrine that comes close to a mystical view of God. The roots of D.’s differentiation between the infinite and the indefinite are traced back to Bonaventura; the ontological proof places D. in the context of Neoplatonic-Christian thought. Running critique of Gilson’s Liberté (no. 164).

214a LAZZERONI, VIRGILIO [i.e., Virgilio Lazzeroni Albani]: La formazione del pensiero cartesiano e la scolastica. Padova, CEDAM, 1940. 265 p. (Problemi d’oggi).

Scholasticism is still alive in D. who resolves its cardinal problem (God and World) in the spirit of a “scienzato.” His concept of truth must appear contradictory to idealist interpreters who fail to see its roots in medieval gnoseology. See Lazzeroni’s “Il medievalismo di Cartesio” in CD 3: 25–31.


Masterly monograph built on a magnificent source foundation. The Oratorian historian of science revises the common view of the relationship between Descartes and Mersenne, who was not just a scientific post-office but an influential thinker in his own right; his empirical, pragmatic tendencies were closer to the mainstream of the new mechanistic philosophy of nature than D.’s metaphysical speculation. Mersenne was also a great organizer, subtly and effectively building up a network of scientific intercommunication. Without denying the importance of speculative vision, Father Lenoble gives due credit to “the cautious, non-metaphysical pragmatism of Mersenne and Gassendi” in making acceptable “a world seen descriptively and not causally, a world that could have forces and actions without spirits and magic” (R. H. Popkin’s Éloge of Lenoble in Isis 51: 1960, 202). Lenoble and de Waard thus remove Mersenne and Beeckman from the oppressive shadow of Descartes which has concealed their true character and stature ever since Baillet. The monograph is indispensable in studying the Mersenne-Descartes correspondence in toto and in its historical context; it elucidates many of the theological, philosophical, mathematical and scientific issues in Descartes.


1. Descartes et la scolastique devant le principe d’individuation: l’enseignement de La Flèche; thomisme et l’individuation par la matière; influences scotistes et
l'individuation par la forme. 2. La différentiation des individus matériels: pluralité des substances corporelles; différenciation physique – figure et mouvement; l'individuelité des corps vivants.

3. L'individu humain: L'Eucharistie et le principe de l'individuation; unité de l'individu humain; son unicité; différences individuelles et le nominalisme; les passions. 4. La multiplicité numérique des substances pensantes: âme individuelle posée par le cogito; existence des autres esprits; communication des esprits. 5. Les différents esprits: égalité du bon sens, inégalité des intelligences; défauts, qualités des esprits.


The author, schooled by Laporte, pursues the unusual theme of Descartes' difficulties with the principle of individuation to some equally unusual conclusions. In his inability to find individuality in material bodies, Descartes was in premature accord with modern nuclear physics which cannot tell one particle from another either; even modern biology suspects “individuality” of being a bit of psychologising anthromorphism if applied to the beast-machine. This leaves man, for Descartes, as the proper domain of individuality, “et le degré de développement de sa liberté en assure à la fois l'unité et l'unicité” (231). This root of individuality in freedom is what man has in common with God. Individuality has the moral character of personality; its highest expression is the passion of “générosité.” On the subject of the individuality of the immortal soul when divorced from the body Descartes seems less communicative. The fascinating study is at its very best in the pursuit of the rich subthemes listed above.


Introduction. [St. Augustine and Descartes.]

Ch. I: Conscience et l'inconscient. [Cogito. Degrees of consciousness in infantile thought; synesthesia; dreaming; day-dreaming etc. Complete consciousness and the potential unconscious: innate ideas; acquired dispositions. Consciousness the only mark of effective thought, but soul not necessarily a succession of conscious states.]

Ch. II: Degrés de la conscience: les Cartésiens. [Immediate and reflexive consciousness; Régis vs. Huet. Limits of consciousness: Spinoza. Occasionalists and Empiricists. Malebranche: critique of innate ideas. Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza and the subject-object problem.]

Ch. III. Les profondeurs de l'âme chez les théologiens cartésiens. [Attempted resolution of the theological problem of the unconscious. Poirot: Cartesianism to mysticism; “pensées imperceptibles” and grace (Nicole, Lamy; Arnauld, Huygens). “Intuition divinatrice,” “esprit de finesse,” the esthetic “je ne sais quoi.” Unconscious dispositions: “surface de la pensée et fond du cœur”; actual and habitual grace; revealing behavior; self-love: La Rochefoucauld. Lamy vs. Jansenists; Malebranche;

Conclusion: Leibniz and Cartesianism: “petities perceptions”; defense of innate ideas and permanence of thought against Locke. Cartesianism rejects metaphysical or vitalistic use of the unconscious, recognizes complexity of soul, degrees of consciousness, the subconscious, and still deeper dispositions.

The Doctor subtilis among contemporary French Descartisants examines the problem of admitting the unconscious and the subconscious (not sharply separated here) into a philosophy founded on the evidence of a mind conscious of its operations. The brilliant introduction poses the problem of self-knowledge in St. Augustine and in Descartes who is found to be closer to St. Augustine than to the School. With scrupulous documentation the study reveals Descartes' concerns with subconscious thought, notwithstanding his rigorous insistence on awareness. The two following chapters show how theology forces into the open this problem which D.'s metaphysics had pushed away. The connections between a theory of unconscious and subconscious action and passion with the theory of grace are historically examined. The subtle, original analyses wrung praise even from that grouchy Marxist reviewer, M. Soriano. Searching discussion by E. Bréhier, H. Gouhier and others: Âme et conscience chez Descartes (BSPF 45: 1951, 133-164.)


Shortest, and by far the best, introduction to D.'s ethical thought and precepts, very carefully formulated and documented. Recognizing that in D.'s correspondence with Chanut, Elisabeth and Christina "les développements traditionnels .... dominant" (3) and that it is impossible and impermissible to construct on his behalf the ethics he did not live to write, the author stays within the limits of what the texts say rather than what they suggest, and supplies the underlying systematic bond. "La morale qui se dégage .... met en œuvre à la fois les vérités les plus importantes de la métaphysique, quelques principes de la physique, la description des fonctions physiologiques de l’homme et la psychologie des passions" (118), which seems to be the chief distinguishing characteristic of D.'s "morale." The small book discusses D.'s formative years and the morale "par provision"; morale and metaphysics; the union of body and soul, and the mastery of passions; person and community (générosité; prudence de D. et révérence pour les souverains); concluding chapter on the "bien juger et juger le mieux possible" of DM, "a formula which, while holding out the possibility of happiness to man, emphasizes primarily the difficulty of his situation, his distance from the ideal," as Bannan (below, 421) sums up this sane and unexaggerated interpretation.


Bergsonizing, vitalistic interpretation of Cartesianism in three chapters: “Die Lebensquellen des cartesianischen Rationalismus,” memory and creation in D., “Die cartesianischen Gewebe.” Lively, suggestive, willful; makes Cartesianism a very French, very Latin philosophy where passion is at the core of man, hence of the world. Author does better by Bergson and much, much worse by Rousseau. Still, an effective piece of “Kulturpropaganda.”


Sees grave difficulties arising from Descartes’ conceiving the “res cogitans” as a substance. Cartesian dualism blocks the road to experimental psychology, tends towards a negation of metaphysics, reduces God from real and objective status to a logical proposition. Marcel’s remedy: back to Scholasticism, with modifications. A cogently developed study with concise historical analyses.


Applies the thesis that value judgments play an integral part in the intellectual life of man (p. vii) to Descartes, Geulincx, Spinoza. Contrasts the Cartesian spirit with that of the Renaissance philosophers and compares Descartes as critic of the culture of his time with Montaigne, before proceeding to an analysis of his ethics and his metaphysical theory of value. Interesting chapters on Arnold Geulincx and his Ethica. Spinoza appears as the ultimate “Cartesian antithesis to the thought of the Renaissance” (196). Boas called the main thesis “Dewey with different emphasis”; the style is slow-moving; but the view of the value principle as binding Cartesian ethics and metaphysics “into a unity of knowledge which is also goodness” (228) is engagingly fresh when encountered in the austere epistemological environment of English Descartes scholarship, however timid and reticent it may look compared to the raptures of the New Quietism across the Channel. “Undoubtedly the most distinguished and rewarding of [recent] English books” on 17th century philosophy (Stewart, review below, 359).


218 Mattei, André: L’homme de Descartes. Aubier, 1940. 262 p. (PhE)

Cartesianism is an all-philosophical attitude of wisdom, “une philosophie de l’amour, une recherche de l’amour par les philtres du doute et du cogito, un amour de l’amour par la mystique de Dieu, une fécondation de l’âme par l’amour de la science” (241). “Descartes joue Dieu et il invente un monde. Or, le monde que
Descartes invente est ce monde même” (234). Brilliant pages on moral, religious aspects of D.’s thought, in poetic language which yet stays this side of bathos and hagiography. But the resemblance between Mattei’s theme figure and the sturdy author of René Descartes’ works is elusive.


Sober attempt by a well-trained mind to determine for himself what questions D. raises, and what the true answers are. Topics limited to doubt, cogito, proofs of God, ideas, judgment, method (of Regulae), “simple natures”. Cogent discussion, argument by argument, with a useful methodical summary (xi–xxviii). Though critical readers are likely to pepper page margins with question marks, this is a good companion for those who, like Descartes, seek to distinguish “le vray d’avec le faux” instead of hunting for the “true” Descartes “dans un tas de si gros volumes, qu’il faudroit plus de temps pour les lire, que nous n’en avons pour demeurer en cette vie,” as the true Descartes himself said in his Recherche de la vérité.


Thèse supplémentaire, Paris.


III. La pratique: 1. Le gouvernement des passions. 2. L’éducation du désir. 3. La générosité cartésienne.

Excursus: Morale et politique; le prétendu machiavélisme de D. Conclusion: La morale cartésienne.

Fundamental. Traces D.’s preoccupation with moral problems from the beginnings in the Cogitationes privatae and the Studium bonae mentis to TP and the “méta-morale” (229) of the late correspondence with Chanut, Elisabeth and Christina. Careful analysis of DM reveals three conceptions: the morale provisoire, a “morale de puissance” connected with the notion of mastery of nature through physics and medicine but actually outside the field of ethics, and the basic elements of a definitive morale, the initial postulate of which is “l’unité réelle du composé humain” (see on this also Segond, no. 230). Thus the problem of dualism and union becomes central to D.’s ethics, which explains the exceptional systematic importance of D.’s treatment of the passions. The moral philosopher must “réaliser l’éducation de cette union, d’une part par l’hygiène du corps, de l’autre par une spiritualisation progressive de l’âme” (Segond’s review, 48). “Sagesse”, first conceived in the manner
of Charron, gradually enters into relationship with other disciplines, to develop a norm of conduct that satisfies both the physicist and the metaphysicist while maintaining the “cohérence interne et l’unité profonde du système” (230). Mesnard, unlike some later commentators, does not try to construe a Cartesian system of ethics but follows the living thought of Descartes which prematurely broke off but had consistently aimed, according to Mesnard, at developing “Sagesse” into an overarching conception which reconciles recognized, legitimate philosophical opposites. The work is essential to the understanding of TP, and helpful in the study of D.’s early thought. See also Mesnard’s fine Royaumont paper “L’arbre de la Sagesse” (no. 42, 356–59, with discussion; cf. note to no. 2724) and the controversy between C. Rodis-Lewis and Mesnard over her and Gueroult’s interpretation of the physiological basis of D.’s theory of passions, following her Royaumont paper “Maitrise des passions et Sagesse chez Descartes” (ibid., 208–36); also Lefebvre (no. 295).


Treats D.’s philosophy from the pure epistemological viewpoint as an early idealistic system; elaborates doctrinal affinities with Kant. Valuable chapter on mechanistic philosophies of nature leading to D. and Hobbes. The solidly argued work remains useful for its study of Cartesian key doctrines, though a much deeper understanding of affinities and differences between Descartes and Kant has been achieved since. See also Natorp’s “Die Entwickelung Descartes’ von den Regeln bis zu den Meditationen” (AGP 10: 10–28, 1897; French translation: no. 2831) and V. Delbos’ rejection of Natorp’s neokantian interpretation: “L’idéalisme et le réalisme dans la philosophie de Descartes” (AnP 22: 39–53, 1911; see the note, no. 1710).


The first chapter considers the unity of D.’s philosophy as one of inferential realism (“realismo ilazionistico”) with the characteristic move from “nosse” to “esse”, a middle path between realism and idealism. Ch. 2 takes D.’s “fisica a priori” as focus of unity. The third chapter is a study of Cartesianism in Italy (see no. 461). Intriguing thumbnail characterization of D.’s philosophy: Occasion – collapse of the Aristotelian-Scholastic theory of substantial forms; genetic origin – scepticist; method – idealistic; intention – scientific-mathematical; foundation – metaphysical-religious; conclusion – realist; “visione totale” – unitarian (10–11). Contribution of great independence and originality. See also no. 27.


This translation of the works of Adam Smith’s successor, with the influential lectures of Royer-Collard, Dugald Stewart’s Life of Reid, and Jouffroy’s substantial
introduction, was instrumental in shaping dominant French Descartes and Malebranche interpretation from Cousin to Bouillier, Saisset and others. The reaction came in the 1880’s with Liard’s Descartes and Pillon’s Malebranche-Bayle studies in AnP 1895-1904 (“L’évolution de l’idéalisme au XVIIIe siècle”), but Renouvier had already in 1842 torn into the epistemology of the Scottish School in his fierce attempt to establish Descartes as the central modern philosopher and pioneer of science (no. 188, 556-58). For the pertinent texts of Reid, Dugald Stewart and Sir William Hamilton see no. 3038, no. 3350, and no. 2179a. See also Dauriac’s essay on Descartes and Reid (no. 249), and Rémusat (no. 224).


Flowery but clear exposition of Dugald Stewart’s view of D. as father of “la philosophie expérimentale de l’esprit humain, de la vraie métaphysique” (169). As to the rest of D.’s work: “Alors commencent les mathématiques et la physique. Nous ne suivons pas Descartes sur ce nouveau terrain” (153); neither did Rémusat’s master, V. Cousin. The curious, deplorable essay (ch. 5) on D., Reid and Kant touches a low point in French philosophical D. criticism.


Purpose: “einen französisch-deutschen Philosophen-Dialog gleichsam aus der Sphäre seliger Geister zu schreiben” (96). The blessed spirits, all German and critical of Descartes – Kant, Goethe, Herder, Hamann, Nietzsche and many others – try to correct D.’s “an sich verständliche Einseitigkeiten” which, “in der Vergrößerung durch seine Nachbeter”, have become a world power and world menace. Useful for its quotations, though exact references are lacking.


Sympathetic yet not uncritical appraisal in popular language sufficiently precise to do justice to the “magnifique virilité de Descartes” (105): “cet homme, peu religieux, est un mystique de l’univers” (109). Gingerly treatment of his proofs of existence of God, recognizing D.’s good intentions but doubting their “valeur apostolique”: they smack of the sin of excessive intellectualism (37–38).


I. The beast-machine and the Cartesians. D.’s denial of animal soul.
II. Animal soul and anticartesians. 1. Traditionalism (Dualists – Cartesian or anti-
cartesian? Peripatetics and substantial form; Neoplatonists and mystic soul; eclec-
ticism. 2. Empiricism [Epicureans and flaming soul; freethinkers; the man-
machine; sequel]. 3. Poets and the animal soul.

Erudite, lively historical monograph. The issue in the three-cornered controversy
"was less the beast than the system of philosophy" (p. 185) as "Cartesian mechanism
[first] defeated [Peripatetic] traditionalism, then, swelled by empiricism, culmi-
nated in the man-machine." Part I deals with D.'s doctrine of animal automatism and its
subsequent spread in physiology, metaphysics, theology and poetry (Cardinal de
Polignac and Louis Racine). Part II introduces the opponents of the doctrine:
Peripatetics, Neoplatonists, eclecticists, empiricists (the treatment of La Mettrie has
been challenged), and again the poets: La Fontaine, followed by nice pages on Mlle.
Cathérine Descartes, Madeleine de Scudéry, Antoinette Deshoulières, and the
widely unknown Gilles Morfouace de Beaumont. Exceptionally rich coverage of
French and Dutch figures in the controversy, with much biographical and bibli-
ographical information. For related studies by Dix Harwood, George Boas, Hester
Hastings see Wade's review below. See also the author's articles on Ignace-Gaston
Pardies' "Discours de la connaissance des bestes" of 1696 (PMLA 52 : 1937, 763-72); on
the 1645-1749 English controversy of the animal machine (Henry More, Sir Kenelm
Digby, Antoine Le Grand, John Norris) in RLC 17 : 1937, 461-81, bibliography 482-87;
and her translation of the Descartes-More correspondence (no. 84). For Holland
see Paul Dibon, "Le problème de l'âme des bêtes chez Descartes et ses premiers
disciples néerlandais" (Sassen Festschrift, no. 1764, 1934, 187-222). A. G. A. Balz gives a
bold explanation why latter-day Cartesians considered the doctrine crucial ("Whi-
terhead, Descartes and the bifurcation of nature," PhR 31 : 1934, 290-92). This and
Balz's brilliant study of "Cartesian doctrine and the animal soul; an incident in the
formation of the modern philosophical tradition" (in no. 431, 106-57, reprinted from
SH 1, v. 3, 1935, 117-77) should not be overlooked. See also Espinas (no. 163), Young
(no. 390), Thijssen-Schoute (no. 467).

Reviews: R. Allers in NSch 16 : 1942, 184-85; J. Anderson in AJPP 19 : 1941, 277-86 (critical);
A. G. A. Balz in PhAb 2, no. 1 : 1941, 18; F. Baldensperger in MLF 26 : 1941, 168-70; J. R.
Cantor in PsychB 38 : 1941, 772; P. Courtelles in RevR 1941, 80-83; V. Guillette in
AmSoR 7 : 1942, 123; H. Hastings in AHR 47 : 1942, 842; G. R. Havens in MLN 57 : 1942,
681-83; R. Hazelton in JRel 22 : 1942, 229; B. M. Haing in Phil 16 : 1941, 438-39; H. A. Larra-
bee in JP 38 : 1941, 276-77; H. Kurtz in RR 33 : 1942, 84-87; A. Montague in Isis 16 : 1942, 153-
56; M. Rader in MLQ 2 : 1941, 441-43; L. W. Tancock in MLR 37 : 1942, 516-17; Ira Wade in
FR 16 : 1942, 153-56.

(La jeune philosophie).

Beautiful, sensitive study, dedicated to Sartre whose L'imagination (1936) and
L'imagoire (1940) provide the phenomenological ground upon which it is built.
Imagination, cardinal in the Dream of D., is later opposed to understanding, and
excluded from the epistemology; yet image and imagery remain a problem.
Moreover, analysis of doubt and cogito leads to a difficulty regarding the body as it
is experienced in two different ways: dualistically separated from thinking, and in
the union of body and mind. While intellectual memory does not concern the
body, corporeal memory does; at this point, the problem of the image issues into
the problem of reality vs. dream. Ch. 2 establishes that the union cannot be proved
by means of the imagination, contrary to some D. interpreters; it also reveals the
importance of "l'imagination-passion," which shifts the issue from metaphysics

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to psychology. The following long chapter on this “imagination-passion” shows
dream at the root of Cartesian doubt: Descartes sees in dreaming the rationally
uncontrollable workings of the imagination, conceived as a passion. This has
profound consequences with regard to the problem of error (ch. 4, L'imagination-
passion et la logique): “pour assurer le maximum de securite a l'esprit, D. a soumis
le rêve au corps et le corps a un mecanisme rigoureux” (191). Descartes’ theory of
the image is found to be “une théorie extrêmement poussée du symbole” which
permits him “d’échapper a l’hypothèse, d’une espèce qui ne soit ni un corps, ni
une pensée, et par consequent laisse intacte la distinction de l’ame et du corps”
(201). This “espèce” is the realm of the Imaginary, particularly the dream: “C’est
d’abord le malin génie qu’il faut terrasser, le rêve dont il faut sortir” (203). [This is
indeed one of D.’s central problems, which opens the First Meditation and ends the
Sixth, leaving a faint question mark after the hesitant solution (see no. 306).] See
also Paul Landormy’s excellent study “La mémoire corporelle et la mémoire intel-
lectuelle dans la philosophie de Descartes” (Bibliothèque du premier Congrès

Reviewed by Kanapa in Pensee no. 5, 1945, 143–35.

RUSSIER, JEANNE: Sagesse cartésienne et religion; essai sur la con-
(BPC)

Livre I. Raison et foi dans la connaissance de l’âme. 1. Le problème de l’âme au temps de
Descartes. 2. Immortalité de nature et immortalité de fait. 3. Doute hyperbolique et
certitude vulgaire.
Livre II. Raison et foi dans les “promesses” de bêtitude. 1. L’état de l’âme après cette vie.
2. Immortalité et individualité.
Conclusion: Sagesse cartésienne et religion. – Bibliographie raisonnée.

The author poses two precise questions: (1) Does Descartes find the assurance of
immortality in Reason or in Faith? (2) In what manner is the status of the soul after
death knowable for him? The answer to the first question emerges from D.’s
dualistic position: the awareness of the res cogitans regarding its separate substantial
existence, its indivisibility, and its higher nature allows the affirmation of its essential
immortality without taking recourse to Faith. Any assurance of actual immortality
after separation from the body however goes beyond Reason and must come from
Revelation. Hyperbolic doubt cannot strike at this assurance because this doubt
leads to certitude only in questions accessible to Reason; in questions of moral
conduct Descartes allows only “certitude vulgaire”. Hence (question 2) Faith must
serve as the guide to the “promesses de bêtitude” after death, since Reason cannot
by its own resources ascertain the posthumous status of the soul. The carefully
documented study seems to read D.’s texts a bit more closely than they were
meant to be read, but the sharp confrontation of Descartes’ positions with the
Thomistic positions of his time is illuminating.

1959, 269–70; A. Robinet in DSS no. 46–47, 1960, 107; M. Varin d’Ainville in Eph 14:
1959, 100–101.

SCHOLZ, HEINRICH, ADOLF KRATZER, and JOSEPH HOFMANN:
Descartes. Drei Vorträge. Münster, Aschendorff, 1951. 80 p. (Abhandlun-
Three model academic lectures, judging Descartes in the cool, objective, scientific manner. Scholz gives a searching appraisal of D.'s role in transforming the Western mind, classifying his influence under four "necessary and sufficient" axioms of Cartesian doctrine. Kratzer evaluates D.'s physics in precise yet popular fashion. Hofmann assesses his mathematical achievement from the modern viewpoint, against a rich historical background, with a good bibliography of sources.

Review: E. J. Dijksterhuis in AIHS 5: 1932, 123.


1. Le besoin de certitude. 2. La notion de la sagesse. 3. La lumière naturelle. 4. L'erreur. 5. Le doute et la libération de l'erreur. 6–8. Le cogito. 9. Symbolisme scientifique et l'agnosticisme religieux. 10. L'âme et le corps. 11. La morale et la bêtitude.

"Sagesse" is harmonic unity of will and mind; its ultimate stage, a purified rationalist ethics; its function, the organization of mind for the conquest of science. The main themes of Cartesian metaphysics are subjected to an unusual idealistic interpretation in which the cogito is not a first truth "mais la forme des vérités que développe la science cartésienne" (181), the "morale de puissance" (self-mastery) a morale of free will and condition for mastery of nature through science, D.'s concept of "absolute science" an almost Hegelian panlogism (187) coupled with mild, enlightened, tolerant religious agnosticism. For Segond, morale de puissance is a step from morale provisoire to the ultimate morale de bêtitude (sagesse), whereas Mesnard's later book treats it rather as a passing aberration of D.'s (no. 220). Copious text citations, without page references, support Segond's thesis by giving "a violent interpretation to all that D. said to the contrary" (E 57: 1937, 547). What emerges is again the old Cartesian tree of knowledge: metaphysical roots, trunk of physics branching into medicine, mechanics, morals, and no forbidden fruit. More recent interpreters of D.'s ethics love to sit on its highest branch, "le dernier degré de la sagesse," basking in the rays of pure Goodness; no wonder they forget that there is a trunk beneath their lofty seat, holding it up. Segond's idealistic stage illumination, by contrast, bathes the trunk in light; in the green chiaroscuro above it, one dimly discerns "libre-arbitre, amour et contemplation de Dieu, autant de figures encore de cette poursuite [cartésienne] de la vérité idéale" (317). This too is willful, but Honi soit qui mal y pense.


Concise study, "admirably conducted in the very 'modern' manner" (Keeling's review, 339) finds D.'s Method essentially mathematical, and therefore inapplicable to his metaphysics, the principles of which "sont des propositions générales que l'on ne peut utiliser que dans le syllogisme, qui est un raisonnement infécond" (118). They attempt the impossible, i.e. the deductive construction of "une pensée sur les relations que le verbe être insère dans la proposition" (ibid.) D.'s Method,
on the other hand, represents a theory of relations and offers “an imposing theory of analysis and synthesis,” vs. the “pauvre théorie aristotélicienne” (28). However, prudence and dogmatism in science prevented D. from recognizing the purely hypothetic and deductive structure of mathematics and the probabilistic nature of physical hypothesis, though both were within his grasp. Seeking to prove the existence of what needed only to be postulated, determined to find truth, certitude, infallible evidence where he needed only observational verification or operational decision, he constructed a metaphysics which, like all metaphysics, is not a rational discipline but one of those wonderful “grandes synthèses” which science, ethics, art, poetry suggest to man: “Il ne faudrait pas les placer avant la science, mais après elle” and “il n’y aurait pas trop lieu de raisonner à leur sujet” (120).

The Method in question is that of the Regulae, as modified by D. Serrus’ brief critical analysis of the methodological difference between Cartesian analysis and synthesis (ch. 1) is remarkable. Ch. 2 judges the significance of the method from the viewpoint of modern logic. Ch. 3 studies the application of the method in MM with regard to nonhypothetical certitude (the cogito), the status of existential and essential statements (the proofs of God) and the “valeur des jugements de perception concernant l’existence sensible” (substance dualism and the union of body and soul). The critique of D.’s application of his Method to metaphysics (ch. 4) shows in detail the decisive and fatal role of Scholastic principles deflecting D.’s original metaphysical intuition; see the striking list of such axioms which he, but not his contemporary critics, held to be indisputable, 89–90. D.’s basic mistake, however, was to attempt to present his metaphysics as a science. Father Lenoble calls the small book an “œuvre capital qui … aide grandement à discerner le philosophe éternel et l’homme des années 1630” (RMM 61: 1958, 351), which is true enough if one adds that for Serrus, Descartes the “philosophe éternel,” i.e., the metaphysician, is not the rigorous rational thinker he wanted to be, but a poet – and a very great one indeed.


In view of the dominating position of French contributions to the study of D.’s ethics, attention may be drawn to two modern monographs in other languages, Teixeira’s substantial Portuguese volume and Alexandru Tîlnan-Tîman’s short, comprehensive Etica lui Descartes of 1946 (no. 3421), in Rumanian) which ranges from the place of ethics in Cartesianism over the major topics to free will and générosité. Utilized by Gueroult in no. 170.


“Ce travail n’est pas historique mais doctrinal” (11), a clear, distinct treatment of D.’s supposedly clear, distinct ideas. Finds the Cartesian revolution far less revolutionary than D. did. D.’s philosophy contains the seeds of French idealism, introduces a new spirit of radical criticism, orients philosophy towards the subject by cutting the bond between mind and things. Five valuable chapters on D.’s
mathesis universalis, problem of knowledge, cogito, innate ideas, and the "réalisme indirect."


Earnest, unassuming study in clear English of D.'s problem of bridging the gap between ideas and existence: "... why a chain of reasoning in our heads, connected by pure logical necessity, should be a true transcription of the real, and why there should be a harmony between the laws of nature and those of the mind" (15). Author takes MM as his chief text, judiciously supplementing it with texts from D.'s other works and from P. S. Régis, J. du Roure, Arnauld. The core chapters patiently explore the Cartesian circle (held to be inevitable in any system), 'cogito', self, substance. Laing's review helps separate D.'s difficulties from author's


VIII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES:
SPECIAL TOPICS


Augustinian philosophy was the "safety valve" that allowed D., and particularly Malebranche, to develop systems which would otherwise have discredited their orthodoxy, just as Augustinism "enables orthodoxy to accommodate such thinkers as [Maurice] Blondel today" (10). Although there is a "fundamental affinity" between D. and St. Augustine, the Cartesian cogito is independent of the alleged Augustinian archetype, despite a general "family likeness" (common Platonic tradition). Critical examination of Gilson's position regarding D. and St. Thomas.


The cogito means, not just "I think," but rather "there is a thought now"; hence the conclusion "I exist" does not follow (no. 235a, 45-46). The "idealistic view that
what is immediately given in sense-experience must necessarily be mental” is rejected (ibid., 142) because “the assertion that the mind is a substance, being a metaphysical assertion, cannot follow from anything.” These incisive but brief comments of 1936 become a full-fledged logical attack on the cogito in Ayer’s work twenty years later: the cogito does not prove that Descartes, or anyone, knows anything: “It simply makes the logical point that one sort of statement follows from another” (no. 2336, 47). The cogito is “not meaningless, only peculiar . . . and not only peculiar but degenerate,” being merely demonstrative: statements like “I exist” have nothing to say “beyond what is implied in the fact that they have a reference” (34). See also Ayer’s 1953 Analysis article on the cogito, cited in no. 335.

C. B. Daly (1961; see no. 1358a) attacks Ayer’s view because it denies Descartes the “phenomenological or existential point” which he considered the core of his argument: Cartesianism does not start with “cogito” but with “sum,” i.e., existentially. For Daly it is no accident that anticartesian philosophies (including Ayer’s) “tend also to be atheistic philosophies” (185), a statement that would have surprised the theologians of Descartes’ age.


For the linguistic view of the same example see J. J. C. Smart, “Descartes and the wax” in PhQ 1: 1950–51, 50–57: Descartes’ question “What, then, was it I knew so distinctly in the piece of wax?” (MM II) “is not a real question because it has no point.” See the rejoinders by P. G. Lucas and J. N. Wright (ibid., 1: 1951, 348–55). Lucas shows that Smart does not give “a true report of what Descartes wrote,” as the Latin text proves. Wright offers a very interesting interpretation of Descartes’ “Personne n’en doute, personne ne juge autrement” which precedes the question which Smart claims to be senseless.


D.’s Cogitationes privatae contain intriguing fragments on automats and mechanical and optical deceptions. His interest in curious and mysterious matters was possibly stimulated by writings of architect Salomon de Caus and mathematician Jean-François Nicéron, also perhaps by Giambattista della Porta’s celebrated Magia naturalis. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (“Machineries et perspectives curieuses dans leurs rapports avec le cartésianisme,” DSS 6, no. 32: 1996, 461–74) offers a rich critical discussion, judiciously concluding that D., whatever stimulus he may have received from these playful forerunners, yet “met en garde contre le goût de mystère et la curiosité désordonnée” (466). See also Rossi, no. 328.
There is no metaphysics in Regulae; their epistemology is independent of DM; they represent a stage of "geometric idealism" between 1619 and the metaphysics of 1628. Their section on imperfect questions, with its theory of sensation, raises the problem of verification where necessity is absent. DM and PP answer the problem: verification decides only between chains of deductive reasoning, an answer which emaciates verification.

Examines the "protophilosophy" (axioms and assertions unproven and not to be proven) underlying D.'s philosophy: basic assumptions, metaphors, syntactical rules of thinking, systematization etc. Develops from DM six such assumptions concerning lumen naturale, pervasive identity of specific forms, uniqueness of the true, similarity of the orders of nature and of logic, substantiality of the subject, similarity of cause and effect.

Collection of papers, some unpublished, by a judicious Italian Descartes scholar. Reprints his valuable bibliographical studies (see no. 15). The philosophical essays revolve about Olgiati's concept of D.'s "fenomenismo razionalistico." Interesting study of Leibniz' critique of Cartesianism. See no. 1278-86 for other studies in this volume.

Reviews: A. Carlini in Gmet 3: 1948, 528-30, also in no. 4, 190-92; E. Garulli in Humanitas (Brescia) 4: 1949, 947-51.

Part II includes three important previously published studies, connected by the creation theme: Cartesian matter and creation (RMM 44: 1937, 21-34), showing D.'s resistance towards Henry More's tendency to spiritualize extension, and the "apotheose de l'étendue cartesienne" by Malebranche and Spinoza "qui la fait passer du rang de créature à celui de réalité incrée" (RMM, p. 21); on the creation of eternal verities (RPFE 123: 1937, 15-29) and its connection with the "malin génie" hypothesis, elucidating a crux in D.'s doctrine of God; Bréhier shows that the doctrine first appears in D.'s correspondence in 1630, is almost forgotten in DM and MM, and revived in response to Gassend's objection; finally a brief paper on continued creation, reprinted from S 5: 1937, 3-10.


Attempts to prove that RV may have been written as early as 1619-20, with interesting discussion of D.'s formative years. Henri Gouhier (RHPH 3: 1929, 296-320) manfully
defends the traditional late date, settling for 1647 on remarkably good grounds. E. Cassirer in no. 1486 (Lychnos 1938, RPFE 1939, and no. 243, ch. 2, with critique of Cantecor, Brunetière, Jungmann, Gouhier) calls RV Descartes' last statement, written for Queen Christina, and interrupted by death. Cantecor's thesis is bold, Gouhier's solid, Cassirer's ingenious. All three suffer from the same incurable ill, lack of facts. K. Jungmann claimed in 1904 that RV was a first sketch of Le Monde; see the note to no. 2321.

CASSIRER, ERNST: Descartes, Lehre, Persönlichkeit, Wirkung. Stockholm, Bermann-Fischer, 1939. 308 p. See also no. 1477–79.

Collection of Cassirer's important contributions to the 1937 anniversary [original publications, French and Swedish editions: no. 1477–79, 1483–86]. Pt. I: D.'s concept of truth; his concept of the unity of the sciences. Pt. II: Important study of D. and Corneille (psychological and moral affinities, notes on tragic art); a study of the genesis of RV (see no. 242); penetrating study of Queen Christina of Sweden from the viewpoint of the history of ideas: universal theism and the problem of natural religion, the Stoicist revival; the significance of the theory of passions; Christina in the light of the heroic ideal of her century. See also Johan Nordström, "Cartesius och drottning Christina omvandelse" (Lychnos 1941, 248–90) on D.'s alleged role in Christina's conversion to Catholicism.


CHASTAING, MAXIME: "Descartes, Fauste de Riez et le problème de la connaissance d’autrui." In: Étienne Gilson, philosophe de la chrétienté. Éditions du Cerf, 1949, 187–211. (Rencontres, v. 30.)

"... bien jolie étude" (Bréhier, RPFE 147: 1957, 78) develops the difficulties of the problem seen by St. Augustine, Faustus bishop of Riez (5th c.), and Claudin Mamert. The Cartesian solution: "J'expérience autrui, comme l'union de mon âme et de mon corps" (Bsig 5: 1951, no. 1906). See also Chastaing's "l'abbé [G.] de Lanion et le problème cartésien de la connaissance d'autrui" (RPFE 141: 1951, 228–48), on de Lanion's Méditations métaphysiques which he published in 1684 under the pseudonym Guillaume Wander [in Beyle's Recueil de quelques pieces curieuses concernant la philosophie de M. Descartes]; also Chastaing's "Le 'Traité' de l'abbé M*** Macy et la 'vieille réponse' cartésienne au problème de la connaissance d'autrui" RPFE 143: 1953, 76–84, on Macy's 'Traité de l'âme des bêtes', 1735, in which Macy opposes David Renaud Boullier's "Essai philosophique sur l'âme des bêtes" of 1728; and Chastaing's remarkable monograph L'existence d'autrui (PUF 1951, 355 p. Reviews: no. 1515).


Noted Thomist draws from D.'s Dream and Cogitationes privatae the unusual thesis that D. considered philosophical cognition as "une activité poétique" which taps the immense capabilities of man's noetic equipment and store of innate ideas. Regulae I–XI, hypothetically dated back from 1628 to 1619, are said to articulate this
epistemology of poetic penetration of reality which Descartes later transformed but never abandoned. Pierre Menard (Eph 5: 1939, 178-84) rates the study, “malgré toutes ses réticences et ses réserves d’école” (178), the most remarkable and meaningful answer to the enigma of Descartes’ “rationalism.” For the opposite view regarding poetic cognition see Read, no. 324a. Cf. Balz in JP 35: 1938, 174-76.


Considers, against the common view, D.’s morale provisoire to be neither banal nor unrelated to the rules of method which, in fact, are even implied in it. Original study, critical of Gilson and Lévy-Brühl; ends on the view of “a relaxed Descartes” (334) who gave most of his time, as he said, “au relasche des sens et au repos de l’esprit” (AT III, 692). No reference to Gouhier who originated this interpretation.


Important study. Tries to separate in French scepticism a rationalistic-nominalistic current (Montaigne, La Mothe Le Vayer, Sanchez) and a mystic-fideistic one reaching up from the Greeks through medieval philosophy to Charron, Pascal, Huet. Finds three types of philosophical refutation of scepticism, viz., axiological, logical, and epistemological. The latter type is represented by Mersenne and by D.’s first two Meditations. See also no. 247.


Distinguishes between D.’s “official” methodology in the Regulae, DM and MM, according to which scientific hypothesis necessarily flows from the first principles of metaphysics; and a second one, applied in the Dioptrique, Météores, Le Monde, and PP, which allows even false hypotheses to be used, provided their consequences are verified by observation. This second methodology goes beyond Galilei’s similar position and anticipates Vaihinger; it brings D. close to the sceptical current of his time. D. is said to have realized the conflict between the apriorism of the first and the instrumentalism of the second methodology. One may ask whether this would not make D. a forerunner of Bridgman’s operationalism rather than of Vaihinger’s “Als Ob.” J.-P. Weber (RMM 63: 1958, 246-50; see note to no. 3544a) tries to show that the supposedly methodological differences are merely expository. See no. 3544a.


La notion de la liberté humaine dans la philosophie de Descartes. Les formules de la liberté. Les controverses religieuses sur le libre arbitre à l’époque de Descartes et sa position.

Posthumously published 1939-40 course, carefully edited. Lectures 6–9 place D.’s doctrine of free will in its historical context, stressing its wholly temporal character, and examines the reasons why D. did not extend it to the theological and ethical field. Sees D.’s decisive advance in having linked freedom to “l’homme du temps, d’avoir entrepris de prouver que cet homme du temps est capable d’initiative et de création . . . .” (104). Ninth lecture examines D.’s position to the religious free will.
controversies of his time, finding affinities with the positions of Guillaume Gibieuf, Jansenius, Arnauld. Running critical commentary to Gilson’s La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie (no. 164). Vigorous, faithful to the texts, free of hagiography and apologetics.


The realist instinct, “une disposition naturelle et universelle de l’esprit,” manifests itself “par une inincible croyance à la réalité des choses” (85). Reid’s polemic against D. is misdirected: D. tries to legitimize the realist instinct; Reid himself merely describes it and submits to it. Though the argument is doubtful, the article helps understand the D. image of the Scottish realists, Royer-Collard, and Victor Cousin.


Careful study of conflicting conceptions of the Cartesian cogito proposed by M. Gueroult (a relation innate in our understanding) and H. Gouhier (a necessary articulation between my thought and my existence). Accepts a modified Gueroult view. Mario Levi’s review in S 21: 1953, 127 points to C. Ottaviana’s resolution of the problem in his theory of synthetic judgments (see no. 2882), not referred to by Dreyfus. For a discussion of the cogito interpretations of Hamelin, Olgiati, Gilson, Gouhier, Jolivet, see: S. Czajkowski, “Cogito ergo sum. Kartezjusza i jego nowa koncepcja duszny” (KF 19: 1950, 39–66; French summary, 164–66; see the note to no. 1677).


Unusual study finds D.’s “adversary” not so much in St. Thomas as in Hugo Grotius who cut the umbilical cord between theology and jurisprudence, formulating “l’ipotesi concessiva della realtà del giusto, indipendentemente dal sapere e dal volere di Dio” (58). This transformation of the metaphysical doctrine of eternal verities in the field of ethics and law, where it had vital practical consequences, is studied by way of contrasting D. and Grotius, Leibniz and Pufendorf, against the background of the Scholastic tradition. See also Eugenio Colani, “Le verità eterne in Descartes e in Leibniz,” CD 1: 132–40, noting Grotius’ famous affirmation of the validity of natural law “etiamsi daremus, quod sine summo scelere dare non esse Deum” (137).


Notable study of D.’s attitude towards metaphysics as shown in his treatment of Being and reality. As against Bacon and Galilei (scientific turn), Descartes’ treatment of the problem recalls that of his Scholastic masters; it does not open the road to Kant. Ferro accepts Olgiati’s thesis of D.’s “rationalist phaenomenalism” but points to the voluntaristic side of D.’s metaphysics, the physiognomy of which is excellently outlined.

FRANCESCII, ALFREDO: "El concepto de 'materia sutil' en Descartes." In: Homenaje (no. 40), v. 2, p. 11-41.
Judicious study of the "subtle matter" concept which D. had to develop to save the doctrine of res extensa with its necessary rejection of the notion of the void. Spinoza's great commentary to D.'s Principia, the profoundest contribution to its understanding, breaks off exactly at the problem of "subtle matter." Author tests the logical consistency of the concept by a Spinozist 'more geometrico' exegesis; he deals with the charges that it is fictitious, artificial, or barren, and determines its role in the history of physical concepts up to Maxwell, Lord Kelvin and Ernst Mach.

Analyzes in plainest language D.'s transition from "cogito" (as mere awareness) to "res cogitans" (as substance), which, in Frondizi's view, originated the untenable conception of self as a substance. Chapters 2-4 deal with attacks upon this concept from Locke through Berkeley to Hume who reduced the "self" to a mere bundle of perceptions. Having revealed the horns of the Cartesian-Humean dilemma, Frondizi attempts to escape it by basing the "self" on "function" and "Gestalt" (Part Two), but his resolve to be more careful than D. in stepping from one proposition to another seems to come to grief within the first few pages.

Following Leon Roth's suggestion, Gadoffre proves the DM to be a conglomerate of texts to which only the boldness of style gives the semblance of coherence and unity of content. Author traces the stages of development from the first conception [a preface to the 'Essais'] to the final stage which incorporated 1627-28 material, with additions and revisions up to the last moment. The consequences of abandoning the illusion of unity are happy ones: "Speculations sur l'importance de la morale provisoire, acrobaties dialectiques destinées a expliquer la rupture du développement de la logique scientifique . . . , conjectures machiavéliques sur la raison d'être du chapitre métaphysique, tout cela cesse tout simplement d'être utile" (Rsyn p. 26; RHPh p. 69). See Lascaris Commeno (no. 292) and R. Jacquin (no. 278). Elie Denissoff ("Les étapes de la rédaction du 'Discours de la méthode'," RPhL 54: 1956, 254-82) calls Gadoffre's analysis insufficient but adds little more than detail and background except for a shift of emphasis to D.'s three "Essais." See also Gadoffre's study of the changing fortunes of DM in literary history, no. 404.

The basic Avicenna text is Chifa I. 1.6 on the place of man in the Avicennian universe. Compared to the cogito, the purpose of the fiction of the "homme volant" is
different, the attitudes are diametrically opposed: pure fiction in Avicenna, real
doubt in Descartes. Therefore, the two “allegories” are also radically different.
[Bsig 1959, no. 5970.]

262 GIACON, CARLO (S.J.): “Cartesio.” In his: La causalità nel razionalismo

Precise, historically oriented study of the shift, under D.’s influence, from the
ontological conception of causality in antiquity to the logical conception in which
substance and causality, separated by the ancients, become one, thus elevating
causality to the position of the constructive principle of the real world. This,
according to Giacon, is the root of the modern confusion regarding the ancient
categories of Absolute and Relative, Being and Becoming. Man and God. Giacon
finely distinguishes between Descartes’ acceptance of the principle of final causes
and his rejection of them in science because man cannot perceive and use them.
The fact that there is no Hume chapter indicates the orientation of the work.
Descartes’ and Malebranche’s role in preparing the assault on efficient causality
remains in the dark, an inevitable consequence of treating the problem within each
thinker’s own system only. See also J. Wild, no. 348.


263 GILEN, LEONHARD (S.J.): “Über die Beziehung Descartes’ zur zeit­

Detailed review of D.’s acquaintance with the work of Suárez, Conimbricenses,
Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, perhaps Antonio Rubio and Charles-François Abra de
Raconis (not a Jesuit, as Ch. Adam assumes). Results help clarify the controversy
between D. and Antoine Arnauld (Fourth Objections and Responses to MM) in
which D. displayed his knowledge of Scholasticism in its contemporary rather than
Thomistic form. Rich notes refer to some little-known sources and literature.
Firmly conducted study which skillfully utilizes historical fact for doctrinal exegesis;
the result strengthens Garin’s thesis (no. 209a).

264 GIORGIANNI, VIRGILIO: “Intuizioni giuspolitiche di Renato Descar­

Sum and substance of what can be reasonably said about D.’s social attitude and his
influence on development of legal thought. See also author’s note on “Ripercussioni
filosofico-giuridiche dello studio delle passioni in Cartesio” (S 17: 1949, 254–58) with
assembly of texts, and G. Comella’s “Cartesio giurista” (RIFD 18: 1938, 440–45) who
rightly concludes that “Cartesio giurista è un Cartesio che interessa più la biografia
che la storia del pensiero” (445). See also Droetto, no. 253, and Tabbah, no. 466d.
GOGUEL DE LABROUSSE, ELISABETH: “Descartes y la pedagogía.”

D. sharply criticizes the education he received, but proposes no pedagogy of his own; he is authoritarian about the education of children, autodidactic about that of adults. Similarly Celia Ortiz de Montoya (“Descartes en la historia de la educación y de la cultura,” no. 40, vol. 2, 209–33): “La Pedagogía cartesiana no es Pedagogía de infantes” (225). Saul A. Taborda’s interesting study “Descartes y el ideal pedagógico francés” (no. 39: 301–20), however, tries to pin the 1789 educational ideal of “ciudadano idóneo y nacionalista” (307) to the Cartesian spirit, its after-effects still visible in Émile Durkheim’s philosophy of education and in the attempted reform of French secondary education in the 1920’s. Hugo Calzetti’s “La influencia del pensamiento cartesiano en el hacer pedagógico moderno” (no. 40, 2: 235–66) accuses D. of having upset the equilibrium of educational values to establish “el dominio de los Robots” (258) — “planes, programas, horarios, minuciosa enumeración de asuntos, distribución de los mismos a lo largo del curso escolar, exámenes, escalafones, reglamentos” — and particularly “los tests,” a French invention “llevado a su máximo perfeccionamiento por los investigadores yanquis” (260), unsuspecting executors of D.’s will. See E. Cassirer’s discussion in no. 5, p. 9–10, and Olgiati’s excellent chapter on D. and pedagogy in no. 185.


Fascinating study by a Plato scholar of the “démarche du raisonnement par paradigme” as reflected in D.’s earliest, fragmentary attempt at a systematic treatment of epistemology. See also Gouhier’s work on the genesis of MM and the role of Socratic inquiry in the Regulae, no. 269.


The subtleties and “barbarism” of Scholastic speculative theology, falling into decay when the new sciences were destroying the old physics, led to the 17th c. crisis in theology. Two ways out were tried: “positive” (scriptural, traditional, historical) theology and the “mystical theology” of F. de Sales, the Oratoire, Saint-Cyran, with its “dialogue sans paroles” and union with God (37), paying little attention to science. D.’s relations with Bérulle, de Condren, Gibieuf are seen as part of this crisis, in the context of which “certains propos de Descartes perdent leur audace avec leur originalité” (49), e.g., his snide remarks about theologians and angels. His own simplified theology was neither positive nor mystical but in line with St. Thomas’ idea of speculative theology, “except that he wanted to replace the old handmaid by a new one.” Complements no. 168.


Great study, linked in theme and style to Gouhier’s Essais (no. 169). Shows that the methodical doubt is carried to methodical negation to defeat it (cf. Popkin, no. 322a.)
Whence does D. derive the certainty that clear, distinct ideas never deceive us when he remembers having been so deceived? The answer leads to a suggestive psychological analysis of childhood as D. saw it. See also Hans Polnow who traces D’s “psychologie infantile,” from embryo to adulthood (no. 2981).


268a GOUHIER, H.: “Le refus du symbolisme dans l’humanisme cartésien.”
Afil 1958, no. 2–3 (Umanesimo e simbolismo), 65–74.

Defining symbolism as affirmation that the world is a language with a rhetoric in which metaphor is a means not only of expressing but of understanding reality, Gouhier opens up a wide, as yet unexplored perspective on the 17th century in one paragraph (p. 66) on the opposition between the two traditional symbolisms (Christian theology, magical cosmology) and the scientific concept of nature. Young Descartes (1619–21) saw symbolism as a language of man, not of things, as Gouhier notes with regard to Olympica: once in the possession of his metaphysics and physics, D. rejected all symbolism. “Signal” now replaces “sign;” and his images and metaphors are now mere analogies. The rich paper concludes with a most fruitful comparison: Béroulle’s depreciation of childhood leads him to a theological symbolism, while Descartes finds in the psychology of the child the root of symbolistic thought, i.e., of error. See also no. 268 and 2098.


269 GOUHIER, HENRI: “Pour une histoire des ‘Méditations métaphysiques’.”

Indispensable historical study, boldly speculative on a foundation of minutely examined fact. Descartes’ 1628 project on “Divinité” becomes the Latin ms. of 1629, the content and changes of which are imaginatively reconstructed. It dealt with the connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même; surprisingly, the cogito appears linked not to methodical doubt but to the impression which “la docte ignorance socratique” made on young D. (11). It contained neither the ontological proof nor the creation of eternal verities; these highly controversial doctrines were not inserted in the 1639 manuscript, the genesis of which is linked to that of DM and Essais. The study bears on the controversy over the chronological vs. the systematic interpretation of D.’s philosophy.

270 GOUHIER, HENRI: “La preuve ontologique de Descartes.”


A controversy about the status of the ontological proof of the Fifth Meditation. Gouhier (no. 270) argues against Gueroult (no. 170) that the proof is wholly independent and does not require, to be valid, the prior “proof a posteriori” of God’s existence in the Third Meditation. Gueroult’s answer rests on a set of interlocking distinctions. The order of nature derives its evidence from the cogito, the order of metaphysics from the guarantee of God. This metaphysical order must be shored up against the destructive malin génie argument, “la grande doute philosophique par laquelle je frappe d’interdit les évidences mêmes”; the natural order is helpless
against the malin génie, though it resists the Dieu-trompeur doubt, "ce petit doute naturel" which merely attacks the memory of such evidence. The proof a posteriori of MM III is metaphysically valid; the ontological proof a priori holds only on the lower plane of nature: though psychologically convincing and a guide to right action, it is metaphysically useless until fitted into the "ordre des raisons." Thus the dependence of the ontological proof upon the proof a posteriori flows from the "general dependence of the order of fact upon the order of ultimate justifications" (Bannan's review, 430; critique of Lefèvre's attempt in no. 179c to improve upon Gueroult, ibid., p. 431). Gouhier's paper at Royaumont (no. 42, 72–87; discussion 88–107) on the "ordre des raisons" and Gueroult's paper on "vérité de la science et vérité de la chose" in the proofs of God (ibid., 108–140 with discussion of Kant's critique of the argument) continue the controversy, revived in 1960 by Jacques Brunswicq who invoked against Gueroult the lesser distinction between "ordo" as structural order and as ratio demonstrandi or, in Cartesian terms, analytic vs. synthetic method (RPFE 191: 1960, 251–65), and was sharply refuted by B. Rochot in RPFE 1951: 1961, 125–30. See also W. Réd in AGP 45: 1961, 128–32 (no. 3107b, q.v.), and Lavelle's discussion of cogito and ontological proof in no. 293.


Spinoza's rigorous formulation of D.'s axiomatics is not a mere reordering and logical sharpening of the Cartesian argument, but a transformation. The cogito ergo sum, for example, becomes an ego sum cogitans. The cogito no longer emerges from doubt: only if I know that I am, can I doubt, and therefore think. The order of demonstration of the underlying axioms, which is "l'ordre naturel de leur dépendance" (174) differs in both thinkers. Spinoza ends where D. begins, with the universal formulation of the principle of causality. Spinoza's reversal of the cogito formula indicates a realistic reversal of D.'s idealistic movement from awareness to existential affirmation. In showing the danger of using Spinoza's commentary to elucidate Descartes, Gueroult contradicts Gilson who, in a remarkable study of the Cartesian proof of the existence of material things, (no. 2036, reprinted in no. 165), calls for greater use of Spinoza's Principia on the grounds that D. is the one great modern philosopher who found an interpreter of equal rank among his successors. See also 258.


Reprints two important articles: "La méthode de Descartes" (RMM 14: 1906, 735–74); and a defense of D.'s ontological proof (RMM 4: 1896, 433–58) against Leibniz' critique, hinging on the possibility of contradiction in a perfect being. Hannequin, accepting the synthetic character of D.'s philosophy, finds D.'s ontological proof logically rigorous.

In D., certainty is a terminus a quo; Cournot, completely reversing the problem, makes it the terminus ad quem, “limite extrême de l’effort rationnel,” or the limiting value of probability; this profoundly modifies modern rationalism. Brief, incisive treatment of Cournot’s D. criticism. See also author’s De l’ordre et du hasard: le réalisme critique d’Antoine-Augustin Cournot. Vrin, 1936, 377 p. (see no. 2184).


D.’s theory of the automatism of brutes reflects the typical confusion between the thought models of common sense, philosophy, and exact science. D. denies interiority in animals (methodological exactitude); considers the res cogitans incorporeal (equivocation between ‘ego sum’ and ‘sum’); attempts to limit the consequences of the automatism doctrine by stressing the ‘non sicut nos’ (failure to solve the awareness problem on a plane common to animal and man). His inability to differentiate between “automatism” in organism and in mechanical artifact is rooted in his conception of “Natur ohne Innerlichkeit” (78). Diffuse, meandering article, probing the methodological foundations of D,’s anthropology and concept of Being.


Francisco Sanchez’ Quod nihil scitur (1581) proposes universal doubt as the foundation of certitude. Analyzing this work and its critics (including Leibniz), the author finds an indubitable resemblance between Sanchez’ and D.’s universal doubt (e.g. parallel passages on ‘les mauvaises doctrines,’ p. 126-27). D. might have known ‘Quod nihil scitur’ through the study of Sanchez’ medical works, published 1615. See also author’s “Francisco Sánchez, el autor de Quod nihil scitur, a la luz de muy recientes estudios” (RyF 10: 1936, 23-42, 157-81) and Ciribini Spazzola’s “Francisco Sánchez alla luce delle ultime ricerche,” RFNS 28: 1936, 372-91.

Reviews: Anon. in RMM 45, suppl. 1. 1938, 12; M. Rast in Sch 11: 1936, 430.


In 1558 Giacomo Aconzio published an Opusculum de metodo, hoc est de recta investigandarum tradendarumque artium ac scientiarum ratione, a treatise on logic having no metaphysical significance. Author modestly notes the resemblance between the DM and Opusculum titles; E. Denissoff (RPhL 54: 1956, 271) jumps to the conclusion that D. used the Aconzio title: “nul doute est permis.” H. de Vleeschauwer, editor of Jacobus Acontius’ Tractaat de metodo (Antwerp 1932, see 350) carefully compares it with DM; sees no influence.

Very useful article, with bibliography, on the Cartesian theories of transsubstantiation which, in 1663, caused the condemnation of D.’s works, donec corrigantur.


The concept of “intellectual intuition,” broadly developed (3–64), takes different forms in St. Thomas, Descartes, Kant, Bergson. In Thomism it bears upon external bodies, postulating abstractions; in Cartesianism upon innate simple ideas, ruling out abstraction. Bergson’s concept of intuition is “foncièrement anti-cartésien” (88). Interesting distinction between intellectual intuition in D.’s Regulae (road to Idealism) and in his cogito (its consequences have hitherto made him pass for the father of metaphysical realism).


Assesses the role of the Cartesian revolution in the development of the substance concept as it defines substance by a principal attribute from which all else derives. In this transformation, Thomistic accident becomes a modification or determination of substance.


After surveying the literature on stoicism in Descartes, author claims that D.’s ‘refutation’ and ‘utilization’ of stoicism were both undertaken from a purely rational viewpoint, giving new orientation to moral philosophy; while “les humanistes chrétiens” refute and utilize stoicism from the theological standpoint (195). Excellent study of the subject, rich in precise comparisons and tabular schemes illustrating stoic concepts in D. and other thinkers.


Leibniz sharply criticized D.’s “chef de secte” attitude (contemptuous, ostentatious show of ignorance of his predecessors) though the evidence points to his familiarity with their work, a criticism echoed by some good modern scholars. Author carefully examines this charge in respect to Scholastic philosophy. Unexpected result: Leibniz had a poor, second-hand knowledge of it, while D. had studied it thoroughly at La Flèche but thought little of it. His show of independence was justified in view of his genuinely novel style of philosophizing: going to problems, not authorities.

Interesting study of Franz Brentano whose Jesuit education, comparable to D.'s, enabled him to see the Scholastic side in Descartes before Gilson did. Evidence of analogy between Brentano’s and D.’s philosophical doctrine in their common errors as well as in their common achievements. Katkov claims that it was Thomas Reid’s analysis of the Cartesian concept of evidence that led Brentano to anticipate phenomenology and to foresee its dangers. One of two substantial contributions to the 1937 German memorial volume, the other being W. Burkamp’s “Das denkende Ich bei Descartes” (3–26), reviewed by E. Cassirer (no. 5, p. 26); summarized in no. 1413.


Since in D.’s doctrine matter is defined as res extensa, the existence of individual bodies (hence proof of such existence) appears impossible, there being but one “body”. See also Whitehead, no. 194a.


Posthumously published collection of important studies, including “La connaissance de l’étendue chez Descartes” (11–36) and “La liberté selon Descartes” (37–87; RMM 44: 1937, 101–64). Laporte argues against Gilson and others that Descartes’ preoccupation with physics did not prevent him from developing an genuine, original, defensible doctrine of freedom. The paper on extension raises once more the question posed by Gassendi and Malebranche: How is the idea of extension possible on Cartesian principles? Both themes, freedom and extension, are carried forward to Malebranche in two parallel papers (153–248; see Lavelle in no. 11, p. 17–19 and 23–31; Cassirer in no. 5, p. 35).


Carefully noting the difference between Descartes’ terminology and ours, Laporte deviates from Gilson and other commentators by having Descartes distinguish external causality (final causes) from internal finality which he calls “nature.” The search for the former is useless precisely because the latter, as the divine design and government of the world, transcends the analytical power of reason: “Voilà la conception cartésienne. N’est-ce pas exactement la conception chrétienne?” (no. 178, p. 361).


“El simple hecho de la importancia que se ha dado al Discurso es ya una deformación del pensamiento cartesiano” (294). This boldly conceived paper recognizes DM as a composite of parts lacking unity, and analyzes the importance and genesis of the principal ones. The reconstruction and separation of the material that went into DM is achieved by chronology, contents analysis, and a unique statistical
study of its formal elements. Last section on repercussions of DM in D.'s later work
The author, evidently unaware of Gadoffre's work (no. 260), reaches similar result
by more comprehensive, bolder methods. The careful study is important despite
the evident lack of access to critical literature.

Lavelle’s profound, concise, much-discussed ontology touches importantly upon
Cartesian studies (sec. 17, 21-23) concerning D.'s ontological argument. “C'est dans
l'argument ontologique que l'on saisit le mieux l'identité de l'être avec la puissance
infinie de l'affirmation” (21). Infinitude beyond finitude of the pensée is interpreted
as infinitude of an act “qui s'engendre éternellement et sans lequel sa pensée ne
pourrait pas s'exercer, c'est-à-dire se donner l'être à elle-même” (22). The cogito is
therefore doubly subordinated to the ontological argument: logically, since
the infinite is the very condition of the finite; metaphysically, because the cogito
merely expresses the limitation of the power of pensée to give itself being. See also
no. 11.

in RevF 8: 1949, 688-89; H. Riefstahl in ZPF 4: 1949, 292-94; M. F. Sciaccia in Gmet 4:
317-18.

295 LEFEBVRE, HENRI: “De la morale provisoire à la générosité.” In: Royau-
mont (no. 42), 237-55; discussion 256-72.
Das Unvermeidliche, hier ist's getan: under the spell of historical materialism, D. at
long last reveals “quelque chose qui l'apparente au Docteur Faustus”; exorcized by
Gueroult's mighty word, the poodle of a malin génie turns into the Devil himself;
and D.'s hypothetical argument was a veritable “Nuit de Walpurgis spéculative”
(239). No wonder the discussion happily dwells on Faust-Descartes, Hamlet, Goethe,
Christopher Marlowe (“C'est le Faust pré-rationaliste,” 258), before returning to
‘générosité’ with illuminating comments on Corneille and Lanson’s “très vieil
article” (no. 413), Mesnard’s thesis of the exceptional position of D.'s “morale
provisoire,” and the role of egotistic “prudence” in making “les grandes âmes”
socially conscious and “généreux”. The last word is the Devil’s: “l'egoïsme est
spécifiquement celui de la bourgeoisie” (272).

298 LEROY, MAXIME: Descartes social. Avec un portrait inédit de Descartes,
Discovers in D. "un très grand homme social" whose “premieres paroles de
l'optimisme moderne” inspired the most diverse tendencies of thought, “même la
dernière, la sociale et la socialiste” (73). Amiably rambling essay, full of suggestive,
often misleading comments. “Avant-propos” recalls less discussed D. interpre-
tations, including A. Comte's. A charming Preface tells the story of the Lievens
portrait which shows an uncommonly humble Descartes (“C'est un paysan!” as
Lévy-Bruhl exclaimed, p. ix). See also Lévy's “Descartes précurseur du social moder-
ne” with discussion (Rsyn 63: 1948, 59-67) and his “L'humain Descartes” (Eur 44, no
175: July 15, 1937, 289-96), showing D. as controversialist and pamphleteer; also Prévost
no. 324.

299 LEVI, ADOLFO: “La filosofia razionalistica dal Descare al Leibniz.” In.
his: Il pensiero di Francesco Bacone considerato in relazione con le
Stresses the common elements (rationalistic traits in Bacon's empiricism, the position of experience in D.) rather than the differences between rationalist and empiricist currents in pre-Kantian philosophy. See also Levi's critical study of a favorite Italian theme: "Il problema dell'errore nella filosofia di Descartes" (LogosN II, no. 2: 1928, 91-108), concluding that D. failed to reconcile the existence of error with Theism, and finding the root of his error concept in a Baconian belief in the lumen naturale.

Reviews: Anon. in RMM 33, suppl. 4: 1926, 9-10; G. Bontadini in Rsyn 14: 1937, 96 (also in no. 239, 44-45).


Indispensable mise au point of a historical relationship. Rich references to the texts, but only key French criticism is considered. Campanella and Mersenne receive their just place. Sresses the originality of D.'s possible use of the Augustinian 'si fallor': "seul il en a compris la force spécifique, parce que seul il en a fait un principe" (1901). Notes that "c'est à travers Descartes qu'on revenait à saint Augustin" during the dominance of Cartesianism, systematizing Augustinian thought "dans le plus pur style cartésien." The seemingly insuperable Cartesian obstacles to understanding, namely "les theses anticartesiens de saint Augustin" with regard to matter, accident, animal soul (1904) were not overcome until Malebranche produced a Christian alliance between the Cartesian and the Augustinian spirit. See also Abercrombie (no. 235) and Scholz (no. 334).


Kierkegaard's "Ärgernis an Descartes' vernünftigem Zweifel" is symptomatic of Germany's passionate revolt against rationalism from Luther to Nietzsche. Kierkegaard pushes D.'s methodical doubt to extreme existential doubt in order to arrive at certainty of faith; for Hegel, the Cartesian dualism between "true" and "apparent" world is dead; Nietzsche's "new enlightenment" starts out with "Ironie gegen Descartes" but fails to bridge the gap between Self and World. See no. 235a (Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus).


"N'avez vous jamais ouy ce mot d'estonnement dedans les comedies: 'Veille-je, ou si je dors?'" asks Eudoxe in D.'s RV (AT X, 511), but the Sixth Meditation leaves the problem of a reality criterion half-suspended. Miss M., editor of Analysis (Oxford), attacks D.'s problem by Oxford "analysis". The word "dream" cannot be used like other words with which it has been confused, and D.'s "lament" is needless (215). Similarly L.E. Thomas, "Waking and dreaming" (Analysis 13: 1953, 121-37): D.'s methodological doubt is inappropriate to the "self-authenticating" experiences of waking and dreaming (127). The Macdonald article drew a spate of critical comment: M. J. Baker in Mind 65: 1954, 539-43 argued that her paper left the Cartesian argument
intact: sleeping and waking cannot in fact be infallibly distinguished from each other, and the problem is not just verbal. R. M. Yost, Jr. and D. Kalisch try “to play the same language game” as Miss Macdonald (PhQ 5: 1955, 109–24) to prove that her criteria for separating sleeping, consciousness, and dreaming do not hold and do not disprove D.’s scepticism of the senses. Also W. von Leyden, “Descartes and Hobbes on waking and dreaming” (RIP 1956, 95–101) and above all Norman Malcolm in PhR 65: 1956, 14–37 who resumed the linguistic attack and whose book Dreaming (London, 1959; see no. 2623a) became the focus of a new controversy (Ayer and others), by now far removed from its Cartesian starting point. See Yost, no. 3596.

MACMURRAY, JOHN: “The rejection of dualism.” In his: The self as agent. The Gifford lectures 1953. London, Faber & Faber, 1957, ch. 3, 62–83. Macmurray radically rejects the notion of self as an isolated individual; the self is a person whose personal existence is constituted in its relations to other persons. Hence M.’s utter rejection of the Kantian dualism between theoretical and practical reason, and of the asserted primacy of theoretical reason. The disastrous Kantian dualism stems from the Cartesian mind-matter dualism as the dichotomy between “thinking” and “acting.” The primacy of theoretical reason is an inevitable consequence of the cogito fallacy: the cogito does not infer existence from thought, it merely identifies both. Only the activity of the self as it thinks constitutes existence; thinking as such is nonaction; therefore: Cogito ergo non sum (81).


Substantial, condensed study of Renaissance influences upon D. finds “dass Descartes’ Lehren weder dem Renaissance-Platonismus noch dem Renaissance-Stoicismus gesondert entstammen, dass ihre Wurzeln vielmehr in beiden Bewegungen zu suchen sind, die sich . . . . aufs manngeltigste durchkreuzen. Auch Descartes kann sich der Atmosphäre nicht entziehen, in welcher er atmet” (64). Good survey of Gilson’s precursors (Freudenthal, von Hertling, Picavet), but it neglects French D. literature.


Descartes’ cogito is untenable: consciousness is no more beyond the reach of doubt than that which is perceived. There is a “cogito véritable” in which my own being is
constituted as a being in contact with the world (my “être-au-monde”). This "cogito véritable," however, is no more indubitable than the Cartesian one. Only a “conscience engagée” can overcome doubt and establish the certainty of existence: "The only indubitable consciousness is committed consciousness," as Herbert Spiegelberg puts it in his critical analysis of this unusual repudiation of Descartes (a post-Husserlian phenomenologist attempting to give a non-cartesian turn to phenomenology). See Spiegelberg, “The new cogito,” in no. 3333a v. 2, 549–52.

Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the mind-body dualism in his: La structure du comportement, ch. 4: “Les relations de l’âme et du corps et le problème de la conscience perceptive” (1942 and 1949; see no. 2709) is critical of Descartes' realism.


“... dès là que le doute devenait universel, il ne pouvait plus demeurer méthodique, mais dégénérait fatalement en doute réel” (198). Penetrating logical analysis by the great Neoscholastic. Similarly Régis Jolivet, “Le doute méthodique de Descartes” (RDePh 29: 1922, 139–58): to save the methodical doubt, we must conceive it as limited.


Rich paper, condensed almost to obscurity, traces the successive deformation of D.’s doctrine of history. Bossuet’s Christian view represents “l’élargissement de la conception cartésienne par un esprit directement au contact de la réalité historique” (276). Malebranche embraces one of the two possible heresies regarding D.’s doctrine, i.e., depreciation of all historical reality even on the level of action. Fontenelle commits the other: rational history subjected to deduction is no more than “l’occasion d’un spectacle divertissant” – the rising 18th c. has already lost the anthropological meaning of D.’s teaching (280).


Perplexities arise when D. applies the contrasting doctrines of simple natures and lumen naturale to proving the necessary truth of mathematical reasoning. The explanation is sought in conflicting patterns of thought in D., and ultimately traced back to his tendency towards irrationalism while tenaciously adhering to rationalism.


The thoughtful first essay traces “l’essence relationelle” (the problem of philosophical abstraction) from Descartes through its transformation in Leibniz, Kant, Condillac to modern mathematics. The second essay “(L’essence emotive)” distinguishes in Proust’s work “ce qu’il y a d’analyse psychologique, de ce qu’il y a de recherche presque cartésienne d’un absolu dans le moi” (55), reflecting two characteristic streams in French literature and philosophy, one stemming from Racine and the “moralistes,” the other from Descartes, Comte, Hamelin, and Proust as cornerstones. Choice quotations from a wide range of thinkers.


Good exposition of Leibniz’ metaphysical objections to D.’s doctrine of extension. Takes up his six arguments: from Transubstantiation, from the inadequacy of concepts in the explanation of phenomena, from individuality, from the principle of plenitude, from complexity and relativity, and from the status of extended objects. See also Emile Baas, “La critique leibnizienne de la physique de Descartes” with M. Guéroult’s “Observations sur ce mémoire” (BFL Strasbourg, v. 11, Nov. 1932); Geneviève Lewis, “La critique leibnizienne du dualisme cartésien” (RPHE 136: 1946, 473–85), and, for Leibniz’ role as D. critic in French intellectual life, W. H. Barber, Leibniz in France from Arnauld to Voltaire: a study in French reactions to Leibnizianism, 1670–1760. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1955 (no. 1138).


Opposing the common view that “Descartes pays lip service to Religion which Pascal pays to Reason” (542), author studies affinities between these thinkers regarding the three Pascalian orders (cœur, esprit, chair), with highly suggestive parallel passages. Finds a corresponding third term in D.’s dualism for which D. makes “an obvious allowance” (545); and the God of Descartes is by no means the “Dieu de la chiquenaude” which Pascal took him to be. Interesting reappraisal.


Remarkable study, difficult and digressive, views D.’s philosophy as the second form of Counterreformation philosophy (Spanish Scholasticism being the first), as the meeting ground of Molinism and “preilluminismo”, and as the precursor of modern laicism. D.’s solution of the Faith-Reason problem may be related to the Thomistic one, as Gouhier suggests, but its spirit is no longer that of authentic Thomism, being more in line with the Molinist view of the state of pure nature. D.’s deep religious ambiguity reflects the opposition of his antinaturalism to Molinist naturalism, though the could well believe himself loyal to the Molinist Catholicism from which he started out. Interesting sidelights on Jansenism and Pascal. The study is part of the progressive revaluation of 17th-century French
philosophy under the impact of the organized Italian post-1945 studies of Renaissance and post-Renaissance humanism; note also Gouhier’s comment on the “Anti-Renaissance” concept in no. 96, p. 9.


Perceptive, documented doctrinal study. Starts from the view that D.’s religious agnosticism is founded on the idea of absolute transcendence of the infinite; for Descartes, “ogni ordine politico è storico e soltanto dalla storia trae la sua ragion d’essere e non da una necessità religiosa o razionale” (121). D. therefore admits a pluralism of social orders, but does not develop a criterion for selecting the best. (Essential literature cited on p. 120, n. 35.) Del Noce’s “Cartesio e la politica” (RF 41: 1950, 3–30, reviewed by I. González in PenM 8: 1952, 261), finds that D.’s metaphysical starting point seems to imply absolutism as political order, though it cannot be reconciled with his philosophy as an integral structure. For a broad historical as well as doctrinal treatment see Pierre Mesnard’s excursus on “Le prestendu machiavélisme de Descartes” in no. 220, p. 190–212. See also H. Gouhier, no. 169; R. Lefevre, no. 179b; V. Giorgianni, no. 264; and Umberto Padvani, “Cartesio e Machiavelli; osservazione sui rapporti tra politica e morale” (Cartesio, no. 35, 623–34).


Malin génie and Dieu-trompeur express Cartesian doubt at its most radical and do not succumb to Descartes’ logical operations. He gains the security of certainty by his never seriously doubted belief in the lumen naturale, not by rationally defeating fundamental doubt. Radical doubt would have to attack the proposition that our principles of cognition yield absolute insights; but Descartes’ “proof” of the identity of human and divine cognition makes the tacit assumption that God is knowable, and this assumption is precisely what should but can not be proved.


Against Serrus (no. 321) who claimed that D. missed the hypothetic-deductive character of modern mathematics and considered syllogistic logic utterly barren, Pastore finds D. using the hypothetic-deductive method in mathematics (solving a problem by considering it solved, as in the example of the anaclastic). The Cartesian equation is an analytical machine or experiment. Similarly, the syllogism is for D. an Euclidean analogy. Using his own “logica del potenziamento”, Pastore explains the character of D.’s analytic geometry as a logical transform of one system into another. Pastore thus anticipates the view of Vuillemin (no. 398) of D.’s geometry as a theory of proportions. Extending his analysis to D.’s metaphysics (F 1930) he finds in the “ergo” of cogito ergo sum the dualism of “intuitus” and “deductio”. Like Vuillemin, he sees D.’s metaphysics as a metamathematical transformation of the mathesis universalis, but deviates in his final conclusion: “Tutto induce a credere che anche per Descartes esista un punto di reciproca impertinenza, in cui la ragione e la fede cessano d’essere affermate contradittoriamente. Il cartesianesimo ha la missione di significare al mondo la rivelazione di questo mistero” (F 1: 1950, 235). Descartes’ metaphysics thus expresses operative dualities between the deductive and
the intuitive, the logical and the mystical, the real and the ideal. Pastore's use of the term "mystical" is odd since he finds that "il Dio di Descartes è il Dio della testa non del cuore, dell'Intelligenza non dell'Amore." Referring to Le Senne's "I suffer, hence I am" which "accetta il dolore sofferto come fonte di moralità," Pastore adds: "Questo pensiero è ignoto a Descartes" (F 1950, p. 237, n. 15).

322 POPKIN, RICHARD H.: "Charron and Descartes: the fruits of systematic doubt." JP 51: 1954, 831–37. Excellent differentiation between D.'s use of doubt to produce certainty (discovery of truth is not miraculous), and Charron's use of it to avoid heresy (leap into Revelation). "But D.'s contemporaries saw that he had either taken the Sceptics too seriously, or not seriously enough" (837) – forgetting that D. had not genuinely met the sceptic challenge for good reason: "The Conquest of Everest was never really attempted, because he was already on top." See also Dambska (no. 246 and 247) and especially Julien-Eymard (no. 283).

322a POPKIN, RICHARD H.: "Descartes: conqueror of scepticism." "Descartes: sceptique malgré lui." In his: The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, ch. 9, 10. Assen, van Gorkum, 1960, p. 174–216. Monographic study of the Pyrrhonist phase initiated by the Renaissance rediscovery of Sextus Empiricus and ending, according to Popkin, with Descartes' Pyrrhic victory over scepticism which set the stage for the next phase (Pascal to Kierkegaard). Only by the "super-Pyrrhonism" of the First Meditation, i.e. by carrying methodical doubt to methodical negation (Gouhier's thesis, no. 268), did D. conquer scepticism. But this "super-Pyrrhonism" made the sceptics turn from their old enemies to D. as their new target: in the second half of the 17th c., scepticism "changed from being anti-Scholastic and anti-Platonic, to being anti-Cartesian" (xiii). Ch. 10 impressively shows D.'s dilemma: either the malin génie and Dieu-trompeur arguments are accepted at full weight, then a Pyrrhonistic crisis ensues; or the emphasis falls on the cogito assertion, then the position becomes dogmatic and fails to refute scepticism. This dilemma is fully exploited by D.'s century, from his contemporaries Pierre Petit, Bourdin, Voetius, Schoock, and above all Gassendi, to Huet and Gabriel Daniel. Ch. 3–8 contain valuable studies of the scepticism of Montaigne, Gassendi, Garrasse, Chanet, Mersenne, Herbert of Cherbury and others. The historical thesis is boldly novel and carefully documented. Reviews: Donald M. Frame in RR 52: 1961, 226–28; Neal W. Gilbert in Renaissance News 14: 1961, 176–78.

323 PRENANT, LUCIE: "Rôle et limite de la psychologie dans la méthode et la philosophie de Descartes." Royaumont (no. 42), 413–37. The term "psychologie .... n'est pas un terme cartésien" (430); the author uses it confusingly to denote the originality of a philosophy "où les valeurs de la vérité .... se présentent comme des certitudes personnelles, qui ont l'assurance intime de leur droit à l'universalité." A study of D.'s Method and metaphysics, perceptively original and "nuancée" as all of author's work on D.

social change, but only D. showed the liberating promise. See the comment by E. Dolléans, "La technique soumise à la générosité" (ibid., 125-30). All these “pros” and “cons” are doubly anachronistic: they falsify Descartes' 17th century thought and falsify 20th century socio-economics as well, being unable to break away from the dated 19th century image of the “modern” world they are supposedly discussing.


Revision of a TLS article. Discusses the Descartes views of J. Maritain and A. N. Whitehead, against the background furnished by Baillet. “Intuition,” a cognitive “process of poetry,” provides “the sense of integral unity with which . . . . . no philosophy . . . . . is ever possible” (77) — and “Descartes’ method or system of reasoning is non-poetic in a very profound sense” (72). Sir Herbert, himself more poet than philosopher, fails to draw the conclusion he implies.


Revaluation of the D.-Gassendi relationship, stressing the importance of Gassendi’s largely ignored Instances written in rejoinder to D.’s Responses to his objections. Despite philosophical opposition, D. should have been Gassendi’s ally, not his enemy. Good comment on the misunderstanding that separated them (106–07). See also René Pintard, “Descartes et Gassendi” (CD 2: 115–22) on the metaphysical as well as the physical and logical antagonism between the two.


Translates Gassendi’s fragment on the Logic of D. in Gassendi’s Syntagma philosophicum, noting that D.’s contemporaries were disappointed in the Discours de la méthode, being more interested in his logic and methodology than in his metaphysics. This supports Gadoffre (no. 404). See also Rochot’s “Gassendi et le Syntagma philosophicum” (Rsyn 67: 1950, 67–79) on G.’s non-metaphysical concept of science, failing to understand the mathematicism of the new science. Good study by Rochot of “Les vérités éternelles dans la querelle entre Descartes et Gassendi” (RPFE 141: 1951, 280–98) claims that both, despite Gassendi’s misunderstanding D.’s position, had an equal share in the origin of rationalism.


Distinguishes a first fact (cogito), a supreme axiom (If I think, I am), and a first principle (cogito ergo sum); this first principle again includes “the first self-supporting certainty” as well as its logical explication: the formula of the cogito is already explication. The well-conceived paper ends with a noteworthy comment on the implicit conflict in D. between metaphysical foundation and mathematicism.
ROME, BEATRICE K.: “Created truth and ‘causa sui’ in Descartes.”
PPR 17: 1956, 66–78.

The doctrines of created essences and of God’s incomprehensible freedom enabled D. to abandon final causes. But to guarantee certainty in science, he needed a Deity more perfect than a mere creative force, yet one still indifferent: hence the causa sui concept to guarantee God’s immutability; but this wreaks havoc with indifferent creation, free will, and the veracity of God. Conclusion: D.’s doctrine of created truth needs justification of God’s existence far more than it needs God to justify created truths. Sharp logical analysis in the contemporary English-American style.


Part of a remarkable, erudite study of the problem of artificial memory and mnemon technics in the literature of magic [“Studi sul Lullismo e sull’arte della memoria nel Rinascimento,” in RCSF 13: 1958, 149–91, 243–79; 14: 1959, 29–60], this fascinating article shows that Descartes, though rejecting Lullism from the very first, was thoroughly aware of the late 16th and early 17th century literature on these subjects. Many of the most characteristic Cartesian notions occur in it; the Royal physician and astrologer Lazare Meyssonnier has a “méthode de conduire la raison,” a “logique naturelle pour resoudre toutes sortes de questions,” the universal science, the catena scientiarum (1639); Jean Belot (1663) has “tourbillons de la matiere”; there are remarkable similarities regarding the catena scientiarum between Descartes and “il medico e mago Jean d’Aubry” (47–48). D.’s arguments against Lullism (“ars combinatoria” and “ars memorativa”) are in “singular agreement” with those of Bacon; yet the method of the Regulae shows that, at least before 1628, Descartes made considerable use of images and symbols in the theory of the thought process, notwithstanding his later rejection of all symbolism [section on “Aids to memory and the doctrine of enumeration in the Regulae,” 35–61, with comments on intuitus, deduction, logical enumeration, etc.]. Of particular interest are Rossi’s comments on the Cogitationes privatae and Olympica: striking formulæ like “larvatus prodeo” or “Una est in rebus activa vis” were commonplace in the hermeneutic literature before and in D.’s times. This hardly weakens Gouhier’s interpretation in no. 96, to which Rossi refers, though it affects some of Gouhier’s reconstructions of their probable sources. On Lull’s Ars inveniendi veritatem see no. 3000a; on his influence upon D. see José Bertran Guell, no. 1217.


Spinoza’s Ethics is “one continued and conscious protest against the scepticism of Descartes” (Mind 1923, p. 13), a scepticism implicit in the method of DM itself; Df fails to explain the connection of one clear and distinct idea with another; the introduction of a voluntaristic God as creator of eternal verities, after a passing appeal to Revelation, marks the collapse of the méthode, makes knowledge impossible, and renders proof meaningless. This is what Spinoza found unacceptable. The anticartesian weapons he needed he found in Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed. This thesis is developed using “toutes les ressources d’une imagination historique inépuisable et dont la hardiesse n’est certainement pas toujours consciente d’elle-même” (review below). Roth’s Mind article outlines with precision his
The document discusses the doctrinal critique of the méthode, showing the "precise opposition" of Spinoza's logic to that of D., using Ludwig Meyer's Preface to the Ethics as a starting point. In Roth's monograph on DM (no. 189), the critique of D.'s méthode is carried into the genesis of D.'s thought, and completed by an analysis of the failure of the méthode to serve the needs of physics, a systematic failure which inevitably turns into an historical one.


An uncommonly clear exposition of the difficulties in D.'s theory of free will, which stem from two conflicting views of freedom (power of indetermination vs. absolute determination by the True and the Good); it concludes with a critique of three Cartesian ways of understanding freedom.

Review: Corrado Dollo in S 19: 1951, 135-36. See also Segond's note on divine and humane freedom ("Prélude cartésien à l'existentialisme," ibid., 223-32), and Sartre, no. 192.


Capital study of the question whether the cogito can be syllogistically proved. If not syllogistically interpreted, it must be transformed into "dubito ergo sum," as D. himself suggests; in this form it is the fundamental proposition of Cartesian metaphysics. D.'s claim that the cogito is unprovable is shown to be false; it can be transformed into a proposition provable by Aristotelian logic. The article comments on the cogito interpretations of Spinoza, Kant, Heidegger, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and others. See no. 334.


Keen analytical comparison of Descartes' cogito and St. Augustine's "si fallor." Finds an overwhelming metaphysical similarity. Differences arise regarding "die Unantastbarkeit" of mathematics (411): for St. Augustine it is an axiom, for D. a "probandum." The fateful impact of Cartesianism is explained by D.'s "Auslieferung der Evidenzkontrolle an die Mathematiker," purpose and consequence of the Cartesian key formula "dubito, ergo sum" (see no. 333).


Remarkable study, discussed by E. Cassirer (no. 5, 44-46), of D.'s rejection of logical formalism, and its present-day acceptance. Modern logic admits an infinity of equivalent, closed isomorphic systems, but cannot determine which of them can grasp reality; it therefore still faces the problem which D. solved by taking the necessarily metalogical step towards a material truth criterion. The paper carefully determines the role of the cogito regarding both material and formal certainty, but does not concern itself with new methodologies, some of them related to formal logic, which treat the "reality" problem as illusory or attack it by rather un cartesian means. See, as an example, A. J. Ayer's "Cogito ergo sum" (Analysis 14: 27-31, Dec. 1953, reviewed by A. Gianquinto in RassF 3: 1954, 199-200). J. A. Passmore's "Descartes,
the British empiricists, and formal logic” (PhR 62: 1953, 545-53) points out that D.’s rather than Bacon’s rejection of formal logic in favor of an “ars inveniendi,” adopted by Locke, remained dominant until J. S. Mill attempted, and failed, to formalize what, according to D., could not be formalized. Hence (?) Bertrand Russell’s return to formalism. See also Serrus, no. 231.


Studiously objective study of D.’s attitude towards the Jesuits as evidenced in his correspondence regarding Bourdin, whose threat to denounce D. in Rome caused D.’s sharp reaction. Bourdin did not have many Jesuits on his side: author considers it not impossible that a formal order was issued to Bourdin to refrain from any polemic with D. with whom the Order wanted to maintain good relations for reasons of prudence. After the Bourdin affair, these relations rapidly improved: “Man hat sich gegenseitig die Bitterkeiten vergessen und ist gut Freund geworden” (182) – for a while, anyway. Utilizes the Jesuit archives in Rome.


Taking issue with Gilson’s DM commentary, author uses D.’s proof of the existence of matter in the Sixth Meditation to show the part which “the impulse to believe ‘the teachings of nature’ plays in Descartes’ proof” (191). These “teachings” are the experience of the link between bodily affectations and the sensation of pain etc., of mind-body unity (Ryle’s “ghost-in-the-machine”), of body being distinct from other bodies. The interesting question why D. believed these “teachings of nature” to be error-free is somewhat doubtfully answered by reference to “the biological utility of the more specific instinctive beliefs” (197).


Laborious, clumsy analysis which yet offers a happy little discovery: D.’s conception of intellectus as intuitus reflects the ancient primacy of the eye over the other senses, hence makes for a philosophy that sees, oversees, and dominates, not for one that listens and obeys (“Wir sprechen vom ‘herrischen Auge’ und ‘demütigen Ohr’; das Umgekehrte ist nicht möglich,” 262). From Heidegger’s school.


Seeks, and finds, antecedents of the methodical doubt and cogito in al-Ghazzâlî, Averroës, Maimonides: “... la parentela spirituale profonda che lege Cartesio con i pensatori arabo-ebrei si basa in fondo sull’ indirizzo spirituale commune di concepire Dio come la realtà suprema razionale accessibile alla mente umana e di sviluppare questa idea di Dio con il procedimento mentale intuitivo unicamente adeguato a questa realtà” (247). Useful references. See also Ch. Saumagne’s “Notes sur l’Iman Abou-Hamed al-Ghazali et le doute méthodique de Descartes” (Con 2: July 1921, 541–49). On Maimonides see Roth (no. 329).

Critical review of the French literature of the 1920's and 1930's on D.'s religiosity, emphasizing Espinas, Gouhier, Maxime Leroy. Conclusions: Descartes was not intentionally a Catholic apologist (against Espinas), but he was not insincere either (against Leroy); he accepted revealed theology sincerely but also for convenience; this admission was coupled with indifference towards Christian religious experience, which explains his tolerance for, and liking of, non-Catholic company; yet, there is a note of (admittedly rationalist) mysticism underneath. A pretty example of synthetic judgment a posteriori, leaving the author and D. with one leg each dangling on either side of the religious fence.


D. saw well enough that his new concept of science required a critique of knowledge “remaniant à la fois . . . le monde et l'esprit. Mais cette même idée qui soulève le problème critique interdit de le poser avec une sincérité complète. La question posée est étroite, la phénoménologie reste courte, et la méthode imprécise” (100). Distinguishes critical sincerity (doubting the evidence) from moral, artistic, psychological, intellectual sincerity. Good pages on Cartesian and Socratic irony (Kant continues Descartes as Descartes continues Socrates, 64–77).


“On the radical opposition between the spirit of 17th c. rationalism and that of recent existential philosophies” (Anon. in Mind 48: 1939, 239), with extensive discussion of Heidegger’s and Jasper’s hostility towards Descartes. Brief section on Husserl.


Magnificent study, justly dedicated to Bergson, of D.'s conception of time, motion, causality: “voir les choses dans l'instant” (44), “simultanéité nécessaire par laquelle s'exprime l'unité de l'action physique, l'unité du moi, l'unité de Dieu” (45), apprehending the discontinuous instant and continuing creation in one intuition. This view of time is traced through (or rather built up from) its expressions in D.'s dominant doctrines of metaphysics and physics. See also J. Vigier, “Les idées de temps, de durée et d'éternité dans Descartes” (RPFE 89: 1920, 196–233, 321–48); Geneviève Lewis' comments on Wahl and Vigier in RIP 4: 1930, 190–93 (“L'âme et la durée d'après une controverse cartésienne”); and Laporte (no. 178) whose view of Cartesian time as continuous is refuted by Gueroult, no. 170, v. 1.


Important, profoundly serious reading of DM I–III from the viewpoint of post-war existential philosophizing. D.’s morale provisoire is an admission that Cartesian
doubt cannot encompass (as the cogito cannot solve) the whole of the problem of human existence; "der Übergang von der Unruhe eines philosophierenden Menschen zur absolutistischen Substanzenmetaphysik eines Welt-Systems ist die negative Seite dessen, was uns der cartesische Zweifelsversuch vormachen kann" (302). But D. was not just "l'homme de lettres dans son cabinet"; his morale provisoire with its "il suffit de bien juger pour bien faire" indicates that his philosophizing should have led "zu einer dialektischen Feststellung über den Menschen" (302) rather than to his two-substance dualism. Wein's "Der wahre cartesische Dualismus" (ibid., 10: 1956, 3-28) consequently finds the true Cartesian dualism in the contrast between D.'s search for absolute truth and his advocacy of a morale provisoire. One of the best recent German contributions.


D.'s account of change as efficient causation is irreconcilable with Aristotle's. Prevailing modern thought looks upon change as Descartes did. Even Hume's critique of D. stays within the Cartesian framework. A problem article, profound in its confrontation of Aristotle and D., disquieting in its vista of modern thought developments.


Distinguishes two basic Western theories of freedom: the Philonic (God endows man's will with His own miraculous power to act freely and indeterminedly) and the Epicurean (undetermined freedom of human will in a world without causality). D. is in Philo's tradition, but "while lavishing upon man the miraculous power of the free will, he begrudges God, in this old world of ours, a few reported miracles; and, in his own imaginary world, he denies Him outright the power of miracle-working." (103). Leibniz too departs from Philo's theory, while Hume "starts with a denial of causality but denies causeless free will" (114).


The road from beast-machine to man-machine does not end in man becoming machine but in "the machine's becoming a man, i.e., in the establishment of biology and other sciences of man as needing no foundation either in physics or in theology," as A. M. Ritchie rightly notes (Mind 64: 1955, 563). The proposition is borne out in Young's lecture series, popular by Third Programme standards, on current biological knowledge of the brain and on "the human calculating machine" (Lecture 3), showing the road from the beginnings in Descartes to the era of cybernetics and electronic "brains." Author draws oddly groping but far-reaching conclusions concerning the Cartesian problem of doubt and certainty in science, calling for a new epistemology based on the biologists' recognition that truth can no longer be defined "as that which can be observed and verified by anyone"; and that individual observers "are not the basic units of life" (154). The noted biologist's
epistemological qualms are one aspect of the machine-man challenging the cogito; for the leap from the mathematical theory of automatism to mastery of the human world, paralleling D.'s leap from Method to "mastery and possession of nature," see Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics, or control and communication in the animal and the machine (New York: Wiley, 1948, 194 p.). On the question whether machines "think": W. R. Ashby, "Can a mechanical chessplayer outplay its designer?" (BJPS 3: 1952-53, 44-57) with comments by J. B. S. Haldane (189-91) and B. M. Adkins ("The dictum of Descartes," 259-60). The issue merges in part with the "ghost-in-the-machine" issue; see no. 190; Pinsky's facetious question "Do machines think about machines thinking?" (Mind 60: 1951, 397f., a jeu d'esprit on D., Spinoza and the therapeutic positivists) was unexpectedly answered in a New Yorker cartoon by Richter (November 1, 1958): Mathematician, reading the tape coming from a giant computer, to another mathematician: "I'll be damned. It says, cogito ergo sum."

IX. MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCES

351 BELOT, ÉMILE: Essai de cosmogonie tourbillonnaire: L'origine dualiste des mondes. Gauthier-Villars, 1911. xi, 280 p. See also no. 1189-90.

Develops a cosmology from the principle of "dualisme tourbillonnaire," declaring that nothing in modern science contradicts D.'s vortex hypothesis. Belot's novel "dualism" hypothesis rigorously deduces the formation of a planetary system from the deformation of a very rapidly turning tube-vortex of gaseous matter under the impact of collision with a slow-moving body. See Busco's chapter on Belot's theory in no. 399, and Parenty, no. 392.


Documented study balances the detrimental influence upon chemistry of D. and his followers against their "epochal" contribution to the radical weeding out of all animistic, teleological and mystical explanations. Rich material on John Mayow (1645-79), English Cartesian chemist, whom the author considers the greatest predecessor of Lavoisier, and on other Cartesian chemists less helpful to the new science. See also Thijssen-Schoute (no. 467), 258-60.


Original, stirring interpretation of D.'s concept of mathesis universalis as a science of pure, naked quantities without any concrete reality, hence independent of imagination in D.'s sense. Descartes recognized this conception to be practically unattainable; his algebraic geometry was merely the most useful and convenient compromise he could find. The thesis rests on distinctions between "imagination" acting in time and "understanding" outside time; memory and perception; deductive reasoning and immediate cognition. Important appendix on D.'s and Vieta's analysis "au point du vue du rôle de l'imagination" (37-41); also on D.'s Regulae (42-45), to the understanding of which this study makes a profound contribution. See also J. Klein, no. 378; Boutroux, no. 355; Brunschvicg, no. 358.

Traces the development of dynamics from Aristotelian physics to Roberval and Newton, defining D.'s place with precision.


The fortunes of algebra, stepchild of mathematics, changed suddenly when D.’s Géométrie broke the tradition by shifting interest from formal proof to certainty and problem-solving. Fermat, independent inventor of analytical geometry, failed to recognize it as an autonomous development, while D. saw the consequences, if too sanguinely. Even his errors were fruitful: his treatment of the tangent problem emphasized the limits as well as the success of his approach which, in fact, contained the seeds of the whole modern development of analysis. Julian Lowell Coolidge (“The origin of analytical geometry,” Osiris 1: 1936, 231–50; also: A history of the geometrical method, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, 122–29) traces analytical geometry from the Greek study of loci by means of their equations to Fermat and D., confirming in more pedestrian fashion Boutroux' and Brunschvicg's assessment. See also H. L. de Vries, “De ‘Géométrie’ van Descartes en de ‘Isagoge’ van Fermat” (NTW 4: 1916-17, 145-68); A. Boyce Gibson’s “La ‘Géométrie’ de Descartes au point de vue de sa méthode” (RMM 4: 1896, 386–98), using the Regulae to explain the general method of the Géométric; and M. Hyppolite, “Du sens de la ‘Géométrie’ de Descartes dans son œuvre” (in Royaumont, no. 42, 166–86, with discussion).


This monograph treats analytical geometry from its Greek roots to the later part of the 19th c. only. In this vast perspective the priority between Descartes and Fermat is less important than the question of how much they contributed to analytic geometry as a whole. René Taton's review (Isis 50: 1959, 489–92) sums up the best answer: “They discovered the two aspects of the fundamental principle of analytic geometry, but they did not make the subject what it is today.”


Voltaire had charged D. with the unacknowledged use of Marco Antonio de Domini's work on the rainbow. Paul Muy (CD v. 2, 47–55) finds D.'s real yet equally unacknowledged source to be Francesco Maurolyco of Messina, though the mathe- matization of the problem is Descartes' own undisputed and brilliant achievement. Boyer's well-illustrated, agreeably written and carefully documented book is the definitive history, from Aristotle to our day. Here and in his papers (no. 1353a,b) Boyer explains the fundamental contribution of medieval European and Arab physicists to the observation and measurement of the rainbow, with a fine chapter on D.'s most important predecessor, Dietrich (Theodoric) von Freiberg. Ch. 8 (The Cartesian theory and its reception, 200–332) shows Descartes the research man
solving the problem by a combination of brilliant insight and indefatigable calculations, then proudly assuming that his solution is the final word, and "in his arbitrary impatience" missing the crowning glory that was his for the asking: having explained the secondary rainbow, he could easily have predicted the phenomenon of the tertiary one, and completed the theory. Good brief statement on Snell's law and D.'s law of sines (182-94); tables comparing D.'s tables of angles with those of predecessors. Though D. rightly considered his explanation of the rainbow a triumph of his method, this pièce de résistance had a curiously cold reception, described in the remainder of the chapter. The book contributes to the understanding of D.'s character and manner of procedure as a scientist. See also Isnardi (no. 376, 122-26) who refutes Poggendorf's notorious charges of plagiarism against D., and Mouy's treatment of the problem in no. 391.


Very detailed account of the struggle of the Cartesians against the Newtonians, 1700-1738, assessing the role of many little-known as well as of the major figures among both. Period divided into three parts: initial Newtonian influences and Cartesian resistance, 1700-20 (1-78); "Les préliminaires du débat, 1720-28" (p. 79-152); "L'effort des grands cartésiens, 1728-38" (153-202). Inestimable source of information. Bibliography. See also Léon Blach's La physique de Newton (Alcan, 1908, 642 p., BPC), especially Ch. 9 on Newton's metaphysical ideas, and E. A. Burtt's broad treatment of the philosophical background, no. 444.


Great idealistic history of mathematical thought. Sees in D. a decisive turn in the conception and philosophy of mathematics, though Brunschvicg recognizes that this science would not be perceptibly different today had D.'s Géométrie remained unwritten. The heart of his singular interpretation of D.'s analytical geometry is on p. 120-21. The contrast between Regulae and Géométrie is ingeniously analyzed. The chapter on Cartesian mathematics notes the Géométrie commentaries of Florimond de Beaune and Erasmus Bartholinus, and gives a trenchant analysis of mathematics in Malebranche's and Spinoza's philosophy. The discussion is in non-mathematical language.


Sir Edmund Whittaker in his History of the theories of ether and electricity, 2nd ed. (no. 3558) wonders what the fate of Newtonianism would have been if the spiral nebulae had been discovered before the overthrow of D.'s theory of vortices (v. i, p. 9, n. 2). Busco's detailed history of cosmologies from Descartes and Malebranche through Newton and Laplace to the early century up to Belot's vortex theory
provides some sort of answer. Ch. 13 on the relationship between cosmogony and epistemology expresses the scientist’s disdain at “l’incohérence et l’inanité . . . de la métaphysique, qui n’a ni méthode, ni affirmations propres,” praising the modern abandonment of the “faux idéal de rationalité, de simplicité, ainsi que la recherche des origines absolus” (432), i.e. the anticartesian turn in the scientific spirit; at the same time the book demonstrates the persistence of Descartes’ vortex concept in modern cosmology, despite its collapse when Newton’s celestial mechanics appeared. Ch. 12 has an interesting discussion of the concept of chaos and the theory of actual causes.


Though D. is commonly considered the anticipator if not the creator of the modern concept of reflex, Canguilhem’s meticulous, absorbing study gives not without regrets Thomas Willis’ “De motu musculari” of 1670 credit for its first authentic formulation (169–72). The chapter on D. is a first-rate contribution to the understanding of his physiology and the philosophical spirit behind it. Ch. 1 outlines the state of the problem before Descartes. Valuable bibliography. No index.


Penetrating analysis of D.’s difficulty in making the transition from mathematics to physics, from statics to dynamics. D.’s mechanics is compared to that of his contemporary adversaries, with precise assessment of the relationship. See M. Gueroult (no. ma).


Detailed history of theories of free fall and throw, with chapters on Isaac Beeckman [also in: NAW ser. 2, v. 14, 186–208, 1924] who found the law of free fall before Galileo but never published it, and on D. (342–57) who made an odd but revealing error in his own account of the law. See Koyré, no. 379.


Capital study treats a wealth of fact with deep understanding of its philosophical and biographical implications. Explains why D., so preoccupied with longevity, neglected therapeutics in favor of anatomy, physiology, embryonics; his treatment of Hippocratic theory of humors; the gap between his physiology and moral philosophy; Princess Elisabeth’s influence upon his medical interest, etc. Finds D.’s neglect of therapeutics normal for his time, points to anticipations of modern discoveries (notably his treatment of fever and infections), sees him develop towards
a vitalistic type of “animisme partiel et indirect,” tending to define (in van Hel­
mont’s manner) “toute une série d’entités moribides par l’isolement anarchique
d’une idée” (275). Excellent on TP and the dualism problem. Guillaume Scipion Bertrand
de Saint-Germain’s Descartes considéré comme physiologiste et comme médecin
(Masson, 1889, xi, 532 p.), out of V. Cousin’s school, is an unproblematic account of
D.’s physiology and gerontology, listing anticipatory achievements (importance of
elementary cells in the formation of higher beings, the role of gastric juices in di­
gestion, of capillary vessels in nutrition, etc.) See also two Paris thèses: Robert Charles
Gootran Martin, Descartes médecin (Legrand, 1924, 72 p.); Auguste Tellier, Descartes et la
médecine, ou les relations de Descartes avec les médecins de son temps; suivi d’un
exposé des idées médicales de Descartes (Vigne, 1928, 72 p.).

366 DREYFUS, GINETTE: “Physique et géométrie chez Descartes et chez
Malebranche.” In: Royaumont (no. 42), 187–207.

Courageous attack upon the view, firmly held by L. Brunschvicg and followed by
the majority of interpreters, that Malebranche’s concept of physics as an essentially
empirical science is sharply opposed to D.’s reduction of physics to geometry. A
close, well documented analysis shows M. admitting, on principle, three possible
geometries and physics, and adopting the one which accords best with observation.
Fundamentally, M.’s concept is identical with Descartes’; but in his philosophy this
concept leads to insoluble metaphysical blocks. Interesting discussion (200–03).

367 DUGAS, RENÉ: “La pensée mécanique de Descartes.” In his: La méca­
nique au XVIIe siècle: des antécédents scolastiques à la pensée classique.
transl.: no. 1804a.]

After his Histoire de la mécanique (Neuchâtel, 1930), Dugas offers in this last work
a huge, well organized history of 17th c. mechanics which gives central place to
Galilei, Descartes, Pascal, Newton, Leibniz without neglecting important lesser
figures, e.g., Beeckman whose extraordinary anticipatory mind shines forth from
Dugas’ list of his findings. The value of the work lies in what is also its weakness:
it is not analytical like Mouy’s, but offers generous excerpts from the texts, with
sparse yet precise comments. Good picture of the nexus between great and lesser
physicists of the century, and of the struggle between Cartesian and Newtonians.
The role of metaphysics in 17th c. physics is not a topic here. Critical review

In “Sur le cartesianisme de Huygens,” RHSA 7: 1954, 22–33, Dugas finds that young
Christian Huygens “s’est libéré, après mûre réflexion, de l’obédience cartésienne”
(24) but returned to D.’s “relativité généralisée” under the impact of Newton’s
Principia, refusing to accept Newton’s absolutes; in cosmology, he preferred D.’s
world as the more intelligible one. See also Dugas, “De Descartes à Newton par
l’école anglaise,” 1952 (no. 1805) on Hobbes, Henry More, Robert Boyle and J. Barrow,
pointing out that in England too D.’s physics fared better than his metaphysics.
Paul Mouy’s chapter on Huygens in no. 390, 180–217, a thorough analysis of Cartesian
element in Huygens’ works, presents Huygens not without some hesitation as being
in the strict Cartesian tradition, a view now modified by Dugas.
Masterly, authoritative treatment of D.'s statics, from the factual historical viewpoint, yields a harsh judgment: "En la statique de Descartes, il n'est aucune vérité que les hommes n'aient connue avant Descartes"; echoing J. C. Poggendorf, Duhem finds that D., "aveuglé par son prodigieux orgueil, .... ne voit qu'erreurs dans les œuvres de ses prédécesseurs et de ses contemporains" (352). See also Ch. 13 on Roberval and Mersenne, and V. 2, ch. 17 on Mersenne, Pascal, Honoré Fabri and the Cartesian physicists. François Menté, in an open letter to Duhem ("un plaidoyer d'exégèse en faveur de Descartes") respectfully reminds the great historian of the relationship between metaphysics and physics which must be considered when judging D. the philosopher (RdPh 5: 1904/2, 217–25).

Traces the problem of centers of oscillation (the pendulum problem) from Leonardo da Vinci to its ultimate solution by Christian Huygens, "un des plus re marquables exemples de la continuité suivant laquelle s'enchainent les découvertes scientifiques" (Études, p. 156), D. being just a link in this chain. D. and Roberval were both partly right, partly wrong in their heated controversy, their contributions finding a joint place in the final solution. Pierre Costabel's "La controverse Descartes-Roberval au sujet du centre d'oscillation" (RSCh no. 61: 1951, 74–86) minutely studies the texts and Lagrange's criticism of D.'s solution; he finds D.'s methodological approach intellectually superior, though Roberval was technically better. Cf. also Costabel. "La demonstration cartesienne relative au centre d'équilibre de la balance" (AIHS 9: 1956, 133–46). On the Roberval-D. controversy over the tangent problem see Léon Auger's "La polémique entre Descartes et Gilles Personne de Roberval" (Thalès 6: 1949–50, 59–67).

The book, laden with forbidding mathematical and physical apparatus, distinguishes two basic attitudes in physics. One, Cartesian in spirit, is exemplified by Faraday, Lorentz and Einstein, the other by Ampère (the author's hero), Helmholtz and Poincaré. The two currents meet in Maxwell to yield a theoretical physics rich in results but heterogeneous in foundation. Admiral Ferrier attempts an Ampérian reconciliation in the unifying spirit of Cartesian method, but without the infertility of Cartesian systematization. Nonphysicists will find his "Aperçus nouveaux sur la cosmologie cartésienne" (Rsyn 63: 1948, 31–42) and the interesting discussion (53–58) a good, accessible summary of his theses, leaving the distinct impression that D.'s concepts of extension, space and number evaporate when translated from classical 17th century metaphysical language into that of modern mathematics and physics. Ferrier's placing D. in relation to modern physics is similar to R. Ingarden's, despite his different approach (see no. 375).


D.'s Géométrie is the work of an analytical mind, his physics that of a geometer who only formally surpassed Greek physics. Cartesian method is essentially a mapping of different concepts upon each other, limited to relations among extended things and excluding the time parameter: “Ihm ist ‘mouvement’ ein ‘état’, nicht eine zeitliche Zustandsänderung” (128). This is exemplified by a brief, nice discussion of the law of free fall (Galileo, D. and Beeckman who read D.'s false solution in Galileo's spirit and ascribed to D. the correct quadratic law). Original commemorative lecture, with comment on D., Kepler and Newton. Similarly S. Gaanebin's "La réforme cartésienne et son fondement géométrique" (ibid., 105–20), with an important extension: D.'s physics, in which the instant only is real (as Jean Wahl has shown), is not predictive like modern physics; its procedure is “construire les appareils comme le géomètre construit des figures” (117), a judgment which falls or stands with the author's assertion that "la géométrie de Descartes est déjà une physique" (116).


Very detailed study of Varignon, late Cartesian mathematician, in his double role as physicist and geometer; case study of the transition from Cartesianism to the new world of Leibniz and Newton, showing Varignon moving easily from statics and kinetics to dynamics, but having trouble understanding the spirit of the infinitesimal calculus, despite the Marquis de l'Hôpital's and Bernoulli's help. Author considers Varignon "das mathematische Optimum, welches der Spätcartesianismus in Frankreich hervorgebracht hat" (82).


Posthumously published study covers D.'s physiology in detail, assessing its contemporary position and subsequent influence. The author's judgment was mature despite his years, his erudition comprehensive, his documentation extremely rich; the study is still almost indispensable for reference to problems, sources, literature. The quite negative assessment of the scientific importance of D.'s physiology may be compared to Mesnard's judgment of its philosophical character (no. 386).


Metaphysically, D. identifies the concept of force with the continuous creative action of God. But basing his laws of motion upon the distinction between force at rest and force of motion, he asserts that both are secondary causes and modes of substance, both effects of divine force, both positive entities; whence his difficulty
in establishing valid metaphysical and physical differences between them, and in moving from statics to dynamics. Absorbing but difficult study, carried forward to Malebranche and Leibniz: To escape Descartes’ dilemma, Malebranche imagines that God created the world at rest. then added a different reality (viz., motion) by “chiquenaude.” M.’s view of rest as simple privation of motion leads him into gravest difficulties regarding the laws of impact. By his theory, a small body should have greater force in motion than a large one. However, he contents himself with the distinction between dead force of inertia and live force of motion, without entering the field of physics, while Leibniz, to save phenomena, goes on to define mass as “vis primitiva et derivativa patiendi.” The article rejects the common view concerning M.’s treatment of Descartes’ concept of force at rest. On Leibniz and the concept of (mechanical) work see Gueroult, Dynamique et métaphysique Leibniziennes (Les Belles lettres, 1954 and PFL Strasbourg, v. 68; on Leibniz and Descartes: ch. 6). See also Carteron (no. 361).


First part deals with D.’s predecessors and his philosophy of nature, second part with his cosmogony and its influence. Still useful.


Spirited defense of D.’s physics against Ernst Mach and J. C. Poggendorf; re-appraises it in the light of 20th-century physics. D. laid the ground for Newton whose refutation of Descartes regarding Kepler’s laws is held to be in triple error. Credits D. with the “philosophy of inertia,” notion of ether, paternity to modern field theories etc., riding roughshod over Galileo, Huygens, Snell. Even D.’s assertion of the constant total quantity of movement is rescued as the prototype of modern thermodynamic concepts. D.’s metaphysical speculations have nothing to do with his science; they merely serve to reconcile his sceptical leanings with his realism. Author ranges Descartes with Maxwell, Lorentz, Einstein as “maximalist” (complete, deterministic, causal, deductive program), against the “minimalists” Newton, Mach, Ostwald, Born and the quantum theorists. Very rich article, quite Cartesian in its treatment of physicists other than the master himself.

376 ISNARDI, TEÓFILO: “La física de Descartes.” In: Homenaje (no. 40), V. 1, 75–139.

Comprehensive expository and critical survey of D.’s physics, with texts and illustrations, judges it to be largely a “roman de la nature,” result of D.’s attempt to combine philosophy of science and concrete research, to the detriment of experimentalism. On this and related studies see E. Cassirer in no. 5, 10–13.


Two model studies, written with clarity, precision, economy, wide source knowledge, of ideas (space, force) in physics, not philosophy. Thus D. does not appear at all in the history of space concepts (no. 377); regarding force (a concept he rejected), his mechanics plays a small part, but his influence reaches to the early 19th c. (Maine de Biran). Both books anticipate and confirm Koyré (no. 379a). Lucid explanation of D.'s vortex theory of gravity and of Huygens’ consequent work on centrifugal forces in no. 377a, elaborated in no. 377 with regard to D., Leibniz, Huygens. Henry More's theologization of space (no. 377) is treated in the context of Jewish-Christian space theologies, while the chapter on the overthrow of Aristotelian space begins with Jewish-Arabic-Scholastic thought and ends with Gassendi and Campanella, omitting D. altogether. Both books are eminently helpful in historically placing D.'s physics; no. 377a clearly sets forth the development of the concepts of force, work, impetus, etc.


Booklength article of stupendous erudition treats with great clarity the Greek heritage in the genesis of modern algebra. Vast scholarly apparatus, relegated to footnotes, some of them little monographs: on D.’s “imagination”, Greek ψυχωσία and Stoic “imaginatio” (212-14); on the sources of D.’s figurative symbolism (217-20). The Vieta chapter shows this conservative French mathematician reaching notions which will look revolutionary in D.: “nullum non problema solvere”; the problema problematum (mathematics as ars inveniendi); mathesis universalis, which becomes D.’s starting point. Regarding D.’s relationship to Vieta, Klein finds D. raising Vieta's ars analytica to the status of a symbolic science. Lively picture of Stevin who figures in D.’s decision to serve under Maurice of Nassau in 1618; Stevin’s number concept is judged deeper, far less traditional than D.’s. The relatively brief but important section on D. sees his great achievement, never again lost, in identifying general symbolic mathesis with extension, thus creating the foundations of classical physics (Euclidean space) on which Newton was to build. Klein’s analysis of “imaginatio” in D.’s Regulae as guaranteeing that the mathesis universalis will grasp the structure of the real world (Klein considers this to be D.’s scientia mirabilis) is superb. On D.’s indebtedness to the Greeks see André Robert, “Descartes et l’analyse des anciens” (Aph 13, no. 2: 1937, 221-45) and Milhaud, no. 388.


Outstanding study. The first volume sketches the genesis of modern physics from Aristotle to the medieval study of impetus and on to Galileo. Vol. 2, enlarged from RPFE 123: 1937, 149-204, skillfully elucidates technical issues to bare the contrast between Galileo and Descartes. Best account of the curious Beeckman-D. discussions or free fall (25-40): Beeckman fully understood the physical problem but could not mathematize it; D. combines "une suprême élégance mathématique avec la plus irrémédiable confusion physique" (36). The long note on p. 26-27 serves as a warning not to take any Beeckman appraisal as final until a complete study of B.'s Journal is available. Vol. 3 has an excellent chapter on D.'s treatment of inertia in Le Monde and PP (198-81), confirming Koyre's assessment of the different scientific temperaments of D. and Galileo. D. errs, if fruitfully, by unconsciously sliding "du temps à l'espace, du physique au géométrique" (v. 2, 43): his physics is "géométrisation à outrance." "élimination du temps," in short, "une revanche de Platon" (v. 2, 53f.) which failed as Plato's physics had failed. Ultimately, D. aimed at a concrete physics, while Galileo treated physics as an abstract Archimedean science; this D. could not accept. See E. Cassirer's valuable discussion of this and other 1937 Galileo-D. studies in no. 5, 38-42. See also Carmelo Ferro's "Galilei e Cartesio" in: Nel terzo centenario della morte di Galileo Galilei, Milan, 1943, 327-50 (UCSC, v. 20).


KOYRÉ, ALEXANDRE: From the closed world to the infinite universe. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP (Oxford UP), 1957. [Full title and reprint: no. 2380.]

This history of the "destruction of the cosmos and the geometrization of space" (Preface) could have been called the history of the theologization of space up to the point where "the mighty, energetic God of Newton," the Divine Artifex, becomes Laplace's "hypothesis we no longer make." Ch. 4 contrasts Galileo and Descartes. The latter's distinction between the infinite and the indefinite is patiently explained as to relevance and consequences, but the heart of these Hideyo Moguchi Lectures is in the following chapters: Henry More's critique of the Cartesian identification of matter and extension; his eventual assertion of an indeterminately vast but finite world, merged in an infinite space; "absolute space, absolute time and their relations to God" (Malebranche, Newton and Bentley); the divinization of space (Joseph Raphson); and three fine chapters on Newton, Berkeley, Leibniz ("The work-day God and the God of the Sabbath"), with a brief "Abgesang" on God's departure from the new physical cosmology, leaving His ontological attributes behind and taking all the rest with Him. A rare combination of scientific, philosophical and theological analysis applied to the 17th-c. scientific revolution, and the perfect complement to Burtt, no. 444.


Lasswitz, an early German pioneer of space opera, gives a thorough, detailed study of the genesis, character, and transformation of Cartesian corpuscular physics
under the impact of dynamics. Dated in its details, unconcerned with underlying metaphysics, often crude in judgment, but useful as a factual historical introduction. See also Lasswitz, “Zur Genesis der cartesischen Corpuscularphysik” (VWPh 10: 1886, 166–89).


Lively, unusually well-written study tries to “éclairer l’œuvre par l’homme” (171), linking Cartesian psychology to the “psychology de Descartes,” i.e., his personality traits, particularly his supposedly perfect equilibrium. Impressive, surprising list of D.’s achievements that anticipate moderne findings, such as the theory of reflexes (but see Canguilhem, no. 360), the association of ideas, the impact of prenatal and early childhood experiences. Though D.’s conceptual apparatus was archaic, his ideas were new. Very good treatment of dualism as foundation of Cartesian psychology, linking it with his physics, metaphysics, moral philosophy.


When Einstein rose to glory, a French attempt to Cartesianize him was called for. Author prepares the ground by finding it impossible to link Einstein with Newton, then discovers Einstein’s Cartesianism, consisting in (1) his belief in invariant laws of nature, (2) his “recherche de la géométrie de l’univers.” What is more, both stimulated speculation yet discouraged it by their greatness! Thirty years later, F. Le Lionnais (“Descartes et Einstein,” RHSA 5: 1952, 139–54) makes a point-by-point inventory of similarities and differences, including their common concern over discord and war. But it still remains true that Newton’s system is a special case of Einstein’s, while D.’s is not.

385 MERCIER, DÉSIRÉ-JOSEPH (CARDINAL): Les origines de la psychologie contemporaine. 2nd ed. Louvain, Institut supérieur de philosophie; Alcan, 1908, xvi, 493 p.

Lays the foundations of a Neothomist psychology by analyzing and rejecting D.’s dualistic psychology as combining excessive spiritualism with mechanistic physiology, both in its original form (Ch. 1) and its historical transformations (Ch. 2) which lead to Spinozism, ontologism, idealism on the one hand, to Comtean positivism on the other. Mercier’s critique culminates in a confrontation of D.’s dualistic psychology with Thomist anthropology (Ch. 4). Ch. 1, 2 were first published as: “La psychologie de Descartes et l’anthropologie scolastique” (RNS 1896–98; see 2704).
D.'s radical departure, "l'explication génétique de l'homme" (197), is contrasted with the "lamentable" state of biology at the beginning of the 17th c. Corrects erroneous views of the Descartes-Harvey relationship: Descartes was instrumental in winning acceptance for Harvey's chief discovery. The animal-machine doctrine is held to follow necessarily from D.'s animal spirits hypothesis; D. answered criticism by merely refining it. D.'s cardinal achievement: giving autonomy and unity to physiology, his main defect: too rigorous exclusion of final causes from biology, though his late moral philosophy reopens a place for them. Original study, to be taken cum grano salis: the same story reads differently when the hero is Science, not Descartes, as Georges-Berthier has shown (no. 373).

Notes the influence of atomism, mechanism and of D.'s concepts of matter and creation upon medicine and chemistry. By reducing matter to space, the Cartesians deprive particles, capable of transmutation, of their individuality, as exemplified in the work of Daniel Duncan (1682), the author's one and only example of a Cartesian chemist. The theory of Nicolas Lemery is characterized as superficially classical and Cartesian. Written with much detail and from the sources, but naive and narrow compared to Bloch (no. 352). See also Thijsse-Schoute, no. 467.


Posthumously collected 1916–19 articles [titles and dates of first publication: no. 2742–54] on D.’s mathematics, optics and mechanics, flanked by biographical studies and general assessments. Milhaud’s work remains basic; only the Introduction and Ch. 2 (D.’s “sincerity” and his Dream) are now out of date. Milhaud writes with precision and authority, explaining technical points in generally understandable language. Chapter 1, 3, 4 translate the scientific part of D.'s Cogitationes privatae and other early writings into modern terms, elucidating the growth of his scientific interests. Among the studies of D.’s mathematics, “Descartes et l’analyse infinitésimale” (162–75) is particularly valuable, analyzing three instances where his “génie naturel” found solutions to problems “qui ne semblent solubles qu’avec l’algorithme du calcul différentiel” not available to him (174–75). Good studies of “Descartes expérimentateur” and “Descartes et Bacon” (Ch. 9, 10). In a brilliant page, D. is evaluated as original but not revolutionary in science, not the creator of modern but the conserver of ancient mathematics, his PP “le dernier des magnifiques romans” in the style of Aristotle, Plato, Lucretius (246). H. J. E. Beth (“Descartes als mathematicus,” ANTWP 42: 1950, 334-44) exemplifies D.’s mathematical method by his procedure in solving Pappus’ problem, supplementing Milhaud’s Ch. 6. See Gérard Milhaud in Rsyn 14: 1937, 80–81.


The standard work on Cartesian physics after Descartes. An excellent historical survey of D.'s work and heritage in physics (1-71) introduces a large chapter on D.'s disciples, especially Rohault and Regis (not one “expérimentateur” among them). Huygens' mathematical physics is characterized as Cartesian, without disguising the points of basic difference. Ch. 5 is the best analysis available of Malebranche’s physics. Disappointing philosophical evaluation of the findings in the “Conclusions.”


Genial forages in late 19th-c. physics by a scientist with patent limitations. Ch. 3 (“Évolution cartésienne des sciences au XIXe siècle”) indiscriminately discusses the “tourbillons” of Cauchy, Helmholtz, Thompson, Maxwell, the Hertzian waves, “les tourbillons sonores,” spiral stress lines, and any other example of spirality, turbulence or vortical motion that comes to mind.


Aggressively anticartesian assessment of D.'s net contributions to physics as mostly a host of errors, plus false claims of priority. Curious for its obvious lack of knowledge about D., in contrast to German physicists and historians of physics of a later generation. See R. Ingarden and T. Isnardi (no. 375, 376).


Interesting comparison of D.'s methodological approach to physiology with that of Claude Bernard, one of the great 19th century founders of experimental physiology. Discussed by E. Cassirer, no. 5, p. 12.


A patient, clear, trustworthy explanation in modern notation and terms of what D. actually says in his Dioptrique, Météores, Géométrie (analyzed in four excellent
chapters, 84–166), and in the PP sections on physics. Excludes biology, physiology, medicine, psychology. The historical development before D. is well handled, but the assessment of D.’s “originality” suffers from lack of acquaintance with modern special studies and approaches. Useful but not error-free biographical notes on 41 contemporaries and predecessors. Best companion-guide of its kind.


Contains most of author’s Descartes studies in connection with his work as mathematical editor of AT, the completion of which he did not live to see. Tannery remains the foremost authority on textual criticism and historical elucidation of D.’s mathematics. Vol. 6 includes his rich study of the D. correspondence in the Fonds Libri, from the viewpoint of the history of mathematics (149–268); his historical study of the inverse tangent problem (457–77); and other papers related to D. and the preparation of AT. Some other D. papers are scattered in v. 13–18. For an assessment of Tannery’s achievement see Pierre Duhem’s obituary article in RdePh 6: 1905, 215–30.

397a VARTANIAN, ARAM: “Scientific literature. Medicine.” In: A critical bibliography of French Literature, v. 3 (see no. 3a), 462–76.
Complements the present section. Critical notices of important works on scientific organization and general scientific development in the 17th c., studies of scientists important to D. studies. Includes several works listed above. In the same volume: “General philosophical background” by Charles J. Beyer. See also no. 18, and no. 464a.

398 VUILLEMIN, JULES: Mathématiques et métaphysique chez Descartes. PUF 1960. 188 p. (Collection Epiméthée).
2. Substitutes cartesiens du calcul infinitésimal: méthodes des tangentes dans la Géométrie, méthode extragéométrique; quadrature chez D.
II. Géométrie et métaphysique. 3. Classification des courbes: constructions mécaniques; classification cartésienne; conséquences sur la physique mathématique; caractère “critique” du système de D. 4. Théorie des proportions: problème de Pappus; géométrie comme théorie des proportions; analogies métaphysiques. 5. Équations algébriques: théorie cartésienne; la 4e règle du DM, réflexion de la méthode.
D. excluded transcendental curves from his Géométrie, but his correspondence deals with the logarithmic curve and the logarithmic spiral. Vuillemin’s study of them is fundamental; it investigates D.’s mathematical method as model for his metaphysics, his metaphysics as obstacle to his mathematics and science. Beast-machine doctrine and geometrization of space, both metaphysical, prevented D. from applying his transcendental curves to psychophysical and other problems (human sensation he considered non-measurable), although the logarithmic curve was to serve the study of sensation from Bouguer (1792) to Fechner, while the
logarithmic spiral became the organic growth model of phyllotaxy. D. clung to the Greek notion of geometry as theory of proportions; hence the curious emptiness of his (only metaphysically mathematized) physics. His brilliant substitutions for the infinitesimal calculus were blocked by his metaphysically motivated insistence upon precision. Thus, transcendental curves – which were to open new realms in mathematics – fell outside the curve classification of the Géométrie. Mathematical method as mathesis universalis determines and limits D.’s metaphysics; his concept of mathematics requires only order, not measurability; hence mathematization is not necessarily quantification. A fine discussion of D.’s number concept shows the effect of his self-imposed mathematical limitations upon his metaphysics, with a section on Cartesian and Kantian critique of reason (Fichte resumes the broken continuity of Cartesian criticist philosophy). The study confirms the iron consistency in D.’s thought (no change in premises as D. moves from one field to another); it suggests that D.’s metaphysics and epistemology cannot be analyzed without his mather which is indeed universal as the matrix and model of all his thought. The small book, which can be mastered by non-mathematicians, is the best critical analysis of D.’s mature mathematical concepts; note however, P. Boutroux’s different conception of D.’s mathesis universalis (no. 351), viewing the Géométrie in the light of the early Regulae. See also Vuillemin on Cartesian evidence, no. 3512, and on methodology of mathematics in D. and Leibniz, no. 3512b.


Leibniz and Huygens charged that D. had found the law of refraction, his great claim in optics, in a ms. of Willibroord Snell or Snel (died 1626). In 1896, J. D. Korteweg (“Descartes et les manuscrits de Snelius d’après quelques documents nouveaux,” RMM 4: 1896, 489–501) acknowledged D.’s originality and suggested independent discovery, but had to admit difficulties not to be solved without new documents. Four decades later, C. de Waard, a great finder of mss., identifies a ms., hitherto ascribed to Johann Gerhard Voss’s son Dionysius, as Snell’s lost work which scholars from Golius to Huygens had seen. Gives the annotated text of the ms., but does not settle the question of D.’s independence from Snell. Good treatment of the controversy in G. Leisegang (no. 87, p. 54–61) with discussion of Leibniz, Huygens, Ernst Mach, and modern historians of optics, elucidating the difference between Snell’s and D.’s formulation of the law.


Another find of de Waard’s: Pierre Petit’s objections to D.’s Dioptrique, resulting from experiments he made at Mersenne’s suggestion. D. abusively refused to answer: “il faut laisser aboyer les petitz chiens sans prendre la peyne de leur resister” (AT II, 353). On the merits of the case and on the eventual reconciliation between D. and the “petit chien” see the note in AM (no. 79), 2: 380–82.

WHITTAKER, SIR EDMUND [TAYLOR]: The modern approach to Descartes’ problem: the relation of the mathematical and physical

D.'s problem: to find a general philosophy or universal science as rigorous and convincing as mathematics. The distinguished historian of science rapidly surveys Descartes' mathematically-physical discoveries and the changes they forced upon philosophy, to find that D. failed because he wanted philosophy to precede, not follow, the sciences; he fails equally himself, proposing a Neocartesianism without Cartesian dualism and without Cartesian (or, for that matter, any other) method.


X. ESTHETICS AND LITERARY INFLUENCE


1. Aristotelian vs. Cartesian science. 2. Science and method [La Flèche; the Essais].
3. Metaphysics and science [PP, TP, Puy de Dôme, free fall, force, cosmology, vortices.]
4. Nature and man [Harvey, physiology, reflex action, pineal gland.]

Excellent short survey views D.'s scientific contributions in their epistemological context, finds Dioptrique and Météores to be his outstanding achievement in physics. Thoughtful comment on causal research vs. D.’s “thought experiment.”


Noting two persistent metaphors in D. (the philosopher-architect: certainty; the philosopher-traveler: method), the author perceives uneasiness beneath them. Digging deeper, he unexpectedly strikes gold in the barren wastes of the Jesuit Pierre Bourdin's Seventh Objections – a long, heavy, ironical play on these very metaphors suggesting D.'s impatience, uncertainty, anxiety. D.'s equally heavy ironical Responses to Bourdin are a refutation close to "rire jaune”. Th. Spoerri's brilliant paper, brilliantly discussed, on “La puissance métaphorique de Descartes” (in: Royaumont, no. 42, 273-301) contrasts D.'s style of “construction cohérente” with Pascal’s “espace constellé”, penetrates deeply into the character of metaphor in D., but misses its “mixed” character which Edelman uncovered, though noting the Bourdin-D. exchange. Hartwig Tornau’s Syntaktische und stilistische Studien über Descartes (Diss. Leipzig, Hoffmann, 1900, 94 p.) has a classified lists of D.'s metaphors (73-91); its discussion of D.'s French usage is based on V. Cousin's now obsolete uncritical edition.
Completes the dethronement of DM. "Pour l'homme du Discours de la méthode, Montaigne est un point de départ" (305), while Guez de Balzac gave D. the style and "la forme même de l'essai" (310). Ironically, PP and TP did what DM was supposed to do: attract "le lecteur honnête homme," who preferred these more substantial later works. The role of DM after D.'s death was more than modest: "Résignons-nous à abandonner la légende du Discours de la méthode, Évangile de la Littérature classique," (314), for not until the 19th c. did the work attain this stature. Though none of author's theses is novel, he stands alone in drawing their combined consequences.

Greatly exaggerating the importance of D.'s brief military service in 1618–19, author collects passages in which Corneille seems to underline, not without malice, "certains aspects héroïques et militaires du Discours" (84), ridiculing D. as "miles gloriosus elegant" (86); in support, author cites a famous yet unexploited epigram by Constantijn Huygens.

In the Cartesian "spirit" Garai finds the explanation of the long rule of classical aesthetics in England, against the native grain of English literature. Between 1637 and 1700, Cartesianism was acclaimed at first, curiously enough because of its mystic, poetic appeal; then subtly revised, openly attacked, and in the end, completely rejected. By then, it had already done its work, helping to substitute the new aesthetics of order accepted by the philosophers and scholars for the élan lyrique of the poets. See Garai's unpublished 1954 Columbia dissertation: The shield of order; a study of the influence of Cartesianism on English literary doctrine, 1668–1774 (Ann Arbor Microfilms; Diss. Abstr. 14/12: 1954, 2135–36). See also Nicolson (no. 460) on D.'s influence upon the changing English prose style.

A comic scene (Act 1, 2, in which Sosie tries to prove that he exists) leads author to conclude that M., "more logical than Descartes," was spoofing Descartes' "abuse of speculation" in the cogito.

Tries to evaluate D.'s style in the light of language psychology, studying D.'s syntax in connection with his images, particularly metaphors expressing solidity, lucidity, "Geradlinigkeit." The last section assembles some recent critical judgments; Paul Claudel's (in his: Contracts et circonstances, Gallimard, 11th ed., 1935, 149–55) is the most interesting, holding style and argument of the Discours to be equally inferior. Author's judgment is brash, but he poses some suggestive questions.

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The Cartesian insistence on clarity and distinctness, and on the singleness of truth hurt English as well as French literature, particularly the treatment of dramatic character. But the rationalistic Cartesian “denudation of nature” (88) soon gave way to a truly English notion of Nature’s richness, embodied in Shakespeare, carrying over into German Romanticism. The article provides the English background to Baader’s anticartesian opposition of “Natur” vs. “Geist” (see Steinbückel, no. 466b). See also Robertson no. 420, and Nicolson, no. 460, and the literature cited there.


Punctures the claim of D.’s originality in using French in scientific writing; points to a small but remarkable body of pre-1637 scientific manuscripts in French, especially Mydorge’s and Gassendi’s whose scientific French is by no means inferior to D.’s. But then, D. had the courage they lacked: he published in French.


Despite Brunetière’s and Lanson’s annihilating attacks, the book has retained its subterranean influence to this day, with its “brilliant paradox that this great thinker, who never wrote a line on aesthetics, was virtually the creator of France’s aesthetic canon” (J. G. Robertson, no. 420, p. 6), its claim that D. did have an aesthetics after all, its fertile lines of inquiry. Though Krantz failed through exaggeration, he was original and perceptive even when wrong. His book is better than its awful reputation, and still more useful than some recent studies which are its equal in imprudence and confusion. On the Krantzian “tourbillon” in the critical tea pot see Olgiati’s informative treatment of the controversy over D.’s literary influence, from Nisard (who started it) and Sainte-Beuve through Brunetière and Lanson to the eloquent silences of Vial and Denise (no. 14, 184–95). N. Abercrombie (MLR 31: 1936, 358–76) gives a summary and critique: “all the constructive principles of 17th c. criticism were already guiding the minds of Malherbe and his contemporaries when Descartes began to write” (376). In particular, Abercrombie finds no sign of D.’s influence upon Boileau. See also Brunetière no. 442; F. Bouillier in RPFE 14: 1882, 556–62; Lanson, no. 412; R. Weibel Richard, no. 459; and H. von Stein, no. 424.


Classical article which long dominated French literary criticism, though D. scholars paid no attention to it. Lanson takes his Descartes image from Liard. Carefully determining the meaning of “influence,” he finds between the “esprit” of D. and that of his contemporaries in literature “d’étoffes rapports, mais sans influence possible” (519). Only after D.’s death did his influence begin (Pascal, Bossuet, Boileau, La Bruyère), but merely in the form of reinforcing independently developing thought:
“Je n’apprêci:ois dans la doctrine de Descartes aucune possibilite d’une esthetique. Le beau se confond dans le vrai” (334). Finds only two instances of direct influence: Bossuet, and Montesquieu’s Esprit des lois. E. Cassirer (no. 5, p. 10) cites René Bray, La formation de la doctrine classique en France, Paris, 1927, as confirming Lanson “on all essential points”; but later studies reveal D.’s indirect influence upon French classicism, and reappraise the notion of “influence” both conceptually and in its historical application to the case in question. See also Lee (no. 415) and Michéa (no. 417).


Another influential article which made the treatment of Descartes’ TP mandatory in French literature courses on Corneille and became the father and ancestor of a host of studies on D.’s concept of “générosité.” See the discussion in Hensch, no. 408, 78–81; also Cassirer (no. 243 and Reichardt’s and Hofstadter’s reviews); Serrurier, no. 423; against Lanson’s thesis: R. Champigny, no. 1909b, and H. Gillot, no. 2024a.


Adds to Lanson by trying to show that Racine’s concept of passions, too, was kin to D.’s. See also William McC. Stewart, “Racine et Descartes” (RCC 39, ser. 2: 1938, 385–94, 499–511) on new evidence of on Racine’s contact with D.’s philosophy. See also Lion, no. 2556a.


Considerable study includes an important assessment of D.’s influence upon French 17th century art (221–25, 266–67). Suggests a connection between Poussin and Descartes and points out that through Le Brun the central concept of D.’s physics as well as his rationalist method became the basis of the “esthetic legislation” of the Academy as it bodily applied D.’s physiology of passions, animal spirits and all, “to specify the minute changes in facial expression by which each passion manifests itself” (221). Geneviève Lewis (“Descartes et Poussin,” DSS 23: 1954, 521–49) admits that in the absence of tangible fact about the Poussin-D. relationship any “confrontation ne saurait . . . être que dérivée,” but finds a common contemporary ideal in “certaines analogies entre les deux hommes, et quelque formules curieusement accordées” (521), engagingly widening her meager theme into an early 17th century background study, rich in nuances. See also Raquel Sajón’s notable study (no. 422) and François Bénou, “Le cartésianisme et l’art français” (RHPh ns 5: 1937, 189–98).


Temperamental attack on Lanson’s thesis (no. 412): “Tant s’en faut que le cartésianisme soit pour rien dans l’art classique, que bientôt il va le détruire. La querelle des anciens et des modernes est la revanche de l’esprit cartésien sur le goût antique, de l’analyse sur la poésie, de l’idée sur la forme, de la science sur l’art” (188–89). The only trouble with this is that the “querelle” opened long before the time of Descartes. Author finds D.’s “bon sens” very similar to Pascal’s “cœur.”

Pleasantly old-fashioned, learned monograph, based on D.’s Compendium musicae of 1618 and his correspondence. Accords D. a merely honorable, rather than an outstanding place in the history of music, in contrast to Hugo Riemann and the conductor-scholar Hermann Scherchen (no. 3218). Pirro’s chief concern is musicology, but there are interesting sidelights: “Descartes et la danse” (85–89); in music, too, D. serves “la cause qu’il se refuse à reconnaître juste, et facilite la réforme qu’il n’accepte point” (19), regarding the equal-temperament scale. See also Jan Branberger, René Descartes, filosof hudby: příspěvek k dějinám hudební estetiky (Praha, Urbánek, 1933, 74p. Prague dissertation, 1909), and L. Prenant (no. 419).


Superior investigation. Opens with the best discussion so far of esthetics in D.’s Compendium musicae, comparing it with Regulae: from the outset D. recognizes esthetic pleasure to be subjective; in 1630 he abandons the notion of a necessary correspondence between specific consonances and passions (same point in no. 421). For him, no objective esthetic judgment is possible, only a psychological analysis – and life is too short to indulge in that. Metaphysics is essential to “sagesse,” as are technology and the passions which contribute to moral control; music, merely being personal delectation, “prend sa place dans la vie du philosophe; non dans son œuvre” (114). O. Revault d’Allonnes (L’esthétique de Descartes,” RScH 1: 1951, 30–33) follows one of Krantz’s leads, finds D. in his “situation de chef de file” defining “l’art idéal” or “l’art cartésien” (50) in his letters to Guez de Balzac, from which the author manages to extract a whole Cartesian classification of literary art forms. See also Victor Basch who asks: “Y-a-t-il une esthétique cartésienne?” (CD 2:67–76) and answers yes.


This distinguished work on Italian literary criticism is above all a study of Gian Vincenzo Gravina and Lodovico Muratori. Tries to show “that the conception of ‘creative imagination,’ with the help of which Europe emancipated herself from the pincers of pseudoclassicism, was virtually born in Italy” (p. vi). Adopting the viewpoint of Krantz, author finds Cartesianism a factor on either side in the quarrel of the ancients and moderns, more clearly so in Italy than in France. Gravina and Muratori both “set out to discover the irrefutable ‘cogito ergo sum’ of poetry” (92); Muratori’s concept of verisimilitude is linked to the Cartesian revolution in criticism. But these démarches degenerated into a placid acceptance of dogmas, equally placidly abandoned when they led to impasses. Cartesianism, an initial stimulus, thus failed to become a formative element. Good chapter on Vico and his anti-cartesianism; interesting discussion of the indebtedness of French criticism to Italy.

Review: G. Maugin, RLC 5: 1925, 322–29. See also Toffanin (no. 3436) on Descartes and Aristotelian classicism, and Cottugno (no. 1648) on Caloprese.

ROLAND-MANUEL: “Descartes et le problème de l’expression musicale.” In: Royaumont (no. 42), 438–42.

Interesting note, supplementing Prenant (no. 419), on D.’s denial that musical expression evokes specific emotional reactions, on his distinction between “le pur
délectable et l’agréable proprement dit” (440), and on his anticipation of the Pavlovian conditioned reflex in explaining individual reaction to musical expression.


Workmanlike study of the concept of amour in Chapelain, Descartes, Pascal, with a notable section on Henri Testelin’s theory of “l’expression générale et particulière,” which applies D.’s theory of passions to visual art (282–83). Denies the originality of D.’s concept of amour and links the theory of expression of Testelin and French 17th century painters to Italian renaissance art, D.’s TP merely providing “una exposición más completa y acabada de lo subjetivo en lo objectivo” (287). See also Lee, no. 415.


Points to St. François de Sales’ Traité de l’amour de Dieu of 1666 as underlying both the drama of Corneille and the TP of Descartes, thus explaining (if the explanation holds) the correspondence between their strictly contemporary concepts of passions.


Rich study. Anticipates many later results while avoiding traps into which Krantz and others stepped. Undertaken at Wilhelm Dilthey’s suggestion, it corroborates his view that D.’s influence upon Boileau was indirect. Makes the nice point that D.’s own doctrine was the more effective upon Boileau since it was not itself an object of controversy, as distinct from Cartesian “Partei-Doktrin.” Finds the mediary between D. and Boileau in Arnauld and Port-Royal. The length of the article is accounted for by extensive, well-documented, dry but useful digressions on Cartesian doctrines and development of French criticism from Ronsard to de la Mesnadière, Boileau and his contemporaries.


Discusses D.’s genuine if infertile love of poetry. Reprints a sonnet by an unidentiﬁed student at La Flèche which some conjecture to be by Descartes, and discusses D.’s ballet for Queen Christina, the sole surviving print of which is assumed to be a specimen of the program distributed to the audience at the time.


Vigny read and re-read Descartes; result: “poème à faire.” A girl plays with a compass. D. warns her: “... ’L’une de ces branches est appuyée au centre, mais elle le perce et le détruit, tandis que l’autre trace un cercle mystérieux. Moi, j’ai servi de centre à ce poignard savant. Il m’a truqué.” – Et il regarda la mer et les vertes îles de Stockholm.” Poem fortunately remained unmade. But Bernhard Bergonzoni did make and publish his Poems 1948–1954, under the title: Descartes and the animals (no. 1209).
VIGORELLI, GIANCARLO: "Circonstanze cartesiane della letteratura francese contemporanea." In: Cartesio (no. 35), 781-91.

A suggestive article, with out-of-the-way references, discusses particularly André Gide and Valéry.

WEIBEL RICHARD, ROBERTO: "Notas sobre el clasicismo francés y el pensamiento cartesiano." In: Homenaje (no. 40), v. 3, 261-93.

Important, original attack upon the problem. Author judiciously appraises Krantz ("perfectamente plausible en su intención primera," though he understood neither D. nor Classicism), Brunetière and Lanson (who formulated the problem in the very terms he exposed as false in Krantz). Rejecting the view that Cartesianism influenced the pseudo-classicism of 1680-1750, author makes the important distinction between D.'s proper thought and a later "racionalismo truno y vulgari­zado," better called pseudocartesianism (288). Positively, he suggests a bold new approach. Casting out the old prop of Cartesianism as order, clarity, mathematicism, and recognizing D. as the founder of the belief in the creative power of thought and the cognitive power of poetry (M. de Corte's view, no. 244a), he interprets Classi­cism as a perennial attitude in art and finds "la verdadera estética cartesiana" alive in modern "classicists" concerned with poetic creativity, from Baudelaire to Valéry and Gide. Written from thorough knowledge of the critical and philo­sophical literature.


The interest in Willey's Descartes chapter lies in its estimate of the effect of the "Cartesian spirit" upon poetry: it sharpened the distinction between prose and poetry, and lowered the status of poetry. The intervening Cartesian spirit explains the onset of the "dissociation of sensibility" (T. S. Eliot's term) after Donne. Tempt­ing comparison between Descartes' and Wordsworth's views of the experience of childhood. Good chapters on the rational theology of the Cambridge Platonists, especially John Smith, and a useful chapter on Joseph Glanvill.

XI. AFTER DESCARTES

ANDRADE, ANTÓNIO DE: Descartes em Portugal nos séculos XVII e XVIII. Bro 51: 1950, 432-51.

Traces D.'s none too conspicuous role in Portugal from the arrival in 1641 of D.'s best student, Jean Gillot, and of the Jesuit J. P. Ciermans (Cosmander) to about 1775. Rich references. See also Domingos Mauricio Gomes dos Santos, "Para a historia do carte­sianismo entre os Jesuitas do século XVIII" (RPFil 1: 1945, 27-44, which utilizes philosophy courses dictated by Jesuits around 1740, based on P. António Vieira and others; same author's "A primeira alusão a Descartes em Portugal" (Bro 25: 1957, 177-87; Augusto da Silva Carvalho, "O cartesianismo e a medicina em Portugal" (AcLisboa 2: 123
1939, 71–107, showing that no Cartesian influence was felt in Portugal until the middle of the 18th c., and then but briefly. Joaquim de Carvalho’s “Descartes e a cultura filosófica portuguesa” (ibid., 39–69) deals with D.’s use of Fonseca and the Commentarii Conimbricenses.


Important work. Main theme: Jansenism ruined Pascal. The relationship between Pascal and Descartes is sharply worked out, noting the differences in attitude, tone and range of interest as well as in doctrine. Baudin finds no real “borrowings” from Descartes in Pascal, whose anticartesianism is evident not only in many of his conclusions but also in the fact that their common Augustinian heritage developed into “deux Augustinismes” which are poles apart from each other.


Capital work, rich in well-documented detail. Deals with the relationship between the two philosophers within the dual framework of both systems, with emphasis on D.’s separation of philosophy and science from theology, Leibniz’s defense of their traditional alliance. Part I (L’esprit de la méthode) brilliantly contrasts the two thinkers: intuitionism vs. formalism, revolution vs. tradition. Part II (Le modèle mathématique) offers a penetrating, fruitful contrast of Leibniz and Descartes (“Archimede contre Apollonius.”) The last part is a searching study of similarities and differences between “the two last great physicist-philosophers” regarding the principles of physics which both, each in his way, conceive in pre-Newtonian fashion, i.e., metaphysically.

A post-war German seeks a European intellectual reorientation founded on an existential rationalism which he sees embodied in the thought of Descartes. How is humanistic man to survive in an age of technology, under the pressures of “ideologies” (Communism) on one side, of eschatology (Christianity) on the other? Descartes offers a solution: renouncing the urge towards unattainable perfection, acknowledging the hard facts of philosophical anthropology, and accepting the limitations which Descartes had the courage to see. Only the Cartesian “reduced man” (der reduzierte Mensch) can preserve freedom and human dignity. Interesting discussions of Simone Weil, Bertolt Brecht and others. But see also P. Engelhardt, no. 1840.

Worst-printed item in the literature, swarming with errors (by retribution, author’s name is usually misspelled “Besancèle”). Naive in judgment, summaries and quotations without adequate references, yet indispensable, since author has actually read his recondite material and reports honestly and fully. Deals with Cartesians, anticartesians, eclectics at Naples, Pisa, Padua and other centers. Ch. 4 on Malebranche’s influence upon P. Giovenale, B. Trevisan, F. M. Zannotti, G. S. Gerdil and others. Two chapters on Cartesian influence on art and poetry, with special reference to Antonio Conti. The bibliography, like the rest, is useful and sloppy. See also Ottaviano (no. 461); E. Garin, “Cartesio e l’Italia” (GCFI 29: 1950, 385-405, with section on Vico). On Malebranche’s influence in Italy see Karl Werner, “Die cartesisch-malebranchische Philosophie in Italien” (AcWien, Philos.-histor. Klasse, Sitzungsber. 102: 1883, 75-141, 679-794 on Fardella and Gerdil); A. Banfi, “Malebranche et l’Italie” (RPFE 125: 1938, 253-74); Balz (no. 431).

Critique of the concepts of “esprit cartesien” and “Cartesian heritage”; clears up the fog created by the great debate on D.’s “influence” (see Lanson, no. 412). Deplores the common tendency to label any brand of rationalism “Cartesian” and exposes the decisive difference between D.’s and Voltaire’s philosophizing. “Attempts to show that the Cartesian triumph after 1660 was not that of Descartes’ metaphysical rationalism, but that of a positivistic mechanism, which Descartes had opposed, and which was to merge with epicurean and ‘libertin’ thought later in the century” (author’s notice in no. 3a). In the quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns “c’est le ‘dynamisme’ militant de la pensée épocrienne, positiviste et scientifique, qui l’a emporté” (33).

The Cartesian “spirit” influenced Montesquieu in the form of logical criticism (Fontenelle) and rational metaphysics (Malebranche), as evidenced in his concept
of natural mechanical order vs. spiritual order of ideal justice, and in his striving for general, invariable laws characterized by “rapport de convenance.” See also Buss, no. 445.

435a BIZER, ERNST: “Die reformierte Orthodoxie und der Cartesianismus.”
Thorough, liberally documented study of the controversy between Voetius and Cocceius, with ample citations from hard-to-find sources. The charge against “Cartesianism” was “concealed atheism,” implied in Cartesian doubt and hermeneutics. The paper deals with the controversies aroused by Ludwig Meyer, Ludwig v. Wolzogen, Christoph Wittich, and Samuel Maresius (Desmarets). The orthodox foes of “theological Cartesianism,” Peter van Mastricht and Melchior Leydekker, receive special consideration. Supplements Bohatec and Dibon (no. 436; no. 38; no. 1763–65). See also Hirsch (note to no. 2228a) on the general impact of Cartesianism upon Protestant theology.

435b BLONDEL, MAURICE: “L’anticartésianisme de Malebranche.”
Incomparable study which penetrates to the “personne profonde du philosophe . . . sa volonté et sa vie” to uncover a radical opposition between Malebranche and Descartes, despite tributes and borrowings. Descartes seeks knowledge of God so that he may master nature; to Malebranche, life, science, philosophy are so many “échelons de notre réintégration en Dieu” (3). Shows the anticartesian character of M.’s “idole de la Sagesse et de la Simplicité, de ce monstre de l’egoïsme divin, de cette liberté serve d’une sorte d’esthétique emprisonnante” (10), of his theory of ideas, intelligible extension, notion of the soul. Yet, thinking himself a Cartesian, M. influenced the fate of Cartesianism more deeply than had he stood outside. Blondel’s thesis is disputed by Fagnola (Archivio della cultura Ital. 1942: 161–76): Malebranche is the most typical of all Cartesians; his theory of ideas has “cartessianizzato Cartesio” (176). A. Del Noce’s digressive but important “Nota sull’anticartesianismo di Malebranche” (RFNS 26: 1934, 53–73), with rich critical literature references, finds in the end that Malebranche, in linking “il Dio filosofico” and “il Dio religioso” within a Cartesian universe, profoundly transformed Cartesianism. For a fundamental treatment on broadest philosophical basis see H. Gouhier, La philosophie de Malebranche et son expérience religieuse (1926, 1948; see no. 2079), a monumental work written with deep understanding of Malebranche’s religion and carefully reconstructing the Descartes image of Malebranche; also Gouhier’s La vocation de Malebranche (1924; see no. 2078) which examines the question why M. did not read Descartes before 1664 and how D.’s Traité de l’homme, of all things, could have had such a decisive impact upon the future metaphysician. See also Gueroult, no. 453c, 7–26 and ch. 1–3; also Gilson, no. 453a, and Gueroult, no. 373a.


Great study, “presque inconnue en France” (Dibon, no. 6, 272), shows that Cartesian theologians in Holland did not wish to break away from orthodoxy but created an
authentic Cartesian Scholasticism, a theologia novantiqua, trying to prove that Cartesianism and traditional philosophy are not incompatible. This thesis is developed with great doctrinal acumen and complete mastery of the historical sources. Ch. 2 surveys the development of Cartesian philosophy and theology at Dutch, German, Swiss universities, with brief sections on England and France. Ch. 3 (Die cartesiansche Scholastik in der Philosophie) is the only study so far of the philosophia novantiqua in regard to logic, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of nature. The appendix reproduces university documents including opinions of Dutch schools on D.’s doctrine (1691).

Review: P. Dibon in no. 6, 272-76. See also Bizer, no. 435a.


The most original of the prize entries in the 1839 ASMP contest; “plein d’éclairs” but fragmentary and poorly organized (P. Janet in no. 142, p. 7). Part I discusses four Cartesian “tendencies” regarding ideas and substances as evidenced in doctrinal development from Descartes to Locke; Cartesian dualism; and the theological themes of original sin, grace, love of God. Part Two (physics, mathematics) leads into the author’s own theory of substance and his metaphysics of the infinitesimal calculus. See Damiron’s thorough critique in no. 451, I: 61–79; G. L. in Revue catholique 2: 1845 (16p.); Hermann Lotze in Gött 1846, no. 89–91, 881–93 (also in his: Kleine Schriften. Leipzig, Hirzel, 1891, I: 388–97).


Grown from a prize-winning entry in the 1839 ASMP contest to full stature 30 years later, the work has weathered its first century well, still the only comprehensive account of Cartesianism as the 19th century understood it. Covers France thoroughly, Holland and Italy reasonably well, Switzerland, Germany, England sketchily. Lotze (review below) noted Bouillier’s French bias and disregard of all foreign-language sources; philosophically “il n’est pas le plus profond, le plus fort” despite his “bon sens” and “bon langage” (Damiron, below, 59); “mais c’est surtout le détail des faits qu’il a étudié avec une exactitude et une précision supérieures” (Janet’s review, p. 7), rich in capsule summaries of minor works and leads to major and lesser themes. His Malebranche (20 out of the 32 chapters in v.2) remains the most comprehensive survey of Malebranche’s relations with his contemporaries and his influence upon successors. No longer indispensable, but still discussed and very useful, though the lack of indexes is deplorable.

First formal appearance of Cartesianism in North America. The principles are those of the Logic of Port-Royal.

Clear, well organized exposition and urbane appraisal of D.'s "theoretical" and "practical" philosophies, followed by a compact survey of later developments of Cartesianism (mainly Arnauld, Geulincx, Malebranche). Chapter on "Die Gesinnung des kartesianischen Kreises." Competent, unprejudiced, popular in the best sense.

Beginning of a historical appraisal at the close of the Cartesian era. D. as "philosophiae reformator" ranks with Bruno, Giordano, Bacon, Campanella, Hobbes, followed by Leibniz and Thomasius. Abundant references to opponents, successors, early 18th c. controversies. See Hagmann, no. 10, 57–60.

Despite Brunetière's great name and influence, his contribution to Cartesian studies is weak and now of little interest except in regard to the controversy over Descartes' direct influence upon French literature (see Lanson, no. 412). F. Bouillier sharply attacked Brunetière on historical grounds: "Deux nouveaux historiens de Descartes" (RPFE 37: 1894/1, 287–97), the other "new historian" being A. Fouillée who discovered Schopenhauer in D. and defended his discovery against Bouillier (ibid., 535–46). Best summary of Brunetière's "filippica" in Olgiati, no. 14, 188ff.

Attempts to link Descartes and the Enlightenment through precise references to Cartesian doctrine, stressing the autonomy of reason, mathematicism (dubiously equated with "esprit de géométrie"), dualism, etc. But the connection, pushed into the field of classical esthetics, natural law, and natural religion, becomes rather weak. Stimulating but unconvincing. Bibliography (several names misspelled).

444  BURTT, EDWIN ARTHUR: "Descartes." In his: The metaphysical foundations of modern physical science. A historical and critical essay.

Now a classic in its own right, the book treats pre-Newtonian metaphysics as the key to the understanding of the upheaval in modern physical speculation and as the source of dogma, uncritically taken over along with genuine advances. The eloquent ch. 4 shows Descartes “on the verge of most far-reaching discoveries” (100) which he never made, yet causing “an incalculable change in the viewpoint of the world held by intelligent opinion in Europe” (116). Excellent discussion of Hobbes’ and Henry More’s reaction to Cartesianism (ch. 5). List of useful secondary literature to 1920. See also Koyré, no. 379a.


Robust paper, seeing D. as the creator of the exalted deism at the roots of the French social revolution. Distinguishes the Cartesianism of the Lettres persanes from the subsequent Malebranchean impact upon Montesquieu.

446 BUSSON, HENRI: “Descartes.” In his: La pensée française de Charron à Pascal. Vrin, 1933, ch. 9, 429–45.
D.’s religious preoccupations were basically the same as those of his contemporaries, chiefly an apologetic urge. Before 1660 Cartesianism played a very small part in French religious life; afterwards “l’esprit cartésien” destroyed the very sentiment which Descartes had displayed. Important background study, very rich in references (bibliography 615–42). See no. 447.


Justly famous work, written in glittering language and with great learning, as indispensable as no. 446; background study bringing to life the intellectual atmosphere and thoroughly displaying the overt concerns of the period, but disappointing in its assessment of Descartes and Cartesianism, and impermissibly insufficient in its treatment of Malebranche (see Sebba, no. 19.)


Interesting group of essays on the proper order of exposition of a philosophical system, on the various forms of Cartesian intuition, on the meaning of the cogito
and on its relation to Descartes' proofs of the existence of God (11–177). Also a comparison between Malebranche's proof of God by excellence and D.'s ontological proof (181–89).


448 CARBIA, RÓMULO D.: “Descartes en la cultura colonial de América.”
In: Homenaje (no. 40), v. 3, 35–40.
Despite the “oscurantismo español,” D.'s writings, though condemned, were known and studied in the Latin American colonies at least since the end of the 18th century. Enrique Martínez Paz, “La influencia de Descartes en el pensamiento filosófico de la Colonia” (ibid., 3: 15–33) supports this revision of the accepted view with details about philosophical instruction at the Universidad de Córdoba (Argentina) since 1730. However, interest in D. seems to have been weak, and neither paper explains the formidable rise of D. scholarship in modern Latin America, as contrasted to the comparative lack of specific interest in North America.

Ample documented study notes “el carácter secundario, epigónico, de la escuela cartesiana” in Spain (11). Discusses first contacts (Juan Caramuel, Luis Rodríguez de Pedrero and others); the Sevilla school (Diego Mateo de Zapata); Emmanuel Maignan and his followers and opponents in Sevilla and Valencia; Peripatetics, Eclectics, and Feijóo. Though the author’s sympathies are not with D., he remains scrupulously factual. See also Cenál's “La filosofía de Emmanuel Maignan” (RevF 13, no. 48: 1954, 15–68, with detailed account of points of disagreement between Maignan and D. despite their common opposition to Aristotelian physics) and his “La vida, las obras y la influencia de Emmanuel Maignan” (Revista de estudios políticos no. 46: 1952, 111–149). For the background see Eloy Bullán y Fernández, De los origenes de la filosofía moderna: los precursores españoles de Bacon y Descartes (Salamanca, Calatrava, 1905, 250 p.) on Luis Vives, Gómez Pereira, Francisco Vallés, Sebastián Fox Morcillo and others. On Feijóo see G. Delpy, Feijóo et l'esprit européen (Hachette, 1936, Ch. 3, especially p. 81–89) and Charles Neff Staubach, “Feijóo on Cartesianism; a chapter on French influence in Spain” (Michigan Academy of science 24, no. 4: 193 79–87; Michigan thesis abstract) and his “Feijóo and Malebranche” (HR 1941, 287–96)

Cousin launched the modern French D. revival with his enthusiastic but hasty edition of the philosopher's works which served for nearly 80 years, and with his equally enthusiastic Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie (Pichon et Didiers, 1829) presenting D. as “le fondateur de l'école idéaliste moderne” (v. 1, 458). His eclecticism and spiritualist D. interpretation dominated French D. scholarship for decades; but his enduring contribution are the small Fragments de philosophie cartésienne of 1845 which grew to two substantial volumes in the fifth edition of
1866, a collection of hitherto unpublished material of exceptional interest, presented with a rich historical commentary. Vol. 3 contains, among others, correspondence concerning Baillet's Descartes biography; the minutes of a Cartesian meeting in Paris, end of the 17th c.; a commentary by the Cardinal de Retz on a D. paper by Dom Robert Desgabets; a study of Roberval; and "De la persécution du cartésianisme" (297-332), still the best account of the gradual subjugation under steady Jesuit pressure of French orders and congregations teaching D.'s philosophy. Vols. 3 and 4 contain invaluable Malebranche material (see Sebba, no. 19, 30-31).


Vol. 1: Descartes (85-312); Hobbes, Gassendi, Bacon, Vol. 2: Rohault, de la Forge, Régis, Antoine Le Grand, Andreae, de la Chambre, Clauberg, Geulincx (1-176); Spinoza (177-351); Malebranche (352-596); Lami, Boursier, Bossuet, Fénélon.

The introduction is Damiron's official report on the 1839 prize contest of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques, with trenchant, extensive reviews and critiques of Bouillier, Renouvier, Bordas-Demoulin and a survey of the history of Cartesianism. The body of the work expands this sketch by a detailed, careful if uninspired treatment of D.'s philosophy and of Cartesianism from Rohault and Régis to Boursier, Bossuet and Fénélon. Less historical and searching than Balz (no. 450), more analytical and critical than Bouillier (no. 438), v. 2 remains one of the few comprehensive histories of French Cartesianism.


Arnauld seems to have lacked understanding for the problems raised by the development of Cartesianism and the new science, while Malebranche more rigorously than any rationalist before Kant asked under what conditions knowledge can be "objective." Arnauld's strong interpretation of Cartesianism pointed directly towards criticist idealism, but failed to grasp the epistemological problem which M. methodically formulated, giving one of the boldest and most profound solutions in modern philosophy.


First of three volumes in progress, this very learned book gives a detailed "administrative and pedagogical inventory" of philosophical propaedeutics at the Dutch universities in D.'s lifetime: curricula, course content, analysis of textbooks, modus docendi, relation to other disciplines. Pioneering utilization of academic "disputationes" and "theses," a hitherto neglected primary source, here helpfully
discussed and classified (34-49). Under Cartesian impact, the tendency towards compromise (philosophia novantiqua) gains among adherents of D., while opponents are driven back to medieval Scholasticism. Important material on Martin Schoock, Henri Reneri, Adrian Heereboord rectifies one-sided views of their philosophical position. The second volume (Aristotelisme et Cartésianisme) will fully develop the important philosophia novantiqua theme, while v. 3 (Méthode cartésienne et théologie) promises to revise and complete J. Bohatec's pioneering work. See also the Leiden thesis of Sybrand H. M. Galama. Het wijsgerig onderwijs aan de Hogeschool te Franeker. 1893-1891 (Franeker, Wever, 1954, 358 p).


Emery’s “Discours préliminaire” (i-clviii) and “Vie religieuse de Descartes” (clix-ccviii, after Baillet) were first during the reign of V. Cousin and his school to recall attention to Descartes as a moralist and Catholic. The 400 pages of “Pensees” are extracts from MM and the correspondence; first publication of D.’s second and fourth letter to P. Mesland on Transubstantiation, which Clerselier reported suppressed by the Archbishop of Paris in 1671 and 1672 on behalf of the King “pour empêcher le trouble que cela pourrait causer à l’état” (no. 79, v. 6, p. 362). See also Gouhier, no. 168, 3-4.


The distinguished German Romanist discounts any direct influence of Descartes beyond the time of Voltaire, but sees Descartes’ “spirit” remain alive in the French moralistes and even in Diderot and Rousseau. “Der französische Geist” is Montaigne’s cosmopolitan Renaissance humanism, transformed into a Nationalgeist with loss of its cosmopolitan basis, and definitely shaped by Descartes. From Victor Cousin onwards, the “Cartesian spirit” becomes the “myth of Descartes” and the foundation of French self-interpretation as the spirit of order, clarity etc. come to be taken as innate French characteristics. This myth then degenerates into a “Vulgar-kartesianismus.” Suggestive discussions of symbolism and of Valéry’s “poetry of dreams” constructed by the waking, working mind. The limitations of the “French mind” are traced by means of considering the Descartes criticism of Vico, Hegel, Schelling, and by contrasting it with Goethe’s organic “Weltbild,” i.e. by oversimplification with built-in bias. An obligatory bow to race and genius reflects “Hitler und der deutsche Geist” at the time of writing. Varet erroneously cites a first edition 1913.

GILSON, ÉTIENNE: “Malebranche.” In his: God and Philosophy [no. 167], 1941, 88–98.

“In his effort to re-Christianize the natural theology of Descartes, Malebranche has Cartesianized the Christian God” (p. 88, n. 12). Malebranche, asking why God created this world among all possible worlds, answers naturally: “because God is supremely intelligent, he could not fail to do what Descartes would have done, had Descartes been God” (96). Evidently, Gilson has no use for this Christian philosopher’s God. See also Gilson’s The unity of philosophical experience [no. 166, 1937, 193ff.] on the concept of causality from Descartes via Malebranche, John Norris, Locke to Hume who drew the ultimate conclusion from Descartes’ impasse.


Malebranche’s concept of clear and distinct cognition as cognition of all possible modifications of a thing leads to difficulties regarding infinite extension, and to contradictions regarding inner awareness. Malebranche, unlike Geulincx, was an independent critic of Descartes’ metaphysics. A stimulating analysis.


Vol. I offers a monumental confrontation of the philosophies of Descartes and Malebranche. Their proofs of God are held to be in patent opposition to each other. In the thought of Malebranche the doctrine of the “vision des choses en Dieu” gradually rises to dominance over the Cartesian cogito, as Malebranche moves from his early Cartesian premises towards the “anéantissement de la véritable philosophie des idées claires et distinctes au profit d’une vaste intuition mystique” (327).


Brilliant works that overflow with main and glancing references to major and minor philosophers, scientists, theologians, writers, travelers etc. Sparkling character sketch of D.: “Quelle aventure!” – to be so Catholic, yet give to Reason “une telle place qu’elle semble absorber tout, même Dieu!” (La crise, p. 140). The three-volume sequel [La pensée] illuminates the 18th c. decline and disappearance of Cartesian influence as other streams swell or enter: Descartes “a foudroyé les saints de l’École, et maintenant il est abattu” – which is the signal for the Jesuits to change over to his side, with reservations (v. 2, p. 33). The “Notes et références” are a bibliographical treasure for the browser.
Though the philosophes followed Bacon rather than D. in their general notion of a system of sciences, they deviated from him in their emphasis upon order and the logical interrelation of the forms of knowledge. This implicit influence of D. made them sacrifice historicism; yet they conceived the interrelationship of all knowledge more like disciples of Locke and Condillac than of Descartes. See also Mougin, no. 459, and Vartanian, no. 468.


Excellent monograph. Spinoza’s conception of universe held to be original and independent of Cartesianism, though D. gave him the theory of substances and attributes, his tool for making this universe intelligible. Claims a double filiation, direct and indirect, between D.’s and Spinoza’s proofs of the existence of God, but carefully points out “identités de formules qui ne correspondent pas à une identité de pensée” (261). The magnificently organized subject index is a compendium of doctrines and problems, the index of “noms et textes” a guide to the literature. See also the author’s important chapter on “Cogito kantien et cogito cartésien” in his these (L’idéalisme kantien [Alcan, 1931], Vrin, 1930, 5–59), an equally careful study of a thorny subject.


Studies D.’s influence upon the clergy, the Cambridge Platonists, and the English scientists of the century, with particular stress upon Hobbes, Henry More, Cudworth, Locke and Newton. Charlotte S. Ware’s valuable study “The influence of Descartes on John Locke” (RIP 4: 1930, 310–39) gives the results of an examination of the Locke papers in the Bodleian Library for references to Descartes and the Cartesianists, noting the chief doctrinal points of agreement and contrast. See also Leon Roth’s “Note on the relationship between Descartes and Locke” in Mind 44: 1935, 414–16, and Charlotte Johnston, “Locke’s ‘Examination’ of Malebranche and Norris” (JHI 19: 1958, 550–58); for the Locke controversy over Malebranche see Sebba, no. 19, nos. 113–18.


Lanson’s course gives a rich, detailed account of the interrelationship between philosophy, theology and literature in the rise of French 18th century thought, stressing the continuity rather than the break between the 17th and the 18th century, cautiously leaning towards Brunetièr’s views. The present value of the course lies in its vast scope and in the concise, masterly treatment of the material.

Comprehensive study of an original, impulsive philosopher, follower of Malebranche, member of the circle of Cardinal de Retz. See also Cousin's Fragments philosophiques (no. 450) and Geneviève Lewis' "L'âme et la durée d'après une controverse cartésienne" in RIP 4: 1950, 190-209 [Desgabets, Cardinal de Retz and Malebranche on the question: is divine action instantaneous or continuous?]


Descartes' doctrine of eternal verities rests on divine freedom and points to the natural sciences; Malebranche's doctrine flows from divine essence and serves a theocentric, anticartesian philosophy. Competent academic exercise, hewing close to received opinion.


Denies that Fontenelle is a Cartesian: he accepted only D.'s cosmology, for reasons which were a challenge to Descartes. Moreover, he attacked the Malebranchists and wanted science freed from dependence on God as explanation. Though admitting that science needs mathematics, he rejected mathematicism and admired empirical observation. His chief claim to Cartesianism was that he dared to challenge vested authority, which is not much of a claim to the title.


Monumental documentary study, agreeably written, deals in great detail with D.'s personal relations with Belgian theologians and philosophers and records his views of "Belgian" doctrines from Nicolaus Cusanus to Jansenius. The next 18 chapters give an unparalleled chronological survey of Cartesians and anticartesians in Belgium and of the struggle against Cartesianism at Louvain, leading to its condemnation under heavy pressure in 1662. Generous quotations and summaries, accurate biographical information, extensive table of names make the work indispensable for the study of D.'s life and of Cartesianism. Since Louvain's library has been twice destroyed, Monchamp now remains our only source for the unique material
he drew from it. See also Monchamp's very interesting study "Le Flamand et Descartes, d'après des documents nouveaux" (1889; see no. 2799a) on D. and the Flemish language; also on D. at La Flèche, no. 97.


Harsh attack upon the modern idealistic "falsification" of Descartes whose metaphysics were merely a mask. In true fact he was an "encyclopedist" embracing all knowledge of man, acknowledging the primacy of experience, recognizing the failure of his mathematicism. His three great paradoxes (independence of thought from extension, of mathematics from physical experience, of philosophy from science) resolve themselves when the primacy of experience and science, and the existence of mens corporea, is acknowledged. The Cartesians started this deliberate systematic falsification by spiritualizing true Cartesianism. D.'s real heir was "le cartésianisme encyclopédiste et matérieliste du XVIIIe siècle" (p. 17), as Hegel already recognized in his appraisal of Diderot and the French Revolution. One of the most intelligent pieces of French Marxist historical acrobatics.


Pleads for greater attention to Descartes' influence upon the changing English prose style. Notes the role of Cartesianism in the quarrel of Moderns and Ancients, the effect of D.'s concept of the "indefinite" upon English notions of infinity, and the gradual psychologizing transformation of Descartes' "thinking-self." See also Sterling P. Lamprecht's survey of "The role of Descartes in seventeenth-century England" (SHI v. 5, 178–240; 1935) and Paul Russell Anderson's brief paper on "Descartes' influence in 17th century England" (CD 3: 113–21; see particularly no. 1063). Among older works, the Edinburgh thesis of William Cunningham, Archdeacon of Ely, may be used with caution (The influence of Descartes on metaphysical speculation in England. London, Macmillan, 1876. xlvii, 188p.). Also Georges Lyon's once hotly debated L'idéalisme en Angleterre au XVIIIe siècle (Alcan, 1888. 483 p.), despite its untenable thesis that English idealistic philosophy if rooted in D. and especially in Malebranche. For background and bibliography see Georges Ascoli, La Grande-Bretagne devant l'opinion française au XVIIIe siècle (Gamber, 1930; see no. 1089). Also Garai, no. 406, and Herford, no. 409.


Galileo's analytical-experimental method overthrew Aristotelian physics in Italy; congenial Gassendist atomism completed the work. Descartes' influence was effective in Italy only within the Galilean-Gassendist current in physics, "e fu sempre influsso transitorio e fugace" (137). "Se Galilei ha un continuatore, è non certo Cartesio, ma Locke" who, "incredibile dictu," merely revives Aristotelian empiricism purged of substantial forms (138–39). The author's verve is surpassed only by his volcanic erudition which erupts in lavalike footnotes that all but bury the text, indispensable critical references to sources and literature. Ottaviano heavily utilizes that "inesauribile repertorio di notizie aneddotiche" (184), Gabriel Mouguin's Étude sur l'évolution intellectuelle de l'Italie de 1657 à 1790 environ
(Hachette, 1909) which excellently describes the conflict between Cartesianism and the scientific movement culminating in Gassendi. On the Vico-Descartes relationship, neither Maugin nor Ottaviano is satisfactory; see in addition Giuseppe Scerbo, G. B. Vico e il cartesianismo a Napoli (Roma, Signorelli, 1933); F. Tocco's terse, still useful "Descartes jugé par Vico" (RMM 4: 1896, 568–72); Jean Lameere, "Giambattista Vivo, critique italien de Descartes" (CD 1: 31–37); Eugène Bouvy's Paris thèse: De Vico, Cartesii adversarius (1889, 67p.); Giovanni Vidari, "L'educazione cartesiana in Italia e le idee pedagogiche di G. B. Vico" (AcTorino, Atti 61: 1926, 585–602). Walter Wittemann, "Giambattista Vico und René Descartes; die geschichtliche Kritik des cartesischen Realismus" in Emge (no. 50), 97–115, gives a summary of Vico's anti-cartesian theses and claims that they furnished two capital concepts to Italian Fascism (creation of true society by an élite, and myth of society) as well as the notion of social atomism as an inevitable consequence of Descartes' philosophy; and especially Giovanni Gentile, Studi vichiani (2nd ed., Firenze, 1927, 3–18) and Robertson (no. 420). M. Giorgiantonio discusses Ottaviano in S 19: 1951, 321. Cf. also Berthé de Besaucè (no. 433) and the literature cited there.


Twelve lengthy articles expound the view that the true history of idealism begins with Malebranche's profoundly Catholic philosophy (first two articles) and with Bayle, "le sceptique d'esprit ouvert, subtil et pénétrant" (4: 1893, 110) to whom the bulk of the work is devoted. Pillon marks the revolt against the epistemological interpretations (especially of Malebranche) of Thomas Reid and of V. Cousin, Royer-Collard and the "spiritualistes universitaires." Note especially the studies of Bayle's critique of Cartesian spiritualism and theism (II: 1900, 65–131, 12: 1901, 85–154) and of the metaphysical attributes of God (last three articles).


Asserting that the res extensa is continuous, while admitting multiple individual substances, D. invited an atomistic interpretation; his failure to provide any transition from divine to human and natural causality laid the ground for occasionalism. The body of the work is devoted to a detailed, still useful study of Géraud de Corderoy and Louis de la Forge, with an informed but inadequate chapter on Malebranche. See A. G. A. Bals' important "Louis de la Forge and the critique of substantial forms" in no. 431, 80–105, reprinted from PhR 41: 1932, 551–76, and Laing, no. 290.


Chapter 4 (69–101) on Cartesianism at Saumur (Jean-Robert Chouet); Ch. 5 on the eclecticism of de Villemandy (102–29). Appendix: unpublished documents, bibliography.
ROSENFIELD, LEONORA COHEN: “Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition.” In: A Critical bibliography of French literature, v. 3 (see no. 34), 486–90.

Supplements the present section, with references to trends and to many contemporary figures. Useful complementary material also in Richard H. Popkin’s “Liber­tinage,” ibid., 478–86. See also Rosenfield, “Peripatetic adversaries of Cartesianism in 17th-c. France,” no. 17.


Within the Neoplatonism of the Cambridge School, the theology of John Smith differs sharply from that of Cudworth and Henry More, partly because of their different attitudes towards Cartesianism: Smith accepts dualism uncritically and “seems scarcely aware of the full significance of the mechanical philosophy” which Cudworth and More oppose in the name of a Neoplatonic “cosmology” (JHI 1960, 567). Smith’s view of Descartes is considered similar to that of the Oratoire. His Select Discourses of 1660 show his debt to Descartes in the beast-machine theory, physiology of passions, and the body-soul dualism. See also Willey, no. 429a, and Tulloch, no. 3490a, on John Smith and the Cambridge Platonists. Ernst Cassirer, Die Platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge, 1932 (see no. 1482, also English transl.) is fundamental; Ch. 4 on the philosophy of nature in the Cambridge School deals more specifically with the Cartesianism issue.


In tracing the iconographic theme of “Time revealing Truth” from Pietro Aretino to Bacon, Saxl comes up with an odd note on “Descartes and Newton” (218–22). In 1707, Bernard Picart engraves a frontispiece showing Time dispelling the clouds that veil Truth whose light illuminates Descartes, while the Ancients are still in half­darkness. An English version of Picart’s engraving slavishly imitates both picture and text, except that Descartes is replaced by Newton; and since the word “Tour­billons,” inscribed on the scroll D. holds in his hands, would have been inappropriate, the anonymous master, not knowing what to replace it with, left the scroll empty. “These documents together raise up a monument to the inherent constan­cy of symbols which human genius and human folly are alike slow to modify”; the English parodist thus “created unintentionally a symbol of D.’s defeat through Newton” (221).


The last work of the erudite Jesuit, barely completed while his powers were failing. Basically a rich, useful collection of material on the Jesuit attitude towards D.’s scientific work, on his relations with P. Vatier and P. Mesland, and on P. André and other Jesuit followers of Malebranche, with a concluding chapter on Jesuit adver­saries of Cartesianism. There is no penetrating historical analysis or evaluation, but
the raw stuff is there, less comprehensive but better documented and easier to use than in Bouillier (no. 438). Sortais’ “Descartes et la Compagnie de Jésus; ménaces et avances, 1640–46” (E 57: 1937, 441–68), also posthumous, gives a detailed account of D.’s attempts to stay on the right side of La Compagnie and to win Jesuit approbation for MM. Finds Jesuit opposition confined to D.’s metaphysics (and vindicated by history), while the scientific aspect of Cartesianism appealed to many Jesuits, whose persistent “attitude bienveillante” (468) is heavily underscored. See also Emmy Allard’s Die Angriffe gegen Descartes und Malebranche im Journal de Trévoux, 1701–1715, Halle, Niemeyer 1914, 58p. (APGE, v. 43), noted in Cabeen 4, nr. 2866; also Six, (no. 101 and especially no. 338).


Important background study of libertinism, scepticism, and the “roughly parallel but sometimes divergent . . . paths” of French naturalism and rationalism, in two parts: Gassendi and the Libertins; Descartes and the Rationalists. Part I gives a richly documented introduction to free-thought and Epicureanism in D.’s own time. Good chapter on Maignan between Aristotle and Epicurus. Part II opens with D.’s “nature without consciousness,” followed by a valuable chapter on the fortunes of D. in the schools, among natural scientists, physiologists and students of medicine. Chapters on the beast-machine controversy (Bossuet, Jesuits, Bayle, Leibniz), on Spinozism: “Monopsychism and the reaction to Spinoza,” “Le grand tout” (noting Cartesians misrepresentations of Spinoza), on clandestine erudition and sociology, on Voltaire vs. Pascal. Thorough mastery of sources, with ample quotations; includes much new or scattered material; index with long list of anonymous manuscript works. Interesting chronological list of authors (1643 to 1719) whose books refer to D. on the title page: 50 for, 60 against, with place of publication.


Thorough study of the D. criticism of Baader, the key figure in the German Romantic Catholic revival at beginning of the 19th century. Baader claimed for his purpose in life putting an end to Cartesianism in philosophy, upholding the mysticism of Jacob Boehme against Descartes’ rationalism. Baader’s work became influential again a century later in Othmar Spann and in German Catholic thought. Steinbüchel carefully traces the positions of the rationalist Georg Hermes (1775–1831) who defended D. against Baader, of the anticartesians Anton Günther (1783–1863) and Martin Deutinger, the sharpest thinker in the group who considered the defeat of Cartesianism a prerequisite for establishing a personal philosophy compatible with Christian faith. Deutinger’s Denklehre of 1844 (no. 1734, § 31, 49–51; cf. no. 1735) criticizes the cogito because it disregards the difference between being and existence, confounds absolute content and absolute form, and makes knowledge absolute. Thus logic came to incorporate metaphysics and thereby “engulfed thought altogether; and since thought is being, it engulfed the latter too” (31). The last part of Steinbüchel’s article systematically presents Baader’s critique under three headings: Catholic Romantic restauration vs. Cartesian revolution; “Ich-Verbundenheit” vs. “Ich-Einsamkeit” (the cogito); “Geist” vs. “Natur” (“die Entgeistigung des Menschen”). The article is a mine of factual information on major and minor figures in this D. controversy, but for a masterly exposition of its place in develop-


The Cartesian controversy, unconnected with D.'s stay in Sweden, had considerable influence upon Swedish intellectual life, leading to much wider freedom of thought. In 1710 a scientific society was founded in Upsala; Swedenborg was a prominent founding member. His astronomical studies (1716 ff.) led him to a cosmology between D.'s vortex theory and the Kant-Laplace hypothesis. Whether Kant had access to his work is unknown.


From a Descartes interpretation taken second-hand from Maritain, the author concludes that the aprioristic method of Pufendorf and his followers derives from Descartes (law is deduced, more geometrico, from clear and distinct ideas). Superficial and shallow. Alessandro Levi (“L'influence de l'esprit cartésien dans le droit, ses avantages et ses limites,” CD 3: 49–54) does better in just six pages, stressing Cartesian individualism rather than Cartesian apriorism and noting the role of innate ideas (see Droetto, no. 253) as pointing to Domat, Montesquieu, and even to the Code Napoléon.


Enormous work of superior erudition, independent in judgment, sometimes polemical, worked up from primary sources while critically considering the secondary literature. It covers all conceivable aspects of its subject in 399 independent sections which follow each other in only roughly chronological order. The study extends from D.'s relations to Dutch and some non-Dutch contemporaries to the remotest ramifications of Cartesianism in Dutch philosophy, science and theology, taking into its fold French, Italian, English, German, Swedish figures of major and minor Cartesian importance. Sidelights fall upon D.'s influence on French literature, on voyages imaginaires, Dutch influences upon Gassendi, to mention but a few of the uncounted bonus items that unexpectedly turn up. The work demands utmost patience and perseverance on the reader's part, but should be consulted on any historical question regarding Cartesianism and its literature. A French summary, translated by Paul Dibon, barely manages to cover the main findings and is as
unorganized as the rest; but the index of some 1400 names and the list of 399 section titles (also in French) will serve as a guide in the absence of an alphabetical subject matter index.


1. An aspect of the Cartesian heritage. 2. From Descartes' Le Monde to the worlds of Diderot and materialistic science. 3. Scientific method from Descartes to the Philosophes. 4. From the Cartesian mechanistic biology to the man-machine and evolutionary materialism.

Traces the uninterrupted, often subterranean current of ideas flowing from Descartes to La Mettrie and Diderot, vindicating the view, developing since the 1930's, that D.'s physics, biology and methodology, not his rejected metaphysics, influenced the philosophes' thought more than did English sensationalism. Their tactical, propagandistic denial of kinship with D. is treated with great skill and penetration. Chapter 1-3 link the heritage of D., especially the beast-machine concept and its implied radical materialism, with the philosophes' materialism and quest for scientific method. Here Vartanian sheds fresh light upon the influential nonmetaphysical aspects of D.'s metaphysical doctrines. Chapter 4, more controversial, finds Cartesian mechanistic biology at the root of the man-machine and evolutionary materialism. The concluding ch. 5 reevaluates Diderot, showing the profound dissimilarity between the views of man of Descartes and Diderot, Locke and Helvetius. Rich quotations from minor and major works. Basically an 18th century historical study, the book reveals the sharp contrast between the turbulent flow of the philosophes' not always disinterested ideas and the architectonic thought of Gueroult's "penseur de granit," shedding light on the manner in which a monolithic philosophy fertilizes thinking even in its historical decay. See also R. Hubert and H. Mougin, no. 455 and 459.


A good survey of the rather meager subject. See also Joseph Halasy-Nagy's short, uncritical but informative "Le cartésianisme en Hongrie" (CD 3: 122-26); also his: "A Cartesianismus és a magyar szellemiség" (Pannonia 1937, no. 7-10, 220-30).


Detailed study of D.'s influence upon Polish thought, summarized by Ludwik Chmaj, "Le cartésianisme en Pologne au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle" 1937 (see no. 1544). See also the references to Bar, Lubnicki and Czajkowski in no. 15.
XII. COLLECTANEA, COMMEMORATIONS, EXHIBITIONS: CHECKLIST

1596–1896: BIRTH OF DESCARTES


Milestone in modern Descartes studies, with influential articles by É. Boutroux, G. Lanson, M. Blondel, V. Brochard, A. Boyce Gibson, and others.

503 [Russia]. VFP 1896, no. 4. See nos. 2131a, 2567, 3456. Also Ljubimov, no. 2561a.


1629–1929: DESCARTES ENROLLS AT FRANEKER UNIVERSITY


1637–1937: DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE


508 [Albania]. Perpjekja Squiptare 2: 1937. [Brief articles on Descartes.]
508a Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie. See 523.


510 [Argentina]. See 512, 524.


513 Bulletin de l'Alliance française en Hollande. BAFH 15, no. 3: September 1937.
[Short commemorative talks and articles.]


Some of France’s outstanding Descartes scholars discuss aspects of Descartes’ work for young people.

[Two articles, by H. Daudin and H. Wallon.]


"Articles consacrés aux origines de Descartes, à ses pérégrinations posthumes, aux fêtes de mai 1937 à Châtellerault, et la société cartésienne de cette ville" [BP]. See nos. 1699, 2566, 2876–78, 3072. Also "Descartes à Châtellerault," NL, 27 May 1937, on the celebrations.


Germany’s chief collective 1937 contribution; not impressive, except for Burkamp on D.’s theory of knowledge, Witzenmann on Vico’s anticartesianism, and Katkov’s study of Descartes and Brentano.


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Remarkable Neothomist contribution. Includes Sortais on D. and the Jesuits, Derisi on S. Thomas and Descartes, and Busto's critique of Laberthonnière. Short, annotated bibliography.


Illustrations, including portraits of Descartes.

[HOMENAJE]. See Buenos Aires, no. 512.


[Poitiers]. Hommage à Descartes, 1637–1937, à l'occasion du IXe Congrès international de philosophie (Congrès Descartes). Poitiers, 1937. 8vo. 72 p. [Reprint, with separate pagination, of the Descartes issue of the Revue générale du Centre-Ouest de France, no. 44, August 1937].


E. Cassirer, R. Hubert, P. Ducasse, and an international Descartes-bibliography (no. 15).

Revue d'histoire de la philosophie. RHPh ns 5: no. 18, 15 April 1937.

Radio talks on Descartes, some of them models of popular scholarship.

Essential contributions by Brunschvicg, Laporte and others.


University catalogue, containing a commemorative article on DM by Josef Babini.


Lists 199 Descartes items, including 63 portraits, medals and statues.

539 [USSR]. Pod znamenem Marksizma, nr. 7, 8, 1937. [DM, methodology, physiology, cosmology, D. and Enlightenment, esthetics.] See no. 1091c, 1426b,c, 1941a, 1950a, 2770a, 3296.

540 [USSR]. Front nauki i tekhniki, nr. 1, 5, 6, 7, 1937. See no. 1426d,e, 2283a, 2337a.

1596–1946: BIRTH OF DESCARTES


Comments by Jacques Hadamard, Langevin, and Grasse on Descartes as mathematician, physicist and biologist. (BAn 1947, no. 6909).

1650–1950: DEATH OF DESCARTES


Memorial address by Hans Leisegang.
544 [Chile]. *Homenaje a Descartes*. Santiago de Chile, Sociedad chilena de filosofía, y Universidad de Chile, 1950. p. 397–567. Reprinted from a special issue of the Revista de filosofía (Chile), 1: 1950, no. 4.


546 [Cuba]. See 555.


549 *Glanes*. Glanes (Cahiers de l’amité franco-néerlandaise, Amsterdam), April 1950. [Brief articles on D. and Holland].


Polish studies, with French summaries, by I. Dąmbska, S. Luszczewska-Romahnova, St. Czajkowski, W. Ślebodziński, R. Ingarden; A. Bar’s bibliography of D. in Poland.


552 *Pensée*. Pensée ns, no. 32, September-October 1950.

Descartes from the viewpoint of historical materialism: Barjonnet, Wallon, Marx himself.


555 *Revista cubana de filosofía* 1/6: January-December 1950. [No more published?] Short articles on Descartes by Latin American scholars.

Important studies by H. Gouhier, F. Alquié, R. Lenoble, G. Lewis, Ch. S. Ware.


OTHER COLLECTANEA


PART TWO

ALPHABETICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

1800–1960
A


On D.’s three material qualities (shape, rest, motion) and his inertia formulation; Einstein following in the same spirit of geometrization.

1002 Abercrombie, Nigel: “Saint Augustine and the Cartesian metaphysics.”


1004a —: “La liberté dans la croyance chez Descartes.” APC Febr. 1893.


1005a Actes du Symposium international des sciences physicales et mathématiques dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle, Pisa, 16-18 juin 1938.
Valuable background studies. See 1833a and 2831a.


—: “Notes sur les Regulae ad directionem ingenii de Descartes.” RPFE 40: 1895/2, 288-93. Reprinted in AT X.


—: “Descartes.” In: Bibliothèque Nationale, Descartes [no. 1, no. 511], vii-xviii.


“Ce sont, pour l’âme seule, celle de la pensée (connaissance de l’âme et de Dieu); pour le corps seul, celle de l’étendue; et pour l’âme et le corps ensemble, celle de leur union.”

Descartes in Bohemia (Komenský, Battle of the White Mountain); at the siege of La Rochelle; his views on longevity; biographical documents. Section on longevity also in: Progrès médical, 1937, p. 1267.

Critique of R. M. Hare (The language of morals, Oxford, 1952) who defines Cartesianism in ethics as deduction of particular duties from some self-evident first principle, with or without factual premises.


Agirrezabal: see Iriarte Agirrezabal, J.


Within the 100 years following D.’s theory of the tides (PP), only the Cartesian de Catelet (1677) advanced a critique of it. Varenius (1690), Rohault (1671) and A. Cavalieri (1740) merely took it over, ignoring the advances made by Henry Philips and Joseph Childrey. [Bsig 1958, 8143.]
Notwithstanding Newton’s destruction of the vortex theory, the Cartesian system was not entirely discarded until the mid-18th century.


Excellent selection from D.'s vast correspondence, with biographical index of correspondents and detailed "table analytique."


Allendes, Eulogio: "Descartes." In his: Los genios de la ciencia. Santiago de Chile, Los Debates, 1889, 244-61.

Relates Descartes' voluntarism to Augustinian Scholasticism and to Occamism.

Sees in Descartes' treatment of the technical structure of music an aid to the understanding of his philosophical and mathematical manner of thinking.


Alquié develops his own metaphysical position in a dialogue with the philosophical tradition and especially with Descartes.

A guide through the argument of PP I.

—: "Marxisme ou cartésianisme?" Tmod 1: May 1946, 1378-1400. See 150.

Descartes cannot in any sense be called an existentialist. Refusing to give unique ontological immediacy to experience, he places the immediate in the factual rather
than the epistemological order, retaining the dialectic relationship between the


Distinguishes in Descartes’ logic the systematic and genetic orders (ordre du système, ordre du temps) which find their unity in man. Cartesian order is therefore not
a uniquely logical system (against Gueroult). See 1056.


1053 —: Science et métaphysique chez Descartes. Centre de documentation

1054 —: “Descartes, 1596–1650.” In: Les philosophes célèbres, ed. M. Merleau-
Portrait of Descartes by J. B. Weenix, accompanied by a brief, appreciative intro-
duction.

1055 —: “Notes sur l’interprétation de Descartes par l’ordre des raisons” [by
“. . . . pour ce qui est du sens de la philosophie de Descartes, M. Gueroult et moi en
avons déjà si souvent, mais si vainement, discuté qu’on peut tenir pour établi que
nul de nous deux ne convaincrà jamais l’autre” (465). See 1051a.

1056 —: “Expérience ontologique et déduction systématique dans la con-
For Descartes, scientific and metaphysical ideas are not of the same order. His main
problem: “comment mettre d’accord la religion et la science” (27). His two “dé-
marches intellectuelles,” creation of eternal verities and cogito, rest on the same
unique experience of the insufficiency of all finite essence, of the contingency “de
tout nécessaire d’ordre scientifique,” of the “déréalisation [de l’objet] par l’être”
(31). The discussion is largely an intellectual duel between Alquié and Gueroult. See
1051a.

1056a —: “Conscience et signes dans la philosophie moderne et le cartésianis-

Alvarez, A. Gonzáles: see Gonzáles Alvarez.


1059 Âme et conscience chez Descartes. BSPF 43: 1951, 133-64. (Discussion of the theses of G. Lewis). See 215b.


Descartes' voluntarism logically leads to a negative theology and to a concept of freedom as arbitrarism. On D.'s concept of eternal verities and Molinist viewpoints in his letters to Princess Elisabeth.


1065 Andrade, Antônio A. de: "Descartes em Portugal nos s. XVII e XVIII." Bro 51: 1950, 432-51. See 430.


Angers: see Julien-Aymard d'Angers.


From D. to Pavlov. [In Russian.]

Idealistic Descartes interpretation (though radically opposed to Hamelin’s) reveals D.’s difficulties in reconciling substance with relativity of change, as exemplified by his treatment of mechanics.

Antonelli, Maria Teresa: “Riflessioni in margine a Cartesio.” Humanitas (Brescia) 1949, 1033–42.

Metaphysical dualism in Descartes results from a wavering between “science” and “sagesse.” His central truth problem implies both a moralism and perfect theoricity. Though his intention is unity, he is methodologically led into the insurmountable difficulties of mediating between deduction and induction. Cf. Bsig 1959, 11087.

Defends D. against accusations of plagiarism (law of refraction and explanation of the rainbow).

The ballet was first translated into German by Johann Freinsheimius at the court of Christina of Sweden: Des Friedens Geburtstag. (s. l.), H. Keysern, s.d. [d’Alverny, no. 1, p. 85].

Characteristic passages assembled under six headings.

Descartes projects a universe of anonymous entities; his system is therefore neither metaphysical nor ontological but projective in the sense of Oresme and Buridan, though it goes beyond them in its mathematicism. [Bsig 1959, 167.]

Sharply apologetic polemic against Ch. Adam's scepticism concerning D.'s religiosity. Superficial survey of pertinent incidents in his life leads author to conclude that D. was faithful to the Church, notwithstanding its subsequent condemnation of his work.

1076 d'Argenson: ‘Note sur la famille Descartes et l'origine de son nom.” MSA Touraine 4: 1847, 87. ()


Ariós de Montoya: see Ortiz de Montoya.


In answer to Huxley's "extrachristian" Descartes, Arnold's address to "plain, simple people" (p. 63) takes the high road from Cartesian mechanism via necessary truth, cogito, and the etymology of "is" and "being" to the God of Metaphysics, leaving Descartes behind in the end.


1091c —: “Kosmogonija i kosmologija Dekarta.” Pod znamenem marksizma, no. 8, 1937. D.’s cosmogony and cosmology. [In Russian.]


Contains: La doute méthodique – Descartes père du naturalisme (ch. 9, 196–224); Descartes et l’induction (ch. 10, 235–50); Le 17e siècle cartésien: l’école cartésienne et le progrès de la science (ch. 11, 251–64).


1098a Autour du Discours de la méthode. Aph 1937. See 509.


1101b —: “Cogito ergo sum.” Analysis, December 1953, 27–31. See 235 a–b, also 335.

B


Review by W. S. Weedon in PPR 1: 1940, 248: Descartes’ mathematics are less closely linked to his metaphysics than Babini would have it.


Bacca: see García Bacca.


Astrological work (Les véritables connaissances des influences célestes et sublunaires, Paris, 1667) by one R. Descartes; no connection with the philosopher.


Review of AT X (Descartes’ earliest works and letters).


Baladi, Naguib: Descartes. Cairo, Al-Ma’arif, 1959. 222 p. (Génies de la pensée occidentale, v. 4.)


Distinguishing different meanings of ego, doubt, cogito, author finds that the fertility and generality of Descartes’ ideas outran his efforts to systematize them. From A. G. A. Balz’ school.

Discusses among other themes the ontological argument in St. Anselm’s and D.’s formulation, with Kant’s critique.


—: "Dualism in Cartesian psychology and epistemology.” In: SHI v. 2, 1925, 83-157.


—: "Louis de la Forge and the critique of substantial forms.” PhR 41: 1932, 551-76. Reprinted: no. 1116, ch. 5. See also 463.


Denies that St. Thomas and Descartes can be sharply opposed to each other in their anthropology. Both conceived man dualistically, and both opposed organic monism. See 431 and Mourant (No. 801) with B.’s refutation, no. 1132.


Summary exposition of the “processus corrélatif de développement . . . des différentes orientations du savoir – philosophique, scientifique et historique” (376) represented by these three thinkers. No discussion of the Descartes-Vico relationship.

Descartes as a pedagogue, on the tercentenary of his death. [In Serbian].

Bibliography of Polish Descartes studies and translations, 1717–1947. Cartesian manuscripts (17th and 18th c.) in Polish libraries.

First part discusses French reactions to Leibniz as critic of Descartes and Voltaire.


Tries to eliminate the circle as follows: “Ego cogito et cogito me – ergo sum res cogitans et cogitata – ergo sum.” On Descartes, Kant, Hegel.


Questions Gilson’s view of medieval philosophy as showing marks of working back to the Middle Ages from Descartes. The real link between medieval and Cartesian thought is extraphilosophical: Descartes’ “deep sense of interiority” – he uses the word “je” 583 times in DM – links him to the mystics, as do other parallels, e.g., rigorous control of self which leads to mystical asceticism as well as to scientific objectivity.


Under the influence of Cartesian method and mathematical progress in the 17th c., mathematical proofs of God’s existence flourish. Gives two examples, including Pardies’ using asymptotic areas to reinforce Thomistic proof, a metaphysically improper usage.


Claims that the foundation of human knowledge in Descartes is not the cogito but the concept of God, disregards D.’s development from the Regulae to MM. The thesis is rejected in M. Solovine’s review in RPFE 76: 1913, 220–31. Other reviews in PhdG 5: 1913, 1225.


Descartes and his theory. [In Hebrew].


Review of Brunschvicg, no. 138 and 1390.

The malin génie discloses the rift between a luminous “pensée .... dans l’ordre désincarné des essences, et l’épaisseur concrète d’une action qui reste irrationnelle en son fond” (236). The hypothesis thus creates “des intervalles éthiques, dans les diverses dimensions de la philosophie” (243). One more step, and Descartes shades off into Teilhard de Chardin.


Descartes and Pascal represent two forms of Augustinism, reunited in Malebranche. Descartes’ Augustinism, however, does not start out from revelation, reason being insufficient. [Gerard Milhaud in no. 15, p. 75.]


Baumann’s treatment of Descartes is criticized and rectified by Natorp (see 221, 147–63).

“Dürfen die Regeln für die Leitung des Geistes als gültige Quelle bei der Darstellung cartesianischer Philosophie und Methode gebraucht werden?” ZPPK ns 53: 1868, 189–205.

Regards Regulae as an early stage in D.’s thought, superseded by his published work and therefore invalid in interpreting it.


Slightly adapted version of B.’s introduction to his 1937 edition of Rousseau’s La profession de foi, arguing against P. Masson’s view of the role of reason in this work. B.’s attempt to inject “l’esprit cartésien” into the discussion is necessarily perfunctory, since he rightly recognizes the thought of D. and Rousseau to be incommensurable.

—: See 515 (Causeries . . . . 1938).


—: "Cogitatio in Descartes." Cartesio, 41–52. 1937.

Cogitatio and extensio are both naturae particulares to D., who fails to specify: he "never seems to do more than 'describe' Cogitatio and the best one could say of his description is that it is unsatisfactory" (52).

—: "L'unité de la pensée et de la méthode." Royaumont, 393–411. 1937. See 198.


The cogito is an immediate inference; for Descartes, intuition and deduction are not opposites. Most critics of the cogito misunderstand him – the validity of his formulation of the cogito is incontestable. Brief comment on the cogito critiques of Kant, Huxley, Veitch, Koyré.


—: "Husserl und Descartes." Emge 152–57. 1937.

A summary of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, pt. 1.


Contemporary French philosophy is faithful to Descartes in spirit but not in the letter, influenced less by Cartesian intellectualism than by German insistence on the troubled areas of the soul, from Schelling to Nietzsche and Heidegger. The same holds of French literature and science. See Dollo in S 19: 1951, 137.


Descartes in Bohemia (1620–21); Comenius; Cartesianism and philosophical thought in Czechoslovakia (T. G. Masaryk and others). Sympathetic commemorative article by the President of Czechoslovakia, once a student in Paris.


—: "L’importance des Méditations métaphysiques de Descartes au point de vue de sa méthode." CD 1 : 3-9. 1937.


Discusses only the non-cartesian papers.


Spirited apology of Descartes by a humanist-philosopher-jurist-huntsman: Descartes’ doctrine of the automatism of brutes is not as unnatural as would appear; he denied animal reason, not animal consciousness. See 276 (Heintel).


—: "Pour un retour à Descartes." Eph ns 5: 1950, 156-64.

Modern epistemology is estranged from Cartesianism. A return to Descartes would help achieve a "practical philosophy." See C. Dollo in S 19: 1931, 137-38.


Against the idealistic interpretation of Cartesian dualism. Traces the subject-object problem from Descartes, Geulincx and Malebranche to Kant. From Nikolai Hartmann’s school.


All copied from Überweg.


From Leibniz to Kant, the German Idealists, and the Neokantians only.


Engaging sketch. The beast-machine theme merges into a discussion of the animal-man problem within the philosophical anthropology of the two thinkers.


Ch. 1: The combinatory system of Raymond Lull. Ch. 2: Descartes. Ch. 3: The origin of the Cartesian system.


Attempts a rehabilitation of Voëtius: Descartes abused the privileges of genius in this controversy.


Descartes the heretic locked Western thought in a vicious circle from which only Christian Wisdom promises liberation [Bphil I: 1954, no. 158].


Besaucèle: see Berthé de Besaucèle.


Descartes’ concept of mathesis universalis and its importance for the philosophy of nature.


Makes a sharp distinction between intuitionism and traditional logical formalism. Descartes had already certain notions anticipating modern symbolic logic, but his aversion against traditional syllogistics prevented him from conceiving a universal logic. Gueroult and others (discussion, p. 161) object to the suggested link between Cartesian and Kantian deduction.


The cogito, being intuitive, is not circular; neither is it plausible. Intuitive proof tends either to be recast in purely logical form, or to be abandoned (e.g. the ontological argument.) Intuitive proof need not be rejected, so long as it is regarded as “acquired evidence” (Paul Bernays) rather than as grounded in “innate ideas.”


Descartes' method exemplified by his treatment and solution of Pappus' problem.


Essential literature, with brief Neothomist comment.


Document study of the Stampioen-Waessenaer affair.

Address on the anniversary of D.’s matriculation at Franeker University in 1629.


Kant destroyed the rationalist (Cartesian) error of placing thinking before being (hysteron-proteron), but his epistemology failed to go beyond “Vernunft” towards ontogenesis.
Review: M. Schlick in VWPh v. 35, no. 2; PhdG 2: 1910, no. 565.

Defense of the Cartesian self against the Louvain Neoscholastics. “Étrange par sa forme, mais assez intéressant par son contenu” (Bontadini).


Important series of articles (H. Gouhier).


Induction and deduction used as synonyms for inference by Descartes.

---: "Note on the use of the term ‘idée’ prior to Descartes." PhR 48: 1939, 532-35.

A certain R. de l’Encre used “idée” for “pensée” 50 years before Descartes.


Bloch, A.: "Descartes et Pascal." VP, 10 January 1922.


Blond, Jean M. Le.: "Cartesian method and classical logic." ModSch 15: 1937, 4-6.

Cartesian and Aristotelian conceptions of science.


Consequences and obscurities of the concept. D.’s methodical mathematicism profoundly modifies logic, and since it leaves aside quantification, it results in a "transformation profonde de la notion même de définition" (p. 170). Agrees with Maritain: Descartes is a “méphysicien infidèle à la métaphysique” (p. 179).


1257 —: “La clef de voûte du système cartésien.” *Cartesio*, 69–77. 1937. The ontological proof, central point of Descartes’ system, is not a logical artifice, hence free of the objections to the Anselmian proof. God’s omnipotence and immutability holds D.’s metaphysical and scientific edifice together. Review: M. Giorgiantonio in *S* 6: 1938, 388–89.


129 Boer, Julius de: Descartes (Cartesius). Baarn, Hollandia, 1911. (Grote denkers, ser. 3, no. 2).


A French engineer’s American travelogue. Descartes serves merely as a jumping-off platform for a discussion of American “méchanisme.”


—: “Descartes défendu contre la nouvelle école philosophique.” Corr 1853. [Varet]

—: “Du monde indéfini de Descartes.” Corr 25 mai 1854. [Schrecker]

—: “Figure du monde: Descartes à l’index.” Corr 1854. [Varet]

Bonavino, Cristoforo: see Franchi, Ausonio.


Good summary statement of Bontadini’s position regarding the phaenomenalism (fenomenismo) of Descartes.

1281: “Note cartesiane.” (1937). In his: Studi (see 1277), 29–35.

(1) “Il cogito ergo sum: interpretazione dell’ergo.” (2) “Il dualismo cartesiano: sua dipendenza dal dualismo gnoseologico.” (3) “L’innatismo e la metafisica.”


Olgiati’s concept of “fenomenismo razionalistico” elaborated in a Malebranche study which draws all relevant parallels with Descartes.

Review: F. Parlatore in GCFl 1940, 127ff. Bontadini’s rejoinder in his: Studi 247–51. See also Sebba, no. 19, p. 44.


The second article discusses the Descartes-Spinoza relationship, the ontological proof, and the cogito.

1285: “La critica leibniziana del cartesianismo.” (1947). In his: Studi (see 1277), 205–18.

1286: “Polemiche sulla interpretazione della filosofia moderna.” In his: Studi (see 1277), 219–58.

1. “Polemica con F. Olgiati,” 1940, bearing on Descartes criticism. 2. “Repliche a vari autori’ (G. Brasca, C. Ferro, C. Giacon, G. di Napoli, G. Soleri and others) on the divergence between Olgiati’s and Bontadini’s concept of “fenomenismo.”

From Rudolf Steiner’s anthroposophic school.


Contains a study of Descartes’ Traité des passions. [Giraud.]


Logic of action vs. logic of thought, provisional vs. definitive morale, générosité vs. sagesse, Cartesianism vs. Christianity.


Detailed study of the Stampioen-Waessenaer quarrel. See Thijssen-Schoute, Nederlands Cartesianisme (1954), 74–79 for discussion and rich references to sources.


1296 —: “L’iconographie de Descartes.” BSA Touraine 11: 1897, 1er trim., 68–82.
1297 —: “Discours pour la clôture du centenaire de Descartes.” BSA Touraine 11: 1897, 1er trim., 83–97.


1301 Bouché, Abbé Ch.: Descartes. Reims, 1858. 34 p. [BN]


Bouligand, G.: "Les prolongements de la pensée de Descartes en géométrie moderne." Journées universitaires poitevines, April-May 1950, 67–70 (see 553.)

"L'étude de l'outillage qu'utilisent les géomètres non-euclidiens ne fait que confirmer la portée de l'arithmétisation cartésienne de la géométrie" [BAn 1952, 7720].


Various theories about the pineal gland.


Philosophy of sentiment against philosophy of mind: Pascal vs. Descartes, Rousseau vs. the Encyclopedists, etc.


Bourdon, B.: "La théorie des sensations chez Descartes." JPNP 36: 1939, 321–43.


I318 - "Valeur de la métaphysique cartésienne." "La morale provisoire." APC 118 (ns 20), June 1889, 278–88. (Two lectures).


D.'s morale changed from early Stoic morale provisoire to rationalist anthropology (self-perfection of reason through use of the natural mechanism).


Descartes' mathesis universalis was to be "une explication mécanique de l'univers: mais ce n'était point une algèbre" (p. 101). His mathematical activity remained episodic. His break with the tradition of the Greek "virtuoses de la démonstration" marks the difference between him and Fermat. Brilliant assessment of the Cartesian method in mathematics: "c'est l'usine succédant au métier" (p. 110).


Descartes and Pascal at opposite ends in their methodical treatment of physics and metaphysics.


On Sartre, Lefebvre, Mury.

183

1330 **Bouwsma, O. K.**: “Descartes’ scepticism of the senses.” Mind 54: 1945, 312–23. “Wittgenstein goes to work on Descartes with wit and charm” (Morgan.)


**Boyce Gibson**: see Gibson, A. Boyce.

1334 **Boyer, Carl B.**: History of analytic geometry. New York, Scripta Mathematica at Yeshiva University, 1956. ix, 291 p. (Scripta Mathematica Studies, no. 6, 7.) See 355a.


Text of Sergeant’s "Non ultra: or a Letter to a Learned Cartesian: Settling the Rule of Truth, and First Principles, Upon their Deepest Grounds .... London, printed for A. Roper, 1698," p. 593–628, with an account of Sergeant and his polemics, including his attacks on Descartes and Anthony Le Grand in 1696 and 1698.


1342 Braham, Ernest Goodall: The problem of the self and immortality; an estimate and criticism of the subject from Descartes to Kant. London, Epworth Press, 1925. xii, 208 p.

1343 Branberger, Jan: René Descartes, filosof hudby .... V Praze, Urbánek, 1933. 74 p. See 418.


1345 Brattle, William: Compendium logicæ secundum principia Renati Cartesii .... Bostoni, J. Draper, 1758. 60 p. See 440.


1348  Breen, J. C.: “De woning van Descartes op de Westermarkt (te Amsterdam).” De Amsterdamer (Weekly), October 9, 1920. See also Pos-Steenberghen (Rsyn 1937, p. 112-13, items ii a, b, c) on Descartes in Amsterdam.


1352a —: “Matière cartésienne et création.” RMM 44: 1937, 21-34. See 241.

1353  —: “La création des vérités éternelles dans le système de Descartes.” RPFE 123: 1937, 15-29; and in his: La philosophie et son passé. See 241.

1354  —: “La création continue chez Descartes.” S 5: 1937, 3-10; and in his: La philosophie et son passé. See 241.

1355  —: See 525 (L’esprit cartésien, 1937).

1356  —: “Les lectures malebranchistes de Rousseau.” RIP 1: 1938, 98-120. Adds to the evidence of influence upon Rousseau through Malebranche and Bernard Lamy, indirect sources of some of his knowledge of Descartes.

1357  —: See 515 (Causeries).


English standard history of psychology. Finds no unity in D.’s psychological doctrines; in his view of man he “belongs to the last phase of the medieval tradition” (367). Editor’s extensive note (345–48) lists the Cartesian heritage as “dualism, atomism, ‘psychologism’, introspectionism, intellectualism, mechanical physiology”; D.’s revolt against Aristotle may have done more harm than good to psychology.


“Elementary review of Scholasticism, Galileo, Descartes” (Morgan.)


Ch. 2, 3 on Descartes and Spinoza.


Contains nos. 1370 and 1371, and an obituary appreciation of F. Bouillier (p. 541–59).

1370 —: "Descartes stoïcien. Contribution à l'histoire de la philosophie cartésienne." RPFE 1: 1880, 548–52, and in his: Études (see 1369), 320–27.
Brief but important summary of what Descartes owes to the Stoics.

1371 —: "Le Traité des passions de Descartes et l'Éthique de Spinoza." RMM 4: 1896, 512–16, and in his: Études (see 1369), 327–31.)
Descartes' TP contains the seminal idea of Spinoza's Ethics which, without it, might not have come into existence.


Rich study in the history of ideas, from Condillac and d'Alembert to Rousseau, Condorcet and early 19th century probabilism. More valuable for the material and its handling than for the conclusions.


1376 Brown, Sarah: "The fundamental postulates of the Cartesian systems."
CD 1: 10–16. 1937.
A logical inquiry into "Cartesian systems."

Gueroult's method of structural analysis perfectly fits the case of Descartes; tested in the application to Malebranche, it shows its limitations as well as its strength. See 170.

1377 Brucker, Jacob: Historia critica philosophiae. Lipsiae, 1743, 1764. See 441a.

Questions the radicality of D.'s doubt: it is merely an attempt at doubting (Zweifelsversuch). The existential assertion is not the only indubitable result of the cogito, since the existence of some object distinct from the self emerges as equally indubitable. "Utmost certainty" can be obtained only through a step-by-step critico-
phenomenological analysis, not from D.'s deductive-constructive method; and "absolute certainty" is unattainable altogether, as D.'s own "Zweifelsversuch" demonstrates.


Brief, well-documented introduction to Descartes and his influence in Holland; many source references.


1390 —: "Descartes." In his: Descartes et Pascal, lecteurs de Montaigne. Neuchâtel, Baconnière, 1942, p. 95–133 (Être et penser, v. 12, reprinted
1945). Also New York, Brentano, 1944, with biographical sketch of Brunschvicg by Robert Tenger. See 158.

1391 —: “La révolution cartésienne et la notion spinoziste de la substance.” RMM 12: 1904, 755–98. Also in his: Spinoza et ses contemporains (see 156), ch. 9.


Probing their “opposition intégrale,” Brunschvicg finds that “Pascal croit à la science autant que Descartes croit à la religion”; but their systems clash, as they try to meet problems as pressing and harsh today as they were in their time.

1394 —: L’expérience humaine et la causalité physique. Alcan, 1922. xvi, 625 p. BPC.


1396 —: “Mathématique et métaphysique chez Descartes.” RMM 34: 1927, 277–324. Also in his: Écrits (see 159), 11–54; bibliographical references p. 106.

Broad discussion of Gilson’s Commentary to DM (see 83) serves as basis for developing Brunschvicg’s own interpretation of Descartes’ Method in mathematics and metaphysics.


Without any direct filiation, Plato and Descartes represent, in turn, the “dialectical hope” of mathematical idealism, and its triumphant realization.

1399 —: De la connaissance de soi. Alcan, 1931. xi, 196 p. [1929–30 Sorbonne lectures, not directly concerned with Descartes].


On “intuition” in Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza.


Cartesian epistemology vs. Cartesian mechanism; Descartes’ method is reductive rather than inductive (Bachelard’s formula). Stresses Descartes’ awareness of the unlimited fecundity of the double process of analytical decomposition and intellectual reconstruction. Contrasts the intuitive unity of system as D. should have seen it with the dismaying “dimorphism” of the philosophy he actually developed.


1406 —: See 515 (Causeries).


Independent meditation on the cogito as “le sentiment vital le plus profondément et le plus parfaitement mien” (p. 252), “le plaisir étrange et métaphysique d’être soi, même vis-à-vis du vrai” (p. 253).


The absolute monarch is the Cartesian God transposed into the world of politics.


Bullón y Fernández, Eloy: De los orígenes de la filosofía moderna .... Salamanca, Calatrava, 1905. See 449.


Shows the importance of D's thinking-self concept for a theory of knowledge which, like Kant's and Fichte's, is opposed to the Aristotle-to-Husserl standpoint which admits absolute evidence. But Descartes, unlike the German Idealists, rejects a transcendental self.


Critique of subjectivist tendencies in Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Bergson. Descartes' methodological separation of self and nature resulted in an isolation of ideas from nature and in the idealistic subjugation of nature. His insistence on clear and distinct ideas produced a misinterpretation of the status and function of conscious perception. Experience is not composed of an infinity of discrete elements but of an a priori causal continuity of events, a continuity which is no more subjective than the events themselves.


Claims that Leibniz depended on Descartes for his conceptions of method, his psychology, and for Cartesian mechanism in science.

Burtt, Edwin Arthur: "Descartes". In his: The metaphysical foundations of modern physical science. A historical and critical essay. New York,


Though Cartesianism developed no concept of progress as such, it opened the road to it by declaring the independence of man and causing the old theories of degeneration to be abandoned. Chief emphasis on Malebranche and Leibniz.


1426a *Bykhovski, Bernard Emanulovič*: “Dekart i religija.” Pod znamenem Marksizma, no. 7, 1937. D. and religion. [In Russian.]

1426b —: “Metafizika Dekarta.” Ibid., nr. 8, 1937. [In Russian.]
1426c—: "Filosofskie osnovy fiziki Dekarta." Front nauki i tekhniki, no. 5, 1937.
The philosophical foundation of D.'s physics. [In Russian.]

1426d—: "Metodologija Dekarta (K 300-letiju Rassuždenija o metode.)" Ibid.,
nr. 7, 1937.
D.'s methodology. On the tercentenary of DM. [In Russian.]

C

1427 *Caballeria, J. M. (S. J.):* "Lo mesurable como objeto de la física." Cartesio,
185–89, 1937.
Cartesian quantification of reality makes the quantifiable the sole object of physics,
as it still is for Einstein and Heisenberg.

1428 *Cabanès, Auguste:* "Descartes." In his: Médecins amateurs. Paris, Michel,
1932. 382 p.

1429 *Cabanès, Jean:* Allocution. BSPF 44/1: 1950, 27–34. [Descartes and experi­
mental science.]

1429a *Cabeen, D. C. (general editor):* A critical bibliography of French literature,

1430 *Caes, P.:* "De Descartes a Sartre." SynB 7: 1952, no. 78, 33–42. (Review of
Sartre, see 192).

See 516.

99.
Comparison between Pascal's and Descartes' scientific method.

1432 *Caird, Edward:* "Cartesianism." In his: Essays on literature and philo­

Contains historical studies of Descartes (Bph 2, no. 2).


See also Vol. 2 (Questions spéciales) on the notion of space from Descartes to Kant.


With Descartes, philosophy begins to discard problems concerning the things themselves, in favor of the instrument of knowledge of things. The artist, instead of presenting objects in their concrete value, tries to reproduce the relationship between forms, utilizing light, atmosphere, and above all movement. [Bsig 1958, no. 9201.]

T. Campaila, 1668–1740, author of the Cartesian poem “Adamo, ovvero il mondo creato” (Catania 1709) and of scientific writings on physics (against Newton), on animal motion, etc.


Thoughtful reassessment of Descartes’ thoughts about the relation of theory and technology (knowledge convertible into technological action, but with significant restrictions). Penetrating closing remarks on the reason why Descartes does not have “une théorie de la création, c’est-à-dire au fond une esthétique” (p. 85).


Discussing Gueroult’s v. 2 (on the Sixth Meditation), Canguilhem analyzes the problem of the conditions of biological individuation in Cartesian man and in the animal as developed in Gueroult’s analysis. See 170.


1446 —: “A quelle date Descartes a-t-il écrit la Recherche de la vérité?” RHPPh 2: 1928, 254–89. See 242.


Today philosophy tends to speak in analogies and metaphors, another proof that the world is coming to an end: “uno de los signos que da el Apocalipsis es que habrá hombres que echen humo de la boca, y no es probable que aluda a los cigarrillos” (78). As to Descartes, he is farther from our philosophy and “menos renacentista” than Aristotle himself.


If the cogito can serve as starting point of philosophical inquiry, it cannot be the origin from which all the rest of the Cartesian system can be deduced: “Descartes, comme S. Augustin, le dépasse en se fondant sur l’idée de Dieu” (Bontadini, Rsyn 1937, p. 95.)


1453 —: Da Cartesio a Rosmini. Fondazione storica dell’ontologismo critico. Firenze, Sansoni, 1946. 308 p. See 204.


1460 —: “Riflessione e trascendenza in Cartesio.” CD I: 93-98. 1937. Also in his: Renato Cartesio (see 205.)


1463 —: “Il metodo cartesiano nelle Regulae e nel Discorso.” Gmet 1: 1946, 375-93. Also in his: Il problema (see 4), 64-98.


*CARTESIO nel terzo centenario . . . . 1937. See 35.

*Carvalho, Augusto*: see Silva Carvalho.


*Carvalho, Ramos de*: see Ramos de Carvalho.


"Je sais que j'existe, et j'en suis sûr par ce que j'ai senti. Je sais aussi que je n'existerai plus quand je cesserai de sentir . . . . Avant (l'âge de huit ans) je n'avais pas vécu en prenant vivre dans le sens de cogitare (penser); j'avais végété." (Casanova’s Préface).


Critical discussion of the cogito analyses of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger.

*Caso, A.*: “Don Juan Benito Diaz de Gamarra, un filósofo mexicano dis-cípulo de Descartes.” Revista de lit. mexicana 1: 1940. [Baldensperger]
1474 Casotti, Mario: "La pedagogia di Cartesio nella sua formazione." Cartesio 185–89. 1937.


1479 —: Drottning Christina och Descartes. Ett bidrag till 1600-talets idéhistoria. Stockholm, Bonniers, 1940. 140 p. (Forskningar och föreläsningar vid Göteborgs Högskola). Also in his: Descartes (1477) and in his: Descartes, Corneille (1478.)
Lectures delivered in October 1938: "Das Verhältnis von Descartes und .... Christina als geistesgeschichtliches Problem"; universal theism and the problem of natural religion in the 17th century; the renaissance of stoicism in 17th century ethics; the theory of passions in the history of ideas; Christina and the heroic ideal of the 17th century.


1482 —: Die platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge. Leipzig-Berlin, Teubner. 1932. (Studien der Bibliothek Warburg,


The unity of the thinking self assures the unity of science; the individual sciences are not parts adding up to science as a whole; the genesis of numbers is Descartes' prototype for his notion of their enchainment.


Comparison with modern psychology would indicate that Descartes did not have a psychology proper.


200
Index to Genava 10–14: 1932–36, "à consulter pour l'iconographique de Descartes" (Giraud.)


"Pouvre": "pure" and "pauvre".


Rich in references and comparative doctrinal analyses.


1499 —: "La vida, las obras y la influencia de Emmanuel Maignan." Revista de estudios políticos no. 46: 1952, 133–149. See 449.

1500 —: "La filosofía de Emmanuel Maignan." RevF 13, no. 48: 1954, 15–68. See 449.


1502a Cercle Descartes. 1937. See 516.

1502b Cercle philosophique Lorrain. Tricentenaire . . . . 1937. See 517.

Neothomist study of Descartes’ “fenomenismo,” viewed as merely “una situazione storica, non . . . un noema che s’afferma e sta” (220). Problem placed in its historical context (Scotism, Cusanus, etc.)


Underneath hyperbolic doubt lies a particular time concept. Only a permanent intuition founded in Being can destroy the effects of this doubt: the cogito, in which the fundamental relationship between eternity and time is attained. The affirmation of a perfect, hence truthful God elevates the self from thought founded in being to the Being which founds it. The undeceiving God destroys the hypothesis of hyperbolic doubt. [Bsig 1960, no. 16534.]


Ch. 3: “Descartes (Verstand und Sinnlichkeit),” with exposition of his analytical geometry (p. 173–275; Engl. tr., p. 195–307). Influential work of popular “Weltan-
schauung" in the old Imperial days of Germany, struggling hard to fit Descartes into it but not getting far beyond the expository.

1509a **Champigny, Robert:** "The theatrical aspect of the cogito." Rmet 12: 1959, 370-77.

The self posited by D. was not a quality of experience but a belief, a "persona" or theatrical mask. This belief is normal in a dramatic situation; the suggestiveness of MM is "due to dramatic technique" (376). "Persona" and "dramatic technique" are epistemological forms of D.'s "larvatus prodeo." MM, not concerned with selfness, is dramatic (Ego appears on the philosophical stage); theatrical (a second Ego judges, destroys the first one, then allows it to reappear). Methodic doubt misses the existential quality of selfness which cannot be detached from experience.


Corneille's "reasoning fanatics" are surely not examples of Cartesian passion. Against Lanson, no. 413.


Good piece of work, still occasionally cited.

**Charrin:** see Fabre de Charrin.

**Chartier, Émile:** see Alain.

1511 **Chastain8, Maxime:** "Descartes, introduction à la vie personnelle." Esprit (Paris) 5/58: June 1957, 531-47.

Descartes' personal road as a road for others; to lead men to "sagesse", Descartes uses his Method as a "truc".


1513 —: "L'abbé de Lanion et le problème cartésien de la connaissance d'autrui." RPFE 141: 1951, 228-48. See 244.

1514 —: "Le 'Traité' de l'abbé Macy et la 'vieille réponse' cartésienne au problème de la connaissance d'autrui." RPFE 143: 1953, 76-84. See 244.


Descartes' reasons for his self-chosen “exile” in Holland.


Reprints Paul Janet’s “Descartes, son caractère” (323–31), and A. Chauvin’s “Descartes, son influence littérale” (331–33, a discussion of A. Fouillée’s Descartes.)


Descartes' erroneous interpretation of the law of free fall. See Paul Tannery’s refutation of Cazottes' error concerning Descartes' error, ibid., 334–40.


Transfer of Descartes' remains to the Pantheon.


On Chénier see also Fr. Picavet, Les Idéologues (1891), 408–11.


1525 -: “Le tempérament spirituel de la France dans la philosophie de Descartes.” Rbleue 1921, 733–35.


God the Father and Creator is the center of DM “et non pas comme pour Pascal, le Fils, l’Homme-Dieu, Jésus-Christ” (p. 10). Careful consideration of Descartes’ “Cogitationes privatae”.

1527 -: “Sur quelques points de la philosophie de Descartes qu’on peut estimer acquis.” Cartesio 221–25. 1937. Also in no. 132.

Despite all the critical razzmatazz, 8 points are assured: the sincerity of the man, the unity of his doctrine, God as its true center, D.’s striving for sagesse and beatitude (not mastery of nature), etc.


From the standpoint of D.’s “intuition originelle”, his goal of establishing the unity of knowing has been achieved.


1530 -: “Descartes et le monde moderne.” NL 24 July 1937.


Calls for rectification of the excessively rationalistic interpretations of Laporte and others: Descartes’ rationalism places God, not man in the center of things. He seeks mastery of himself, not of nature.
Chevallier, Abbé C.: “Note sur l’origine tourangelle de Descartes. (Pièces justificatives, 1956 – an XL)” BSA Touraine, 1871–73. [Lanson, no. 4154]


On the “neuralgies” of his system (Bontadini I.)


Comprehensive Polish study of Descartes’ philosophical development to 1637. Tries to uncover by “historical method” the persistent oscillations in Descartes’ thought, with polemics against interpreters who stress the unity of the Cartesian system. Author’s ambitious aim of giving a definitive monograph is only partly achieved (Lubnicki’s review; see 15, p. 106).

Wolzogen przeciw Descartesowi.” Archiwum Komisji do badania historii filozofii w Polsce (Kraków) 1917/1, 81–132.
“Ludwig Wolzogen against Descartes: the connection between Polish Arianism and Western philosophical thought.”

The problem of the “three phases” in Descartes’ philosophy. See also Chmaj’s “Le problème du développement philosophique de Descartes” (Ile Congrès polonais de philosophie, tenu à Varsovie 1927. Rapports et comptes-rendus, Varsovie, 1930, 40–41); and his “L’évolution philosophique de Descartes jusqu’à l’année 1637” (Bull. international de l’Académie des sciences et des lettres, Cracovie, 1929, no. 1–3).

Critical discussion of recent studies of Descartes’ philosophy.

Le cartésianisme en Pologne au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle.” Bull. internat. de l’Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres, classe de

—: “Pojęcie przyczynowości w filozofii Kartezjusza.” Prz 45: 1937, 120–32. The concept of causality in Descartes unites the certitude of inner experience with the stability of the physical order.

For three centuries, Cartesianism furnished blinkers “contre l’angoisse . . . . Le cartésianisme est la philosophie du refoulement,” Descartes “l’homme qui ne fait pas scandale,” the scandal being the abrupt passing from the psychological to the thought level (p. 139).

Psychoanalysis and questionnaire survey (see “Deux enquêtes de l’I.F.U.P.”, ibid., 134–49) combine to produce the desired result, expressed in the title.


Valuable analyses, precise and well documented. Critical use of the literature. Considers psychological elements of propositions; the truth criterion; the problem of transcendence; existential propositions. Its voluntaristic interpretation of judgment in D. is criticized by Kastil, no. 212a.

1550 Christiansen, S. A.: “Oversigt over inholdet af Descartes geometri, grundlaget for den analytisk geometri.” Norsk Matematisk Tidschrift 1933, 64ff. [Survey of Descartes’ Geometrie, basis of analytical geometry.]


Descartes’ influence in Portugal.

Confused and generally trivial remarks on the four rules of method, introducing a long didactic exposition of algebraic functions.


1559 Clère, Jules: Histoire de l’école de La Flèche, depuis sa fondation par Henri IV, jusqu’à sa réorganisation en Prytanée impérial militaire. La Flèche, Jourdain, 1853.


A school lecture. No new material.

1562 Cochet, Marie-Anne: “Les conditions de la liberté dans le système cartésien.” CD I: 147–51. 1937.
These conditions rest on the relation of infinite freedom to finite understanding. A dialectic rhythm “se scande entre le déterminisme de l’action et la liberté de la pensée.”
Sumptuous limited edition (100 copies) of reflections stimulated by some of the papers at the Congress.

Académicien Cochin’s biography of Descartes “n’apporte à l’historien contemporain rien que de déceptions”. (Anon. in RMM 22: 1914, suppl. 1). All of Kant’s “relativism” is already in Descartes’ doubt “et dans les supercheries du démon malin” (author’s notice, PhdG 5: 1913, no. 335).


1566 ---: “Le dernier projet littéraire de Maurice Barrès: Descartes et la princesse Elisabeth.” Figaro, 10 December 1927.


1569 ---: “Descartes in Franeker 1629 – 26 April 1929.” Haagsch Maandblad 1929/1, 624–32.

1570 ---: “La maison Descartes à Amsterdam.” NL, 4 November 1933.


On Descartes’ “scientia mirabilis”. Quotes the Introitus to the Easter Mass, from Psalm 138: “... posuisti super me manum tuam, alleluia; mirabilis facta est scientia tua, alleluia.”

Cohen, Leonora Davidson: see Rosenfield, Leonora Cohen.

Vol. 1 has an "Examen des philosophies de Descartes, Bacon, Comte," etc., with discussion of the beast-machine problem (Descartes, Bayle, Pardies). Antimaterialistic.


Descartes’ ideal society should be “dirigée par une aristocratie intellectuelle, créée sur des bases démocratiques,” perhaps headed by “un roi-philosophe, législateur unique et prévoyant.” Cartesian man a synthesis “de la sagesse antique, de l’artisan moderne et de l’homme créateur” (p. 86).


1582 Commémoration centenaire de la mort de Descartes. RPFE 141: 1951, no. 4-6. See 558.

Commemo: see Láscharis Comneno.


"Most important technical contribution published in Italy, 1900-37," with much reference to "l'immense bibliographie existant sur ce philosophe .... Cet essai mérite d'être signalé d'une façon toute particulière" (Bontadini).


1640 —: "Malebranche ou le cartésien endurci." Revue catholique des idées et des faits 18: 1938, 8-10.
Through Malebranche, Cartesianism became the foundation of the antichristian rationalism of the Enlightenment. Hostile profile of Malebranche, by a Thomist. See Sebba, no. 19, p. 51.


This "phenomenological reading" of Descartes' metaphysics centers upon the distinction between "esse formale" and "esse objectivum." In the Regulae, thinking is measuring and proportioning; in DM, metaphysical problems (doubt) open; in MM Descartes finds the transition from "esse" to "nosse."

1644 Costabel, Pierre: "La controverse Descartes-Roberval au sujet du centre d'oscillation." RScH no. 61: 1951, 74-86. See 369.


The order of proofs is exacter in PP than in DM or MM.

Caloprese, teacher of Gravina and "gran filosofo renatisto" to whom Vico attributed the diffusion of Cartesianism in Naples (Robertson; see 420, p. 25, note 2).


The époche of Carneades and his error theory compared with Cartesian doubt: their character similar, but Carneades derives high probability, not certainty from the époche.


1657 **Crahay, Franz:** "L’argument ontologique chez Descartes et Leibniz et la critique kantienne." RPhL 47: 1949, 458–68.  

1658 **Cramer, Jan Anthony:** Abraham Heidanus en zijn cartesianisme. Dissertation Utrecht, J. van Druten, 1889. 208 p.  
Heidanus, an unquestionably orthodox theologian and one of Descartes’ most faithful followers, the first Cartesian at Leiden.  

Readable, conscientious if unexciting introduction, by a professional philosophical biographer.


1661 **Crombie, A. C.:** "Galileo, Descartes and metaphysics." The Month (London) 191: 1951, 354–63.


Descartes cited and opposed the view that the eternal verities do not depend on their being known by God. Author shows that the adversary referred to is Suárez (Disput. metaph.). Good critical survey of literature on eternal truth in D.

1662 **Cuccaro, Jacinto J.:** "Descartes y Vico." Homenaje 2: 149–71. 1937.  
First part deals with Algazali (following Teicher, see 344), second part with Vico (cogito and gnoseology).

Confronts Thomist and Cartesian cogito, suggests as acceptable: "aliquid cogitans sum." Neothomist viewpoint.

1664 **Cumming, Robert:** "Descartes’ provisional morality." Rmet 9: 1955–56, 207–35. See 245.


Reprint of scattered pieces in Rsyn and NL, including reviews of G. Lewis and F. Alquie, and two Malebranche papers.

Cartesian synthesis remained incomplete, as Gassendi noted; it unduly neglected experimental science; later remedied by Malebranche.

1670 —: “L’invention humaine: Progrès de la connaissance et pressentiment de son pouvoir (Bacon, Descartes, l’Encyclopédie).” Rsyn 74: 1953, 5–23. Also in his: Parti pris, no. 1668, 68–85.

Chapter on “Barocke Philosophie – ein Weg zu Descartes?” (p. 92–124) is an attractively written attempt, by the Viennese critic of Baroque Literature, to understand Descartes through the “Baroque spirit,” without the heavy spade work such an attempt requires. The “universe as a clockwork” idea alone is hardly enough.

“Creative intuition in Descartes’ philosophy and the significance of the idea of God in his epistemology”: the unity of creative intuition guarantees the perfect unity of the system. With the Dream of 1619 Descartes “est en pleine possession de la vision créatrice de son système”; the detailed working-out occupied his life. Bergsonizing analysis, an “objective and impartial historical study” (Lubnicki’s review, see 15, 106–07). See also de Corte, no. 2Ha.

Descartes’ ontological proof and his new concept of God.
On Descartes' proofs of the existence of God by the effects.


Surveying idealist, phenomenalist, realist cogito interpretations, author finds that they can be viewed as successive stages in the development of Descartes' spiritualist idealism. Regarding "intuitus", Bergson's "attention à la vie" has its parallel in Descartes. As to will, voluntarism imposes itself upon rationalism in D.'s system. See also 252.


Attempts to find the root of the system and to determine its historical moment.


Descartes' methodological postulates.


Brief note calling attention to Descartes' anticipating William James on several points.


The experimental spirit of Pascal versus Descartes' extreme confidence in human reason (Pos-Steenberger, Rsyn 1937, p. 113).

d'Alverny: see Alverny.

d'Argenson: see Argenson.

Deals with the principles of Jesuit education, the ratio studiorum which governed La Flèche, etc.

Finds in Cajetan and Duns Scotus "plus qu'une ébauche de la théorie de l'être objectif" (p. 467, against Gilson who in his Commentary to DM, no. 83, 318-23, stresses the originality of D.'s conception.)


Dal Verme: see Verme.


Remarks on Descartes on the tercentenary of his death.

Damodos (1679-1732), a Ionian islander who studied at Padua, philosophized "still on traditional (i.e. Aristotelian) lines," but "a section on the passions of the soul is obviously Cartesian in inspiration" (G. P. Henderson in PhQ 5: 1955, p. 159).


Daubrée, Auguste: "Descartes, l’un des créateurs de la cosmologie et de la géologie." Jl. des savants, March-April, 1880. 27 p.


—: "Le rationalisme de Descartes." In: Cahiers du Cercle Descartes (see 516), 6: 1937, 5–33.


Introduction (7–32) argues that Descartes' science cannot be separated from his philosophy.

Debrou, Dr.: "Le cartésianisme de la marquise de Sévigné et de son entourage." SAg Orléans. Mémoires 26: 1886, 1–36.

No new sources.

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de Bruyne: see Bruyne. de Carvalho, J.: see Carvalho. de Carvalho, R.: see Ramos de C. de Charrin: see Fabre de Ch. de Corte: see Corte. de Coya: see Garcia Tuduri de C. de Dainville: see Dainville. De Feo: see Feo. de Féret: see Kampé de F. de Finance: see Finance.


de Gallagher: see Parks de G. de Giuli: see Giuli. de Groot: see Groot. de Haan: see Bierens de Haan.


1703 —: "Le libre arbitre chez Descartes." RdePh 31: 1924, 261–88.


1705 —: "Note sur la preuve ontologique de Descartes." FC Lille. Mémoires et travaux 32: 1927, 159–67. (Mélanges de philologie et d'histoire publ. à l'occasion du cinquantenaire de la Faculté des lettres de l'Université catholique de Lille.)

de la Harpe: see Harpe. de la Meurthe: see Boulay de la M. de Lanesseau: see Lanesseau.


de Launay: see Launay.


1707 Delavaud, L.: [Note in:] Corr 10 October 1913.

About an attempt by Dr. Paul Richer to authenticate the skull in the Musée de l'homme (Paris), supposedly that of Descartes, by comparing its measurements with those of a drawing of Descartes' skull based on the portrait by Frans Hals. Richer found a close correspondence in these measurements. See 3068.


For Descartes, Reason does not establish the a priori conditions of objective cognition, but presupposes Being. Descartes' gnoseology is a far cry from Berkeley's "esse est percipi," Kant's "gesetzgebende Vernunft," or Fichte's creative activity. Critique of Natorp’s idealistic interpretation (see 221). See also 14 (Olgiati, Cartesio, p. 188).


1712 —: "Descartes et la pensée classique." Revue des Français 31 mai 1914. Also in his: Figures (see 134).


1714 Delbos, Yvon: Allocution. BSPF 44/1: 1950, 39–42.

del Busto: see Busto. dell'Oro: see Maros dell'Oro. Del Noce: see Noce.


Distinguishes mathematics as study of numerical relations and geometric properties (rudimentary physics) from mathematical physics which deals with all other relations between bodies. Useful collection of texts on D.'s concept of mathematics.

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De Pesloúan: see Lucas de P.

—: Oeuvres inédites de Descartes .... par Louis Alexandre comte Foucher de Careil. 2 vols. 1859–60. See 75.


—: The philosophical works of Descartes. Rendered into English by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross. 2nd ed. 1931. See 77.


—: Correspondance avec Arnauld et Morus, ed. Geneviève Lewis. 1953. See 84.


Excellent selection from D.'s vast correspondence, with biographical index of correspondents and detailed "table analytique."


—: [Dioptrique]. G. Leisegang, Descartes' Dioptrik. 1943. See 87 and 2494.

—: Discours de la méthode. Texte et commentaire par Étienne Gilson. 2nd ed. 1925. See 83.

—: Discurso sôbre o método, tr. Miguel Lemos. Apostolado positivista do Brazil. 1896. See 146.


1740c —: Meditationes de prima philosophia, ed. Geneviève Lewis. 1946. See 89.

1741 —: La naissance de la paix. See 78. See also 1072, 2890.


1746 —: Regulae ad directionem ingenii, ed. G. Le Roy. 1933. See 92.
1747 —: Regulae ad directionem ingenii, ed. H. Gouhier. 2nd ed., 1946. See 92.

1747a Descartes à l'occasion du tricentenaire de sa mort. RIP 1950. See 557.

1747b Descartes à l'occasion du troisième centenaire . . . . RPFE 132: 1937. See 536.

1747c Descartes. 31 Octobre 1937. Ville de la Haye. See 528.

1747d Descartes. Cahiers de Royaumont, 1937. See 42.


1747h Descartes. Homenaje. Sante Fé. 1937. See 537.

1748 Descartes à Châtellerault. NL, 27 May 1937. [Celebrations.]

1748a Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais 1950. See 38.

1748b René Descartes et le siècle de Louis XIV en Touraine. Tours, 1937. See 538.


1750 “Descartes-i, dhene.” [Descartes et nous.] Perpj 2: 1937, 137–40, 200–03. [In Albanian.]

1750a Descartes, par M. Leroy et al. 1937. See 37.


Deslandes: see Couanier Deslandes. De Urmeneta: see Urmeneta.


Alleged relationship between the two philosophers: Although there probably is no historical ‘progress’ in philosophy, “en revanche, il y a des ‘gestes’ philosophiques constamment à retrouver et à reprendre” (282). What unites D. and H. is the conviction of the seriousness of philosophical responsibility, rather than community of doctrine. References to important earlier studies.


Brief critical appraisals of important contributions to Cartesian studies.

1758 Devaux, Philippe: “Descartes philosophe.” Combat (Bruxelles) II: 1937, 4. [Brie 11487]


His regimen for longevity. How he faced death.


1762 —: “Notes bibliographiques sur le cartésianisme hollandais.” In: Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais, 1950, 261–300. See 6 and 38.


Inaugural lecture on 20th century French Descartes criticism; Hamelin, Laporte, Gueroult.

1766 Dickstein, S.: “Czy Karteziusz był plagiatorem?” Wszechświat (Warszawa) 1883, no. 28. [Bar]
The distinguished Polish mathematician discusses the question whether Descartes was a plagiarist.


Beeckman’s share in the development of the laws of free fall, anticipating Galilei. See 363.


Météores. Dioptrique etc. as examples of Cartesian method in action.


Brief historical exposition of the D.-Pascal controversy in its scientific and personal aspects.

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1774 -: "La méthode et les essais de Descartes." In: Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais (see 38), 1950, 21–44.


Solid, factual popular introduction to Descartes' philosophy. Neothomist viewpoint. See 152.

Competent popular biography. Catholic viewpoint.


1781 Domela Nieuwenhuis, Ferdinand Jacob: Commentatio de Renati Cartesii commerçio cum philosophis Belgicis .... Lovanii, 1827. 115 p. See also 458.


Descartes vindicated: There is no circle.

Abstract of a paper taking issue with Th. Reid and N. Kemp Smith over D.’s theory of the perception of material objects.
1786 Doniselli, Casimiro: *Sulle funzioni della coclea: La spirale di Cartesio e la coclea organo aritmetico*. Bologna, Gamberini & Parmeggiani, 1911. 5 p.

1787 Dorner, Otto: *Die Rolle der Erfahrung in Descartes' Naturaufassung*. Programm Altessen, 1913.

1788 Doumic, René: “Les fêtes de Descartes à Amsterdam.” RDM 1 novembre 1920 (Per. 6, v. 60), 151–56.
Celebrations held on October 16, 1919 in Amsterdam.


1790 —: “Zu René Descartes' cogito ergo sum.” *AGP* 32 (ns 25): 1919–20, 45–55. [Descartes, St. Anselm, St. Augustine].


The unity of philosophical intent and scientific execution in Descartes' physics, and the viability of his findings.

Interesting attempt to determine with precision how D. arrived at his laws of collision, and to interpret the difficulties of doing so.


Somewhat weak analysis of Socratic and Cartesian inquiry as the two main departures in Western philosophizing which cannot leave Christian philosophy indifferent. Redeeming closing pages on the Catholic position which seeks to transcend rationalism by separating wisdom and intelligence; P. Dubarle earnestly recognizes the urgency and the difficulty of reconciling them again.


Attempts to minimize the contradictions between Descartes and Comte: “Réveil nécessaire de l'esprit positif, synthétique et cartésien, dans l'expérience scientifique contemporaine.”


Descartes figures only in the title of this note on a recently edited work of Montesquieu, said to show Gassendi's influence.


Elisabeth chose William Penn as her last “directeur spirituel.”


Romanticized, lively sketch of “Le maître à penser” (p. 95–138), by an avowed “agnostique respectueux et attentif” (p. 113). D. the physicist “s’est condamné . . . . au pensum métaphysique” (p. 125), though the essence of Cartesianism lies in the Method which is “un instrument de science, et ce n’est donc pas un évangile de sagesse” (p. 135). Pleasant way to meet D.


“Critique religieuse d’inspiration catholique” (Pos-Steenbergen.)


Definitive study of the controversy between Voetius and Descartes from the viewpoint of authority of the School vs. personal inquiry. “La dissertation du jeune théologien reste d’une lecture captivante” (Dibon’s review, see 6, 278–80).


General critique of Descartes’ philosophy as mechanistic. [PhdG 2: 1910, no. 566]


“Tout l’effort de la philosophie moderne a échoué parce qu’à la suite de Descartes on a appliqué à la philosophie une méthode qui ne convient qu’à la science” – speculation operating ‘more geometrico’ on ideas unrelated to experience and not even remotely resembling a metaphysics (p. 83, and see PhdG 3: 1911).

Reviews: Garrigou-Lagrange in Rethom 20, 233; Anon. in RMM 19, suppl. 1; F. Blanché in RSPT 61, 97; A. Penjon in RPFE 72: 1911/2, 186–95.


Highly original Descartes appraisal by an Ingenieur général de l’air, who not unexpectedly leaves behind “l’énorme bagage littéraire” of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics etc., to show the “pouvoir magnétique” (“metapsychique”) of Descartes the scientist as “théoréticien, expérimentateur, réalisateur.” Succint survey of Descartes’ scientific work, item by item. Traces the eclipse of this scientific “génie sans équipe,” the 19th century scientific renaissance, and the 20th century “apotheose” of his ideas.


ch. 13, 318–23 (Univ. libre de Bruxelles, Travaux de la faculté de philosophie et des lettres).

Cartesianism an end product of the classical belief in the uniqueness of values. The modern mind breaks away from it to move towards pluralism.

1823 Durděk, Josef: O významu filosofie Descartesovy . . . . v Praze, Otto, 1897. 16 p. (Sbírská přednášek a rozprav, ed. J. Goll, ser. 4, no. 7).
Commemorative address and congratulatory telegrams on the occasion of the 1896 Prague D. celebration.


E

On the complex position of the “moderns” and the controversies in Toscana, Naples (Tommaso Cornelio) and Padua (Elia Astorini).

(On the German Johann Jakob Waldschmidt.)

Important study of Maurice Blondel, Father Laberthonniere, Pierre Duhem and many other modern French philosophers and historians of philosophy and science, who played a notable role in the shaping of the modern Pascal and Descartes images.

Finds no circularity in Descartes’ argument.

Descartes’ cosmogony (“Eine notwendige Tat”), its predecessors and its influence to the time of Kant. Author’s notice in PhdG 1: 1908–09, n. 610. [Rsyn 1937 lists author erroneously as “Berhardt.”]


Francesco de Toledo and late Scholasticism in general influenced Descartes through his study at La Flèche. See also 263 (Gilen).


Discusses Husserl, Maine de Biran, Dilthey, Scheler and the reality problem: doubt and solipsism.


Descartes’ proofs of dualism are reassuringly perennial; they guarantee that Western philosophizing will retain its spirituality and independence.


The French Preface to the 1647 edition of MM (“Le Libraire au Lecteur”) was approved by Descartes and is therefore authoritative; however, ever since V. Cousin’s D. edition it has customarily been replaced by the Latin Preface of 1641. Interesting sidelights on D. editions.


Nicely balanced, firm appraisal of common points of departure and basic differences.


1834 Ellend, Josef: (Descartes' system of the universe). Athenaeum no. 21: 1912, 111–118. In Hungarian. [Not traceable]


Cordeiro as example of the development of Scholastic philosophy towards mechanism in D.'s time. Cordeiro claims that material form is something new, produced by efficient causes not as "ens quod" but as "ens quo." [Bsig 10: 1955, 11608.]


1842 Epelbaum, Jacob: "El agnosticismo de Descartes y su sumisión a lo infinito." Homenaje, 2: 311–33. 1937. See 152.


Introduction to a paper which was apparently not completed.


1846 Ernst, Christian: “Hielt Descartes die Tiere für bewusstlos?” AGPs II: 1908, 433ff.


1847a Escritos en honor de Descartes (La Plata, 1938). See 39.


1853a Études cartésiennes (Congrès Descartes, 1937). See 36.

1853b Études sur Descartes (RMM 1937.) See 533.

1854 "Extraits des manuscrits de M. Phélipe Beaulieux sur la famille Descartes." BSA Touraine 1871-73, 1897-98. [Lanson 4153]

F


1858 Fabro, C.: "Cartesianismo e neoscolastica." Bolletino filosofico (Roma) 4: 1938, 189-96. Discussion of CAR TESIO, see 35.


1864 "La famille Descartes en Bretagne." BSA Bretagne 1876. [Lanson 4155]


Thomist of purest observance treats Cartesianism as rationalist virus infection. D. may have been a Christian and a philosopher, but was not a Christian philosopher, whatever his intentions.

1866a —: La crise de la certitude. Paris, Berche, 1908.

On Cartesian doubt.


On Descartes, Mersenne, Nicéron. See also ser. 4. [Cordie]


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1876 *Féret, P.:* "L'aristotelisme et le cartésianisme dans l'Université [de Paris] au XVe siècle." APC April 1903. ()

*Féret:* see Kampe de Féret.


Definitions of philosophy from Plato to Balmes.

1879 *Ferretti, Gino:* "Descartes et le problème: Le monde n'est-il un rêve?" CD 1: 61-68. 1937.

The "Dream of Descartes" is linked to his antithesis of imaginary dream world vs. intellectual reality, to his formulation of doubt, and to his attitude towards imagination.


1882 —: Progrès vers l'unité rationnelle; réflexions proposées d'après les œuvres de Descartes et d'Ampère. Ch. 6: La cosmologie méthodique. Ulman, 1954, 265-306. [Revision of Ch. 6 of his: De Descartes à Ampère, see 370.]


*Feuillet*: See Biot et Feuillets.

Routine piece, except for an interesting appraisal of D.’s personality from the style of DM (381–3).


A comparison of the two ontological proofs shows a wholly different philosophical spirit despite obvious technical similarities.


Author’s remarks about the antecedents of the cogito “achieve a broader basis only by virtue of the fact that he does not stick to his subject” (Erdmann, see 1844.)


Descartes the architect building a church to the greater glory of God, always refraining from endangering faith, shoring it up by his metaphysics.


The Cartesian model is too simple for the modern scientist: physics cannot be mapped onto mathematics as geometry can be mapped onto algebra. D.'s metaphysical geometricism of extension plunges into depths not needed to constitute science even in his own time. Sharp attack on Jaspers. No evaluation of the Baroque aspect of Descartes.


Jaime Balmes’ “excessive eulogies” addressed to Descartes should not conceal the profound philosophical differences between them. Balmes did not see D. as a rationalist but as a kindred Catholic apologist. Good brief comparison of their thought.


Focht, Ivo: “O historijskom značenju Descartesovog učenja o metodu.” Studentski list (Zagreb) 6, no. 9: April 1950, 4–5.

The historical significance of D.'s doctrine of method.


Cartesianism moving towards Spinozism.

Foncin, P.: “A propos d’un autographe de Descartes et d’un document inédit sur le cogito ergo sum.” MSAS Carcassonne, 1884, 367ff. [Alquié in no. 149; Lanson in no. 4167 gives the publication date as 1879.]

A copy of PP and Specimina, 1644 edition, at Carcassonne, dedicated to Ogier by "Des Cartis" (sic), has a ms. note of Ogier saying that the cogito is taken from Eusebius.


Cogito and cartesian circle: Kant, Maine de Biran, Liard.

Also: Hommage à Descartes. Poitiers, 1937 (see 531), 47-60.

On the difference between Cartesian and Thomist ethics.

1914 Forest, Ceslas: "Le cartésianisme et l'orientation de la science moderne."


Rich, vigorous but sparsely documented work. Very brief treatment of Descartes himself, enlivened by quoting the characteristic judgment of his contribution to physiology by Nicolaus Stensen (1638-1686).


Cousin’s report deals with Foucher de Careil’s “Réfutation de Spinoza par Leibniz.”


Introduction (7–45) and correspondence.

Rapidly moving, lively introduction to Descartes, popular without being fuzzy, with an unconcealed “parti pris” for Descartes and some sideswipes at Pascal. Kant was the “grand continuateur et renovateur du cartésianisme au XIXe siècle,” and Schopenhauer recognized the cogito as equivalent with his “Welt als meine Vorstellung” (p. 198).

Fouilléé’s reply to Bouillier’s sharp critique (ibid., 287–97) of his book, regarding the affinity of Cartesian and modern philosophy, esp. Schopenhauer.


Fouquer de Jonquieres, Ernest: see Jonquieres, Ernest.


Discussion of Descartes and Cartesianism, following and critically appraising Bouillier’s Histoire du cartésianisme.
“L’honnête homme” and the classicist milieu of the 17th c.

1930a *Franeker.* Descartes exhibition 1929. See 505.


18th century philosophy is linked to Descartes by the tendency to subordinate knowledge to practical ends, and by its interest in medicine, technology, man and his needs, (BP 1937/2.)

Well-written, briskly debunking piece of popularisation which could have been very good if the author had made at least his basic facts complete and right.

1936 *Freud, Sigmund:* “Brief an Maxime Leroy über den Traum des Descartes.”

Commonly cited as starting point of the reappraisal of Descartes’ relationship to Scholasticism, but see 214 (Koyré, German ed., 6–7.) See also Lewkowitz, 2544.

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1938 Friedmann, Georges: 'Un prince des temps modernes.' Eur 44, no. 175: 15
July 1937, 297–311, also in: Descartes (see 37).
Descartes as a rallying point when man "seems to be possessed by a kind of rage against himself."


1941a Frolov, Iu.: "Fiziologicheskoe učenie Dekarta i teorija uslovnykh refleksov Pavlova." Pod znamenem Marksizma, no. 8, 1937.
The physiological doctrine of D. and Pavlov's theory of the conditioned reflex. [In Russian.]


Chiefly on Malebranche's influence upon Berkeley, with scattered comment and references regarding the title theme.

1944 -: "Descartes y la filosofía inglesa del siglo XVII." Escritos 61–74. 1937.
Tries to reveal a latent Cartesianism in English philosophy in the second half of the century, carrying into the beginning of the 18th c., the formative period of Berkeley.


“Mit Descartes begann das Sterben Gottes, aber gleichzeitig das Sterben des Menschen.”


Useful for Gadoffre’s 44-page introduction, stressing the “trompe l’œil” character of D.’s clarity, and the notes (75–94), especially on the chronology of DM.


Gallagher, Mercedes Parks de: see Parks de Gallagher.


Identical with Galli’s Studi (no. 1960), except that the last chapter (Il problema dell’errore) is lacking.


Review article on Carbonara's "Circolo viziooso." See 205.


D.'s chief concern was philosophical, not scientific, least of all ethical (in ethics and politics, "non fu un eroe, Cartesio": his strength lay elsewhere.) His meditative inclination explains the "larvatus prodeo" as well as the "bene vixit qui bene latuit." Commemorative 1950 lecture.


Pt. 2 criticizes Descartes' method in science for ignoring the principle of empirical verification.


On Calvin's Institutions and Descartes' Traité des passions.


Descartes and the renaissance of philosophy. The problem of method in the 17th century. Descartes' method, metaphysics, physics, physiology, psychology. Descartes and religion. Descartes and literature; his place in modern science. [BP 38/2.]

247


**Garcès Castiella**: see Castiella.


The other “models” are Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, Kant, Husserl and Heidegger. **Reviews:** L. van Hecht in RPhL 50: 1952, 350–51; J. Barrio in RevF 12: 1953, 310–33.


Man does not need God to reinforce the certitude of his existence: from Aristotle through Descartes to Heidegger. [BAn 1953, no. 78.]


Existence of more than one independent world. Distance and contiguity in Balmes and Descartes (his concept of space.)


Late and Neo-Thomist critiques of the cogito from Goudin (1724) to Gredt (1922), with author’s own objections against transition from thought to existence.


Examines, among other themes, the divergence between Descartes and Spinoza. [Bsig 1960, 16357]


The “mask” of Descartes, Mona Lisa of philosophy.


On the “forgotten” Descartes monument in The Hague. See also Rsyn 1937, p. 112 (nos. 2, 4, 5, 6) on the action taken.

Useful for the Schelling references.

On “logocratic idealism” which makes, not Being, but concepts “den Gegenstand des Bewusstseins.” Sees in Descartes’ Dream an attack of acute tuberculosis releasing a crisis of liberation from Jesuitism. Repeats Schelling’s Descartes criticism. Cartesianism a philosophy destructive to family, government, fatherland.

Lumen naturale in Descartes and Locke (who is not an opponent). Hobbes’ relationship to Locke regarding knowledge of nature.

1994a Genève. See: Catalogue de la collection de portraits, Bibliothèque de Genève, 1938 (see 1492.)


“. . . . . Descartes es idealmente posterior a Aristóteles. El pensamiento moderno nace y se sostiene en la negación de la Metafísica, hasta anularse finalmente en la afirmación de su propia negación” (p. 75). Descartes “el momento crítico” in Western conscience.


250


First of three Cartesian studies by the Marsilius of Padua scholar and editor. Distinguishes (a) methodology from metaphysical argument, (b) analytical from synthetic demonstration. Conclusion: no circularity.


Examines Descartes' definitions of ‘clare et distincte’ without finding conclusive criteria for determining what is so perceived; hence D.’s difficulties in distinguishing between ideas and acts of perception.


Thoughtful analysis of the “ego” in the “cogito.” Descartes does not clearly answer the question: “Wie können wesensverschiedene Bewusstseinsregungen eine substanzielle Daseinseinheit, die Seele, bilden?” (416).
Valuable study of Descartes' epistemology.

“Penetrating, though with an alarming lack of cohesion” (Bontadini I.) See also the detailed discussion of this book which, with the work of de Giuli and Ruggiero, marks the Italian Descartes revival of the 1930's, in Bontadini II (Cartesio, 87–92; his: Studi, 48–55).


2033 —: “Météores cartésiens et météores scolastiques.” RNS 22: 1920, 358–84; 23: 1921, 73–84. Also in no. 165 (2028).


2038 —: “Projet d’un commentaire historique du Discours de la méthode.” BSFP 24: December 1924, 135–38, 150. See 83.


2040 —: “Recherches sur la formation du système cartésien. I. La critique des formes substantielles.” RHP 1929, 113–64. Also in no. 165 (2028).


Announces Gilson's break with D.: "cogito ergo res sunt" is the Cartesian ruin of Scholastic realism. Gabriel Picard's Le problème critique fondamental (Beauchesne, 1930) is cited as cartesianizing Scholasticism.

2042 —: “Le Traité des passions de Descartes inspira-t-il la Phèdre de Racine?” ML 15 April 1939.

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Gironella: see Roig Gironella.


2052 —: “Rassegna cartesiana.” RF 26: 1935, 258–64.

Marcel, Garin, Lachièze-Rey, Gouhier, Campo, Lantrúa, Olgiati, Segond, Mouy, Bachelard.

2053a Le glaneur châtelleraudais, 1937. See 518.


Remarkable sketch of Descartes, anticipating Péguy: "Das Leben dieses feinsinnigen Mannes wie auch seine Lehre wird kaum begreiflich, wenn man sich ihn nicht immer zugleich als französischen Edelmann denkt."


2059 —: "Descartes y la pedagogia." Actas del primer congreso nacional de filosofía (Mendoza, Argentina), 1949, 3: 1816-25. See 265.

2060 —: "La evidencia en la etica cartesiana." RF Chile 1: 1950, 540-44.


2064 Golliet, P.: "Le problème de la méthode chez Descartes." RSCh no. 61; 1951, 56-73.

Genesis of D.'s development of his method in "moments décisifs qui ont été ceux de la maturation et de l'explosion d'une découverte" (p. 67).
Gomes dos Santos: see Maurício Gomes dos Santos.


2069 —: "La primera prueba cartesiana de la existencia de Dios." P 7: 1950, 73–103.

Thomist critique.


Valuable commemorative lecture on the problem of freedom and reason.


—: "L’itinéraire ontologique de D." RFNS 26: 1934, 259–76. Reprinted in no. 169 (2074), Ch. 3; concluding section expanded into Ch. 4.


—: "Descartes et la vie morale." RMM 44: 1937, 165–97. Reprinted in no. 169 (2074), Ch. 5; conclusion expanded into Ch. 6.

—: "L’esprit de la métaphysique cartésienne." RHPH 5: 1937, 137–44. [Radio talk.]

—: "Le grand trompeur et la signification de la métaphysique cartésienne." CD 1: 69–73. 1937.

Summarizes Gouhier’s argument.

—: "Le malin génie dans l’itinéraire cartésien." RdePh 37 (ns 6): 1937, 1–21. Reprinted in no. 169 (2074), Ch. 4.


—: "L’homme cartésien." Ren no. 2: 1941, 119–130.


Profond study of Cartesian doubt, circle, cogito. Concludes that "aucun existant n'échappe au contrôle du doute méthodique" any more than any axiom, notion or verity other than "les principes inscrits dans l'existence même" (i.e. propositions about Nothingness.)


2099 — "Descartes a-t-il rêvé?" RIP 10: 1956, 203–08. Reprinted in no. 96 (2076), Ch. 2.


Continuation of the controversy with Gueroult over the ontological argument (see 270). Gueroult opens the discussion with a defense of his interpretation "selon l'ordre des raisons."
Le refus du symbolisme dans l’humanisme cartésien.” Afif 1958, no. 2-3 (Umanesimo e simbolismo), 65–74. See 268a.


Concludes that in Descartes intuition and induction are the same, signifying the totality of thought in different degree but without contradiction: induction of the imperfect, the created, resolves itself in the intuition of the perfect, the uncreated. See 2104.


—: Interpretación existencial de la duda cartesiana. Córdoba (Argentina), Universidad, 1937. 21 p.


Valuable study by the eminent Munich medievalist, with an unpublished “Judicium theologicum de philosophia Maignani coordinata per Johannem Saguens,” partly reprinted and critically appraised.


P. Agostino Molin (O.C.), i.e. Giacomo de Violis (died 1840), his teacher P. Filiberto Perricone (O.D.), and other eminent clerics at Padua formed a philosophical circle devoutly critical of Scholasticism, though the epithet "Cartesian" seems misplaced. Author cites unpublished mss.


—: "Le lieu de naissance de Descartes." Illustration (Paris) 197: 1937, August 21, 531–32.
            Reply to J. Rondeau, no. 3111.


            Descartes, Luther, Rousseau, Renan.


—: "El problema de Descartes y la experiencia." Homenaje 1: 203–42. 1937.
            Descartes’ methodological problem: "a encontrar un órgano racional que le permitiese llegar a conocer plenamente lo natural" (209). Detailed analysis of experience in the Regulae.


            On Gassendi’s Syntagma philosophicum: impossibility of metaphysics as a science; his controversies with Fludd, Cherbury, and particularly Descartes over this proposition.


Malaval (Malleval), born 1627, blinded at age 9.


“Belle étude compréhensive qui envisage la pensée de Descartes dans ses rapports avec la Scolastique” [Pos-Steenbergen.]


D.’s life and personality. [In Russian.]


D.’s concept of God. [In Russian.]

The creed of a 17th c. Faust. [In Russian.]

2135b —: “Problema svobodi voli v filosofii Dekarta.” VFP 1914, 363–83.
The problem of free will in D.’s philosophy. [In Russian.]


Güel, José Bertran: see Bertran Güell.


Leading the demolition experts in levelling Becker’s Heavenly City, Guerlac stresses the persistence of Cartesianism in the course of the 18th century as against the fluctuation in the fortunes of Newtonism. Good bibliographical notes.

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From Descartes, there derived crude materialism, and “a Neo-Epicurean revival” in thinkers of the second half of the century.


—: “Observations sur ce mémoire” (i.e., Émile Baas: La critique leibnizienne de la physique de Descartes, no. 1102). BFL Strasbourg, v. 11, November 1932. See 317.

—: “L’économie et les fins essentielles de la doctrine cartésienne.” BFL Strasbourg, 1933.


—: “L’Ars combinatoria et les méthodes de Leibniz et de Descartes.” BFL Strasbourg 1935.


On the systematic relationship of the two proofs, a posteriori and a priori, in Descartes, refuting Kant’s criticism, with considerable discussion. See 270a.


Monographic treatment of the problem of the relation between Malebranche’s and Berkeley’s theories of perception, ideas, God, and the order of nature, with references to Descartes and Cartesian thought in general. See Sebba, no. 19, p. 60.


Parallel between générosité in D.'s ethics and the cogito in his epistemology: as the self in the cogito grasps the certainty criterion, so it may freely recognize its own intrinsic value and become capable of ordering all other values. This recognition is the basis of générosité which recognizes man’s autonomy and God’s independent free will, and becomes the basis of practical knowledge in its entire latitude. Review: Cassirer, no. 5, 50-51.


Rich material, including unpublished Jungius fragments, etc.


Gutzeit, Berthold: Descartes' angeborene Ideen verglichen mit Kants Anschauungs- und Denkformen a priori. Bromberg, Programm des Städtischen Realgymnasiums, 1883. 29 p. [Col.]


H

Haan: see Bierens de Haan.


—: “A Cartesianismuz és a magyar szellemiség.” Pannonia (Budapest) 1937/7–10, 222–30. See 469. [Cartesianism and the spirit of Hungary].


— and G. R. T. Ross (translators): The philosophical works of Descartes, 1931. See 77.


2187 Harris, Errol E.: Nature, mind and modern science. London and New York, 1954. 455 p. (Muirhead's Library of Philosophy). “The Cartesian dichotomy” (pt. 3, ch. 6, sec. 2, p. 120ff.) Attempts a critique and refutation of neopositivism based on a survey of what may be accepted as definitive gain from past philosophizing. The contradiction that material objects have a causal relationship to mind though mind and matter are totally different and separate is avoided by Descartes “only at some considerable cost; but Locke embraces it without the slightest qualm.”


Francisco Romero criticizes Cartesian reason as immanent and leading to a concept of matter that excludes becoming. Descartes insists on clarity as if reason were omnipotent. See 316a.


Ch. 2 on Romero and Cartesian reason, incorporating no. 2188.


The “simple natures” of Regula XII become the innate ideas of Descartes' later works.
Hartmann, Nikolai: See: Springmeyer on res simplices (no. 3338), quoting Hartmann's Ontologie, v. 3 and his: Aufbau der realen Welt, Einleitung; ch. 1; ch. 16.

Hartmann seems to assume that Descartes can simply deduce "das 'concretum' .... aus den vorerkannten und vorgegebenen Prinzipien," which reduces his Descartes critique to a rejection of "aprioristic-deductive ontology."


Rejecting the usual form of the circularity claim, author sees in the "circle" "non pas certes l'élaboration .... rigoureuse d'une philosophie transcendentale de l'esprit," but an anticipation of it.

—: "Réflexions d'un clerc sur un congrès de philosophie" [Congrès Descartes.] NRT 8: 1937, 1116-22.


Heinrich, Wł: “O przedmiotowości u Karzezjusza i u sofistów.” Sprawozdania z Czynności i Posiedzeń Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, Kraków, 1920, no. 1. [Bar]


“Antrittsvorlesung” (Leipzig) gives the prevalent view of the time: Descartes’ “morale provisoire” is scientifically worthless though humanly respectable, while the “Lettres sur la morale” are refurbished Stoicism, or what Descartes took Stoicism to be, since he knew the Stoics only at second-hand.
—: "Pfalzgräfin Elisabeth und Descartes." Historisches Taschenbuch, ser. 6, 5: 1886, 257–304. See 117.


On the distinctio rationis between substance and its attributes.


Portrait, not at the Tours or BN exhibitions of 1937, in the Musée des Beaux-arts de Tours, the original of the drawing by Jacquet which Ch. Adam had made for AT, later "lost." Also on the Tours portrait of Descartes as a young man.


Henriot, E.: "Descartes, Galilée et le Discours de la méthode." Temps, 2 December 1924.

—: "Des lettres inédites de Descartes." Temps, 9 February 1926. [L. Roth, Correspondence of D. and Huygens.]


—: "Descartes, sa fille et l'automate." Temps, 23 November 1937.


Helped initiate the revaluation of D.'s relationship to Scholasticism.


Critique of modern refutations of Descartes' dualism, including that of Ludwig Klages. No proper analysis.


A simplified, yet useful view of the effects upon Protestant theology of the changing philosophical climate of the 17th and 18th century. The very emphasis (Malebranche and Spinoza rather than Descartes; Derham, Wittich, the Cambridge Platonists, Poiret, etc.) is revealing. See 435a.


Catholic apologist, argues Descartes' Catholic orthodoxy. Varet (p. 393) characterizes von Hock as "pro-Günther."


Contains a discussion of the cogito and related problems in St. Thomas, with reference to Descartes.


Descartes viewed in Kantian retrospect. Written before AT.


French influence upon Swedish biological research before Linné, with notes on the development of Cartesianism in Sweden.


2238b  *Homenaje a Descartes* (Chile, 1950). See 544.


2239a  *Hommage à Descartes*. Poitiers, 1950. See 553.

2239b  *Hommage à Descartes*. Poitiers 1937. See 531.

2239c  *Hommage solennel*. BSFP 1950. See 559.


2239e  *Hommes à René Descartes*. Eur 15 July 1937. See 527.


The “critical problem” (“Philosophie als Denken des Denkens”) developed by analysis of Descartes (77–102) and Kant. Cartesian certitude, method, lumen naturale, universal science, “Systemlogik.” Rather far from the texts and vaguely general, the study manages to show old results in a somewhat different light.


2243  Hotho, Heinrich Gustav: *De philosophia cartesiana*. Berlin, 1826.


Within Cartesian method, enumeration represents the concern with the concrete as it guarantees that a scientific system exactly reproduces the reality of things. Good study of Regulae.


—: "Le cartésianisme et le mouvement des idées philosophiques au XVIIIe siècle." RPh ns 5: 1937, 121–36. ("Causerie au radio.")


Of the two paths opened up by DM, "the one leads, by way of Berkeley and Hume, to Kant and Idealism; while the other leads, by way of De La Mettrie to Priestley, to modern physiology and Materialism" (p. 338). Interesting excursus into "this Extra-christian world" (p. 342) in which the scientist Huxley happily follows both of Descartes' paths at once, and with much spirit.


2256 —: "On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history." (1874). In his: Methods and results, 1894, 199–250. (Collected essays, v. 1).

Descartes anticipated Davis Hartley's fundamental conceptions about the physiology of the nervous system; but Huxley shrinks from the bête-machine doctrine; "considering the terrible practical consequences to domestic animals which might ensue from any error on our part, it is as well to err on the right side, if we err at all" (p. 237), a very English reaction.


Iberico, Mariano: "Breves reflexiones sobre el racionalismo de Descartes." Escritos 123–26, 1937.


"La realidad universal no se deja aprehender en solas dós líneas rígidas, ni en solo centro monístico, ni en meras tensiones dinámicas." [BP 1938/2.]


Descartes' TP can stand comparison with late 19th c. theories; even his contradictions help refute William James.

Review: Anon. in RMM 4: 1896, supplement 1, p. 7.


Ivánka, Endre von [Andreas de Ivánka]: “Die Stellung des Cartesianismus in der Geschichte der Philosophie.” Cartesio 473–85. 1937. Rejects the view of Descartes as father of “modern philosophy.” Descartes is to Kant as Plato is to Aristotle. His merit lies not in his system but in his method which alone has remained effective.


Jacob, S. M.: Notes on Descartes’ Règles pour la direction de l’esprit. London, The Author (also: International Book Club), 1948. 35 p. Comforting conclusion: “The lasting good done by Descartes the mathematician will far exceed any harm done by Descartes the philosopher” (p. 35).


Interesting confrontation of Descartes' biology with modern findings; D.’s illustrations and modern photographs.

2282 —: “La psicología de Descartes a través de tres siglos.” Anales del Instituto de psicología (Buenos Aires) 2: 1938, 297–328.


2283a Janovskaja, S.: “'Geometrija' Dekarta: K 300-letiju so vremeniy vykhoda v svet.” Front nauki i tekniki, no. 6, 1937.
On D.'s Géométrie. Tercentenary paper. [In Russian.]


Extremely detailed international survey by countries. “Der philosophische Jesuiten-stil” of the time: a healthy, critical, conservative eclecticism, far from rigid Scholasticism. Notes its lack of constructive contributions, its quickness in introducing new thought. Valuable background material.

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—: Preface to: Descartes. Discours de la méthode, ed. K. Fischer. Mainz, Universum-Verlag, 1948. ()

Jastreboff: see Yastreboff.


Jefferson, Geoffrey: “René Descartes on the localization of the soul.” Irish Journal of Medical Science, September 1949, no. 285, 691–706. Cheerfully digressive, informative account of early views on the location of the soul. Anatomists had long before D. accepted the pineal gland as gate-keeper regulating the flow of animal spirits; but “so much did Descartes improve on the
beliefs on his forerunners and contemporaries, that he eventually undid the pineal gland. His one mistake was to be too lucid and too exact” (703).

A mathematical monograph.

On a hitherto unknown Descartes comment by Leibniz.


Jöchner, G.: see Binder, F. et al.


Pascal’s Jansenism the hidden source of his conflict with Descartes.


2305 —: “L’intuition intellectuelle et le problème de la métaphysique selon Descartes.” Aph II, no. 2: 1934, i–iii. See 281.

Three pessimists against that optimism of technological progress and mastery of nature which the author labels “Cartesian.”
In the Cartesian system, “la plupart des oppositions de doctrines restent à l’état brut, sans principe supérieur de conciliation ou de synthèse” (p. 515): idealism and realism, absolute rationalism and radical empiricism, ambiguity in the Method and in the cogito – no wonder that the Cartesian system as such had but one adherent, namely Descartes himself.


See AT X, 257–65 on the curious history of the repeated “discoveries” and translations of this work. See also Prouhet, no. 3095.


Discusses Descartes’ “Begriffssprache.”


Despite all antecedents, the cogito is new: it envisages the passage from thought to being not as a deduction but as an instantaneous vision; this truth beyond history is still useful (BAn 1955, 3772.)


“Mésooccidental” refers to the countries of D.’s life and travel. Standard popular lecture.

2317b Les journées universitaires poitevines. Hommage à Descartes, 1950. See 553.


Sees in Malebranche, the supposed mystic, a pure rationalist. The true antirationalist mystic among the Cartesians is Poiré who recognizes the mystical element in D.’s doctrine of the creation of eternal verities.


Considers RV a first sketch of Le Monde; what is now known as Le Monde and Traité de l’homme is the intended substitute for the work abandoned in 1633. RV corresponds exactly to what is known of the 1629 project of Le Monde, except for its rounding out the facts into an artistic picture.


Shows how D. used the factual knowledge of his time to achieve a unified framework for mastering science, thereby setting “unveräusserliche Normen des menschlichen Geisteslebens.” Solid, faithful but too schematic in assigning a specific
preoccupation to each period of D.'s life (method-mathematics-epistemology-science).


Title misleading. Useful article examines D.'s physical theory of transsubstantiation, which the Jesuits opposed.

Surprise: Descartes was no psychoanalyst.

K


Useful doctrinal comparisons.


Kalisch, Donald: see Yost & Kalisch.

2329 Kahn, Lina: Metaphysics of the supernatural as illustrated by Descartes. New York, Columbia UP, 1918. vii, 66 p. (Archives of philosophy no. 9, January 1918.)
The conflict between science and theology induced Descartes to disguise his scientific ideas “in a theological garb”.

Kalish, Donald: see: R. M. Yost, Jr. and D. Kalish.

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Kapp, a “latter-day Cartesian” (Walker, ibid. 6: 1955-56, 285) turns the usual cartesian and anticartesian arguments upside down; still, “certain hard facts tell against the hypothesis that living organisms are 100% automatic.” See the comments by Miles and Szasz, no. 2739 and 3380.


On D.’s Regulae. [In Russian.]


Formal logical analysis confirms that “sum” does not refer to an undefined existential quantifier, that “ergo” is non-inferential, that the argument is neither a material implication nor a nominal definition but “un énoncé de la structure . . . du moi et du genre de réalité que constitue le moi” (260). D.’s method of argument consists in stating a doubt such that doubting the statement of doubt will confirm it. Some strange consequences concerning the existence of material objects and regarding freedom are suggested.


Cartesianism is neither realism nor idealism; it went too far towards representationa idealism (simple natures), not far enough towards absolute idealism.


The synthesis of realism and conceptionalism in Descartes' theory of knowledge is at the root of the increasing abstractness of physics.


Answering contemporary philosophical aspirations, Descartes instituted new methods which adequated reason to reality, and opened the road to a solid movement of scientific investigation. [BAn 1952, 6934.]


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Baillet's text is carefully examined from the viewpoint of testing the currently prevalent belief that Olympica proves that D. did not consider reason the sole authority. Kennington sees no rational theology in the Dreams but a pagan or Stoic quest for tranquility. The detailed study of the three dreams in their dramatic articulation (pagan ascent followed by descent from the peak) clarifies several issues of detail and reveals striking parallels between the Dream and the Pythagorean Idyllia of Ausonius, though author does not document his claim that D. had read the whole sequence of them.

Kemp Smith: see Smith, Norman Kemp.


On axiomatic systems.


Competent study of cogito, psycho-physical conditions of cognition, psychological determinations of consciousness in Descartes, utilizing his "Notae in programma quoddam." Diagrammatic comparison of Descartes' classification of "Bewusstseinsvorgänge" in Regulae, MM, PP, and Programma (85–90).

Keyser, Cassius Jackson: Portraits of famous philosophers who were also mathematicians. New York, Pictorial mathematics, 1939. Folio.

Portfolio containing a conventional posthumous engraving of Descartes at his working table, brief biographical comment.


—: "El tricentenario de D." Ultra (Havana, Cuba) July 1937, 42–43.

Kierkegaard, Søren: Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum. (About 1842–43.) Unfinished manuscript. See 304.

For a brief summary of the turn which Kierkegaard gave to Cartesian universal doubt see: Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard (Oxford UP, 1938), 268.

The commentaries of this enthusiastic amateur who founded the “Philosophische Bibliothek,” a jurist with vast but unscholarly philosophical reading, laid a broad foundation of popular interest in Germany. Arthur Buchenau’s meticulous translations now take the place of von Kirchmann’s unusable editions.


Kant’s transcendental idealism, in relation to the epistemological principles of Descartes and Fichte.


Voluminous but diffuse and of little value.


Descartes' view of the physical world. [In Japanese.] Descartes' cosmogony and genetics gave him an evolutionary though mechanistic outlook on the physical world which, when linked to his metaphysics, produced his chief difficulties, viz. regarding the theory of matter, the union problem, the Cartesian circle. Author asserts against Laporte and others that Descartes never doubted this evolutionary view. [Author's notice in Bph 7: 1960, 264.]


Descartes should not have downgraded the "tangible" qualities as secondary ones (importance of senses other than sight).


2373 —: "Descartes et le journal de Beeckman." Archives néerlandaises ser. 2, v. 3: 1906, suppl. p. VI–XX. 

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Entry in the “Stammbuch” of Christian Otter, b. 1598, who studied fortifications in Holland and was present at the siege of Breda. “Domino Ottero solertissimo et studiosissimo/cultori matheseos, memoria et benevolentia/ergo scripsit./Renatus Des Cartes/”. If this reading of Kowalewski’s is correct, this would be one instance of Descartes' spelling his name “Des Cartes.”


The historical picture of their relationship, created by Descartes himself, is false. Both are Platonists, mathematical apriorists, believers in innate ideas.

2382 —: “Descartes et le Discours de la méthode.” Revue des conférences françaises en Orient (Cairo) 2: 1938, 235–42.


2391 Kronenberg, M.: “Descartes und Faust.” Morgen (Berlin) 1908, no. 27. [Überweg]

2393 —: "Descartes-Bibliographie." Emge 203-04. 1937. [Unimportant].


2395 Kuçi, Ali: "Racionalizmi i Descartes-it." Perpjeka Shqiptare 2: 1937, 184-86. [In Albanian.]

Elementary, reliable first introduction to Descartes' thought, method and scientific work.


Descartes prepared the way for idealism, not positively but through weaknesses of his realism which this article explores.


2402 Kvačala, Jan: "Komenský a Des Cartes." Praha, Narodni Museum Časopis 68: 1894, 50-68.

Discusses Bordas-Demoulin's book of the same title.
Descartes is closer to a Marxist scientist than the modern defenders of "la science pour la science," if the accent falls on the Essais rather than on DM, as it should.


2407  —: "Le dualisme cartésien." *APC* 80: 1909, 35–92. Also in no. 177 (2406), v. 1, p. 5–73.

2408  —: "La théorie de la foi chez Descartes." *APC* 12: 1911, 382–403. Also in no. 177 (2406), v. 2, p. 213–37.


2410  —: "Le prétendu rationalisme de Descartes au point de vue religieux." *APC* 12: September 1911. Also in no. 177 (2406), v. 2, p. 254–63.


*Labrousse, Elisabeth*: see Goguel de Labrousse.


2415 Lacombe, Olivier: Descartes. (Turkish transl. by Mehmet Karasan.) Ankara, 1943. 124 p. (Dil ve tarih-coğrafya Fakültesi felsefe enstitütü, v. 6. Felsefe tarihi, ser. 1.)


2418 —: “Sodobni pomen Descartesa.” Misel in delo (Ljubljana) 3: 1937, 164–67. [In Slovene.]


Surprising “similarities” of doctrine suggested by the notorious method of parallel quotations, but the assembly of texts is useful independently of conclusions.
Review: Roland-Gosselin in RSPT 5: 1911, 778.

Lalande, A.: See 515 (Causeries . . . . 1938).

Lalo, Ch.: “La discipline cartésienne commande-t-elle une esthétique?”
NL, 24 July 1937.


Substantial lecture on Descartes and Leibniz.

Nice introduction, worth the honor of translation.


Considers Descartes the true father of materialism, as La Mettrie had asserted, though the idealistic side of his dualism must be taken seriously. See Book I, Pt. 2, Ch. 3.


2439 —: “La prose de Descartes.” Annales politiques et littéraires, June 1905. Also in his: L’art de la prose, 1909.

2440 —: “Origines et premières manifestations de l’esprit philosophique dans la littérature française de 1675 à 1748.” RCC 1907–09. See 457.


2443 —: “Il ritorno di Cartesio.” Afìl 4: 1934, 185–203. [Discussion of Olgiati’s Cartesio (see 14)].


Denies that Descartes’ position regarding doubt is legitimate. “Inevitabilmente si è recondotti all’idea di essere ed al principio di contraddizione,” the sole primary data in the order of knowing (p. 565).


In the system of Descartes the characteristic of idealism (resolution of the object in the subject) is lacking.
The deduction of God’s existence based on the concept of clear and distinct ideas is critically examined.


The concept, in Descartes, refers to the contrast between distinction in thought and real distinction, revealed in its purity not in the notion of cause but in that of substance.


Descartes’ Method is only outwardly mathematical. Its meaning is experience and freedom.


2461 Lasserre, Pierre: “Christianisme et cartésianisme.” MerF 1 November 1927, 513-35. The Cartesian aftermath: Malebranche, Fénelon, Bossuet. Stresses the capital importance of Bossuet’s insistence, against Descartes, upon the notion that essential verities may well appear in confused ideas (Augustinian reaction against Cartesian spirit.)


2469 —: "De Descartes à Fontenelle." Temps, 4 July 1932. Also in no. II (2467), 55–62.


2471 —: "Sagesse cartésienne." Temps, 29 November 1936. Also in no. II (2467), 45–53.


2473 —: "Le Congrès Descartes." Temps 77/27811: 31 October 1937. Also in no. II (2467), 239–50.


2478 Leander, Pehr Johan Herman: Om substanzbegreppet hos Cartesius, Spinoza och Leibnitz. Dissertation Lund, 1862. (BM)


Le Blond: see Blond.

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Descartes' purely spiritual conception of the soul helped destroy the notions of hell fire, visible demons, and inner body.


Descartes' purely spiritual conception of the soul helped destroy the notions of hell fire, visible demons, and inner body.

Lecointre, Léon: Analyse de Descartes appliquée aux lignes des deux premiers ordres. Bruxelles, 1865. 4to. [BN]


—: "De la morale provisoire à la générosité". Royaumont 237-55; discussion 256-72. 1937. See 295.


Maine de Biran's critique of the cogito jumps the gap between soul and body, is brought before the court of Judge Lefèvre, and dismissed after a fair trial.

"Le doute cartésien, épreuve des objets de pensée." RHPH 5: 1931, 1-23. [Boorsch]


Legendre, M. "Descartes et Cervantes." Les lettres, June 1924.


Le Lionnais: see Lionnais.


Lemos, Miguel (tr.): Descartes. Discourso sobre o método, tr. Miguel Lemos. Rio de Janeiro, Apostolado positivista do Brazil, .... Mars 1896 .... 86 p. See 146.


—: "La psychologie cartésienne." RIP 4: 1950, 160-89. See 381.

—: "La représentation du monde physique à l'époque classique." DSS no. 30: 1956, 5–24.
Stresses the importance to the development of the modern scientific world view of the new concept of the indefinite universe as represented in Descartes' vortex model, more influential perhaps than the Copernican revolution and the repercussions of Galilei's condemnation.


—: "La vocation et l'humanisme de Descartes." RMM 63: 1958, 349-357. [Review article of no. 2487-88.] See 179d.

On the dialectic development of Cartesian thought in Spinoza's doctrine of the relation between thought and object. A study not of the psychological and historical genesis of Spinoza's theses but of the Cartesian foundations he was able to give them afterwards. Reviews: RMM 1909, no. 3; MF Oct. 1909; Études religieuses 20: 1909, no. 9; PhdG 1: 1908-09, no. 950.

Discussion of Bordas-Demoulin and F. Bouillier.

Le Roy, Georges: see Roy.


—: "L'humain Descartes." Eur 15, no. 175: July 15, 1937, 289-96. Also in: Descartes (37, 527.)
2510 —: See 515 (Causeries, 1938).


On the disagreement between Descartes' earlier and later conception of methodology.


See 299, and Bontadini's careful analysis of Levi's critique of Descartes (Cartesio 100–104; also in no. 1277, 64–69).


Vives, De anima et vita.

2534a —: "La personne chez Descartes." Recherches et débats, suppl. philosophique no. 8, Jan.-Feb. 1950.


2535b —: "Augustinisme et cartésianisme à Port-Royal." In: Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais, 1950 [see 38], 131–182.


2538 —: "L'innéité cartésienne et sa critique par Lelarge de Lignac." RSch no. 61: 1951, 30–41.

In 1951, Lignac (Éléments de métaphysique tirés de l'expérience) develops a solution between innism and empiricism through appeal to the "sens intime." [BAn 1954, 4165.]


—: "Le principe de vie chez Platon et Descartes." In: La vie, la pensée. Actes du VII Congr. des SPLF. Grenoble. PUF, 1954. ()


Discipline of Freudenthal who complements and rectifies F.'s findings. See 1937.


—: "Du rôle de l'expérience dans la physique de Descartes." Annales de la faculté des lettres de Bordeaux no. 3, 1879. 19 p. [Schrecker] 

—: "La méthode et la mathématique universelle de Descartes." RPFE 10: 1880, 569-600.


Rudbeck, discoverer of the lymphatic vessels, published his De circulatione sanguinis in May 1652, showing his Cartesian indebtedness by rejecting spiritus naturalis and spiritus vitalis, but retaining spiritus animalis. His teacher Olaus Stenius seems to have been the first Cartesian in Upsala; Queen Christina's personal physician, Grégoire François Durietz, friend of Descartes and Chanut, was also Rudbeck's friend.


D.'s doubt is denial of authority, a bourgeois reaction: denial of God in MM, denial of feudal authority in DM. But the alienation stops short of breaking the bonds: the cogito reaffirms what has been doubted.


Notes in Coleridge's copy of D.'s Opera omnia (1685) indicate that he read D. in 1800–03 and again and more philosophically around 1815, which left traces in his discussion of relation between thoughts and things in his Biographia litteraria.


On Manuel Barbado's Études de psychologie expérimentale (BP 1947/1).


Finds the philosophical roots of Racine's drama in two concepts of D.: sovereignty of thought, and passions. See 414.


The noted German psychologist discusses "meaning" in terms of semantic theory, using Descartes' alleged confusion in spiriting "soul" into "self," and his "mythological" use of the term "causality," as examples.


Applies the psychological viewpoint to the epistemological problem, with interesting and original results.


A rather general discussion.


Husserl's radicalization of Cartesian doubt destroys rather than heightens its radical character; epoche is definitive and universal, Cartesian doubt provisional and only as an attempt universal. At the root of these differences is the identification of
thinking self and âme in D., their differentiation in Husserl; D. questions the certainty of knowledge while Husserl questions "avant tout son sens." See 174.


2567 Lopatin, Lev Mikhailovič: "Dekart kak osnovatel’ novago filosofskago i naučnago mirosozerčanija." VFP 1896, 608–49. D. as founder of the modern philosophical and scientific world view. [In Russian.]


Lopez, J. García: see García Lopez.


—: "Descartes e la teoria dei numeri." Bolletino di matematica 1923. [Schrecker]


—: "Un periodo di storia delle scienze: da Galileo a Newton." Scientia (Bologna) 1926. [Bontadini]

—: "Descartes géomètre." RMM 44: 1937, 199–220.
—: See also: Faggi, A., and G. Loria.


On conflicts and contradictions in the doctrine. See Bontadini, no. 1277.


On D.'s influence upon the early thought of Leibniz (K. Schr., 455ff.)


Youthful attempt at philosophical discussion written between 1840 and 1844 as an exercise in French, which the distinguished philosopher found worthy of rescue.


Descartes, no cosmological innovator, illustrates the affinity between the new cosmologies, particularly of G. Bruno, and the old religious temper (otherworldliness). Cartesianism deserves and received credit for the rapid spread of the theories of the plurality and infinity of worlds, though Descartes' own role was small.


Rejects the Cartesian “saltus in concludendo” from act to substance but accepts hyperbolic doubt as a method for constructing a non-dualist science, with postulates rooted in “the reality of the immediate.”


Brings D. close to modern materialism, both in his physics and his psychology; also in his naturalist and democratic doctrines (le bon sens), his attitude towards Scholasticism, his notions of the utility of science, and his method of negative dialectics. [Bsig 1938, 13968].


Lucas, Peter C.: “Descartes and the wax. Rejoinder” (to J. J. C. Smart, q.v.). PhQ 1: July 1951, 348–52. See 235C.


Inherent contradictions in D.’s substance concept. What is tenable in his doctrine was unconsciously borrowed from Scholasticism.


Joachim Jungius of Lübeck (1587–1657) annotated his copy of Descartes’ DM and PP and discussed his Descartes reading with correspondents.


“... difficile, abstrus et d’une obscurité qui tient à la nature du problème” (Renouvier’s review in CrPh 12: 1877, 134–39.)


On Descartes’ ideal of knowledge: Distinguishes the methodological and the utilitarian concept of science. Descartes’ connection between science and certainty led later thinkers into error, e.g. the 19th century intuitionists and J. S. Mill, who thought that absolute general laws could be found by induction. Obligatory reference to Friedrich Engels’ polemic against intuitionists. Progress of science viewed as the principal cause of the decline of Descartes’ scientific ideal.


Descartes (17-46). Le cartésianisme en Angleterre (47ff.)
Mc, Mac

On Thomas Compton Carleton (1591–1666), with reference to the teachings of Descartes.


Beeckman was first in deriving a rule of impact (algebraic sum of moments). Descartes uses Beeckman's rule but substitutes the arithmetic sum. The role of Huygens and Mersenne in the final establishment of the laws of impact is analyzed in detail. See D. J. Struick in Isis 51: 1960, 390.


2609 McRae, Robert: "Descartes: the project of a universal science." In his: The problem of the unity of the sciences, Bacon to Kant. University of Toronto Press, 1961, 46–68.
D.'s concepts of universal wisdom, unity of method according to Regulae and DM, the logical ordering of the sciences; mathesis universalis as related to physics, mathematics. Based on the texts. Good brief comments on "bona mens" and on hypothesis, induction and deduction in physics.


        "Two words on Descartes' moral philosophy." [In Albanian.]

        81 p.
        Traces the relations between Descartes and Denmark: Tycho Brahe, Danish
        students at Leiden; remarks on Schooten's portrait of Descartes. Documented.

2613  Mabire, P. H.: see Ombres de Descartes.

2614  Mac .......: see 2604-2610.

2615  Mach, Ernst: Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung historisch-kritisch
dargestellt. 6. verb. und verm. Aufl. Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1908. (Inter-
nationale wissenschaftliche Bibliothek, v. 59).
        Passing criticism of Descartes' mechanics. Fundamental epistemological opposition.

2616  Mager, Alois (O.S.B.): "Die anthropologische Bedeutung der Affekten-
lehre Descartes'." Cartesio 567-75. 1937.

2617  —: "Descartes and theology." Princeton Review 14 [?]. (So cited by
        Keeling, Rsyn 1937).
Discusses the influence of Suarez on Descartes. See also Mahieu's "L'ecclècisticisme suarezien”, Rthom 33:1925, 250.

Exposition and critique of their doctrines of mind and will, developing from it their doctrines of the origin of error (PhdG 2: 1910, no. 568).

"Descartes' error, according to the Roman faithful." [Morgan.]

Main, A.: see S. H. Hodgson et al.


Cartesian philosophy does not pose the problem of “destinée,” and this is why Pascal considers it “useless and uncertain,” not without a certain amount of incomprehension.


The indubitable character of the cogito rests on this presupposition: the truth of a proposition supposes that it is thought by me. This kind of idealistic presupposition does not convert all knowledge into "conscience de soi," and plays no further role in the system once the methodical doubt is overcome. (Bsig 10: 1956, no. 89.)


Richard Hönigswald’s neocritical “Denkpsychologie” evades the ambiguities of Descartes’ cogito.


See Book 2 (p. 43ff.) on Descartes, Malebranche, and the monism of causality; Spinoza and the monism of substance; the “Scholastic Cartesianism” of Leibniz and Wolff; and on Cartesian mathematicism.


What is reality? The fact that this problem had no meaning for D. distinguishes his Cartesianism from its modified modern version. Another stumbling block: D.’s “Adamism,” i.e. lack of sense of history.


2637a —: “A propos de la révolution cartésienne: Philosophie scolastique et philosophie mathématique.” RThom 1918, 159ff.

2638 —: “Le songe de Descartes.” RU Dec. 1, 1920, 593–607. Also in his: Le songe (see 183), Ch. 1.


2640 —: “Réponse à Jacques Chevalier” [regarding 2639 above]. Les lettres, 1 March, 1922. [Giraud I].


2642 —: “La pensée religieuse de Descartes.” RdePh Jan.-Feb. 1925. [Discussion of Gouhier’s book; see 168].


2647 —: See 525 (L’esprit cartésien, 1938).


Claims that the work of Renaissance thinkers (Cusanus, Bovillus, Zabarella, Marsilio Ficino, Galileo) made D.’s achievement in establishing mathematical intelligibility as the knowledge criterion “possible if not inevitable.” Leans heavily on Cassirer and Burtt, without making its point.


Descartes’ treatment of evidence from the viewpoint of aprioristic certitude is today impossible: ideas are merely working tools. Interesting application to the theory of light.


Mentioned with approval by H. Gouhier.


Maseres, Francis: “Ferrarius redivivus: or a Comparison Between the Methods invented by Lewis Ferrari for resolving certain biquadratic equations by the mediation of cubick equations, and the method afterwards given by Des Cartes . . . . for the same purpose. Intended to show the superiority of the former . . . .” In his: Tracts of the Resolution

Claims that Descartes' Geometry goes back to Ferrari (ca. 1543), perhaps via Bombelli (1579).


On divine nature and divine free-will in Descartes and St. Thomas, using Gilson (see 164) as a starting point.

2667 —: "L’uomo di San Tommaso e l’uomo di R. Cartesio." Cartesio, 577–
80. 1937.

"Autocoscienza" the deciding issue between Thomism and Averroism, as well as between Thomism and Cartesianism.


2669 Masson-Oursel, P.: "Commémoration de Descartes 1937: tricentenaire du

List of RMM and RPFE articles.

2670 Mateu, F. [i.e. Felipe Mateu y Llopis]: Descartes. Barcelona, Editorial
Seix Barral, 1945. 115 p. (Grandes filósofos).

Factual introduction (43 p.), and selected texts.

2671 Mathieu, Félix: "Pascal et l’expérience du Puy-de-Dôme." RPar 2 : 1906,
568–89, 772–94.

Accuses Pascal of lack of honesty in his priority claims for the achievements of
others, including Descartes. Article caused much controversy; see the Pascal chapter
in Cabeen, v. 3.

2671a Mathrani, G. N.: "A positivist analysis of Descartes’ ontological arguments

The arguments do not withstand critique by logical positivism. Whatever meaning
one may give to the truth criterium of the cogito for clear and distinct ideas, it is
inapplicable to the idea of God. Equally dubious is the representative theory of ideas
as copies which entails a petitio principii and a contradiction, illegitimately con­
sidering existence an attribute. [Bsig 1958, 8625).

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Enthusiastic exposition of Thomism by way of attacking later doctrines from Descartes to German Idealists. Unlike Cartesian science, Thomist science is never a priori, though often deduced from “incontestable principles” (p. 401). Early work of Neothomist revival, most interesting in its polemical treatment of “ontologism” (Malebranche, and 19th century “ontologists”).


2678 —: Para a história do cartesianismo entre os Jesuítas do século XVIII.” RPFil I: 1945, 27–44. See 430.


2682 Mazarelli [i.e. Claire Marie La Vieuville de Saint Chamond, marquis de Mazarelli]: Éloge de René Descartes, par l’auteur de Camédris. Paris, La veuve Duchesne, 1765. 82 p. See 126.

A small text of philosophy.

Critique of Olgiati (see 14) who sees in this controversy proof of Descartes’ “phenomenalism”: For Descartes, ideas have thought-immanent ontological reality, which is what Caterus, in the name of all Thomism, attacks as incomprehensible from the viewpoint of pure gnosiological reality. [BAn 1954, no. 126].

Descartes as scientist. [In Albanian.]
M . . . . : see 2604–2610.


Transfer to France of the supposed remains of Descartes, and the sequel.


2698 —: "Infinito e indefinito in Cartesio." RF 3: 1911, 420–27.

Finds it hard to separate the two concepts. Positivist approach, and a weak one [Bontidini I].


On Descartes' ethics and Spinoza's Ethics.


"On the Cartesian influence in general" [Robertson, no. 420.]


2706 **Mercier, Jeanne:** “Expérience humaine et philosophie cartésienne.”
In Descartes’ dualism, “toute l'expérience cartésienne se résume . . . , toute la philosophie s'y suspend, toute la sagesse y commence” (p. 591). But his “philosophie de la suffisance de l’âme” (p. 596) fails to integrate human experience as a whole.

Not “Descartes or Pascal” but “Descartes and Pascal.” [BAn 1947, 1490.]


“Who is Descartes?” Main article in this Albanian commemorative issue.

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Descartes tried to satisfy the “exigences techniques d'une exposition scolastique,” presenting his proofs “sous l'aspect le plus voisin du langage traditionnel,” his “mentalité scolastique” showing in the uniquely causal character of his dialectics, though the spirit is very different indeed.

2720  —: “Qu'est-ce qu'une ‘méditation’?” RCO no. 44: 1937, 663–74. Also: Hommages à Descartes, Poitiers, 1937 (see 531), 23–34.


How the question is posed in MM.


On the Cartesian Tree of Wisdom as a Baroque-type emblem, image, and symbol, and on its link with Descartes' concept of man. The discussion speakers consider Cartesian meditation and the 'exercitium spirituale' of St. Ignatius of Loyola.

Review article, discussing Gouhier’s Les premières pensées.


Meurthe: see Boulay de la Meurthe.


The philosophical and ethical value of Cartesianism. [In Albanian.]


Meyer, W.: see Meijer.


To Mersenne, Amsterdam, 20 novembre 1629.

Critique of R. O. Kapp: “Men can relate their perceptions to a body-scheme, but in the case of machines there is no body-scheme to which perceptions can be related.” See T. S. Szasz (no. 3380) for an attempted refutation.


For content of this posthumous collection of papers see 2742–54.


—: “Descartes et la loi des sinus.” RGPSA 1907. Also in his: Descartes savant, Ch. 5.


—: “Une crise mystique chez Descartes en 1619.” RMM 23: 1916, 607–21. Also in his; Descartes savant, Ch. 2.
—: “Le double aspect de l'oeuvre philosophique de Descartes.” Scientia (Bologna) 19: 1916, 348–67. Also in his: Descartes savant, Ch. 11.


—: “Descartes et Bacon.” Scientia 21: 1917, 185–98. Also in his: Descartes savant, Ch. 10.


—: “Note sur Descartes: La notion du travail.” RPFE 85: 1918, 497–508. Also in his: Descartes savant, Ch. 8.

—: “L'oeuvre de Descartes pendant l'hiver 1619–20. I. La méthode et la mathesis. II. Les premières travaux d'analyse et de géométrie.” Scientia (Bologna) 23: 1918, 1–8, 77–90. Also in his: Descartes savant, Ch. 3.

—: “Descartes expérimentateur.” RPFE 86: 1918, 221–40. Also in his: Descartes savant, Ch. 9.

—: “Note sur Descartes. Ce que rappelait à Descartes la date du 11 novembre 1620.” RMM 25: 1918, 163–75. Also in his: Descartes savant, Ch. 4.

—: “La question de la sincérité de Descartes.” RMM 26: 1919, 277–311. Also as Introduction to his: Descartes savant.

Milhaud, Gérard (editor): Adam & Milhaud, Correspondance de Descartes. 1936ff. See 79.


1. To Mersenne, Deventer, end November 1633. 2. To Mersenne, Leiden, 28 January 1641. 3. To C. Huygens, Endegeest, 13 October 1642.


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Holds the obscurities in the work not to be intentional but the result of a defense
mechanism. Comment on Florimond De Beaune’s Notes on the Géométrie of
Descartes.

2758a —: “Descartes est-il rationaliste?” Les cahiers rationalistes no. 169,
February 1958, 44–68.

2759 Millán Puelles, Antonio: “El segundo argumento cartesiano de la existencia
de Dios.” RevF 7: 1948, 49–90.

2759a Miller, Conrad: “Descartes’ Géométrie und die Begründung der höheren

2760 Miller, Dickinson S.: “Descartes’ Myth and Professor Ryle’s Fallacy.” JP 48:

Regarding universals, Descartes was neither realist nor nominalist but “con­ceptualist”; his view still prevails in spite of Whitehead, Russell, Santayana, Husserl,
Neoscholasticism.

65. See 314.

Concludes that Kant’s critique of the proof is unjustified.

2764 Millet, Joseph: Descartes, sa vie, ses travaux, ses découvertes avant 1637.
Paris, Didier, 1867. xxxii, 492 p.
First work to attempt an explanation of the puzzling early fragments first published
by Foucher de Careil, and to give a documented picture of Descartes’ formative
years. See the interesting anonymous critique (by Renouvier?) in: Grand Diction­
nair Universel Larousse, t. 6, 532–33: “L’ouvrage de M. Millet est l’un des signes de la
décomposition de l’école” (viz. the Scottish school and Cousin’s eclecticism) “en
France . . . Le cartésianisme est pour lui un positivisme vrai.”

2765 —: Descartes, son histoire depuis 1637, sa philosophie, son rôle dans le
mouvement général de l’esprit humain. Paris-Clermont, Dumoulin,
1870. 372 p.
Disappointing sequel to author’s “Descartes . . . avant 1637,” being a “historical
analysis and critique” of Descartes’ main work, no longer of any interest. Ac-
ccording to Varet (p. 393), Millet here defends the value of cartesian metaphysics in D.'s scientific work against the positivist interpretation; but see note to no. 2764.


Places D. in relation to Simon Stevin and François Viète whose algebraic symbolism remained confined to particular operations, while D.'s new symbolism expresses intellectual operations in general, transcending any special operations. But see J. Klein (no. 378) and P. Boutroux (no. 353).

2767 **Minich, Serafino Raffael:** Sopra un teorema della geometria dei solidi osservato dal Cartesio e sopra altri teoremi concernenti i poliedri. Venezia, Antonelli, 1866. 29 p.

2768 **Mino-Bezzi:** La vita considerata secondo il sistema cartesiano. Milano, Rubini, 1905; v. 1: xxviii, 192 p. [No more published].


2770a **Mitin, M.** : “Rene Dekart i ego Rassuždenie o metode.” Pod znamenem Marksizma, no. 8, 1937.

On the Discours de la méthode. [In Russian.]


On the relationship between Cartesian Method and mathesis universalis.

2772 **Miyake, Gōiti:** “Descartes ni okeru Entýo.” Tetugaku-Kenkyū (Kyoto) 23/1: 1938, 1–51.

Descartes’ concept of extension. [In Japanese.]


Descartes, Richelieu and Corneille are the political, pedagogical, and spiritual heroes who made France a solidly united great power. Appreciation of Descartes’ role from the viewpoint of cultural history and “Kulturpolitik.” A remarkably sympathetic appraisal in the journal of the National Socialist German Student Exchange Service.

**Moffey, F.** : see Agoglia, R.
Moigno, François Napoléon Marie: Note sur la détermination du nombre des racines réelles ou imaginaires d’une équation numérique, comprises entre des limites données. Théorèmes de Rolle, de Budanou, de Fourier, de Descartes, de Sturm et de Cauchy. Paris, 1840. 4to. [BM]


—: “Un correspondant belge de Descartes: le P. François Fournet, S.J.” Bruxelles, 1893. [Balz]


—: “Descartes et Bossuet.” AcBelg Bulletins 1896, no. 5. ()


Mondolfo, Rodolfo: Memoria e associazione nella scuola cartesiana (Cartesio, Malebranche, Spinoza), con appendice per la storia dell’inconscio. Firenze, Ricci, 1900. 35 p.


Monteiro de Barros Lins: see: Lins, Ivan.

Montero: see Mendoza de Montero.


Montoya, Celia Ortiz: see Ortiz de Montoya.


Ch. 1 discusses the doctrine of the “sens intérieur” in Descartes and his successors, with emphasis on those elements that became important in the Kantian treatment of the problem.


Moreau, Joseph: "Le cercle cartésien." RCO no. 44: 1937, 651–661. Also Hommages à Descartes, Poitiers, 1937 (see 531), 11–21.


A mélange, by a professor of education. On the application of Descartes’ four rules of method to education, especially language teaching. No plums in this pudding, but a few pedagogical raisins.


Part I and II attempt a new interpretation of Cartesian method in mathematics (application of the four rules of method): study the significance of each element in an equation; combine these elements, rising from simple to increasingly complex equations (T.V. Charpentier in his review, RPFE 5: 1878, 220–26). Note the contrast between Mouchot’s and Brunschvicg’s approach.


Rejoinder by A. G. A. Balz, ibid, 383–90. See 431.


On Descartes’ theory of sensation.


Some comment on the relationship of the English Neoplatonists to Descartes and Malebranche. Ch. Peirce and his relation to Descartes, Berkeley and Kant (318–31).


“Psychological antecedents” refers to Descartes’ formative years (DM, pt. I).


Interesting introduction (“La poésie de la raison,” 9-38) on D.'s rationalism (see Bouvier, no. 1288, p. 90-92); perceptive appraisal of D.'s attitude to religion as compared to Pascal’s: “Ce qu’un croyant ne peut pardonner à D., c’est d’être un homme heureux et tranquille, dans l’univers fermé de la raison” (24). Frontispiece: anonymous Kiev portrait of D. (first publication.)


Compares Descartes with Heidegger, Jaspers, Ludwig Klages.

Nardi, Bruno: Soggetto e oggetto del conoscere nella filosofia antica e medievale. 2a ed. riv. ed accr. di una appendice su Giovanni Rodington e il dubbio iperbolico di Cartesio. Roma, Ateneo, 1952. 92 p. (Centro Romano di studi.)

2825 Nardi, Pietro de: La teorica rossiniana della forma dell’umana intelligenza ne suoi rapporti colle teoriche di Kant, Cartesio etc. Voghera, Gatti 1891. 67 p.

2826 —: Fonti, cause e critica del sistema filosofico di Cartesio. Saggio. Forli, Mariani, 1896. 39 p.


On Descartes’ influence upon the development of administrative law, by a German Regierungsrat.


2832 Navarrete, S.: “Bajo el signo de Descartes.” La Universidad (San Salvador) 1938, no. 2, 7-38. [Brie 11891]

Searching for a fundamental metaphysical total experience, which he finds in the experience of “Ich bin,” author discusses the cogito and especially Kant’s comment on thinking and existing.

Navratil, Michel: Introduction critique à une découverte de la pensée. PUF, 1954. 112 p. BPC.

On the cogito ergo sum.


Catholic critique.


Interesting discussion of Descartes’ “morale provisoire” by a leading member of the Schlick-Kreis in Vienna.


Nieuwenhuis: see Domela Nieuwenhuis.


——: “La gnoseologia cartesiana nell’interpretazione di Arnauld.” Cartesio 259-84, 1937. Critical survey of the literature of the Malebranche-Arnauld controversy, and statement of the points at issue regarding the doctrine of ideas.


Discussion of Saisset's "Précurseurs et disciples de D.,” expanded into a valuable study of the attacks upon Descartes from 1650–1700 and of the Descartes revival in the 19th century (Emery, Maine de Biran, Cousin etc.).

2860  —: "Descartes." In his: Tableau des progrès de la pensée humaine depuis Thalès jusqu'à Hegel (1858). Paris, Didier, 1867; reprinted 1886, 347–86.

2861  —: "De l'idée du plein et de l'idée du vide chez Descartes et Pascal." AMP 116: 1881, 58ff. [Schrecker]

2861a —: La philosophie de Saint Augustin. Paris, Didier, 1865. 2nd ed. 1866, v. 2.

On Béroul's influence upon D.; Augustinian and Cartesian cogito. Unduly neglected, according to Koyré (no. 214).


On the Discours de la méthode.


Swedenborg attributed to D. his concept of spiritual influx, which he identified with occasional causality.


Oeijma van der Wal, Th.: De mens Descartes. Amsterdam, Querido, 1960.


Basing his perceptive analysis upon Alquié’s “metaphysics without ontology” in his La nostalgie de l’être, author finds the weakness of Alquié’s D. interpretation in his failure to understand historicity. See 149.


—: “La genesi e la natura del fenomenismo.” RFNS 34: 1942, 253–75. [See Bontadini, no. 1277, 219–34].

Les ombres de Descartes, Kant et Jouffroy à M. Cousin, par un professeur de philosophie [P. H. Mabire?]. Lyon, Pélagaud, 1844. 249 p. See 114.


—: “Descartes et les Provinces-Unis.” In: Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais (see 38), 109–12.

Two unpublished letters of Descartes to Mersenne (Amsterdam, 7 may 1641) and to Math. Passor, professor of philosophy at Groningen (26 mai 1645).


With Descartes, source of all errors and immanentist illusions created by Idealism, philosophy moves into its fourth, the modern stage. For Descartes the real world disappears, preparing the ground for Berkeley, the greatest immanentist of them all. A lively survey of the problems of Idealism vs. Realism, knowing vs. being in D., with rich references, especially Italian.

—: “Pascal y Voltaire contra Descartes.” Escritos 145-64. 1937.


Contains Ottaviano’s cogito critique.


Descartes’ effort to bring his physical and psychological theories within the scope of his postulates regarding thought and reality.

His reduction of physiology to physics, and anticipation of the biochemist attitude of many modern physiologists.

P

Two significant anniversaries: Giordano Bruno and Descartes.

Pabst, Heinrich: Der Mensch und seine Geschichte. Wien, 1830.


2894 Palau, Joaquin Xirau: see Xirau Palau.


Contains a brief comparison of Descartes' psychology of emotions with modern somatic theories, especially that of Revault d'Allonnes.

2896 Paliard, Jacques: "Le cogito cartésien et le cogito biranien." Cartesio 635-54. 1937.

2897 —: "Le cogito biranien et la notion d'existence personnelle." Eph: 1940, 6-10. Discussion: Marcel Blondel, 10-11.


Text dictated by a professor at Piacenza, 1797, partly defending and partly attacking Cartesianism. The discussion of the authorship leads to an interesting discussion of the Neothomist revival in the 1790's at Italian universities despite the suppression of the Jesuit order. Manuscript summarized with key quotations, p. 662-84. Complements the Appendix in Gilson's Études (see 165).

2899 Papakostas, Alkis: Ντεκάρτ. 'Ο Α'Ιώνας μαζί 5: May 1, 1950, 149-50. [Commemorative article].
Examine early theories of light and their role in the development of modern physical theory.


—: "Newton considéré comme disciple de Descartes." AMPS 99: 1873, 53ff. (?)


The dubito-cogito is the discovery of an "ego sum," a consciousness aware of its own insufficiency and that of the world. From the movement of purification of the doubt, the author tries to derive an evaluation of different types of awareness that become evident in the dubito, without a priori metaphysical presuppositions and without accepting D.'s dualism. [Bsig 1959, 6160.]


Parks de Gallagher, Mercedes: "En defensa del maestro Descartes." RPerú 9: 1941, 283–90.


—: See 515 (Causeries, 1938).


From the viewpoint of the philosophy of science, “la famosa revolución cartesiana es una frase, pero no una realidad” (p. 57); Descartes’ struggle against Scholasticism was a Quixotic battle with windmills, his pyramidal edifice has crumbled – but his “espiritu unificador, su ensueño faústico” is triumphant – in his anniversary year, at any rate.


2914a  —: “Presentazione degli ‘Studi cartesiani’ di Gallo Galli.” AcTorino v. 79, t. 2, 1943–44. See no. 209.


Logical interpretation of the cogito [Alquié.]


Review: Anon. in La filosofia delle scuole italiane. 1: 1870, 277–78: Descartes was neither sceptic nor atheist; book written with clarity and order.


2920  —: Du cartésianisme. Lecture faite à l’Académie delphínale, 19 janvier 1855. Grenoble, Impr. de Prudhomme, 1855. 4 p. [BN]

Paz: see Martínez Paz.


Review of an article in RIE (November 15,1894) on the proposed edition of Descartes’ works; draws attention to the lost item “C” of the Stockholm Inventory (Olympica, Parnassus, etc.)

Pelayo: see Menéndez y Pelayo.


All modern “fictionalism” comes from Condillac. Comparison of his organic theory of the self and D.’s cogito.


Concerns Maine de Biran more than Descartes [Bontadini.]

Pelseneer, Jean: “Gilbert, Bacon, Galilée, Kepler, Harvey et Descartes; leur relations.” Isis 17: 1932, 171–208. See 120.

Henri Poincaré’s theorem (if a phenomenon admits one complete mechanical explanation, it admits an infinity of others) anticipated by D. in PP IV, § 204 (God has an infinity of ways of producing a phenomenon; mind cannot determine which way He chose.)

On the foundation problem in modern physics, with survey of its development since Descartes.

[Pepys]: The diary of Samuel Pepys. [See entries of August 5 and 8, 1663; April 3 and 18, 1668, December 25, 1668.]
“So home and to dinner alone with my wife, who, poor wretch! sat undressed all day till ten at night, altering and lacing of a noble petticoat: while I by her, making the boy read to me the Life of Julius Caesar, and Des Cartes book of Musick – the latter of which I understand not, nor think that he did well that writ it, though a most learned man. Then after supper I made the boy play upon his lute – and so, my mind in mighty content, we to bed.” Christmas-day, December 25, 1668.

Contrasts Descartes the philosopher with Galilei the scientist.

Claims that the Abbé’s “Projet de paix perpétuelle” adopts Cartesian method, advocating unity of science and geometric method and rejecting syllogism as means of discovery. The project is deduced from a first principle, adopted from Hobbes rather than D. (“fear is reason”), with external union among men, an invention imposed by a sovereign. Descartes would have approved the method and rejected the principle. The reader may ask: What, on such terms, is not Cartesianism?


Persiani, Vincenzo: Considerazioni sopra le dottrine filosofiche di Cartesio. Napoli, Morano, 1879.


Protracted meditation, verging on litany, on Pascal the Christian vs. D. the Cartesian. “Descartes incapable de se fondre en Jésus” (357) receives honors but no credit. Mystical tone without the peculiar clarity of the genuine mystic.


Where Descartes concealed his bitterness beneath serene words, Pascal, 25 years later and in a wholly different political climate, lashes out in the Provinciales. Two different reactions to pressure.


A glance at Descartes’ work and personality. Commemorative address. [In Romanian.]


Appendix (p. 24–26) raises the question how long (in 1629) Descartes was occupied with metaphysical problems. Paul Tannery answered (ibid.).


Affirming the primacy of the knowing subject, Descartes is led to affirm the superiority of will over mind. (BAn 1954, no. 4170).

—: "Sur le Discours de la méthode." RFrance 14: 1934, 55–66.
Preface for an "édition de grand luxe que publie un groupe d'anciens élèves bibliophiles de l'École Centrale des Arts et Manufactures."

Attempts to found realism on the cogito. Neoscholastic attitude “very close to D.’s” (Gilson, no. 2041, p. 747.)

Rapid survey of Cartesianism, condensed from a 200 page study setting forth “des affirmations fort opposées à tout ce qu'on lit dans la plupart des Histoires des philosophies” (p. 10, n.3).


For titles of the 12 articles forming this series see Varet, 1: 383, note 1.


2961 Piñera Llera, Humberto: "Descartes, el sentido común y la filosofía." RcubF 1/6: 1950, 7-16.


Important background material, exceptionally rich in biographical and historical detail.


Dioptrique and Météores deductively utilize experience, i.e. move from causes to effects.


The Chanet de la Chambre controversy (1643–48) shows that Descartes' theory had its adherents and opponents even before the publication of the Discours de la méthode (Chanet wrote in 1636 but did not publish until 1643).


Descartes reaches the conclusions of St. Thomas by a different method. Modern philosophy, following him, develops metaphysical categories without reference to experience; but, more consequent than he, it rejects his traditional conclusions. [Ban 1934, 10035.]


—: “La complexité de la pensée de Descartes.” In: Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais (see 38), 1–20.

General appraisal; revised translation of 2988.

Pouilain, abbé: “La vérité du système cartésien mise à la portée de tout le monde.” Dieppe, 1882. [BN 8°. R. pièce 2321.]


Descartes has three theories: Mechanism, Interaction, Occasionalism; as his thought matures, he leans more and more towards Interaction.


—: “Rôle et limite de la psychologie dans la méthode et la philosophie de Descartes.” Royaumont, 413–37. 1957. See 323.


—: “Le cartésianisme à Saumur: Louis de la Forge.” Revue de l’Anjou, 1904. ()


Prudhomme, Sully: “Descartes” [a poem]. BSA Touraine II: 1er trim. 1897, 16–18.


D.'s failure to distinguish adequately between the principle of sufficient reason and principle of causality.


"... scholarly treatise ... an admirable demonstration of the way in which this complex doctrine is basic to the whole of Cartesian thought" [W. S. Weedon in PPR 1: 1940, 248].


—: "Descartes et l'idéalisme." RCO no. 44: 1937, 701–11.


Puig: see Font Puig, P.


Pujula, Jaime (S.J.): "¿Qué influjo ha ejercido el mecanicismo fisiológico de Descartes en el mecanicismo biológico moderno?" Cartesio 711–18. 1937.

Descartes' mechanistic approach had no influence upon the development of modern biological theory; even the newer biomechanistic theories arose independently.


Kant did not understand "la naturaleza del cogito," interpreting it as a mere empirical consciousness.


Merit of the Compendium musicae lies in its exclusively scientific and analytic character, yet it had an indirect influence on "les idées esthétiques ultérieures."


Tschirnhaus tries to translate Spinoza’s thought into terms accessible to Cartesian thinking; hence he expresses Spinoza’s rationalism in essentially realistic terms.

From the realism of Regulae to the idealism of MM with their view of “el juicio como acto voluntario”; the unresolved “dualidad de motivos” in D.’s theory of substance (conocimiento noumenico y fenoménico) is resolved by Spinoza; there is in Descartes an “afirmación resuelta y victoriosa de la persona,” while Spinoza “rompe los limites de la persona” as he dissolves it in God.

God’s role in cartesian philosophy: certitude of cognition.

Ramírez, José Artigas: see Artigas Ramírez.

La Flèche confronted Descartes with the tradition and style of medieval understanding embodied in the pedagogy of memory of the trivium-quadrivium. The “physiognomy” of this pedagogy reflects the technical limitations of the pre-printing era. Rising against this, Descartes gave posterity the notion of a pedagogy of reasoning, capable of supplanting the older tradition.


Raulica: see Ventura da Raulica.

Commemorative address.


Descartes, Scholasticism, and Catholic tradition.
Reichardt, Konstantin: "Ernst Cassirer’s contribution to literary criticism."
Analysis and critical discussion of Cassirer’s views of Descartes, Christina and Corneille (p. 672–76).


—: “La physique de Descartes.” CrPh 3/1 (v. 5): Feb. 5, 1874, 1–16; March 5, 1874, 65–76; March 19, 1874, 101–12. See 188.


Rough biographical sketch drawn from Haldane, Mahaffy, Fouillé etc.


All doubt needs justification. D.’s “generically warranted doubt” is justifiable only when no ad hoc information about the statement at issue is available. But sensory perception offers a guarantee of certainty; hence D.’s “contention that sensory perceptions are necessarily dubious lacks adequate logical warrant.”


Reulet, A. S.: see Sanchez Reulet, A.


Revue générale du Centre-Ouest de France. Descartes number 1937 (RCO no. 44, August 1937). Also, with separate pagination, as: Hommages a Descartes. Poitiers, 1937. See 531.


Transition from ancient to modern algebra well summarized under 10 headings.


Defense of the cogito as verification of a metaphysical hypothesis. See the related view of R. N. Beck.

—: "De la méthode dans la recherche métaphysique." Université de Lausanne. Recueil des travaux, June 1937, 9–43.

"L’idée serait de découvrir un fait qui . . . soit perçu immédiatement par la pensée" and recognized as indubitable, i.e. the Cartesian cogito. [BP 1937/2.]


—: "Le problème cartésien des vérités éternelles et la situation présente." Eph 8: 1953, 155–70.

_Reyna:_ see Wagner de Reyna.

_Reynier, C._: "La science des dames au temps de Molière." RDM 15 May 1929, 436–64.

"Diffusion des idées scientifiques de Descartes" [Giraud I].


On A. Boyce Gibson’s Descartes (see 210).


_Ricci, Clemente_: "Descartes y el problema religioso." Homenaje 2: 79–112. 1937.

Sweeping, loosely constructed exercise in the history of intellectual movements from the Renaissance to Descartes and somewhat beyond, rather than an analytical study of the title problem.
Richard, R. Weibel: see Weibel Richard.


3068 Richer, Paul: [Notice on the skull claimed to be that of Descartes.] Aesculape (Paris), 1913. See 1707.


3070 Rimaud, Jean: Thomisme et méthode. Que devrait être un Discours de la méthode pour avoir le droit de se dire Thomiste? Beauchesne, 1925. 276, xxxv p. (Bibl. des Archives de philosophie).

See especially Pt. IV: De la pensée philosophique – méthode cartésienne et méthode thomiste.


Against misunderstandings of Descartes as "parrain des philosophies sans problèmes, parrain du plus naïf et du plus paresseux empirisme" (p. 746); calls for a just appreciation without exaggerations.

Ríos, F. Gonzáles: see Gonzáles Ríos.


Galluppi, a Calabrese philosopher (Lezioni di logica e metafisica, 2nd e., 1841), criticized Cartesian doctrine for neglecting the role of experience. Orientation: French Idéologues.


Comparing Ritter's judgment of Descartes with Hegel's, Paul Janet remarks: "Il est difficile de porter sur un grand homme un jugement plus acerbe et plus superficiel" (no. 142, p. 31.)


Based on author's own Descartes research, with good bibliography. See also p. 161-85 on Cartesianism and its influence. Vol. 2, Ch. 24, p. 420-33, surveys the state of science which Descartes encountered, and notes what he retained.


Careful explanation of what Cartesian reason and reasonableness is, against the distortions of Schoolmen, pedants, faux-semblants, social reformers with their inhuman theories, et hoc genus omne.

Rivaud: "Quelques remarques sur la notion d'essence dans les doctrines de Descartes et de Spinoza." Septimana Spinozana (Hagae Com.) 1933, 208-25.


Cartesian method not an orthodoxy but a discipline of the mind, independent of the dogmatic assertions to which Descartes linked it. This theme is developed through a vigorous exploration of DM and PP.


The connection between distinct ideas is different in the orders of extension and of thought. There are two juxtaposed mechanisms, "celui des machines corporelles, dominé par les lois cinétiques, et celui de l'esprit, dominé par les liaisons internes des notions."


Robert-Pimienta: "La résurrection de Descartes." Temps no. 27748, 1937, p. 3.


Sketch of the period "which awaited Descartes." [Balz]

Robin: "Le système de Descartes." APC February 1912.

Robin, Léon: See 525 (L'esprit cartésien, 1937).


Review of Gouhier's Premières Pensées. no. 96.

Review article.

Campanella, St. Thomas and Aristotle as possible precursors, with references to the literature.

Tracks modern idealism in its immaterialist form back from Kant through the English idealists to 17th century France, claiming its French (i.e. Cartesian) origin.

Study of Descartes' formative period, Cogitationes privatae, Dream. Doubts, despite DM, that Descartes discovered his method as early as 1619–20 in the poële.

Rocha: see Munhoz da Rocha.


On the Gueroult-Gouhier controversy concerning the ontological proof. See Louis Cognet’s review in DSS no. 32: 1956, 568–70.


Review of P. Arnold and A. Georges-Berthier (see 102 and 104), with useful details.


Review article, discussing Alquié: Descartes, l’homme et l’œuvre.

Review of de Sacy, no. 146a and 3173a; Rodis-Lewis, no. 215c; Royaumont, no. 42; Lefèvre, no. 179b.


The fundamental problem of epistemology in Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher.

Rodis-Lewis: see Lewis, Geneviève.


“Wie jedes Beziehungssystem mit Objektanspruch stößt auch der Cartesianismus auf jene Grenze der Deduzierbarkeit, die durch das unaufhebbare Wissen von der Wirklichkeit gezogen ist.” See 270a and 179c–d.


The problem of intellectual intentionality in Descartes from the Dioptrics (visual
impressions and the ideas they generate) to MM (no difference between actual and imagined sensation) to the consequences in the Cartesian school and to Condillac. Cartesian perception and matter.


If substance is gradually reduced to an invisible, inoperative, immovable bond foreign to reality, the end result are the a priori forms of Kant. Solipsism cannot be avoided. [Ban 1948, 6169.] See Blondel, Une énigme historique: le vinculum substantiale (no. 1335).


—: "La révolution cartésienne." RSPT 4: 1910, 678–93.

Cartesian and Aristotelian intellectualism. The individualistic realism of the "idée claire." The nominalism of the "idée générale." The autonomy of thought.

Roland-Manuel: "Descartes et le problème de l'expression musicale." In: Royaumont, 438–42. 1957. See 421.


Romefort, Thomas de: "Descartes et l'aliénation de l'homme." Témoignages 1951, no. 29, 140–46. [Rêp. 3: 2467.]


Descartes' influence (through MM) is most evident in Husserl's "Ideen," though Husserl's purpose is epistemological, Descartes' metaphysical. Distinguishing effective from methodological doubt, Romero suggests a simple link between effective doubt and "époché." The differences chiefly regard the function of reason. Review: W. S. Weedon in PPR 1: 1940, 249–50.


—: "El Congreso Descartes." Sur (Buenos Aires) 7: 1938, 66–73.


—: Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition.” In: A critical bibliography of French literature, v. 3 (see no. 3a), 1961, 486–90. See 465.


Review of N. K. Smith, no. 192b and 193.


Both the Scholastic and the Cartesian concepts of truth (vérité-copie, vérité-code) are superseded by the modern “vérité cohérente (réussite),” in Lalande’s language.


149  —: “Descartes au Panthéon.” RPLL, 14 January 1928.


Lively, thoughtful introduction for the general reader. Too much stress on DM, less than justice towards Galilei and Pascal, but sustaining a high level of insight and interest.

151  —: See 515 (Causeries, 1938).


“Devant le mystère humain, il faut invoquer l’expérience biranienne et non la métaphysique cartésienne....”


[ROYAUMONT]: Husserl. 1959. See 2254b.


Ably chosen quotations attempt to prove that Cartesian key concepts are taken from the early stoics: “bête-machine” and “malin génie” (from Chrysippos); inneism; clear and distinct ideas — “mais il manque l’examen historique prouvant l’influence réelle des textes stoiciens sur D.” [Lubnicki’s review; see 15, p. 104.]


The problem of D.’s methodology and epistemology. [In Russian.]
3159 Rudi, Zwi: “Chenath Descartes.” Moznayim (Tel Aviv) 6: 1937, 548–52. [In Hebrew].

The Descartes year: notes on Descartes’ influence on Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. [BP 1938/2.]


A note on the history of the animal spirits concept.


“Consistency might have made him merely the founder of a new Scholasticism, whereas inconsistency made him the source of two important but divergent schools of philosophy, namely empiricism and rationalism.” A shrewd, tongue-in-cheek appraisal. See C. Ferro in RFNS 42: 1950, 198–99.


Descartes’ “system, psychologically, was as follows: No God, no geometry; but geometry is delicious; therefore God exists.” (p. 48).


3168 Rychlicki, St.: “Das Folium von Descartes.” Programm des Seminars in Wagrowitz, 1884. [Bar]

Saboia de Medeiros, Roberto (S.J.): "El hombre Descartes." E 57: 1937, 373-440. Interesting biographical sketch with broad emphasis on Descartes' formative period.


—: "Des Regulae aux Cogitationes en remontant." MerF 329, no. II24, 1957, 734-48. 10-year phases in Descartes' thought: 1618-1628-1637-1649; parallels between Regulae and Cogitationes (Olympica), and some fresh light on DM.


—: "Bacon et Descartes (5 décembre 1834)." In his: Variétés littéraires, morales et historiques. 2nd ed. Paris, Didier, 1859, v. 1, 414-24. "Le point de départ de Descartes comme son but ce n'est pas la doute, c'est la foi au spiritualisme" (p. 418). Pure Victor Cousin.
Saint-Germain: see Bertrand de Saint-Germain.

A refutation ad hominem of Descartes' opinion concerning the cogito as a first principle. Discussion of the value of universal doubt which Descartes justly thought capable of use for this purpose. [Bsig 10: 1956, no. 89.]

3178  Saint-René Taillandier, Henri: “La philosophie spiritualiste depuis Descartes.”

See also Sainte-Beuve's Port-Royal on the relations between Jansenism, Cartesianism Jesuits (good introduction for readers not too familiar with philosophical terminology – H. Gouhier in RIP 1938, p. 169).


Aims to give “un nouvel éclat et une force nouvelle aux grandes vérités du spiritualisme” (p. xxv). See 3178.


“Chauvinistic belittling of Descartes behind the cover of an anniversary”: a view from behind the Iron Curtain.

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Survey of proposed solutions.


Santayana, George: Scepticism and animal faith; introduction to a system of philosophy. New York, Scribner’s, 1923. xii, 314 p. See 191.


Santos, Délio Nobre: Descartes e a speciosa generalis. Dissertation. Lisboa 1940. ( )
Report on the Congrès Descartes. [In Bulgarian.]


Useful references to Greek, Patristic, Scholastic texts in which author seeks the roots of the concepts under discussion.


On Descartes’ notion of imagination (7ff.) and that of Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume.

“Le cogito comme conscience réfléctive; Le Je et la conscience dans le cogito” etc. Cf. the Introduction to Sartre’s L'être et le néant (Paris, Gallimard, 1943).


Cf. P. Dibon (see 6, 289–97) on Reneri.


Saumagne, Ch.: "Notes sur l’Imam Abou al-Ghazali et le doute méthodique de Descartes." Con July-August 1921, 541–49. See 344.


Sawada, Nobushige: [Descartes and existence; a consideration of the history and nature of existential thought. In Japanese]. Philosophy (Tokyo) 1951, no. 27. English summary 4–6. (To be continued.)


By a disciple of H. Lotze, influenced by Ritter.


3216 *Schedin, Gustaf Theodor*: Är occasionalismen en konsequent utveckling af Cartesianismen? Dissertation Upsala, 1864. [Is occasionalism a logical consequence of Cartesianism?]


Scherchen, conductor and musicologist, finds some of Descartes' observations on acoustics and esthetics “so surprisingly novel that Hugo Riemann's enthusiastic support of the work .... seems almost restrained” (p. 16).

3218a *Schier, Donald S.*: Louis Bertrand Castel, Anti-Newtonian Scientist. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1941.
Père Castel, scientific correspondent of Montesquieu, was the author of Le vrai système de physique de M. Isaac Newton exposé et analysé en parallèle avec celui de Descartes (1743).

Descartes' Dream as “l’indice d’une profonde angoisse morale” which often forced him to sacrifice his luminous intelligence. Critique of M. Leroy (no. 124).


Hobbes transferred the Cartesian notion of man to the state, making it a mechanism whose soul is the person of the sovereign. This, though, is not a true concept of the state of totalitarianism because a mechanism is incapable of totality, scil. the “organic” totality of the latter-day Leviathan’s Tausendjähriges Reich. By a brilliant, controversial German political theoretician.


In Descartes, the struggle between science and philosophy took place within one person, with the result that neither physics nor the philosophy of nature benefitted. Jaspers’ evaluation of his historical influence appears to be the most satisfactory one.


Schöpf, K. D.: Cartesius als wiskundige. Groningen, 1869. (Stedelijk Gymnasium Groningen, Progr.)


—: “Descartes’ Bedeutung für die Umgestaltung des abendländischen Geistes.” In: H. Scholz et al., Descartes (see 3228), 3–37. See 229.


—: “La République, fille de Descartes.” In: La République Française v.1, no. 2, New York, 1944. [Schrecker]


The Cartesian revolution assessed as a philosophical revolution during a period in which a revolutionary political ideal was beginning to take shape. On the inspiration which Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Voltaire drew from Descartes and Leibniz in developing the new political ideas.


Descartes’ physiology sympathetically appraised in the light of turn-of-the-century physiological thought.


The philosophia perennis acknowledges the liberating deed of Cartesianism, recognizes its tragic character, but sees hope: “Die Wege des Menschen sind heimnisvoll.” And so they are.

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Descartes' doctrine has two roots; idealism developed one of them (“connaissance imaginative,”) while the other (“connaissance non-imaginative”) still awaits the development of a realist psychology of knowledge. Cf. author's book: Die Umwäl- zung der Wahrnehmungshypothesen durch die mechanistische Methode. Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1895.


The cogito seen as a “Denkbewegung”, a development of thought, rather than as a simple position. The German idealists determine the possibilities of Being, latent in the “Denksetzung” of the cogito, not only as substance but as “Aktivität, Potenz, Negation, schöpferische Verwirklichung.”


Survey of Catholic evaluations: Was Descartes the first idealist or the last realist? Consequences of the cogito; Cartesian method and Thomism.


Sédail, Charles: see Chaigne et Sédail.


3255 —: "La sagesse cartésienne et la sagesse antique." CD 1: 46–51. 1937. Also in Eph 1: 1940, 11–12.


3259 Seligkowitz, B.: "Causa sui, causa prima et causa essendi." AGP 5: 1892, 322–36. [Varet]


Comparison of their starting points [BAn 1947, 1486.]

3260a Sentroul: "Doute 'méthodique' et doute 'fictif'." RSTP 1909, 433ff.


Thomistic exposition of the structure of theology. Comparison with the Cartesian
position leads to the conclusion that the two are incompatible. "Todo ensayo de conciliación es estéril si no se sacrifica un punto esencial a ellas." Descartes tried to make theology as a science impossible, but in vain: "Qui scrutator est Majestatis, opprimetur a gloria" (328).

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3262 **Sergescu, Pierre:** "Un soldat oublié de la mécanique cartésienne au début du XVIIIe siècle: Antoine Parent (1666–1726)." Sphinx (Bruxelles) 8: 1938, 196–97.


3264 **Sérgio, António:** Cartesianoismo ideal e real. Lisboa, Seara nova, 1937. 45 p. (Cuadernos de Seara nova; estudios filosóficos.)

3265 **Serrurier, Cornelia:** "Saint-François de Sales, Descartes, Corneille." Neo 3: 1918, 89–99. See 423.

3266 —: Descartes. Leer en leven. s'Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1930. xii, 295 p. See 125 and 3267.


3268 —: "Descartes' levenskunst (briefwisseling met Prinses Elisabeth)." De Gids 1929/2, 77–101.

"Rapporte la morale de Descartes à son tempérament, et en analyse les éléments chrétiens et stoiciens." [Pos-Steenbergen, Rsyn 1937, 113.]


3271 —: "Descartes, l'homme et le croyant." In: Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais (see 38), 45–70. 1951.

3272 **Serrus, Charles:** La méthode de Descartes et son application à la métaphysique. Alcan, 1933. 125 p. (BPC). Thèse Paris. See 231.


Though Cartesianism secularized philosophy, “Descartes est un philosophe chrétien de tradition, de volonté et pour une large part de doctrine” (p. 68).


“Willensdeterminierung und Urteil; das falsche und das wahre Urteil.”

3277 Sganzini, Carlo: “Le fonti del principio gnoseologico vichiano e il significato della opposizione di Vico al cartesianismo.” Sophia 1937. [Barié, see 129.]

See also author’s “Vico gegen Descartes” in: Der kleine Bund (Literarische Beilage des Bund, Bern), October 1937.

Shestov (Shestoff): see Chestov.


Letting Descartes speak for himself most of the way, author deftly leads up to the point that “le thomisme est bien l’air que respire le cartésianisme naissant” and that the Cartesian return to the “inspiration de Platon” must be judged relatively to Aristotelianism (p. 299): in the end, the revolutionary method of Descartes is “orientée vers l’application, dans tous les sens du mot. L’intelligence, pour lui,
ressemble, plus qu’au discours, à l’habitude elle-même,” and the elliptic treatment of the title topic culminates in the equally elliptic but transparent statement that: “La vérité ressemble plus à la coutume qu’à l’instabilité” (p. 304).


Descartes and Voltaire.


Cartesian “deduction” designates both mathematical and experimental (inductive) reasoning.
Review of Descartes' formative period (to 1628), with discussion of the historical value of the autobiographical part of DM.

Descartes' methodological idealism (nosce ad esse valet consequentia) is neither a metaphysical nor a critical idealism.

Contributes nothing new on Descartes' dreams.

Only by equivocation can pantheism be derived from Descartes' concept of the external world. His theory of creation "se rapproche singulièrement de la thèse de S. Thomas" in his De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes.

A study of the controversy over Descartes' proofs in the Objections and Responses to MM.

Descartes' role in the development of mathematics. [In Polish.]


3305 Smart, Harold Robert: The philosophic presuppositions of mathematical logic. New York, Longmans Green, 1925.
On the Cartesian roots of modern logic.


Stresses the inductive part in Descartes’ Method which is too often misinterpreted as Euclidean deductiveness.

3310 —: “Newton’s objections to Descartes’ astronomy.” Monist 34: 1924, 543–57.

3311 Soddy, Frederick: Cartesian economics. The bearing of physical science upon state stewardship. London, Henderson’s, 1922, 22 p.
Neither Cartesian nor economics.

Commemorative article. [In Slovene.]


Official Stalinist view: D., falsified by Blondel, Gilson, Laporte, Sarte, was materialist and anticlerical.

Reviewed by M. Soriano in Pensée 1952, no. 40, 113–14 (“admirable study.”)


3318 Sommer, Robert: Locke’s Verhältnis zu Descartes. Preisschrift der Berliner Universität. Berlin, Mayer und Müller, 1887, 63 p. [BM]


Richly documented work. A third volume on Descartes was planned but not published (references to v. 3, 1929 are erroneous).


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S(ouday), P.: “Descartes et Constantin Huygens.” Temps, 7 December 1925.


Commemorative lecture stresses Descartes’ conflict with Scholastics, notes his alleged errors and triumphs.


Cartesianism is one of the “Fehl- und Mischsysteme des Idealismus” (226–30): “Nicht mit dem Zweifel soll der Mensch beginnen, sondern mit dem Glauben.”


See p. 203–11, 256–65 et passim on Descartes (important, according to Ottaviani).


Descartes’ influence on the social sciences. [In Croatian.]


Descartes failed to extend hyperbolic doubt to ethics; not until Husserl was this step taken. Spiegelberg tries to carry the Cartesian principle into the field of ethics.


A linguistic note on the word "poêle," and a welcome one.

3337 Spoerri, Theodor: "La puissance métaphorique de Descartes." Royaumont 273–87; discussion, 288–301. See 403.

Nikolai Hartmann objected to the notion of res simplices because it leads to an aprioristic-deductive ontology. Author points out that Descartes dealt with things not "prout revera existent" but "in ordine ad cognitionem nostram": his doctrine may yet prove useful.


Descartes' méthode is not deductive but presuppositional.

Note the date of this memorial lecture: the tercentenary of Descartes' Dream.

Descartes method was not based on experience, which explains the difficulties of Cartesian medicine. Our knowledge has since widened, but the unity of man is lost. What remains of Descartes' work is the idea of quantitative research [BAn 1954, 12997.]

---: "Feijöo and Malebranche." HR 1941, 287-96. See 449.


Vol. 1: Dissertation, exhibiting the metaphysical, ethical and political philosophy, since the revival of letters in Europe, p. 112-141. See also vol. 2, p. 90ff., 473ff. on Thomas Reid and Descartes, and the Index (v. 10 s.v. Descartes) for summaries of the arguments.


Stewart, William McC: "Descartes and poetry." RR 29: 1938, 212-42. See 425.


Obscurities left by Descartes and his interpreters regarding the cogito, distinct and clear ideas, veracity of God, in their systematic relationship. See 3362.


Author rejects his earlier view (see 3360) that Descartes did commit a circle. Careful analysis of the problem yields a valid reply to the charge of circularity, which author believes to represent Descartes' own view, however ambiguously he expressed himself. Important contribution.


Only the mechanistic part of Descartes' psychology of error was influential, until modern psychology developed its anthropological part.

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A psychiatrist’s comment on Descartes’ difficulties in finding a reality criterion to decide between sleeping and waking: “The choice is not between two predicates, real-unreal or true-false”; “the one who awakens is not a ‘mind’ making judgments, not a ‘consciousness’ attending to an outside world but a human being experiencing the world in its corporeality” (15–16). See also author’s: Vom Sinn der Sinne. Berlin-Göttingen-Heidelberg, Springer, 1956, ch. 2.

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3384 *Taborda, Saul A.:* "Descartes y el ideal pedagógico francés." Escritos 301-27. 1937. See 265.

3385 *Tannery, Paul and Ch. Adam (ed.):* Œuvres de Descartes. 1897–1913. See 74.


Attempts to determine the rank of Galilei and Descartes as physicists: neither of them was an experimental physicist in the modern sense; Galilei a mathematician leaning towards applied physics, Descartes a system-builder without the desire (though not without the ability) to make exact experiments. Thesis corroborated by brief, precise survey of the concrete physical problems which Descartes tackled.

3389 —: "Un mot sur Descartes." AGP 16: 1903, 301–06.

Rejoinder to Pfeffer (ibid., 1–26) concerning Descartes’ work during the critical years 1629–30.


Answers J. Chazottes (ibid., 171–75): Descartes did indeed err regarding the law of free fall, while Beeckman was right. See 1519.


3391 *Tannery, Mme Paul (publisher):* Correspondance du P. Marin Mersenne. 1932ff. See 82.


Rejecting the “ghost-in-the-machine” model (see Ryle), Taylor attempts to retain Descartes’ epistemological dualism while abandoning Cartesian psycho-physical dualism.


The Descartes chapter also treats followers and adversaries. Cf. Hagmann (see 10), 77–78.

Notes the relaxation in Descartes’ formulation of the beastmachine theory around
1646-49 (letters to Newcastle and Henry More), admitting that animals have consciousness. Cf. Lubnicki (see 15), p. 105.

Report on the commemorative session of the Soviet Academy of Science, history of philosophy section. [In Russian.]


3407 Thamin, Raymond: “Les idées morales au XVIIe siècle.” RCC 1896. ()


3414 —: “Le cartésianisme aux Pays-Bas.” In: Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais (see 38), 183–260. 1950.


Reviewed by L. in NAK 40: 1954, 256.


Protestant analysis. Finds the seeds of Spinozian monism and Leibnizian pluralism in Descartes.


Careful study of Gassendi’s Objections regarding cogito and proofs of God. Gassen­di finds Descartes’ weak spots; instead of using the controversy to advance his own views, he forces Descartes to be more precise in his statements. Gassendi’s Objections therefore do not always reflect his own viewpoint.


Despite Pascal’s anticartesianism, Thomas sees a certain compatibility between Pascal’s analytical spirit and Descartes’ rationalism.

3424 *Thomist Congress 1936*: See 41.


Uses four early 17th century courses (2 unpublished) to illustrate, with concrete examples, pre-Cartesian scientific instruction in France.


Thorndyke’s collection of superstitious notions in Bacon’s works is intriguing, amusing, and rich, but although he introduces D. with Gilson’s comment that Cartesian philosophy was largely a clear explanation of facts which do not exist, his search for such facts yields almost nothing (p. 453–54). Gilson had a different kind of fact in mind.


Valuable compte-rendu of the many scattered studies on the subject.


3433 —: Cartesio. Milano, Athena, 1926. 89 p. (I maestri del pensiero.)

“Lyrical but evocative” [Bontadini I]

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3436 Toffanin, G.: “Cartesio e il classicismo aristotelico.” In his: La fine del umanesimo. Torino, 1920, 247ff. [Cited by Robertson; see 420, p. 7].


3441a Travaux du IXe Congrès Intern. de Philosophie (Congrès Descartes). See 36.


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Trognitz, B.: Die mathematische Methode in Descartes' philosophischem Systeme. Saalfeld, Wiedemann, 1887. 16 p. [Col.]

Troisième centenaire de Descartes. Tours, 1897. See 504.


Tuduri de Coya: see García Tuduri de Coya.


Still useful for its treatment of John Smith, Ralph Cudworth and Henry More.

Turbiano: see Castro Turbiano.


—: Le antitesi tra il medio evo e l'età moderna nella storia della filosofia, in ispecie nella dottrina morale di Malebranche. Roma, 1877.

“Mediocristissimo lavoro italiano” (Del Noce) shows Descartes, Malebranche and Spinoza captives of “Scholastic aprioristic ontology.” See Turbiglio's Preface for his other relevant works.

Turienzo, Alvarez: see Alvarez Turienzo.

Descartes in Prague (p. 140–42).


U

D.’s importance in the history of the physical sciences. [In Russian.]

(Reprinted from: Bull. du bibliophile, 1911).
On a manuscript draft of Huet’s Nouvelles mémoires (see 2249) and Huet’s corrections.

Sustancia (Tucumán) 4: 1934, no. 14. [Brie 1667.]


Critique of Descartes’ methodical doubt as “positive,” hence as precluding any a priori road to certainty. His proofs of God are inconclusive.

3462 —: “René Descartes, oce moderne filozofije.” Čas (Ljubljana) 30/10: 1937, 357–65.
Descartes as father of modern philosophy. [In Slovene.]

Urbane popular essay on Descartes, a true believer because he was able to separate (rather than reconcile) faith and science.


Descartes’ cogito leads to an empirical self, Husserl’s to a transcendental one; Husserl is preoccupied with staying within the cogito, Descartes with finding realities beyond it. Husserl’s “Formale und transzendentale Logik” and “Logische Untersuchungen” provide the main texts.


The most widely used English translation, first published in 1850 (DM) and 1853, with a lengthy introductory study by Veitch, chiefly of Descartes' metaphysics and epistemology, from an idealistic point of view.

Velasquez Jimenez, Juan: El Discurso del metodo y la obra cientifica de Descartes. Lima (Peru), 1937. 42 p. Reprinted from: Boletin de minas, industrias y construcciones. [Col.]


Ventura da Raulica, Gioacchino: Essai sur l'origine des idees et sur le fondement de la certitude, suivi de nouvelles observations sur le cartésianisme à l'occasion d'un nouvel écrit de M. le vicomte de Bonald. Paris, Vaton, 1853. 262 p.

À propos Bonald's “La défense des principes philosophiques de M. de Bonald: de la philosophie nouvelle et ses erreurs.” Sharp Catholic critique of Descartes and Bonald.

Ventura, J.: De methodo philosophandi. Romae, 1828. ()

Vergara: see Zahar Vergara.

Verme, Maria Eugenia dal: “Intorno all'influenza esercita da Cartesio su Hume a proposito del problema dell'anima umana e della sua unione col corpo.” Cartesio 239-47. 1937.

Finds Hume using Cartesian concepts, though the dualism problem is more complex than Descartes, Locke and Hume thought: St. Thomas had already furnished what it takes to set aside the positions of Descartes and Hume.

3484 Verneau: [On the authenticity of the skull of Descartes.] Aesculape (Paris), 1912. ()


3486 —: "La sincérité critique chez Descartes." Aph 13, no. 2: 1937, 15–100. See 346.


The elements of the concept of problem are already in the Regulae: the unknown, the indication of the unknown, the data, etc.


A bit of philosophical fooling, with clever comment on the malin génie as "a declaration of the will to power which enables us to get beyond the domain of rationality" (198).


Compte-rendu of Huet's Nouvelles mémoires .... (1692), and not a study of Descartes' "influence upon the Laplanders," as one bibliographer has it. See 2249 and 110.


Loose biographical sketch of Descartes' early years, barely touching the subject.


The first “new meditation” (220–30) deals with the structure of the self, the second with the antinomies of freedom (230–42). A reconsideration of the classical concept of reason in the light of Kant, Hegel, phenomenology, and existential analysis.


Undocumented summary of a promised but apparently still unpublished extensive study. On the subject cf. Thijsen-Schoute (see 467), 613–22, with ample source references.

3501 —: “Bij het eeuwfeest van Descartes.” Streven (Brugge) 4: 1937, 369–75.


Cf. the sharp critique by C. L. Thijsen-Schoute in her: Nederlands Cartesianisme, no. 467, § 60, 156–62 (“How Prof. Dr. H. J. de Vleeschauwer in 1942 modified his Geulincx interpretation to please the Nazis.”)


Vvedenski, Aleksandr Ivanovich: Dekart i okkasionalism. Berlin, Grshtchebina, 1922. 80 p. [In Russian.]


The Regius side of the controversy, with documents.

—: “Un entretien avec Descartes en 1634 ou 1635 (John Dury).” AIHS 6: 1953, 14–16.


—: “La certeza en Descartes.” In: Miscelânea de estudos a Joaquim de Carvalho, t.l. Figueira da Foz (Portugal), Biblioteca-Museu Joaquim de Carvalho, 1959. ()


On the concept of idea in Descartes.


Distinguishes several meanings in Descartes’ use of “esse,” e.g.: epistemological, essential, referring to origin; the “unknown rule”: Descartes uses “esse” for “l’être mathématique,” “existere” for the self, God, things.

—: “Au sujet des jugements de Husserl sur Descartes et sur Locke.”


Discusses four charges of Husserl against D.’s treatment of doubt and cogito (the doubt is not universal, D. should have bracketed the world out instead of denying it, he confuses cogito and cogitatum, he conceives the idea as an image.) Husserl’s critique of Locke’s alleged naturalism or objectivism turns out to be a continuation and sharpening of his D. criticism; Husserl found in English empiricism the means for formulating his D. critique.


Former Oxford don, former junior member of British Labor government, repudiates the “Cartesian view” of man and society. Cartesianism-Calvinism bred capitalism, Cartesian science-worship bred Marxism. Walker’s “hankering after a conservative philosophy to buttress his socialist faith in planning . . . does much to enliven his polemics against thinkers of the ‘Cartesian’ school” (Arnold’s review).

Critique of the "Cartesian" (dualistic) definition of psychosomatic disorder as somatic symptoms with psychic causes. Attempts to develop an operational definition satisfying both dualists and "functional materialists." For the ensuing controversy see Szasz, W. P. D. Wightman, and Walker's rejoinder (BJPS 7: 1956-57, 235-36).


3532 Wallach, E.: "Descartes und Harvey." Archiv für die Geschichte der Medizin 20: 1928, 301-06.


3534 Wallon, Henri: "Descartes et nous." In: Cercle Descartes (see 516), 34-40. 1937.

3535 —: "La psychologie de Descartes." Pensée ns no. 32: 1950, 11-20.
Descartes' psychology is "évidemment progressiviste," modern, ambiguous because it is ahead of his time-bound metaphysics. Friendly appraisal by way of carefully picked quotations.


Fecundity and weakness of Cartesian thinking stem from the search for simple natures which often proves fruitless.


After a desultory paragraph on the structure of MM, author treats D.’s greatest work as rationalization of a childhood event, loss of the mother at age two. Impertinent, misleading title.


Maintains against Dąmbska, no. 247a, that the two methodologies she distinguishes are only two different manners of exposition, one popular, the other detailed and scholarly. Purely logical hypotheses appear already in Regulae, which Dąmbska denies.


Husserl’s relation to Descartes. [In Hebrew.]


3556 —: Adventures of ideas. 1933. See 182.


Ch. 6 and 7 (p. 43ff.) on Descartes and Fermat: neither of them recognized the true power of analytical geometry or went beyond the scope of Greek thought. Euler (1748) took the next step: everything needed is in the equation itself, and no recourse beyond it is needed.


—: "Die Anfänge der analytischen Raumgeometrie." ZmnU 47: 1916, 73–79.


—: Spinozas Cogitata metaphysica und ihr Verhältnis zu Descartes und zur Scholastik. Breslau 1902. [So quoted by Lachièze-Rey, no. 2413, p. 288. Not located.]


Arguing against Nigel Walker (see 3530) and Ryle, Wightman makes the important observation that Descartes did not conceive mind as a "ghost in the machine" or a "pilot in the cockpit," as the texts show. He was neither an "official" nor a "Cartesian" dualist. See 3379, 3530, and Walker's rejoinder (BJPS 7: 1956–57, 235–36).


Detailed account of the Dreams, quoting much of Baillet’s text in translation. Notably restrained psychoanalytical evaluation: the dreams reveal Descartes’ fear of impotence, desire for “life,” his use of philosophy as a retreat from poetry and life, and as an escape from fundamental inner conflict.


Temperamental paper urging the “non-Eulerian” vs. the non-Euclidean viewpoint in modern geometry.


Gives Galilei priority in discovering the law of inertia, but defends D. against the charge of plagiarism.


In both thinkers, human freedom is linked to the negativity of human consciousness: in Descartes at the expense of man devalued before God, in Sartre to man’s sole profit. Is it not possible, despite Sartre, to find a place for the freedom of man in the face of the existence of a “hidden God”? [Bsig 10: 1936, 7728.]


"The double guarantee of Descartes' ideas." Rmet 3: 1950, 471–89.
Study of the Cartesian circle: The clear and distinct idea is true only as long as that perception is actually present to the mind. Restatement of the thesis that God's veracity guarantees the memory of the cogito.

Critical discussion of the literature (following Olgiati's scheme), especially of Hamelin, Mercier, Lantrüa, Gouhier. [BAn 1951, 1905.]

Self in D. "a philosophical superfluidity" (473): unity and self-identity of mind remain unexplained. Sees a parallel between D.'s doctrine that mind is more easily known than body, and Kant's substance as a category of understanding.

Subjective and objective aspects of Descartes' epistemology in the Regulae.

Descartes claims no borrowings, but took his property where he could find it, without acknowledging his debt. The "destructive" part of his philosophy is already found in Montaigne.

Wootton, F.: "The physical work of Descartes." Science progress 21, no. 83: Jan. 1927. ()


Wundt, Max: "Cogito ergo sum." ZdtK 10: 1944, 81-100.


—: "Der Traum des Descartes." K 46: 1954-55, 367. [Answer to Quiring, see 107.]


X – Z


Xirau, Ramón: "Lo que no se lee en Descartes." RcubF 1: 1950, 17–22.

Yanosvskaja: see Janovskaia.

Yastreboff-Ragozine, Nadine: "Descartes moraliste." In her: Conception et analyse de l'homme en France au XVIIe siècle; idées morales et répercussions littéraires. Praha, Russki svobodnyi universitet, Brochures v. 25. 1936, 65 p. (Bull. de l'Association russe pour les recherches scientifiques à Prague, v. 4 (IX), Section des sciences philosophiques . . . . no. 25; Descartes: p. 240–48.)


Author attempts "to play the same language-game that Malcolm does," to prove that Malcolm's criteria for distinguishing sleeping consciousness and dreaming do not hold as stated and do not refute Descartes' scepticism of the senses. See 306.


St. Augustine a sceptic who humbly recognizes his ontological deficiency, while Descartes' doubt arises from pride (the self as central part of reality.) [BA 1954.]

Żeleński, T.: see Boy.

Zgórski, Alfred: "Goethe i Descartes." Świt (Lwów) 1872, no. 1-5. [Bar]


Reprints Huygens' poem "In Cartesium."


Major Polish work. Descartes' philosophy as a forerunner of modern intuitionism, while its critical spirit makes Cartesian "imagination" an indubitable prototype of Kantian "transcendental imagination." [Lubnicki's review: see 15, 107-08.]


On Descartes' controversies, particularly the Responses to the Objections.


Specifies "toute une série d'assertions" of Descartes which, apart from the principle of Regula VIII, will become "les idées directrices des grands systèmes idéalistes," viz., unity of knowledge, interdependence of concepts and their necessary and progressive development "à travers leurs contradictions," the insufficiency of finite knowledge.

---: "Teoria poznania kartezjańska a idealistyczna." Prz 41/1: 1938, 3-8.

The Cartesian and the idealistic theory of knowledge. [Same as 3604.]

Zoppi, G. B.: "La Fontaine e Descartes." RRFC 1920-22, 345-60, 472-82. (?)


Allotria

[Conférence Descartes]. CrPh 12: 1877–78, p. 351.

Announcement of the organization in 1876 of a group ("Conférence Descartes") devoted to the free discussion of philosophy and related scientific questions.

Richter, Mischa: Cartoon in: The New Yorker, November 1, 1958, p. 38.

One mathematician to the other, looking at the tape delivered by a giant electronic computer: "I'll be damned. It says, 'Cogito ergo sum'"


Reproduced below, by permission of The New Yorker.


A 10-inch long-playing phonograph record, containing readings from Descartes and his contemporaries: "Le démolisseur, le constructeur, le sage."

Drawing by Steinberg
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PART THREE

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Selected headings from the Analytical Index, conveniently grouped. The most comprehensive headings are italicized.

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Descartes' role in Western philosophy
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[see also: COGITATIONES, DESCARTES, RELIGION]

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[see also: FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS]

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b., d. (after names): born, died.
AM refers to the “Table des noms propres” in Adam-Milhaud’s edition of the correspondence of Descartes (no. 79) where the user will find a complete summary of factual information on the person referred to.
Cabeen refers to: A Critical Bibliography of French Literature, vols. 3 & 4 (see no. 3a).
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# ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>()</td>
<td>incomplete information</td>
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<tr>
<td>app.</td>
<td>appendix</td>
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<tr>
<td>ms</td>
<td>manuscript</td>
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<tr>
<td>ns</td>
<td>new series, nouvelle série, neue Reihe</td>
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<td>sb</td>
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<td>ser</td>
<td>series, série, Serie, Reihe</td>
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## WORKS OF DESCARTES

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<td>DM</td>
<td>Discours de la méthode</td>
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<td>MM</td>
<td>Méditations métaphysiques</td>
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<tr>
<td>O &amp; R</td>
<td>Objectiones cum responsionibus authoris</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Principia philosophiae</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regulae</td>
<td>Regulae ad directionem ingenii</td>
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<tr>
<td>RV</td>
<td>Recherche de la vérité</td>
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<td>TP</td>
<td>Traité des passions de l’âme</td>
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## GENERAL

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<td>Académie Royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, Bulletin de la classe des lettres</td>
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<td>AcBerl</td>
<td>Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, Historisch-philosophische Klasse</td>
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<td>Académie des beaux-lettres et arts de Clermont-Ferrand, Mémoires</td>
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<td>Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations [see: AHES]</td>
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<td>G. Bontadini, “Annotazioni ad alcune scritti italiani su Cartesio.” Cartesio 83-104 [no. 1279]</td>
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<td>G. A. de Brie, Bibliographia philosophica 1934-1945, v. 1. (Utrecht-Bruxelles, 1930)</td>
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<td>Broteria, Revista de ciências naturaes do Collégio de S. Fiel.</td>
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<td>BSA Ouest</td>
<td>Bulletin de la société des antiquaires de l’Ouest</td>
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<td>Cartesio nel terzo centenario del Discorso del metodo. Milano 1937 [no. 35]</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Congrès Descartes. Travaux du IXe Congrès International de Philosophie, Paris 1917 [no. 16]</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>Cahiers du Sud</td>
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<td>Chronique des lettres françaises</td>
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<td>Col</td>
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<td>Dcom</td>
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<td>Eth[ics]</td>
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<td>GCFI</td>
<td>Giornale critico della filosofia italiana</td>
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<td>J. Giraud, Manuel de bibliographie littéraire, v. 1, 2 [no. 8, 9]</td>
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<td>Gmet</td>
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<td>Hochland</td>
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<td>Homenaje</td>
<td>Descartes; homenaje en el tercer centenario, Buenos Aires, 3 vols. [no. 46]</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>The Hispanic Review</td>
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<td>Humanitas</td>
<td>Humanitas (Brescia)</td>
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<td>ILPP</td>
<td>International Library of Philosophy and Psychology</td>
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<td>Isis</td>
<td>Isis, revue consacrée à l’histoire de la science. Isis, international review</td>
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<td>Janus</td>
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<td>Jdeb</td>
<td>Journal des débats (Paris)</td>
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<td>JHI</td>
<td>Journal for the History of Ideas</td>
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JP Journal of Philosophy
JPNP Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique
JRel Journal of Religion
JSPG Jahrbuch der schweizerischen philosophischen Gesellschaft
JSPh Journal of Speculative Philosophy
K Kantstudien
KCTS Katholiek Cultureel Tijdschrift Streven [later: Streven]
KF Kwartalnik filosoficzny (Kraków)
Lanson G. Lanson, Manuel bibliographique de la littérature française moderne, 1910 (no. 2441)
LBGP Literarische Berichte aus dem Gebiete der Philosophie
LC Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
LilleM Mémoires et travaux, Facultés catholiques de Lille
LogosN Logo, rivista internazionale di filosofia (Napoli)
LogosT Logos, internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur (Tübingen)
LTP Laval théologique et philosophique (Québec)
MAS Mémoires, Académie des sciences (Paris)
MerF Mercure de France
Merkur Merkur, deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken
Meth[odos] Methodos; rivista trimestrale di metodologia
MF Mercure de France
Mind Mind, a quarterly review of psychology and philosophy
MLF Modern Language Forum (Los Angeles)
MLJ The Modern Language Journal
MLN Modern Language Notes
MLQ Modern Language Quarterly
MLR Modern Language Review
MM Descartes. Méditations métaphysiques
ModSch The Modern Schoolman (St. Louis University)
Morgan D. N. Morgan, Cartesiana, 1955 [no. 13]
MPF Les maîtres de la pensée française
MSA Mémoires de la société archéologique de . . .
MSAS Mémoires de la société des arts et des sciences de . . .
MScR, MSR Mélanges de science religieuse (Lille)
Mus Museum (Leiden)
NAK Nederlandisch archief voor kerkgeschiedenis
Nature La nature, revue des sciences (Paris)
NAW Nieuw archief voor wiskunde (Amsterdam)
Neo Neophilologus
NL Nouvelles littéraires (Paris)
NN New York Public Library
NRF Nouvelle revue française
NRJ Nouvelle revue des jeunes
NRT Nouvelle revue théologique (Tournai)
Nsch The New Scholasticism (Baltimore)
O Opinion (Paris)
O & R Descartes. Objectiones cum responsionibus authoris
OrleansM Mémoires de la société d’agriculture, sciences, belles-lettres et arts d’Orléans
Osiris Osiris; studies in the history and philosophy of science
OUP Oxford University Press
PA, PhAb Philosophical Abstracts (New York)
PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
RevR  The Review of Religion
RevSR  Revue des sciences religieuses (Strasbourg)
RF  Rivista di filosofia (Modena)
RFChile  Revista de filosofia (Santiago de Chile)
RFNS  Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica
RFrance  Revue de France
Rgén  Revue générale (Bruxelles)
RGenève  Revue de Genève
RGS[PA]  Revue générale des sciences [pures et appliqués]
RH  Revue historique
Rheb  Revue hebdomadaire
RHE  Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique (Louvain)
RHEF  Revue d'histoire de l'Église de France
RHES  Revue d'histoire économique et sociale
RHist  Revue historique
RHL[F]  Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France
RHPh  Revue d'histoire de la philosophie et d'histoire générale de la civilisation
       [now: RScH]
RHPRA  Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses (Strasbourg)
RHR  Revue de l'histoire des religions
RHSAS, RHSCh  Revue d'histoire des sciences et de leurs applications
Riec  Ricerche filosofiche
RIE  Revue internationale de l'enseignement
RIF  Rivista italiana di filosofia
RIFD  Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto
RIHS  Revue internationale d'histoire des sciences
Rint, RInt  Revue internationale
RIP  Revue internationale de philosophie
RLC  Revue de littérature comparée
Rmet  Review of Metaphysics
RMM  Revue de métaphysique et de morale
RN  La revue nouvelle (Tournai)
RNS  Revue néoscolastique de philosophie
RomF  Romanische Forschungen
Royaumont  Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie no. II: Descartes [no. 42].
RPar  Revue de Paris
RPeru  Revista de la Universidad Católica de Perú
RPF, RPFil  Revista portuguesa de filosofia
RPFE  Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger
RPGA  Revista de psicología general y aplicada (Madrid)
RPhL  Revue philosophique de Louvain [formerly: RNS]
RPLL  Renaissance politique, littéraire, artistique
RQH  Revue des questions historiques
RQS  Revue des questions scientifiques
RR  Romantic Review
RRFC  Rivista Rosminiana di filosofia e di cultura
RScH, RSH  Revue des sciences humaines [formerly: RHPh]
RSA  Revue des sciences et de leurs applications
RSG, RSGA  Revue des sciences générales et appliquées
RScR, RSR  Recherches de science religieuse
RSci[i]  Rivista di storia della filosofia [italiana]
RSPPA  Revue Suisse de psychologie pure et appliquée
RSPT  Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques
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